N C Gupta vs Punjab National Bank And Ors

The Petitioner joined the services of the Respondentâ€"Bank on 21 st September, 1972. On 1st August 2008, he was suspended, which was

followed up by issuance, to him, of a charge-sheet on 21st January, 2009 and a supplementary charge-sheet on 4th March, 2010.

The disciplinary proceedings that ensued, culminated in the imposition, on the petitioner of a penalty of removal from service, vide order dated 23rd

March, 2011.

An appeal preferred by the petitioner thereagainst, was dismissed on 30th December, 2011.

The petitioner approached this Court, vide WP(C) 2761/2012, challenging the aforementioned penalty, imposed on him.

Rule was issued on the said writ petition, which is still pending before this Court.

The petitioner’s case is that, notwithstanding the penalty imposed on him, he was entitled to be disbursed the encashment of the leave, standing

to his credit as on the date of his removal, i.e. 23rd March, 2011.

The writ petition avers that the petitioner addressed numerous representations, to the respondent, on 7th January, 2014, 19th September, 2016, 12th

August, 2017, 9th December, 2017, 17th March, 2018 and 18th May, 2018, but of no avail.

It is in these circumstances that the petitioner approached this court.

Mr. Arora, learned counsel for the respondent raises the preliminary objection of laches, submitting that there is no justification for this Court to

interfere, at the behest of a petitioner who has approached the Court seven years after the accrual of the cause of action.

There is substance in the contention of Mr. Arora learned counsel for the petitioner, on being queried, in this regard, has no explanation except to

state that the petitioner was not “sleepingâ€, but was following up the matter with the respondent, and was also waiting for the disposal of WP(C)

2761/2012 (supra).

Neither of these contentions, in my view, can save the petitioner from laches. The right to claim leave encashment, if any, accrued at the time

when the petitioner ceased to be in the service of the respondentâ€"Bank, i.e. in March, 2011. More than seven years have passed since then.

Notably, the first representation, to which the writ petition refers, was itself addressed almost three years after the said date, on 7th March, 2014.

The submissions, advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, to the effect that the petitioner was waiting for the outcome of WP(C)

2761/2012 (supra), finds no mention in the writ petition and is clearly an argument of desperation. The argument is clearly bereft of substance, as the

entitlement claimed by the petitioner in this writ petition is entirely independent of the relief claimed in WP(C) 2761/2012 (supra).

Law, it is trite, does not favour the indolent.

Inasmuch as the petitioner’s plea of his having made making repeated representation, is concerned, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme

Court has, in S.S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1989) 4 SCC 582, (in para 20 of the report)

“20. we are of the view that the cause of action shall be taken to arise not from the date of the original adverse order but on the date when the

order of the higher authority where a statutory remedy is provided entertaining the appeal or representation is made and where no such order is made,

though the remedy has been availed of, a six months’ period from the date of preferring of the appeal or making of the representation shall be

taken to be the date when cause of action shall be taken to have first arisen. We, however, make it clear that this principle may not be applicable

when the remedy availed of has not been provided by law. Repeated unsuccessful representations not provided by law are not governed by this

principle.â€​

(Emphasis Supplied)

The same principle would apply where the petition is barred by laches.

In view of the above, it is not possible for this Court to come to the rescue of the petitioner at this belated stage.

The writ petition, being hit by delay and laches, is dismissed with no orders as to costs.