AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Nainar Sandaram, J.—The plaintiff in the suit, who lost his case in the courts below, is the appellant in this second appeal. The respondents are the defendants in the suit. There was an order passed by the second respondent under S. 14A of the Tamil Nadu Public Trusts (Regulation of Administration of Agricultural lands) Act 57 of 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Act, directing resumption of the land belonging to the first defendant and demised to the plaintiff, on the ground that the plaintiff was not personally cultivating the land demised. The plaintiff wanted to impeach this order as unsustainable and invalid on the ground that it was not passed in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure and in conformity with the provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder. His main grievance was that he was not served with notice of the proceedings under the Act. Admittedly, the plaintiff did not agitate the matter further under the Act itself. There is a machinery under the Act for such agitation. There is a right of appeal under S. 17 of the Act. It is not claimed by the plaintiff that the processes under the Act are inefficacious or inadequate for relief and remedy under the stated circumstances. The two courts below found that the attack by the plaintiff of the order passed by the second respondent under the Act cannot be sustained and that there was factually a warrant for passing the order in question against him. The second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court. This Court admitted the second appeal to consider the questions with reference to the jurisdiction of the civil Court to sit in judgment over orders of statutory tribunals. I find that the plaintiff could not complain that the order passed by the second respondent was totally without jurisdiction. The general rule is, the civil court is not competent to sit in judgment over orders of Tribunals of exclusive jurisdiction, especially when the jurisdiction of the civil Court stands excluded for matters covered by the statutes creating the Tribunals therefor, as in the case of the Act. Where however the orders of the Tribunals of exclusive jurisdiction are without jurisdiction, or tainted by fraud or irregularity or illegality or other fundamental defects like violation of the provisions of the Statutes concerned or fundamental principles of judicial procedure, the civil Court can go into the legal propriety or otherwise of such orders. But, if for remedying the situation in the above contingencies, the Statutes themselves provide for the machinery, that must alone be resorted to and the general remedy of suit must be deemed to have been barred. The plaintiff claims himself to be a cultivating tenant and seeks statutory protection. He must resort to the statutory right given to him to remedy any irregularity or illegality in the order passed by the second respondent. The plaintiff ought to have agitated the matter further, as provided in the Act and the rules framed thereunder. In his own wisdom he did not do so. Even otherwise, so far as the jurisdictional facts are concerned, they have been found by the two courts below against the plaintiff in that their finding is to the effect that the plaintiff, in fact, was not personally cultivating the land demised. As already pointed out, the second respondent did not lack jurisdiction to pass the order. If the appellant has got a grievance over the procedure adopted by the second respondent with regard to service of notice, he ought to have agitated the matter under the Act and the rules framed thereunder. I do not find any warrant to interfere in second appeal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. No costs.
