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Judgment
Courtney Terrell, C.J.—This suit was begun in the Munsif''s Court at Raghunathpur in the district of Manbhum in relation to certain lands to which the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act applies. The plaintiff was the widow of one Kanta Mahato, a Kurmi Mahato, and the defendants were, as to some of them, the superior landlords under whom she said she held the land as a raiyat and as to the other part the persons whom she said were inducted upon the land as under-raiyats by her. As was her duty in her plaint she set forth the facts which she considered entitled her to relief at the hands of the Court. The Court did not give her the whole of the relief which she asked for but gave the relief which in its opinion she was entitled, on the proof of those facts, to receive.
She said that as regards the under-raiyat defendants they had denied that they were under-raiyats at all, that they claimed to be raiyats themselves and that in so far as the payment of rent was concerned they would pay the rent to the defendant superior landlords. Furthermore the plaintiff alleged that the defendant not content with denying her title both as a raiyat under the superior landlords and as a raiyat towards them as under-raiyats with the right to receive rent, had also declined in fact to pay any rent and had not paid any rent. She in fact suggested in her plaint that the remedies to which she was entitled was a declaration of her raiyati holding and further the eviction of the under-raiyats from cultivating possession of the land, and she also made the usual and proper application for any other relief to which in the opinion of the Court the establishment of facts pleaded by her should entitle her.
The issues were decided by the Munsif and ultimately decided on appeal by the District Judge from whose decision this appeal is preferred and the effect of the decision is this: firstly it is said that in so far as the claim for possession is concerned, inasmuch as the plaintiff herself had established that the relationship between herself and the under-raiyats being that of landlord and tenant and inasmuch as the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act gave to the revenue Courts exclusive jurisdiction in claims by a landlord to evict his tenant that the Court had no power to grant the relief by way of eviction. Furthermore the Court proceeded to deal with the fact held by it that the under-raiyats had been in actual possession of the land for a very long time and for the reasons set forth, which are ample in mp opinion, declined to give the relief of forfeiture.
Nevertheless the Court, as it was in duty bound to considered that remedy the facts proved entitled the plaintiff to receive and said that inasmuch as the defendant under-raiyats denied that any relationship of landlord and tenant existed and inasmuch as the plaintiff in fact established that such relationship existed it was in the power of the Court to declare the right of the plaintiff as landlord to recover rent from the tenants. The right to recover rent is a necessary implication of the declaration of relationship of landlord and tenant.
The objections by the under-raiyats tenants in appeal are based upon two contentions. First it is said that inasmuch as the suit was framed as a suit for the purpose of ejecting persons who on the contention of the plaintiff were said to be tenants of the plaintiff it should have been dismissed in limine because the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act gave exclusive jurisdiction in such matters of eviction to the revenue Court and that the civil Court was incapable of entertaining the suit. The second objection is based upon the contention that, inasmuch as tested by the ultimate relief given the suit was for a declaratory remedy only, the period of limitation should be six years and in fact formal denial by the under raiyats of the plaintiff''s position as a landlord with respect to them took place more than six years but within 12 years of the date of the suit.
The first contention is simply answered. It is the duty of a suitor to set forth in his plaint the facts which he considers entitle him to relief. In the majority of cases he need do no more than suggest the relief to which he considers himself entitled in law. It is for the Court to decide as a matter of law, when it has decided the question of fact, what relief the plaintiff is entitled to. The Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act is an act for the regulation of the relationship between landlords and tenants. It is not for the regulation of the relationship between landowners and trespassers--revenue Courts under the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act cannot entertain an application for relief until the relationship of landlord and tenant is first established.
It was perfectly open to the civil Court to decide that the relationship of landlord and tenant in fact existed and then to leave further proceedings between the parties (if they were necessary) for ejectment to take place under the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act and this in effect was what the civil Court did. That view of the law has been enunciated many times, but so far as this Court is concerned has received authoritative confirmation in the recent case of Raja Shiva Prasad and Others Vs. Bhuban Mahto and Others, by Macpherson and Agarwala, JJ.
As regards the second objection perhaps a little more difficulty might be felt, but in my opinion the plaintiff is entitled to succeed and the period of limitation which is to be applied to the case is regulated by Article 131, Lim. Act., which provides that in suits to establish a periodically recurring right the period is to be 12 years from the date when the plaintiff is first refused the enjoyment of the right.
If I am right in saying that Article 131 applies it is clearly established that the plaintiff was first refused her enjoyment of the right to recover rent from the under-raiyats within a period of 12 years. The test to my mind of the proper article to apply is to consider the facts alleged in the plaint and the remedy granted by the Court. It is not necessarily to be measured by the remedy which the plaintiff may have asked but which has been refused. It is the duty of the Court to consider the facts and then to give such remedies as are not barred by limitation. Here the plaintiff claimed as against the under-raiyats defendants that the relationship of landlord and tenant existed and the Court gave effect to that claim in so far as it had jurisdiction to do so by merely declaring that right and it was within the period of limitation.
Neither Article 142 nor Article 143 applies for those articles are merely concerned with suits for the possession of immovable property, and here again by the test which I have suggested, that is the relationship of the facts alleged and the remedy applied, this cannot be considered as a suit for possession of immovable property. Had it been a suit for possession of immovable property then having regard to the relationship of landlord and tenant it could not have been entertained by the civil Court but by the revenue Court.
The right of a landlord to receive rent is a periodically recurring right and the period of limitation is 12 years. For these reasons I am of opinion that both the points urged by the appellant fail. The learned District Judge was right and this appeal should be dismissed with costs. The stay order will be vacated.
Saunders, J.
I agree.
