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Judgment
Srinivasan, J.—The challenge in this writ petition is with reference to the constitutionality of S. 6 of the Tamil Nadu Cinemas Regulation Act
1955 and R.41 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1957. S. 6 of the Tamil Nadu Cinemas (Regulation) Act in so far as it is
relevant for the purpose of this case reads thus:�
6(1) Power of Government to issue directions� The Government may, from time to time, issue directions to any licensee or to licensees
generally, requiring the licensee or licensees to exhibit such films or class of films having a scientific or educative value, such films, dealing with news
and current events, such documentary films, indigenous films, or such other films having special value to the public, as may have been approved by
the Government in that behalf from time to time; and where any such directions have been issued, those directions shall be deemed to be additional
conditions and restrictions subject to which the licence has been granted; provided that no direction issued under this section shall require the
licensee to exhibit any such film or films exceeding two thousand feet at, or for more than one fifth of the entire time taken for any one show
R.41 of the rules reads thus:�
After obtaining the certificate referred to in R.40, the applicant shall submit his application for licence in writing to the licensing authority. The
application shall be accompanied by...
(1) the certificates issued by the executive engineer and Chief Electoral inspector;
(2) a declaration by the applicant to the effect that he had completed all arrangements for obtaining films approved by the State Government under
S. 6 of the Act and films certified by Central Government with the previous approval of the Central Film Advisory Board for exhibition at each
performance together with a statement from the suppliers confirming that such arrangements have been made;
(3) a treasury receipt for the payment of fees for licence at the rates prescribed in R. 4(sic); and
(4) Evidence of having insured the cinema building, machinery etc., against fire hazards.
The contention of the petitioner is that in view of the provisions of S. 6 and R.41, the petitioner is made to obtain films approved by the State
Government and films certified by the Central Government from the Films Division of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of
India for which the petitioner has to pay a fee every year. According to the petitioner, by compelling the petitioner to pay a fee to the Films
Division, an unreasonable restriction has been imposed by the provisions of S. 6 and R.41 on the petitioner in carrying on his business. Hence, it is
submitted that the provision in S. 6 of the Act and R.41 violates Art. 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution of India. I do not agree.
The section is intended for a particular purpose. While theatre owners exhibit films for the entertainment of the people, the Government intends
that the theatre owners should also exhibit films of scientific or education value so that people may gain knowledge therefrom. Under the proviso
the time for exhibition of scientific or educative films is restricted to one fifth of the total time and also to 2000 ft. Thus the restriction, if any,
imposed by S. 6 is quite a reasonable one and for the good of the people. That cannot be said to be in any manner unconstitutional. Just because
the petitioner is made to pay an amount to the Films Division for getting ''approved films'', his right to carry on business is not curtailed. It may, if at
all, lead to a reduction in the profits earned by him, but it does not amount to an unreasonable restriction. If the grievance of the petitioner is that
the fee charged by the Films Division is very high, the section or the rule cannot be invalidated.
Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohammad Yasin Vs. The Town Area Committee,
Jalalabad and Another, . In that case, the question was, whether the imposition of licence fee On wholesale vegetable and fruit vendors by the
Town Area Committee was valid or not. The Supreme Court found that there was no authorisation in the provisions of the U.P. Municipalities Act
for imposing such levy and making any by-law authorizing such levy. Hence, the Supreme Court held that when the impost is illegal, it could not be
stated to be a reasonable restriction. The Supreme Court pointed out that by imposing the illegal levy it was a case of imposing restriction on the
person who carries on business. Learned counsel places reliance on the following passage in the judgment of the Supreme Court�
Learned counsel however contends�and we think with considerable force and cogency�that although in form, there is a prohibition against
carrying on any wholesale business, by anybody, in effect and in substance the by laws have brought about a total stoppage of the wholesale
dealers business in a commercial sense. The wholesale, dealers who will have to pay the prescribed fee to the contractor appointed by auction, will
necessarily have to charge the growers of vegetables and fruit something over and above the prescribed fee, so as to keep a margin of profits for
themselves, but in such circumstances, no grower of vegetables and fruits will have his produce sold to or auctioned by the whole sale dealers at a
higher rate of commission but all of them will flock to the contractor who will only charge them the prescribed commission.
On the other hand, if the wholesale dealers charge the growers of vegetables and fruits only the commission prescribed by the by-laws, they will
have to make over the whole of it to the contractors without keeping any profit themselves. In other words, the wholesale dealers will be converted
into mere collectors for the contractors or the respondent committee without any remuneration from either of them. In effect, therefore, the by-
laws, it is said, have brought about a total prohibition of the business of the wholesale dealers in a commercial sense and from a practical point of
view. We are not of opinion that the contention is unsound or untenable.
The facts of the case are in no way similar and the ruling will not apply to the present case. Further, the Supreme Court has pointed out in that case
that there was no authorisation for the by-law imposing a charge. In the same judgment, the following passage occurs also at page 117�
These by-laws do not purport to fix a fee for the use or occupation of any immovable property vested in or entrusted to the management of the
Town Area Committee including any public street or place of which it allows the use or occupation whether by allowing a projection thereon or
otherwise. Ss. 293(1) and 298(2) (i)(d) UP Municipalities Act 1916 as amended at the time they were extended to the town areas in the United
Province do not empower the Town Area Committee to make any bye law authorising it to charge any fees otherwise than for the use or
occupation of any property vested in or entrusted to the management of the Town Area Committee including any public street. Therefore, the by-
laws prima facie go much beyond the powers conferred on the respondent Committee by the sections mentioned above, and the petitioner
complains against the enforcement of these by-laws against him as he carries on business in his own shop and not in or on any immovable property
vested in the Town Area Committee or entrusted to their management.
The above passage clearly brings out the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court That judgment will have no bearing in this case.
I do not find anything unreasonable either in S. 6 or in R.41. Hence, the writ petition fails and is dismissed.