Nagammal vs Mani and Others

M. Anantanarayanan, O.C.J.

In my view, the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate (J) of Sankari,. was perfectly justified in dropping further proceedings u/s 145 Criminal Procedure Code, and, in dismissing the petition. The facts are that the Revision Petitioner Nagammal (Party A) had moved the Executives Magistrate of requisite jurisdiction, for promulgating an order u/s 145(1) Criminal Procedure Code, in respect of a small piece of land upon which some structures had been put up. Party B opposed the claim of the Revision Petitioner to possession of this, land, and, ordinarily speaking, the Executive First Class Magistrate of Sankari would probably have been in order in taking cognizance, and in promulgating a notification u/s 145(1), Criminal Procedure Code. Even so, the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate (J.) of Sankari, to whom the proceedings were subsequently transferred for disposal, had every jurisdiction to drop the proceedings, u/s 145(5), Criminal Procedure Code if he was satisfied that the dispute had ceased to exist.

Actually, the proceedings had to be dropped, because the order of the Executive First Class Magistrate of Sankari is not in conformity with the requirements of the law. As it is not a valid order, this particular proceeding had necessarily to be abandoned. The law is very clear. u/s 145(1), Criminal Procedure Code it is the Magistrate who must be satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists, concerning property within his jurisdiction, and, in his order, he is required to state " the grounds of his being so satisfied". In the present case, all that we have in paragraph 2 of the order is that information was laid by the Inspector of Police, Sankari, about this dispute. Paragraph 3 then merely calls upon the parties u/s 145(1), Criminal Procedure Code, to produce evidence concerning the facts of possession. Learned Counsel for the revision petitioner has drawn my attention to a decision of a Bench of the Tripura Judicial Commissioner''s Court, reported in Altab Ali v. Jagadish Chandra (1961) 2 Crl. L.J. 292 which contains a statement of law that

the section does pot say that the Magistrate should write in his preliminary order in so many words that he was satisfied.

The section does make it mandatory that the Magistrate should state in writing " the grounds of his being so satisfied "; even if that particular word is not used, language to similar effect must be employed, and, the crux of the matter is that the order must make it evident that the Magistrate had applied his judicial mind to the information, and had come to the conclusion that he should take action u/s 145(1), Criminal Procedure Code. In the present case, there is no such evidence. As far as I can judge from the order, the Executive First Class Magistrate seems to have thought that, when the Police laid some information concerning a dispute about property in his jurisdiction, which might lead to a breach of the peace, the Magistrate was thereupon bound to exercise his power u/s 145 , Criminal Procedure Code. That is not the law, and, in that case action under this section would merely mean a form of police procedure, and not a judicial proceeding at all. I entirely agree with the view taken by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate that this order is void. There is, of course, nothing to prevent the revision petitioner from moving the authorities again, if the dispute and the imminent likelihood of the breach of the peace still exist or the revision petitioner, if so advised, may file a civil suit for injunction in the Court of requisite jurisdiction.

With these observations, the revision proceeding is dismissed.