Nadendla Bhaskara Rao vs Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad and Others

Anjeneyulu, J.—The petitioner, Nadendla Bhaskara Rao, is a senior politician of considerable standing. He was initially a member of the congress-I Party. The second respondent, Sri N.T. Rama Rao, a film artist of high repute, jumped into the political field in the year 1982. Respondent No. 2 and the petitioner joined hands to found a new regional political party. They worked together towards this end and created history by organizing a new political party from the scratch and contested in the general elections in December, 1982. The new political party captured power defeating the Congress-I party. On 9th Jan., 1983, respondent No. 2 was sworn in as Chief Minister of the State and the petitioner joined the Cabinet as Finance Minister. They worked together for about twenty months. Unfortunately dissensions arose and the petitioner and respondent No. 2 fell out.

In the struggle for capturing power the petitioner succeeded and respondent No. 2 went out of office. The petitioner was sworn in as the Chief Minister on 16-8-84. What happened during the subsequent one month is again unparalleled in the country''s political history. Omitting certain details, not necessary for our purpose, if is enough to state that the petitioner was ousted and respondent No. 2 came back to power. In exactly one month from the date he relinquished office, respondent No. 2 was again sworn in as the Chief Minister on 16-9-84. Thus, the petitioner held the office of Chief Minister of the State for the period 16-8-84 to 15-9-84.

On 9-11-84, a Commission of Inquiry was constituted u/s 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Inquiry Act, 1952'') to inquire into specific matters, the decisions concerning which were allegedly taken by the petitioner by improper or corrupt motive or with the intention of securing gain for himself. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, a retired Judge of the Supreme Court of India, was appointed as under Ex. A-1 agreement; in turn it went as consideration to Ex. B-l agreement which was spoken to by P. W. 2 and his wife, P. W. 7: the appellant put the respondent in-possession of the suit land who continued in possession thereof till date of the suit; the Court appointed a Receiver at his behest; thus the possession continues to be with the respondent. From the facts thus found, mere discrepancies on inconsequential particulars do not affect the decree for specific performance granted by the Court below warranting interference.

The question at issue is whether the respondent is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and he is entitled to a decree for specific performance. The essential ''terms in Ex. A-1 dated May 1, 1977 are that the appellant entered into an agreement of sale of Ac. 3-50 cents situated within the boundaries mentioned therein; the total consideration is Rs. 18,000/-: Rs. 100/- was paid on that date; Rs. 10,000/- was to be paid on or before May 31, 1977 in default, the agreement stands cancelled; he was to pay the balance consideration of Rs. 7,900/- on or before January 31, 1978; in default thereof, the total amount paid would be forfeited. The respondent on payment, is entitled to get the sale deed executed at his expense. Though the learned counsel for the appellant Sri Dayakar Reddy, reiterated the stand of the appellant that Ex. A-l is not an agreement of sale but is only an agreement of exchange, in the view I am taking, it is unnecessary to decide this dispute and I proceeded on the premise that Ex. A-l is an agreement of sale. His further contention that survey numbers of the lands are many; they have not been mentioned in the agreement; therefore, the contract is not concluded, etc. is devoid of force. Para 2 of Ex. A-l indisputably describes the total extent of the agricultural land to be Ac. 3-50 cents within the boundaries specified therein.

Fry on Specific Performance of Contracts, 2nd Edition, Chapter III provides that the contract must be complete, certain and fair, In Section 325(i) it is stated that "every valid contract must contain a description of Gangadhara Rao had resigned. In the latter writ petition the petitioner attributed bias and mala fides to Justice Krishna Rao. The matter was gone into and this Court dismissed the writ petition on 10-9-87. Eventually, Justice Krishna Rao had also resigned as one-Man Commission on 31-10-87 with the result that Justice Krishna Iyer Commission was completely wound up and the inquiry directed against the petitioner by G. O. Ms. No. 658 dt. 9-11-84 was frustrated.

There were political bickerings and accusations were freely levelled against all persons who have either occupied or have been occupying high offices. There were mutual demands for appointing Commissions of Inquiry. The result was the constitution of Inquiry Commission which may be known as Agarwal Commission by G. O. 587 GAD (SCF) dt. 28-11-87. The Commission consisted of former Justice R.N. Agarwal, retired Chief Justice of Delhi High Court as the Chairman and Sri V. Sundaresan, IAS., and Dr. G.V. Chelapathirao, IA & AS, as Members. It may be appropriate to quote below the terms of reference of this Commission;

i) to inquire into the facts and circumstances relating to specific allegations of corruption, abuse of authority and malpractices against;

a) Sri N. Chandrababu Naidu, former General Secretary. Telugu Desam Party,

b) Sri N. Srinavasulu Reddy, former Revenue Minister,

c) Any Chief Minister and any Minister, present or past,

d) Any Member of Parliament, Member of Legislative Assembly, Chief of State Public Enterprise, Co-operative Society, Market Committee, Local Bodies present or past.

The Commission was appointed for the purpose of making inquiry into matters of public importance, that is, corruption, abuse of authority, malpractices since 1-11-1956.

The constitution of the aforementioned Agarwal Commission was questioned (not by the petitioner, but some other person) in W. P. No. 18173/87. This Court admitted the writ petition and stayed the proceedings before the Commission by order dt. 30-11-87. This order of stay continues to be effective as on date and the writ petition is pending. The result is that the inquiry into the allegations against the. petitioner, whether specific or general, is once again frustrated.

It is now time for appointing yet another Commission. By G. O. Ms. No. 612 General Admn. (SEF) dt. 8-12-87, another Commission of Inquiry was, constituted to inquire into specific matters which were previously the subject-matter of consideration by Justice Krishna Iyer Commission. It was already pointed out that five specific matters were referred to for inquiry by Justice Krishna Iyer Commission. The Commission constituted under the G. O. dt. 8-12-87 was directed to inquire into these five specific matters and also inquire the matter regarding allotment of land to Deccan Medical Centre, Hyderabad, concerning respondent No. 2 and with which the petitioner had no connection. Justice T. Chandrasekhara Menon, a retired Judge of Kerala High Court was constituted as a single-Member Commission of Inquiry under the aforementioned G. O. For the sake of convenient reference this Commission is henceforward referred to as "the Menon Commission". The petitioner lost no time in questioning the constitution of the Menon Commission, and the result is the present writ petition, wherein the petitioner challenges the constitution of the Menon Commission. The petitioner seeks a Writ of Certiorari to quash G. O. Ms. No. 614 dt. 8-12-87.

Sri K. Jagannadha Rao, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner urged that the Menon Commission constituted under G. O. Ms. No. 612 dt. 8-12-87 runs counter to the provisions contained in Section 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. It is claimed that the State Government having already constituted the Agarwal Commission by G. O. Ms. No. 587 dt. 28-11-87, cannot constitute the Menon Commission by G. O. Ms. No. 612 dt. 8-12-87. It is pointed out that the five specific matters forming the subject-matter of consideration by the Menon Commission come squarely within the terms of reference of the Agarwal Commission. It is urged that the State Government has no power to constitute concurrently two separate Commissions to go into the same, matters. Learned Counsel submits that the provisions contained'' in Section 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, by necessary implication, do not confer power on the State Government to appoint two separate Commissions to inquire into the same allegations. Learned Counsel invited attention to the five specific matters referred to the Menon Commission and pointed out that each one of these matters alleges corruption, abuse of authority and malpractices and that being so, these matters can be gone into only by the Agarwal Commission and the Menon Commission cannot inquire into the same. Learned Counsel contends that if two Commissions are concurrently appointed to inquire into the same allegations, there is always a possibility of conflict in the findings of the Commissions and consequently the State Government has no power to appoint a Second Commission, if the allegations referred to the second Commission are capable of being considered by the Commission appointed earlier. Learned Counsel submits that the five allegations referred for inquiry by the Menon Commission being allegations of corruption, abuse of authority, and malpractices, are liable to be inquired into by the Agarwal Commission alone. For the same reason, the power of the Menon Commission to inquire into these allegations is ousted rendering the Commission itself a futile exercise.

The next ground urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the constitution of the Menon Commission, like the earlier Justice Krishna Iyer Commission, is not for the bona fide purpose of seeking the truth or otherwise of the allegations made against the petitioner. Tracing the events from 1982 till respondent No. 2 was ousted from power in August, 1984, learned Counsel pointed out that, a bitter political rivalry developed between the petitioner and respondent No. 2. Learned Counsel submits that respondent No. 2 entertained grave doubts that the petitioner might turn against him and try to replace him, as the Chief Minister of the State. With that apprehension in mind, learned Counsel contends, respondent No. 2 became hostile and ousted the petitioner from the office held by him as the Finance Minister. The subsequent developments resulting in the petitioner becoming the Chief Minister and respondent No. 2 once again replacing the petitioner in Sept. 1984, learned Counsel submits, created serious rift between the petitioner and respondent No. 2. It is stated that respondent No. 2 was bent upon tarnishing the image of the petitioner and wreak vengeance against him. It is submitted that it is for this purpose that respondent No. 2 had constituted the Justice Krishna Iyer Commission of Inquiry on 9-11-84. When that effort was frustrated, he had again constituted the Agarwal Commission with much wider terms of reference. With a view to further harass the petitioner, the Menon Commission was constituted. These successive Commissions of Inquiry appointed by respondent No. 2 to inquire against the petitioner are calculated to bring down the image of the petitioner in the eye of the public and, therefore, constitutes clear character assassination, according to the learned Counsel. It is submitted that the cumulative effect of all these actions on the part of respondent No. 2, would leave one in no doubt that respondent No. 2 was actuated by considerations of malice. The actions of respondent No. 2, it is claimed, are mala fide, and, consequently, the Menon Commission constituted is an integral part of the main endeavour to punish the petitioner for political reasons unconnected with public interest. Learned Counsel submits that this renders the constitution of the Commission invalid.

Learned Advocate-General contends that Section 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, does not prohibit the constitution of more than one Inquiry Commission by the State Government. Referring to the language of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, it is pointed out that there are only limitations on the constitution of an Inquiry Commission concurrently by the State Government and the Central Government. Learned Advocate General invited attention to Clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso to Section 3(1) and stated that even in regard to the constitution of an Inquiry Commission both by Central Government as well as, by the State Government, there is no legal prohibition. But what is required is to see that the Commissions do not cover the same field. As far as the State Government is concerned, there is no prohibition, either expressly or by necessary implication, against the constitution of two Inquiry Commissions Concurrently. Learned Advocate General would not, however, go to the extent of stating that the State Government can appoint two Commissions to cover the same field. It is admitted that although provisions of Section 3 do not contain any specific prohibition, by necessary implication, even the State Government may hot constitute two separate Commissions to inquire into the same matters. It is not because of any statutory prohibition but because of the possibility, remote as it may by, of the two Commissions arriving at two different findings. It is claimed that the five specific matters which were initially referred to the justice Krishna Iyer Commission, were dealt by the Government as a class by themselves, because these matters relate to the period when the petitioner was the Chief Minister. These five matters were the subject-matter of Inquiry before the two-Man Commission after Justice Krishna Iyer had resigned. They constituted the terms of reference to the One-Man Commission after the resignation of Justice Gangadhara Rao. Thus there is clear evidence of the fact that the Government intended for a separate Inquiry being conducted into the five specific matters. The Agarwal Commission was constituted by G. O. dt. 28-11-87 for inquiring into matters of corruption, abuse of authority and malpractices, generally speaking. The inquiry was directed against a large number of persons who occupied high offices from 1-11-56 to the date of constitution of the Commission. Learned Advocate General pointed out that the terms of reference of the Agarwal Commission included the inquiry into the allegations, if any, against the present Chief Minister, Sri N.T. Rama Rao. In constituting this Inquiry Commission for making inquiry, generally speaking, the Government did not intend that the Agarwal Commission should inquire into the five specific matters which formed the Subject-matter of enquiry by, the Krishna Iyer Commission. The intention was that the Agarwal Commission should inquire, as far as the petitioner is concerned, matters other than those specifically covered by the Justice Krishna Iyer Commission. It was for this reason, that shortly after constituting, the Agarwal Commission, the, Government constituted the Menon Commission on 8-12-87 for inquiring into the five specific matters which formed the subject-matter, of inquiry by Justice Krishna Iyer. Commission. The constitution of the Menon Commission was, therefore, a clear indication that the Government had always intended to treat the five specific matters separately for the purpose of inquiry. In view of the above, learned Advocate General urges that the Agarwal Commission and the Menon Commission, so far at the petitioner is concerned, do not cover the same subject-matter, Learned Advocate General states that this is explicitly brought about by the language used in the Notification constituting the Menon Commission. In the preamble of the Notification it was mentioned that the Menon Commission was constituted in supersession of the previous Notifications on the subject. The previous Notifications were those constituting the Krishna Iyer Commission, the two-Man Commission after Justice Krishna Iyer resigned and the One-Man Commission after Justice Gangadhara Rao resigned. The supersession also included the Agarwal Commission but only to the limited extent of the five allegations forming the subject-matter of inquiry separately by the Menon Commission. It cannot, therefore, be said, contends the learned Advocate-General, that the State Government appointed concurrently two separate Commissions to inquire into the same matters concerning the petitioner. According to the learned Advocate-General, while the Menon Commission would inquire into the five specific matters referred to it, the Agarwal Commission would inquire into the allegations other than the five forming part of the inquiry before the Menon Commission, It is, therefore, submitted that there is no clash of inquiry between the two Commissions, and tile petitioner cannot be heard to complain that any prejudice will be caused to him by the appointment of the two Commissions concurrently. Learned Advocate-General also contends that the plea of mala fides against Respondent No. 2; cannot be sustained. It is pointed out the contention relating to mala fides was raised in the earlier writ petitions challenging the constitution of the Krishna Iyer Commission and a Division Bench of this Court had considered the above matter at considerable length while disposing of the writ petition bearing No. 11/85 on 26-11-85. Learned Advocate General invited attention to the observations of Ramarao J., in the leading judgment to the following effect :

It can be reasonably inferred that there is acute political rivalry, and bitter feud between the petitioner and the 3rd respondent, as disclosed from the events set out in the affidavits on either side. The acrimonious political rivalry cannot by itself lend support to allegation of mala fides in the absence of clinching evidence or circumstances and the petitioner is not able to project evidence or circumstances to demonstrate mala fide action. If the political rivalry alone is considered as litmus test for mala fides, the object of Commissions of Inquiry Act will be crippled as the change in the political setup brings in its train the move for probe into abuse of power, if any, by the erstwhile setup.....The averments in the affidavit and the circumstances, highlighted by the petitioner are not sufficient to come to the conclusion that the 3rd respondent is actuated by mala fides....

Learned Advocate General, therefore, urged that the matter concerning mala fides on the part of respondent No. 2, does not fall to be considered once again in the present writ petition and the finding of the Division Bench is final in this regard and is binding on the parties. Learned Advocate-General pointed out, the petitioner seeks to rely more or less on the same material for the purpose of advancing the plea that respondent No. 2 is actuated by mala fide considerations in appointing successive Commissions of Inquiry against the petitioner. Once the decision to appoint the Krishna Iyer Commission is held to be valid and is not the outcome of any malice or mala fide action (as held by the Division Bench) the appointment of subsequent Commissions is only a matter of course, because the petitioner frustrated the effort to inquire into the allegations by the Krishna Iyer Commission. No new situation is brought about for reconsideration of the matter. In the circumstances, learned Advocate-General claimed that the plea of mala fides should be rejected.

Appearing for respondent No. 2 Sri M. Chandrasekhararao has dealt mainly with the question of the allegation of mala fides attributed to respondent No. 2 by the petitioner. Learned counsel tread the same field as was covered by the learned Advocate-General and pointed out that the matter concerning the mala fides is no longer open for consideration as it was considered at length while disposing of W.P. No. 11 of 1985. Learned counsel, therefore, urged that this Court shall not permit the petitioner to re-agitate the issue, as the matter has already become final pursuant to the judgment of the Division Bench.

I shall first deal with the contention that in appointing the Menon Commission the second respondent acted mala fide and that the real purpose of appointing the Commission was to bring down the image of the petitioner in the public esteem and to wreak vengeance on account of the bitter political rivalry existing between the petitioner and the second respondent. Having given my careful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner must reject this contention. I had already referred to the writ petition No. 11 of 1985 filed by the petitioner questioning the appointment of the Justice Krishna Iyer Commission. The appointment was challenged on two grounds. The first being mala fides on the part of the second respondent herein and the second ground being bias against the petitioner borne by Justice Krishna Iyer. While disposing of Writ Petition No. 11 of 1985 on 26-11-1985, the Division Bench consisting of A. Raghuvir, J. as he then was and P. Rama Rao J. considered the petitioner''s contention regarding mala fides on the part of the second respondent in appointing the Krishna Iyer Commission. In paragraph 9 supra I had extracted the relevant portion from the judgment of the Division Bench wherein a finding was recorded that there is no material to come to the conclusion that the second respondent (third respondent in writ petition No. 11 of 1985) is actuated by mala fides. The learned Advocate-General and also. Sri M. Chandrasekhara Rao were right in contending that this finding recorded by the Division Bench has become final and binds me. If the contention of mala fides is rejected by this Court in the appointment of the Justice Krishna Iyer Commission, the same position prevails with regard to the appointment of the successive commissions. I have already pointed out that the Menon Commission was appointed because Justice Krishna Iyer Commission could not enquire into the matters referred because of the decisions of this Court and also the resignations eventually of Justice Krishna Iyer, Justice Gangadhara Rao and Justice Krishna Rao. What is good in regard to the appointment of the Krishna Iyer Commission is, in my opinion, equally good of the Menon Commission and I must, following respectfully the Division Bench decision in the matter, record the finding that there is no material sufficient to come to the conclusion that the second respondent acted mala fide in appointing the Menon Commission. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contends that the events subsequent to the appointment of the Krishna Iyer Commission should be taken into account by this Court and according to him those events change the complexion and add considerably to the weight of the contention regarding mala fides. Learned counsel referred in this connection to the appointment of the Agarwal Commission and urged that one might possibly come to the conclusion that the appointment of the Agarwal Commission was a step consequential to the failure of the Justice Iyer Commission to inquire into the matters referred. But then, contends the learned counsel, the petitioner has been picked up for a hostile treatment by appointing the Menon Commission to go into the matters which squarely fall within the terms of reference of the Agarwal Commission. This, according to the learned counsel, would clearly demonstrate the hostility by the second respondent against the petitioner which was the real cause for subjecting the petitioner to continuing harassment by appointing successive commissions of inquiry. As the Division Bench observed while disposing of Writ Petition No. 11 of 1985, there may be truth in the contention that there is hostility and bitter political rivalry between the petitioner on the one hand and the second respondent on the other. But on that ground, however, it is not possible to say that the second respondent did not consider it expedient to appoint the Commission of Inquiry in Public interest and to get at the truth of some matters in which the petitioner was involved. The allegations against the petitioner are serious. They related to a period when he was the head of the Government. It is difficult to accept the plea that an inquiry into those allegations is not expedient in public interest just because there is political rivalry between the petitioner and the second respondent. Where bitter political feuds exist between parties it is difficult to identify the thin dividing line where personal hostility ends and public interest begins. I am, therefore, unable to accept the plea very eloquently canvassed by sri Jagannadha Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the entire exercise of appointing the Menon Commission was only to settle political scores and none else. The contention is accordingly rejected.

I shall now deal with the basic and more formidable contention raised by Sri Jagannadha Rao that the appointment of the Menon Commission is contrary to the provisions contained in Section 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act Fortunately I find consensus between the counsel on the scope of Section 3(1) of the Act." The learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Advocate-General agree on the question that by necessary implication Section 3 does not confer power on the State Government to appoint more than one Commission to inquire into the same charge or allegations. While learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously urges that the terms of reference of the Menon Commission come squarely within the field of inquiry by the Agarwal Commission, the learned Advocate-General is categorical that the subject matter of inquiry by the Menon Commission is not covered by the terms of reference of the Agarwal Commission. It is for that reason, the learned Advocate-General contends, that there is no infirmity in the Government appointing the Menon Commission after the appointment of the Agarwal Commissions. The short question that falls for consideration, therefore, is whether, having regard to the terms of reference of the Agarwal Commission and the Menon Commission, it could be said that the specific matters of inquiry referred to the Menon Commission fall within the ambit of inquiry by the Agarwal Commission. If the answer to this question is in the negative, then there is no infirmity in the appointment of the Menon Commission; if the answer is, however, in the positive, then the appointment of the Menon Commission is bad.

I have already referred to in paragraph 4 supra the terms of reference of the Agarwal Commission appointed by G. O. dt. 28-11-1987. The matters referred for inquiry are allegations of corruption, abuse of authority and malpractices against;

(a) Sri N. Chandrababu Naidu, former General Secretary, Telugu Desam Party;

(b) Sri N. Srinivasulu Reddy, former Revenue Minister;

(c) Any Chief Minister and any Minister, present or past; and

(d) Any Member of Parliament, Member of Legislative Assembly, Chief of Public Enterprise, Co-operative Society, Market Committee, Local Body, present or past.

The inquiry relates to the period commencing from 1-11-1956 when the State of Andhra Pradesh came into existence.

As far as the Menon Commission is concerned, it is appointed by G. O. dt. 8-12-1987 to inquire into five specific matters which were previously the subject-matter of consideration by Justice Krishna Iyer Commission. The five specific matters referred to the Menon Commission are :

(i) Grant of exemption of a large extent of urban land of Chiran Palace from the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act;

(ii) Enhancement of the capacity of the rectified spirit unit of M/s. Vinedale Distilleries Private Ltd.;

(iii) Permission given for the import of 7,000 cases of Mc Dowella Brandy to M/s. Ramakrishha Wines, Sree Rama Wine Corporation, Srinivasa Wines and Kiran Wines;

(iv) Allotment of additional quantities of 12 lakh litres of rectified spirit per annum to the McDowells; and

(v) Supply of 75,000 tonnes of bamboo and 45,000 tones of hard wood to Sree Rayalaseema Paper Mills up to the year 1997-98 at a provisional rate of 50% concession.

Now, under each one of these matters, the reference was:

Whether the said decision was actuated by improper or corrupt motive or was intended to secure gain to himself or any other or intended to confer undue favour to the party or any other or to cause harm or loss to the public.

Thus, there could be little dispute that each one of the five specific matters related to corruption. and abuse of authority and malpractice.

The Agarwal Commission appointed by G. O. dt. 28-11-1987 was also to inquire into the facts and circumstances relating to specific allegations of corruption, abuse of authority and malpractices against, among others, any Chief Minister or any Minister, present or past.

A close look at the terms of reference of the Agarwal Commission would undoubtedly show that Commission was entitled to inquire into every allegation of corruption, abuse of authority and malpractices against the petitioner, who was a former Chief Minister. The terms of reference would also show that the inquiry by the Agarwal Commission shall be in regard to complaints or allegations that may be made before the Commission by the State Government or any individual or association in such form and accompanied by such affidavits as may be prescribed by the Commission. It seems to me, therefore, that the Agarwal Commission would be acting well within its terms of reference to inquire into all or any of the five matters specifically referred to the Menon Commission, if such matters are brought before the Agarwal Commission by the State Government or any individual or association. As already observed, the five specific matters related to alleged acts of corruption, abuse of authority and malpractice so far as the petitioner is concerned while he was the Chief Minister of the State during the period of one month in August/Sept., 1984, and the Agarwal Commission cannot possibly refuse to inquire into these matters if they are brought before it. It must, therefore, be said that these five specific matters of inquiry concerning the petitioner referred to the Menon Commission fall squarely within the field of inquiry by the Agarwal Commission so that it would appear that the Agarwal Commission as well as the Menon Commission exercise concurrently power to inquire into the five matters referred to the Menon Commission. This at once renders the appointment of the Menon Commission bad in law, being contrary to the terms of Section 3(1) of the Act by necessary implication.

The learned Advocate-General, however, contends that although prima facie it may appear that the terms of reference, couched in general terms, include the five specific matters referred to the menon Commission, on the principle of the specific excludes the general, the Agarwal Commission cannot go into these five matters specifically referred to the menon Commission. In other words, the learned Advocate-General states that because of the appointment of a separate Commission to deal specifically with five matters, the power of the Agarwal Commission to inquire into those five matters is ousted In that view, there is no overlapping and the Agarwal Commission and the Menon Commission discharge their functions in separate fields of inquiry. The learned Advocate-General also claims that right from the beginning when the Justice Krishna Iyer Commission was appointed in 1984, the Government was treating the five matters specifically referred to the Krishna Iyer Commission as a class by itself. Pursuing the same line of thinking, the Government treated the five matters as a distinct and separate class and thought fit to appoint the Menon Commission to inquire into these five specific matters. It is stated that, the intention of the Government being so clear right from the beginning, the appointment of the Agarwal Commission and the Menon Commission must be held to cover different fields. According to the learned Advocate-General, while the five specific matters against the petitioner shall be inquired into by the Menon Commission, other matters brought before the Agarwal Commission shall be inquired into by that Commission. It is, therefore, submitted that there is no clash or overlapping in the inquiry of the matters against the petitioner by the Agarwal Commission and the Menon Commission. Inasmuch as they cover different fields of inquiry, the learned Advocate-General contends that there is no infirmity in the appointment of the Menon Commission.

I am afraid it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned Advocate-General. When the Justice Krishna Iyer Commission was appointed in the year 1984, there was no question of treating the five matters as a separate class. It was not contemplated at that time to appoint a commission of the nature of the Agarwal Commission to go into a very field of inquiry relating to the allegations against persons occupying high offices. All that the Government was concerned at the relevant time was to refer the five matters concerning the petitioner for inquiry by the Justice Krishna Iyer Commission. There is no material from which it could be deduced that the Government treated the five matters as a class by itself while contemplating the appointment of yet another Commission to inquire into the matters other than the five referred to the Justice Krishna Iyer Commission. The appointment of the Agarwal Commission on 28-11-1987 was obviously the result of mutual recriminations between politicians belonging to different parties. There was a demand that there should be inquiry into various acts of respondent No. 2 also. Conceding to these claims the Agarwal Commission was appointed with wide range of terms of reference relating to the period commencing from 1-11-1956. Looking at the terms of reference of the Agarwal Commission, it is impossible to accept the suggestion of the learned Advocate-General that the power of the Agarwal Commission to inquire into any matter is ousted, either expressly or by necessary implication. If any member of the public brings before the Agarwal Commission all or any of the five matters referred to the Menon Commission, the Agarwal Commission cannot refuse to go into those matters on the ground that a separate Commission is appointed for the purpose of inquiring into these specific matters. Once the Agarwal Commission is vested with jurisdiction to inquire into the five matters referred to the Menon Commission, then there is a clash of two Commissions concurrently inquiring into the same matters covering the same field. Such a situation, even according to the learned Advocate-General, is not contemplated by Section 3 of the Act and the State Government cannot exercise power to appoint two separate Commissions to inquire into the same allegations.

It is also difficult to appreciate the need for appointment of the Menon Commission once the Agarwal Commission is appointed with wide terms and the five specific matters referred to the Menon Commission squarely fall within the ambit of the inquiry by the Agarwal Commission. It is not disputed by the learned Advocate-General that had it not been for the appointment of the Menon Commission, the Agarwal Commission would have been well within its rights to inquire into all or any of the five matters referred to the Menon Commission. If that be so, it is difficult to understand the need for appointment of yet another Commission in so far as the petitioner is concerned when the Agarwal Commission is clearly empowered to inquire into the specific matters referred to the Menon Commission. It should be remembered that the Agarwal Commission was appointed to inquire into allegations against a large number of individuals who occupied high offices. The terms of reference were very wide. Out of a large body of individuals covered by the Agarwal Commission, the petitioner is picked up for a special treatment in the sense that a part of the inquiry which could have been conducted by the Agarwal Commission was made over to yet another Commission, namely, Menon Commission, appointed subsequently. This would show that the petitioner has been subjected to hostile discrimination violating Article 14 of the Constitution. It is needless to emphasize that multiplicity of Commissions should be avoided. It is convenient from all points of view that a Commission of Inquiry, when it is appointed, is empowered to go into all allegations against an individual instead of breaking up the allegations into different classes and appointing different Commissions of Inquiry. Such a course, apart from the inconvenience and hardships to an accused individual, is also inconvenient to the Govt. and other individuals to cope up with the inquiry by different persons. No special reasons have been brought to the notice of this Court as to why the Govt. considered it expedient to appoint the Menon Commission in so far as the petitioner is concerned having appointed the Agarwal Commission with wide terms of reference. Having regard to all these facts and circumstances, the contention of the petitioner that the appointment of the Menon Commission, in the face of the Agarwal Commission already appointed, is bad and violates the provisions contained in Article 14 of the Constitution and Section 3(1) of the Commissions of Enquiry Act has to be accepted.

The learned counsel for the petitioner invited attention of this Court to the inquiry concerning Chandrababu Naidu which may have some reflections in the matters. As already indicated, the Agarwal Commission was empowered to inquire into all matters of corruption, abuse of authority and malpractices against Sri N. Chandrababu Naidu. After the appointment of the Agarwal Commission, the Government in G.O.Ms. No. 1103, Revenue (K) Department, dt. 9-12-1987. had appointed Justice H.A. Ayyar, ICS, a retired Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court to inquire into the genuineness of the letter dt. 20th Oct. 1986, purported to have been written by Dr. S. Venugopalachary, MLA, to one Gangadhar, Sarpanch of Narsapur. The matter related to the alleged payment of a sum of money to Sri Chandrababu Naidu. Sri Justice H.A. Ayyar declined to accept the appointment. Consequently, the Government in its G.O.Ms. No. 161, Revenue (K) Department, dt. 29-2-1988 had cancelled the appointment of Sri Justice Ayyar as Commission of Inquiry. It did not stop at that. Another G.O. Ms. No. 162, Revenue (K) Department, dt. 29-2-1988, was also issued by the Government cancelling the Commission of Inquiry itself. The learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that respondent No. 2 was confronted with the above situation by press representatives. Respondent No. 2 was asked to state why the Commission of Inquiry itself was cancelled when it is possible to appoint some other Judge if Justice Ayyar was unwilling to accept the appointment. It is reported that respondent No. 2 stated that this matter had been brought under the purview of the Agarwal Commission and, therefore, the Government felt that there was no need to appoint another Commission for the purpose of inquiring into the genuineness of the letter written by Dr. S. Venugopalachary, MLA. The learned counsel invited attention to the press reports which would indicate that the Chief Secretary, Mr. Shravan Kumar, was also present at the time when respondent No. 2 made the above statement. Referring to the above statement of respondent No. 2, learned counsel for the petitioner states that the legal implications were correctly understood in that when the Agarwal Commission was already appointed to inquire into matters relating to N. Chandrababu Naidu, there was no need to appoint Justice H.A. Ayyar Commission specifically for the purpose of inquiring into the genuineness of a letter written. That matter should also be brought before the Agarwal Commission and that was the reason why the Government thought it expedient to wind up the Commission itself as the purpose is served by appointing the Agarwal Commission. Learned counsel for the petitioner complains that this understanding shown in the case of Chandrababa Naidu was not shown in the case of the petitioner and that, according to the learned counsel, is deliberate. It is pointed out that in the rejoined affidavit filed on - 5-6-1988 the petitioner made a pointed reference to the above aspect and respondent No. 2 in the counter filed on 8-6-1988 made no endeavour to explain the matter.

The learned Advocate-General states that the understanding of respondent No. 2 is not conclusive and, at any rate, it does not render the appointment of the Menon Commission invalid. The learned Advocate-General also points out that on 21-5-1988 by G.O.Ms. No. 367, another single-man commission presided by Justice T.L.N. Reddy was appointed to inquire into the same matter as was referred to Justice Ayyar for inquiry. It is stated that this Commission is now inquiring into the matter.

It is not necessary to comment on the correctness or otherwise of the actions taken by the Government. The cancellation of the appointment of the Justice H.A. Ayyar Commission through G.O.Ms. No. 162, dt. 29-2-1988, would undoubtedly demonstrated the mind of the Government, at the relevant time, that a second Commission was really not required to be appointed. It may be that the Government had second thoughts in the matter and appointed the Justice T.I.N. Reddy Commission in May, 1988.

I have referred to this matter not because it has relevance to the Menon Commission but because of the seemingly conflicting positions taken up by the Government from time to time. counsel, of Inquiry. It is alleged that Justice Menon was appointed apparently on the advice of Justice Krishna Iyer. The petitioner alleged bias to Justice Krishna Iyer and unfortunately before the High Court could decide upon that question, Justice Krishna Iyer resigned as the Chairman of the Commission. As a result, that Court found it unnecessary to go into the question. The allegation of bias on the part of Justice Krishna Iyer against the petitioner, it is contended, stood undecided. It is submitted that having resigned from the Chairmanship of the Commission, Justice Krishna Iyer recommended to respondent No. 2 to appoint one of his own acquaintances as Commission of Inquiry for the obvious purpose of exercising influence over the thinking of Justice Menon. It is unfortunate that allegations of this nature are made against Justice Krishna Iyer, a Judge of high repute and commanding wide respect in the country. I have called upon the learned Advocate-General to produce before the Court the relevant file to see how Mr. Justice Chandrasekhara Menon, a retired Judge of the Kerala High Court, came to be appointed as the Commission of Inquiry in the present case. The file produced before this Court unfortunately does not give any indication as to how Justice Menon''s name was thought of. It is true that Justice Chandrasekhara Menon is not quite known in Andhra Pradesh and respondent No. 2 could not have known Justice Menon greatly. The file starts with the letter addressed by the respondent No. 2 to Justice Chandrasekhara Menon requesting him to accept the Commission of Inquiry against the petitioner. There is no indication in the note filed as to how respondent No. 2 addressed the letter to Justice Menon, since obviously the matter was not processed at the lower levels. However, one thing seems intriguing, a copy of the letter addressed to Justice Chandrasekhara Menon was endorsed to Sri Justice Krishna Iyer, Sadgamaya, Tribunal Buildings, Cochin-11, while Justice Chandrasekhara Menon himself lives in Layam Road, Ernakulam, Cochin. There is apparently no need to mark a copy of the letter addressed to Justice Chandrasekhara Menon by respondent No. 2 to Justice Krishna Iyer. I feel unhappy that this fact lends some support to the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that probably Justice Chandrasekhara Menon was recommended by Justice Krishna Iyer. Even if one is inclined to accept the suggestion, it is not possible to say that that vitiates the appointment of Justice Chandrasekhara Menon as the Commission of Inquiry.

In the result, G.O.Ms. No. 612, General Administration (SCF) Department dt. 8-12-1987 issued by the first respondent appointing Justice Chandrasekhara Menon as Commission of Inquiry against the petitioner is quashed and a Rule shall issue accordingly. The writ petition is allowed but, in the circumstances, without costs.