High CourtsSingle Bench(2010) 04 MAD CK 0069

N. Arumugam vs The Secretary to the Government Agriculture Department

Madras High Court · Decided on 20 April 2010

HON’BLE JUDGES
B. Rajendran, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No. 34575 of 2006

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Judgment

63 paragraphs · 1,337 words

B. Rajendran, J.—The petitioner has filed the above Original Application before the Tribunal, challenging the order of punishment dated

21.01.1993 passed by the respondent stopping increment of the petitioner for a period of three years with cumulative effect and also ordered to

recover a sum of Rs. 2,220/- in ten instalments at the rate of Rs. 220/- per month from his salary. On abolition of the Tribunal, the matter stood

transferred to this Court and re-numbered as WP No. 34575 of 2006.

2.

The petitioner entered the service as Extension Officer in the agricultural department on 10.07.1967. When the petitioner was working as

Deputy Agricultural Officer (Oil Seeds) at Gobichettipalayam during the year 1977, a vigilance enquiry was initiated against him on the ground that

he had procured ground nut seeds from a farmer at exorbitant rate of Rs. 13,200/- thereby misappropriated a sum of Rs. 2,200/-. A charge memo

dated 15.09.1984 was served to the petitioner. Thereafter, an enquiry officer was appointed and the enquiry officer submitted his report to the

respondent on 15.04.1988 holding that the charge against the petitioner has been proved. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority, without furnishing

the copy of the report of the enquiry officer has straightaway passed an order dated 21.01.1993 imposing the punishment of stoppage of increment

for three years with cumulative effect and also to recover the alleged loss of Rs. 2,200/- from the petitioner''s salary in ten monthly instalments. The

petitioner assails the impugned order on the ground the alleged occurrence stated to have taken place in the year 1977 to 1978 for which a charge

memo was issued in the year 1984; that the first hearing of the enquiry was conducted on 27.11.1987 and on 15.04.1988, the enquiry officer

submitted his report. Thereafter, after five years, the respondent has passed the impugned order of punishment on 21.01.1993. Challenging the

order dated 21.01.1993, the petitioner has filed an appeal on 07.05.1993, but no order was passed. Therefore, the petitioner sent a reminder on

24.05.1995. Even thereafter, the appellate authority did not take up the appeal, therefore, the petitioner has filed O.A. No. 1362 of 1998 before

the Tribunal and the Tribunal, by an order dated 12.02.1998 directed the appellate authority to pass orders within twelve weeks. Even after such

direction issued by the Tribunal, the appellate authority did not pass any orders. Therefore, according to the petitioner, by reason of inordinate

delay on the part of the respondent in passing order of punishment as well as in disposing of the appeal within a reasonable time, he was subjected

to untold trauma, hardship and mental agony. Therefore, on the ground of inordinate delay, the petitioner seeks to quash the entire disciplinary

proceedings.

3.

The respondent has not filed any counter. The learned Government Advocate vehemently opposed the prayer of the petitioner to quash the

disciplinary proceedings on the ground of delay. According to the learned Government Advocate, the petitioner was given sufficient opportunity in

the enquiry and only thereafter, the punishment was imposed by the disciplinary authority by adhering to the Rules. Taking into consideration that

the punishment imposed on the petitioner is a minor punishment, she prayed this Court to dismiss the writ petition.

4.

Heard both sides. The writ petition has to be allowed on the ground of inordinate delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. To fortify my

conclusion, it is necessary to extract the relevant portion of the impugned order dated 21.01.1993 passed by the disciplinary authority which is as

follows:

...Government have held that the charge as proved and for the proved charges Government have decided to impose the punishment of stoppage of

increment for three years with cumulative effect on the accused officer and also to recover the loss of Rs. 2,200/- caused to the Government from

him. They, accordingly, direct that the next increment of Thiru. N. Arumugam, formerly Deputy Agricultural Officer (Oil Seeds), Gobichettipalayam

be stopped for three years with cumulative effect for the charge held proved against him. The period of stoppage of increment reckoned will be

inclusive of the period spent on leave before the period is completed. The Government also direct that the los of Rs. 2,200/- (Rupees Two

Thousand and two hundred only) caused to the Government be recovered from the pay of the individual at the rate of Rs. 220/- (Rupees two

hundred and twenty only) per month for a period of ten months.

6.A copy of the enquiry officer''s report i.e., D.E. No. 133/04 of the Commissioner for disciplinary proceedings, Coimbatore is communicated to

the accused officer.

5.

Therefore, it is clear that the disciplinary authority, after imposing the punishment only, had served the report of the enquiry officer to the

petitioner, which is per se illegal and opposed to the principles of natural justice. The disciplinary authority ought to have furnished the copy of the

report of the enquiry officer before imposing the punishment and sought the explanation of the petitioner, but the same was not done in this case.

Therefore, when this mandatory requirement has not been complied with by the disciplinary authority, by which the petitioner would have been

given an opportunity to disprove the findings of the enquiry officer by adverting to the statement of the witnesses, the entire disciplinary proceedings

are vitiated. To add fuel to the fire, the petitioner was made to wait for a long time from 1977 to 1998 to see the end of the tunnel. It is relevant to

point out that the occurrence stated to have taken place in the year 1977 to 1978 for which a charge memo was issued in the year 1984. The first

hearing of the enquiry was conducted on 27.11.1987. On 15.04.1988, the enquiry officer submitted his report. Thereafter, after five years, the

respondent passed the impugned order of punishment on 21.01.1993. Challenging the order dated 21.01.1993, the petitioner has filed an appeal

on 07.05.1993, but no order was passed. Therefore, he sent a reminder on 24.05.1995. Even thereafter, the appellate authority did not take up

the appeal, therefore, the petitioner was constrained to file O.A. No. 1362 of 1998 before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, by an order dated

12.02.1998 directed the appellate authority to pass orders in the appeal within twelve weeks. But, even after a direction was issued by the

Tribunal, the appellate authority did not pass any orders. Therefore, by reason of inordinate delay on the part of the respondent in passing order of

punishment and in disposing the appeal within a reasonable time, the petitioner is entitled to succeed in this writ petition. In this context, it is relevant

to refer to the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in (P.V. Mahadevan v. Managing Director, T.N. Housing Board (2005) 6

SCC 636 wherein in Para No. 11, it was held thus:

11.

Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this

distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity

would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee

should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring

confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The

appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of

the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the

department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer.

6.

Therefore, in the light of the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court mentioned above, the impugned order is set aside and the writ petition

is allowed. No costs