Nakli Singh vs State of Punjab and Others

Tejinder Singh Dhindsa, J.—The petitioner, who was working as Chowkidar in the Government Senior Secondary School, Lalru, SAS Nagar, has filed the instant writ petition impugning the order dated 29.7.2010 passed by the District Education Officer (Secondary Education) SAS Nagar, District Mohali whereby his services have been terminated. Further challenge is to the order, dated 13.7.2012, whereby the statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed by the Appellate Authority. A brief factual backdrop would be necessary. The petitioner joined the respondent-Department on the post of Chowkidar in the year 1987. While he was working as Chowkidar at Government Senior Secondary School, Lalru (Boys), a theft of ''educet'' articles took place from the School on the intervening night of 7.1.2009 and 8.1.2009. The petitioner was issued a charge-sheet dated 11.2.2009 and the articles of charge drawn up against the petitioner were as follows:

That theft of Educet articles from the school took place in the intervening night of 07.01.2009 and 08.01.2009 due to his negligence.

He did not inform the Principal of the School regard the theft took place in the school.

He allowed some unauthorized persons to enter into the school in the night of 07.01.2009.

He misbehaves with the Headmaster and some staff members of the school.

Bottles of liquor in large quantity has been recovered from his room situated in the school premises.

The petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet and the same having been found to be unsatisfactory, the Deputy District Education Officer (SE), SAS Nagar was appointed as the Enquiry Officer vide order dated 29.4.2009 for conducting a regular enquiry. The Enquiry Officer furnished enquiry report dated 2.6.2009 holding the petitioner to be guilty of all the charges leveled against him. A copy of the enquiry report was furnished to the petitioner and time was granted to him to file objections as regards findings returned by the Enquiry Officer. The petitioner submitted his objections on 7.7.2009 in which he denied all the charges and took a stand that it was the Head of the School who should be primarily held responsible for the theft. Thereafter, the Punishing Authority having afforded an opportunity of personal hearing passed the impugned order dated 29.7.2010 terminating the services of the petitioner. The petitioner preferred statutory appeal and the same was dismissed vide order, dated 9.7.2012, at Annexure P15.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the impugned order, dated 29.7.2010, whereby his services have been terminated, has been passed in the colourable exercise of power. Learned counsel would submit that the petitioner has been made a scapegoat by the School Authorities only on account of saving their own skin as valuable articles had been stolen from School. Further submission is that the negligence on the part of the Principal of the School for not providing adequate security for the protection of such ''educet'' equipment is being passed on to the petitioner. Learned counsel would further argue that even the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer would stand vitiated inasmuch as there was no independent and clinching evidence adduced against the petitioner so as to hold him guilty of the charges leveled against him. It has been submitted that the Enquiry Officer has placed heavy reliance upon the statement of one Ballu Singh, Sarpanch who, in turn, was inimical towards the petitioner on account of political rivalry in the Panchayat Elections. Learned counsel has further argued that the school staff and specifically the lady teachers have deposed against the petitioner during the course of enquiry proceedings only to toe the line of action of the Principal as they had been provided due latitude for coming late to the School and had even been enjoying furlough. Lastly, learned counsel would submit that the petitioner had almost 23 years of unblemished service and as such, the punishment of termination of service is grossly disproportionate to the charges leveled against him.

Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and having perused the pleadings on record, this Court is of the considered view that no basis for interference in the impugned orders is made out.

There is no dispute as regards the fact that due procedure as envisaged under the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1970 was adopted by the respondent-authorities. Apart from having held a preliminary enquiry, a regular departmental enquiry was initiated against the petitioner. Specific articles of charge were framed. The petitioner was afforded due opportunity of hearing at every stage. A copy of the enquiry report was also furnished to the petitioner so as to object to the findings of the Enquiry Officer. A show cause notice was also issued by the Punishing Authority who had taken a decision to agree with the findings contained in the enquiry report. Even the Appellate Authority prior to passing the impugned order dated 13.7.2012 has afforded an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner.

It is by now well settled that the scope of judicial scrutiny in matters of departmental proceedings culminating in the passing of orders imposing a penalty would be limited to the decision making process and not to the decision itself. This Court in exercise of its extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not sit as a Court of appeal so as to re-appraise and re-appreciate evidence. This Court would not interfere with the findings of the Enquiry Officer as also with the decision of the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority unless it is shown that the orders are patently arbitrary or utterly perverse. In the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are without any material/evidence. As many as 12 staff members have deposed against the petitioner. Even though an attempt has been made by the petitioner to attribute motive against the female teaching staff but such issue cannot be gone into in the light of the vague and sketchy pleadings on record and without even the concerned teaching official having been arrayed as a party respondent.

The scope of judicial scrutiny in such matters as observed hereinabove would be extremely limited and the observations of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in State Bank of India and Others Vs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde, would be relevant and read as follows:

The High Court, on re-appreciation of evidence, reversed the finding of the Inquiry Officer and set aside the orders of the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority.

Before we proceed further, we may observe at this stage that it is unfortunate that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority despite the consistent view taken by this Court that the High Court and the Tribunal while exercising the judicial review do not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication on merit by re-appreciating the evidence as an Appellate Authority. (See Govt. of A.P. and Others Vs. Mohd. Narsullah Khan, at page SCC 379).

Even the submission raised by the learned counsel seeking a lenient view insofar as the quantum of punishment is concerned, is without merit. The charges leveled against the petitioner, which had been duly proved, are in the nature of insubordination, negligence and gross dereliction of duty. In such situation, the Court would not proceed to substitute its own opinion as regards the punishment to be imposed in relation to a view taken by the Punishing and the Appellate Authority. For the reasons recorded above, there is no merit in the petition and the same is dismissed.