Nagarajan vs Guru Nanak College

Ramanujam, J.—The petitioner was admitted in the B.Com., Degree course in the respondent College, in June, 1974. The said course, is of

three years, duration commencing from June, 1974. At the end of the first year course the petitioner has to appear for the University examination.

As the petitioner did have the requisite attendance and as the University did not condone the lack of attendance, he was not allowed to write the

examination held in April, 1975 for the first year course. Later, the principal of the College by letter dated 6th May, 1975 informed the petitioner

as follows:

.........As you have not earned your attendance progress and conduct certificate during 1974-75 and as the University had not granted the

necessary condonation to appear for the examination, you have not been promoted to the second year. I am therefore sending you enclosed, your

Transfer Certificate, and conduct certificate which will enable you to apply afresh for admission to a sellable first degree Class at the

commencement of the next academic year at any College, if you so desire.

The petitioner, who was under the impression that be would be allowed to continue again in the first year B.Com., degree course, was surprised at

the said letter and approached the principal to permit him to continue in the first year course. Since his attempt failed, he approached this Court for

the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the said communication dated 6th May, 1975 on the ground that the said communication amounts to an

order expelling him from the College, and that the said communication is arbitrary, unjust and opposed to the principles of natural justice. In the

writ petition the petitioner has also raised various other allegations. He has said that he was not short of attendance, that he has attended the

college for the requisite number of days, and that the action of the respondent is discriminatory in that several students who were similarly absent

have been permitted to write the examination. But as all these facts are denied by the respondent in his counter, those allegations cannot be gone

into in this writ petition. The only question now arises for consideration is whether the respondent can send the petitioner out of the College by

issuing the transfer and conduct certificates without continuing him in the first year B. Com degree course as one having been detained in the first

year.

The petitioner''s case is that his not appearing for the University examination will result only in his detention in the first year degree course but,

that will not enable the respondent to expel him from the College as it were, by issuing the transfer and conduct certificates and asking him to apply

afresh for a suitable first degree class at any college. The respondent''s case, however, is that once a candidate is not promoted to the second year

he must go out of the college unless be applied afresh and gets admission to the first year degree course in the same College.

Both the parties place reliance on Regulation 10 of Chap. 39 of the University Regulations in support of their respective contentions. The said

Regulation is as follows:

In the Pre-University or the B.A. degree course, a student who has failed to earn the progress certificate at the end of the first year''s course shall

be required to rejoin in the first year class for another lull year.

A student who has not been selected for the March--April University Examination but who at the close of the academic year is certified by the

Principal to have made such satisfactory progress that be may be admitted to the Examination, may appear for a subsequent examination without

further attendance at a college, provided that be has earned the necessary attendance certificate.

A student who has failed to earn the progress certificate for the second academic year must attend college, to receive such additional instruction as

the Principal may, in his discretion, prescribe so as to enable him to earn the required progress certificate.

The said regulation provides that if a student fails to earn the progress certificate at the end of the first year''s course, he shall be required to rejoin

the first year class for another full year, and that if a student fails to earn the progress certificate in the second year, he must attend the college to

receive such additional instruction as the Principal may in his discretion, prescribe so as to enable him to earn the required progress certificate. The

petitioner in this case was a student in the first year degree course and he has failed to earn the required attendance as also the progress certificate

contemplated by the said regulation and, therefore, he is required ""to rejoin the first year class for another full year.

While the petitioner relies on the said regulation to say that though he was not allowed to sit for the examination for want of the required

attendance and progress certificate he should be allowed to continue to study in the first year class for another full year, the respondent relies on

the same regulation in support of its contention that a student like the petitioner who has failed to earn the required attendance and the progress

report in the first year class should join the first year class by applying afresh for admission in the same college or in any other college"".

On a due consideration of the matter, I am not inclined to agree with the contention of the respondent in this regard. The above regulation deals

with various types of cases. Firstly it deals with a case where a student fails to earn the progress report in the first academic year and says that such

a student has to rejoin the first year class for another full year. Secondly it deals with a student who has failed to earn the progress report for the

second academic year and says that he must attend the college to receive such additional instruction as the Principal may, in his discretion,

prescribe so as to enable him to earn the required progress certificate, and not for the full year. Thirdly, it deals with a case of a student who has

earned the necessary attendance and progress certificate for the third academic year but who has not been selected for the University examination

and says that he can be admitted in the subsequent examinations without further attendance at the college. Impliedly it means that a student who

had not obtained the required attendance and progress certificate in the third academic year should attend the college for such period as the

Principal may, in his discretion prescribe as in the case of a similar student in the second academic year. Thus a distinction is made between a

student who has failed to earn the attendance and the progress certificate at the end of the first year''s course and the student who has failed to

obtain such certificates at the end of the second or third academic year. While in the first case a student is required to undergo the first year course

once again for the full year, in the second case the student is asked to attend the college only for such period as the Principal may prescribe the

expression, required to rejoin the first year class for another full year, occurring in the regulation cannot, in my view, be read as ""required to rejoin

the course"" as is contended by the respondent.

The petitioner got admission to the B. Com course, and the coarse is for a period of three years. Once a student joins a course, he is normally

allowed to complete the course unless in the meanwhile he is expelled for any tenable reason. In this case the petitioner has not appeared for the

first year''s examination for want of attendance and the progress certificate. As per the said regulation 10, he has to rejoin the first year class and

undergo the first year course for another full year and he cannot join the second year coarse. The expression ""rejoin the first year class for another

full year"" clearly contemplates that student is to continue in the first year class for one more year. The said expression does not, in my opinion,

suggest that the student has to discontinue the course and apply afresh for the same course or different course in the sane college or in any other

college. If the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is accepted it will mean that students who have joined a particular course of

study but failed to acquire the required attendance or progress certificate due to circumstances beyond their control such as illness, etc., will have

to be treated as having discontinued the course in which case they have to apply afresh for the same course or for any other course in the same or

other colleges. This will be quite an anomalous situation in that while he first year students in a degree course is taken to have discontinued or the

course of study, second and third year students are not so penalised for want of attendance or progress certificate. Therefore a consistent and

reasonable interpretation of the regulation can only be that she first year students who are detained are enabled to continue the course of study to

which they have been admitted by joining the first year class for another full year. The said regulation does not state that for shortage of attendance

or for want of progress certificate a student should be sent out of the course of study to which he has been duly admitted. It is not, therefore,

possible to agree with the respondent''s contention that because of want of attendance or progress certificate, the petitioner can be sent out of the

college by the issue of transfer and conduct certificates.

Mr. M.R. Narayanaswami, the respondent''s learned counsel refers to the following clause relating to the admission of students in the college

found in page 10 of the College Calendar for the year 1975-76.

Clause 8:--Students of the College seeking re-admission into the college should also apply for admission in the prescribed form. The re-admission

is not a matter of right, but will be entirely at the discretion of the principal. This also applies to students who may be detained for lack of

attendance.

It is true the said clause says that students who may be detained for lack of attendance should again seek readmission by applying for admission in

the prescribed form and that the readmission is not a matter of right but is entirely at the discretion of the principal. In my view this clause is

inconsistent with the said regulation which seems to say that the penalty, if any, for not earning the required attendance or the progress certificate

by a first year student in a degree course is to require him to join the first year class again for another full year. It does not contemplate a student

again applying for and getting admission to the course of study to which he has already been admitted. The respondent college is affiliated to the

University of Madras and, therefore, the rules for admission cannot be inconsistent with the regulations prescribed by the University.

In this case, except saying that the petitioner had not acquired the requisite attendance and progress certificate, no other allegation has been

made against him. The issue of a transfer certificate along with a conduct certificate asking the petitioner to apply afresh for admission to a suitable

first degree class at the commencement of the next academic year at any college is virtually an order of expulsion from the college. As already

stated, the course of study to which the petitioner has been admitted has not come to an end nor the petitioner has asked for a transfer and

conduct certificates to enable him to apply for the same course or for a different course in any other college. I am not therefore inclined to agree

with the respondent that the issue of transfer and conduct certificates in this case will not amount to expulsion. Though the word expulsion is not

used in the order, the order has resulted practically in the expulsion of the petitioner from the college, in that the petitioner has been sent out of the

first year class against his will.

The learned counsel for the respondent contends that the respondent-college not being a public authority is not amenable to the jurisdiction of

this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and, therefore, the petitioner cannot get any relief in this writ proceeding. The learned counsel refers

to the decision in Swapan Roy v. Khagendra Nath AIR 1962 Cal. 520 wherein the Calcutta High Court held tat a rule against a principal of a

private college cannot be issued, that the fact that the college is affiliated to and receives grant from the University or is obliged to conform to the

conditions contained in the statutes, Ordinances or Regulations issued by the University will not make the principal of a college a public officer or

the college a statutory body and that, therefore, no writ will be issued against the principal of such a college.

In C.D. Sekkilar Vs. R. Krishnamoorthy, . (as he then was) while dealing with a similar objection has, however, stated that the principal of an

educational institution maintained from the funds of a public trust, affiliated to the University and as such governed by the rules to the University,

and administered under a scheme framed by High Court, is a person holding a quasi public office, and, amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court

under Article 226. In that case a student of the Pachiappa''s college run by the Pachiappa''s charities, a public charitable endowment was expelled.

The student filed an application for a writ of mandamus directing the principal to re admit him in the College, on the ground that he has a legal right

to continue his studies in the college, and that the action of the principal in sending him out of the college was arbitrary and against the fundamental

principles of natural justice. A preliminary objection was however taken by the principal of the college that an application for mandamus cannot be

maintained against a private institution. Dealing with this objection, the learned Judge referred to Chapter VIII of the Madras Educational Rules

providing for disciplinary Regulations in regard to Colleges, particularly Rules 95 and 97 enabling Headmasters of Schools and Principals of

colleges to exercise the power to inflict various punishments in the interest of the students or of the institutions concerned such as fine, less of

attendance, loss of term certificates, suspension and expulsion and also the disciplinary Regulations of the University and expressed the view that

the College being a public institution and governed by the Madras Educational Rules and by the disciplinary Regulations issued by the University,

the Principal should be taken to be holding a quash-public office and is bound to discharge his duties in accordance with the rules governing the

institution and regulating his conduct. The learned Judge referred to the following observations, of Bayley, J. in King v. Benchers of Lincoln''s Inn

107 E.R.K.B. 1277

They make their own rules as to the admission of members and even if they act capriciously upon the subject, this Court can give no remedy in

such a case, because in fact there has been no violation or any right. This case is analogous to that of a college.

and expressed that there is an essential distinction between admission to a college and illegal removal or expulsion from the college, that in the latter

case, if the principal had acted arbitrarily or contrary to the rules, the student has got a right to compel the principal to follow the rules and

regulations and to allow him to continue to study in the college. After referring to the relevant case law on the subject, the learned Judge laid down

the following four propositions:

Though Article 226 of the Constitution is apparently wide a writ of mandamus will not issue except to a public or quasi-public body or officer

which is under an obligation, statutory or otherwise, to do or refrain from doing anything and which is likely to interfere with the rights of persons.

A student studying in a college has a personal right to continue to study therein till the course is completed or he has otherwise been removed or

expelled from the college in strict compliance with the rules governing the institution.

The Principal of an institution maintained from the funds of a public trust and affiliated to the University and governed by the rules of the

University is certainly a person holding a quasi-public office.

As the maintenance of discipline and the standards of behaviour in a body of students in such a college being primarily entrusted to the Principal

the High Court will not interfere with his discretion unless It is satisfied on consideration of the entire materials placed before it that the impugned

action of the principal is arbitrary and is due to mala fide exercise of discretion actuated by extraneous circumstances.

With respect, I am in entire agreement with the principles laid down in the said decision. The decision of the Calcutta High Court referred to above

runs counter to the views expressed in the above Madras Case and it does not also contain, if I may say so with respect, any detailed discussion

on the point. In University of Madras v. Nagalingam (1964) 2 M.L.J. 251 a Bench of this Court held that an academic authority is imposing a

punishment is not merely discharging an administrative act but is functioning as a quasi-judicial Tribunal. In S.H. Joseph Thabaraj Vs. The

Prinicipal, Government Arts College, Kailasam, J. had held that the Government Arts College which is run by the Government with public funds

and governed by the Madras Educational Rules and the disciplinary Regulations issued by the University is a public institution and the principal who

is holding a quasi-public office is bound to discharge his duties in accordance with the rules. It is true in that case the institutions was run by the

Government, but the reasoning of the learned Judge equally applies to the institutions run by a public trust white exercising their disciplinary

authority. In Films Division, Bombay v. R.M. Seshadri 1973 11 L.L.J. 444. A Division Bench of this Court while dealing with a contention that the

Court has no power to issue a rule under Article 226 against the private arbitrator expressed the view that the terminology of Article 226 is wide

that the Court has power to issue a writ or direction to any person or authority, that though once Courts were exercised over the limitations of the

English writs those limitations need not necessarily apply to the wider concept of the power under Article 226 and that, therefore, a private

arbitrator who acts as a quasi-judicial body entrusted with the task of deciding a dispute between two contesting parties involving rights and

liabilities, the Court is empowered to issue rule against such a private arbitrator. The Supreme Court in Gulabhai Vallabhbhai Desai etc. Vs. Union

of India (UOI)and Others, had held that an examination committee exercising its powers in cancelling the results of the students and debarring them

from appearing for further examination was acting quasi-judicially and, therefore, the principles of natural justice have to be followed before a

student is so debarred.

In this case, admittedly the respondent-college is run by a public trust and its disciplinary jurisdiction is both under the Madras Educational

Rules as well as under the Disciplinary Regulations framed by the University. The petitioner who has been admitted to a course of study has been

abruptly asked to discontinue the course and seek admission afresh for that course or any other course in this or any other college. Such as abrupt

termination of the petitioner''s course of study is said to be only on the ground that the petitioner has not acquired the requisite progress report in

the first year. As already stated that will enable the respondent to detain the student in the first year, but not to remove him from the course itself.

Even the Impugned order shows that the petitioner has been detained in the first year. For the foregoing resorts, the writ petition is allowed and the

respondent is directed to permit the petitioner to undergo the first year B. Com. course for a fresh period of one year as per Regulation 10 of

Chapter 39. There will be no order as to costs.