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Judgment
B.S. Raikote, J.—The petitioner-M/s. Muthyala Rao Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., has challenged the G.O.Ms.No.1049, Revenue (ASN-III) Department, dt. 15-10-''92, (hereinafter referred to as ''1992 G.O.'') issued by the first respondent. It is submitted xxxx that by this G.O., the first respondent Government have modified its earlier G.O.Ms.No. 1699,Revenue(Q) Department, dt. 17-11-1984, (hereinafter referred to as ''1984 G.O.'') under its review power u/s 166 of A.P.(Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act 1317 Fasli.
The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that 1992 G.O. is illegal and without jurisdiction. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents have supported the said 1992 G.O.
In order to appreciate the rival contentions of both parties, it is necessary to note a few facts of the case.
The dispute relates to a land bearing Survey Nos. 218/1&3 of Ramakrishnapuram, hamlet of Malkajgiri village. It is submitted that though the land in Survey No. 218 is a very vast land more than Ac.200.00 the present dispute relates only to the extent of Ac.30.00. It is not in dispute that in the year 1953, this piece of Ac.30.00 was handed over to the Social Welfare Department as per the orders of the then Collector and Tahsildar, Hyderabad East, for the purpose of rehabilitating 150 families of "defence followers lines", and on the representation made by one Sri J. Mutyala Rao, the then Member of Parliament, possession was also handed over on 8-5-1953. But the contention of the petitioner is that after such handing over of possession of the land to the Social Welfare Department, the said land was handed over to the petitioner-Society, which was registered in the year 1967. Such handing over of possession took place on the basis of the letter issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, Social Welfare Department, dated 15-4-1974. The said letter reads as under:-
"GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
(Social Welfare Department)
From: To: V.Dharma Chary, B.A., The President, Dist. Social Welfare Officer, Muthyal Rao Co-op. Housing (Land Acquisition), Hyderabad. Society Limited, Ramakrishnapuram, Office at 10-B Staff Quarters, O.U.Campus, Hyderabad. Rc.No.E/658/78, dated 15-4-1974 Sir,
Sub:- Sy.No.218/1/3 (30 acres) Jagjeevanramnagar colony assigned in 1953 - title of assignment intimation - Regarding
Ref:- Your Lr.No.MCHS/1/74 dt. 15-4-1974
With reference to your letter cited, it is to inform you that an area of 30.00 acres of land in Sy.No.218/1/3 of Malkajgiri village (at Ramakrishnapuram hamlet) has been assigned to Social Welfare Department and possession was also taken in the year 1953 for allotting plots to the members of Muthyalarao Co-operative Housing Society Limited, Ramakrishnapuram, (Regd.No.TB-864/69). As per the bye-laws of your society, the Managing Committee has to allot the plots to the members and also obtain loans from the Co-op. Societies or from any other source from where loans can be secured for construction of houses.
Sd/- District Social Welfare Officer, (Land Acquisition) Hyd.
true copy
Sd/- for Asst. Secretary to Government"
From the reading of the said letter, it is clear that the Social Welfare Department was given possession of the land in the year 1953 for the purpose of allotment of plots to the members of the petitioner-society. Further, the said letter authorises the Managing Committee of the Society to allot the plots to the members according to its bye-laws. It could also obtain the loans from any other source for the construction of the houses. This letter is not disputed by the learned counsel for the first respondent.
It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that on the basis of the said letter, plots were allotted to the members of the petitioner-society and such allotment has been made in all to 265 members. In pursuance of such allotment, number of members of the petitioner-society put up constructions and such constructions were at different stages. At that stage, the Government officials attempted to demolish such construction put up by the members of the petitioner-society and in those circumstances, the petitioner-society approached and submitted representations to the first respondent for regularising those plots in favour of the members of the petitioner-society, on the basis of the allotment orders by restraining the Officers from demolishing the constructions. The petitioner-society made representations on 1-5-1983, 26-9-1983 and 27-12-1983. On the basis of the said representations, proceedings were started by the First Respondent in G.O.Ms.No.1699, Revenue (Q) Department, dated 17-ll-''84. In 1984 G.O. proceedings the 4th respondent- Ravindranath Tagore''s Weaker Sections Association also represented to the Government, vide its representations dated 5-9-1983, 10-10-1983, 26-12-1983 and 4-8-1984. Both the representations of the petitioner-society and the 4th respondent/Association were considered by the Government after giving opportunity to both of them, vide 1984 G.O.''. Accordingly, the first respondent directed the Collector, Rangareddy district, to regularise the house site plots, as per allotment made by the petitioner-society among its members in pursuance of the directions given by the then District Social Welfare Officer, by issuing house site plots patta Certificates to them. It would be appropriate to extract the operative portion of 1984 G.O. as under:-
"In view of the aforesaid reasons all the members to whom the society in question had allotted the house-site plots in S.No.218/1 & 3 situated at Ramakrishanapuram H/o. Malkajgiri, Secunderabad as per its bye-laws and the clear directions given by the District Collector in Social Welfare Wing, they have become virtual owners of their respective house-site plots. Hence, it is held that the eviction proceedings initiated by the concerned District Collector or his subordinates against the members of the Muthyal Rao Co-operative Housing Society Limited are illegal, improper, irregular and null and void ab initio."
"Accordingly, the Collector, Rangareddy district is requested to regularise the house-sites plots distribution made by the concerned society among its members in pursuance of the directive given by the then District Social Welfare Officer, by issuing house-site plots patta certificates to them as per rules without prejudice to their rights over their plots, taking what all incidental action necessary. He is also requested to take up this long pending cosmopolitan colony construction under the weaker sections Housing Scheme or the HUDA Programme whichever is possible."
On this basis, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that when this order is passed by the respondent No. 1, vide 1984 G.O., the same could not have been modified by the impugned 1992 G.O. under its review power. Therefore, the impugned 1992 G.O. is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. He submitted number of points for consideration of this Court.
On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader for the Respondents 1 to 3 and the learned counsel for the 4th respondent-Association contended that the points urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner are untenable and the impugned 1992 G.O. has been issued according to Law and procedure. There is neither illegality nor irregularity in the impugned 1992 G.O.
Now, I propose to consider each point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner and opposed by the respondents'' counsel.
The first point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that 1992 G.O. is barred by time u/s 166(6) of Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli, (hereinafter referred to as the Land Re venue Act.) To elucidate this point, he brought to my notice the entire Section 166 of the said Act, which reads as under:-
"166. Reviewed) Every Revenue Officer may, either himself or on the application of any party when the application is accompanied by the original order or decision or by an authentic copy of such order or decision against which the review is desired, review the order or decision passed by him or his predecessor and make such order as he may deem fit: Provided that an application for review shall be made on the following grounds only:-
(a) When some new and important matter or evidence has been discovered which the applicant ever after due diligence, could not know or adduce till the order or decision was passed; or
(b) When some mistake or omission, by reason of which the applicant has suffered loss, is apparent on the face or order or decision; or
(c) When there is some other reasonable ground for review.
(2) (a) Where it appears to the reviewing authority that there is no reasonable ground for review he shall reject the application, but before rejecting the application, the person applying for review shall be given an opportunity to produce arguments in support of the application.
(b) Where such authority is of opinion that the application for review should be granted, he shall grant the application but before doing so the opposite party shall be given an opportunity of being heard.
(c) Where such application is on the ground of the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which the applicant alleges was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him till the order or decision was passed, it shall not be granted unless such allegation is fully proved.
(3) Where in the opinion of a Settlement Commissioner or the Collector the review of an order or decision not passed by him is necessary or when any other Revenue Officer, below the rank of a Collector, Settlement Officer, desires to review an order or decision whether passed by him or his predecessor every such officer shall before granting the application for review obtain the sanction of such officer or higher department whose immediate subordinate he may be.
(4) No order or decision shall be modified or annulled on review unless all the parties to the case to be affected are summoned and heard against the order or decision under review.
(5) When a memorandum of appeal or application for revision has been filed against any order or decision, such order or decision shall not be reviewed.
(6) No order or decision shall be reviewed which affects the mutual rights of the ryot unless an application is filled by some party to the case and such application for review shall not be admitted unless it is filed within 90 days from the date of the order or decision.
(7) When an order or decision has been disposed of in appeal or revision, no Revenue Officer lower in rank to the authority hearing the appeal or revision shall be competent to review such order or direction.
(8) For purposes of this section, the Collector shall be deemed to, be the successor of every such Revenue Officer in the District as may not be present within the limits of the district or who has ceased to have powers in the Revenue Department: Provided that his successor has not been appointed.
(9) Orders passed in review shall on no account be reviewed."
Relying on this, particularly with reference to Section 166(6) of the said Act, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order or decision in 1984 G.O. could not have been reviewed unless an application was filed by the party aggrieved within 90 days from the date of the order or decision. In the instant case, from 1992 CO., it is clear that representations were made by 4th respondent / Association, as noted in the reference column of the said G.O. vide Items 2 to 4 and 6, on 15-6-1990, 24-2-1992, 23-4-1992 and 8-5-1992. Even if those representation are treated as applications filed by the 4th respondent, those are beyond ninety days, from the date of issuing 1984 G.O. Therefore, the said representations should have been rejected as barred by time instead of issuing 1992 G.O.
On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that in the instant case, the power of review has been exercised suo motu by the first respondent for which no limitation is prescribed. The learned counsel for the 4th respondent further submitted that Section 166(6) of the Land Revenue Act applies only in case of agricultural land, because sub-section (6) refers to ryots, which means in relation to agricultural land, and thus, he submitted that the question of limitation does not arise in this case, as the dispute relates to house plots.
From the reading of Section 166(1) of the Land Revenue Act, it is clear that every Revenue Officer may, either himself or on the application of any party, review his own order. u/s 166(6) of the Land Revenue Act, no order or decision shall be reviewed, wherever the mutual rights of the parties would be affected, unless an application is filed by some party to the case and such application shall be admitted only, if it is filed within 90 days from the date of the order or decision. The harmonious construction of the provision would be that there could be suo motu review by the authority u/s 166 (1) of the Land Revenue Act, under the words "either himself." If the review is by himself, it is only to correct some clerical or arithmetical mistakes or errors. Similar power is given to courts u/s 152 of C.P.C. according to which "clerical or arithmetical mistakes'' in Judgments and decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may, at any time, be corrected by the Court either by its own motion or on the application of any of the parties. "But wherever such review affects the mutual rights of the parties u/s 166(6) of the land Revenue Act, the review has necessarily to be done only on an application filed by the party to the original order. Such application should be made within ninety days from the date of order or decision.
From these two sub-sections of Section 166 of the Land Revenue Act, the only inference, that is possible, is that, if there is to be review affecting the rights of the parties, it shall be done only on an application of the parties to the proceedings and, if there is to be a review as to certain clerical or arithmetical error without affecting the rights of the parties, the Authority can do suo motu. It is clear from the further rider, that if there is to be review at the instance of a party, such review shall be done within a period of ninety days and not at any time. As held by the Supreme Court in Godde Venkateswara Rao Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, , that the moment the order is passed by the quasi-judicial authority," it becomes functus officio." In fact, in another decision H.C. Suman and another Vs. Rehabilitation Ministry Employees Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. New Delhi and others, the Supreme Court ruled that:-
"It is settled law that a quasi-judicial order once passed and having become final cannot be reviewed by the authority passing that order unless power of review has been specifically conferred."
Even when the statute confers a power of review, the same shall be exercised subject to the conditions imposed by such statute. The power of review conferred by the Statute may be of two kinds (1) to correct clerical or arithmetical error and (2) to modify the judgment or order on the basis of some error apparent on the face of the record. The earlier one is a procedural review and the latter is a substantive review. Section 166(1) of the Land Revenue Act provides such a procedural review and Section 166 (6) of the said Act provides a substantive review. Such a distinction in review power is made by the Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Others, , which reads as under:-
"The expression ''review'' is used in two distinct senses, namely, (1) a procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a court or tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by it, and (2) a review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. It is in the latter sense that the Court in Narshi Thakershi''s case held that no review lies on merits unless a statute specifically provides for it, obviously when a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected Ex Debito Justitiae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in every court or Tribunal."
Therefore, u/s 166 (1) of the Land Revenue Act, the Authority can suo motu correct the arithmetical or clerical error. This is under the power of procedural review.
Moreover, when the judgment and order passed are modified so as to affect the rights of the parties under its substantive power, the same shall be done within a period of ninety days either u/s 166(6) of the Land Revenue Act- or under Article 124 of the Limitation Act, under which the period of limitation is 30 days from the date of judgment and order, which is made applicable to the proceedings u/s 166-A of the Land Revenue Act.
In the instant case, it is not the case of the respondents that by 1992 CO., some arithmetical or clerical error is corrected. But by 1992 G.O. the order and judgment in 1984 G.O. are modified at the instance of the 4th respondent. By the review order, the rights conferred by 1984 G.O. on the petitioner-society would be affected. In these circumstances, either a representation or an application by the 4th respondent should have been filed within ninety days. But from the 1992 G.O., it is clear that the 4th respondent filed representations on 15-6-1990, 24-2-1992, 23-4-1992 and 8-5-1992 i.e., after 6 to 8 years of the 1984 G.O. Therefore, the said representations/applications were beyond the prescribed time u/s 166 (6) of the Land Revenue Act and on such applications, 1992 G.O., could not have been passed.
On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the first respondent has exercised suo motu power and for that, there is no limitation at all. But by reading both G.Os., it is clear that 1984 G.O. has been modified by the 1992 G.O. and such modification affected the rights of the members of the petitioner-society. Therefore, if there is to be any review of 1984 G.O., the same should be done within a period of ninety days from the date of the judgment and order, i.e., from 17-11-1984, as per Section 166(6) of the Land Revenue Act. Hence, this contention fails.
The other contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that for suo motu power to review the order on merits, no limitation is provided also cannot be accepted, for the reason that u/s 166-A of the Land Revenue Act, the provisions of the Limitation Act are made applicable "to every Memorandum of Appeal and application for review under this Act." From this, it is clear that Article 124 of the Limitation Act applies to the review petitions under the Land Revenue Act and under Article 124 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation is thirty days from the date of decree or order. u/s 166(1) of the Land Revenue Act, there could be a review suo motu and for which the limitation provided u/s 166(6) of the Land Revenue Act is not made applicable, (as that provision applies only, if there is to be review affecting the rights of the parties on the merits of the case, on an application filed by one of the aggrieved parties). From this, further consequence would be that so far as the suo motu power that could be exercised u/s 166(1) is concerned, Section 166-A makes the Limitation Act applicable. Under Article-124 of the Limitation Act, there cannot be review after the period of limitation of 30 days. Therefore, if there is to be review u/s 166(1), suo motu, it shall be done within a period of thirty days as per Section 166-A of the Land Revenue Act, read with Article 124 of the Limitation Act. As per the decision of the Supreme Court in H.C. Suman''s case (2 supra), the review power should be conferred and such review power shall be exercised according to the conditions prescribed by the statute. Therefore, it follows that so far as the power to review under its suo motu power is concerned, it shall be done within 30 days only and not at any time. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that such suo motu power can be exercised at any time cannot be accepted, having regard to the statutory restrictions provided under Sections 166 (1) and 166-A of the Land Revenue Act. In this context, the other contention of the learned counsel for the 4th respondent was that Section 166 of the Land Revenue Act applies only to agricultural land but not to non-agricultural land also cannot be accepted. The word "ryot" used Section 166(6) of the Land Revenue Act is only meant the person, who is liable to pay the land revenue to the State, because the Act itself dealt with basically the land revenue and other ancillary matters. In the instant case, the dispute is in relation to Survey No. 218, out of which the plots are carved out. Therefore, notwithstanding the word "ryots" used u/s 166(6) of the Land Revenue Act, the said sub-section applies to all the cases, wherever there is to be review affecting the rights of the parties. This part of the contention also falls to the ground.
It is an established principle of Law that after the judgment is pronounced, the Court or Authority pronouncing such judgment or order becomes functus officio and for any reason, if such judgment or order is to be reviewed by such authority, it shall be done within the prescribed time. Finality is also one of the principles of Law accepted. Therefore, after the prescribed period of limitation, that judgment becomes final and, if at all, there should be any occasion for setting aside that order or modifying that order, it should be done by the Courts or the Authorities higher than that original authority, either under appeal or revision. Moreover, in this case, as pleaded by both the parties, 1984 G.O. was called in question by the 4th respondent by way of Writ Petition No. 2500 of 1985 and this Court by its judgment dated 2-7-1987 dismissed the writ petition with the following observations:-
"The argument of Mr.E.Ella Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner- society is that this land was assigned to them and pattas were granted and possession was also given to them on 27-8-1982 and, therefore, the holding of the Minister against that was wrong. On the other hand, the respondent ''No.2''s contention is that they have been in possession of the property ever since the assignment was made in their favour in the year 1953. In fact, it is not denied that in the year 1953 there was an assignment in favour of the 2nd respondent-society and that even some huts were constructed in pursuance of that assignment and that additional foundations were also laid for construction of some more huts. It is not at all shown to me that the assignment so made in favour of the 2nd respondent-society in the year 1953 was cancelled by any valid proceedings. In those circumstances, the Minister''s observations, though could be found fault with on the ground that he is deciding a civil dispute, are substantially correct. In any case, I am told that the 2nd respondent-society has already filed a suit in City Civil Court, claiming relief of injunction against the petitioner-society. I am of the opinion that is the correct procedure and that civil court alone is the proper forum where such matters can be adjudged. It is for the civil court to find out answers to the various contentions which have been raised before it and in doing so the civil court will not be bound by anything said either by the Minister or by me in this Judgment."
From the above observations, it is clear that the judgment in 1984 G.O. has been confirmed by this court in the said writ petition. When once an order of the authority or the Court of first instance stands challenged in a superior Court either by way of appeal or revision or writ and when the higher court passes a final order either confirming the same or setting aside the same, the court or the authority of the first instance loses its jurisdiction to review its own judgment. The reason behind this principle is that the judgment or order of the authority or the court of the first instance stands merged with the judgment and order of the appellate Court or revisional Court whatever it may be. In such circumstances, if the court or the authority of the first instance is permitted to review its judgment, it tantamounts to reviewing the judgment and order of the superior court. On this ground also, the first respondent could not have passed 1992 G.O. by reopening the entire issue in its review power u/s 166 of the Land Revenue Act. Therefore, the impugned 1992 G.O. on this ground also is wholly without jurisdiction.
However, the learned counsel for the 4th respondent in this context argued that in the writ petition, the learned Judge of this Court further observed that there was already a suit pending filed by the petitioner in the civil court and the parties could agitate their rights before the civil court. He further submitted that unfortunately, the petitioner withdrew its suit for injunction.
It is not in dispute that the petitioner herein filed a suit for injunction in O.S.No.462/82 on the file of the District Judge, Rangareddy district, and subsequently, the same was made over to the Prl. Subordinate Judge, Rangareddy, and numbered as O.S.No.140 of 1983. In that suit, there was an order of injunction against the 4th respondent, not to interfere with the possession of the members of the petitioner. But the said suit was withdrawn by the petitioner-society on 18-4-1990. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that in view of 1984 G.O., proceedings were initiated against the members of the 4th respondent-Association for cancellation of allotment made in their favour by the Revenue Divisional Officer of the year 1982, in the survey number in question, and in those circumstances, the petitioner withdrew its suit.
It should be noted here that when the petitioner filed an application for withdrawal of the abovesaid suit, the 4th respondent should have objected, requesting the court to dismiss that LA. or it should have filed a suit for declaration of their rights. In fact, this court, after confirming the 1984 G.O. in the Writ Petition No. 2500/85, held that the reasons made in 1984 G.O. are "substantially correct." It further held that the correct procedure would be that the civil Court alone was the proper forum where such matters could be adjudged and it was for the civil court to find out answers to various contentions which have been raised before it. Therefore, without objecting for the withdrawal of the suit filed by the petitioner and without filing their own suit, the 4th respondent could not have approached the first respondent again, under the impugned proceedings and accordingly, the impugned 1992 G.O., could not have been passed, in view of the judgment of this Court in the said writ petition. Therefore, on this count also, it is clear that the impugned 1992 G.O. is wholly without jurisdiction.
At this juncture, the learned Government Pleader for revenue and the learned counsel for the 4th respondent submitted that the impugned 1992 G.O. has been passed on the basis of the representations made both the petitioner- society as well as the 4th respondent-Association. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that those representations of the petitioner referred to in the 1992 G.O. were only for issuing directions to the District Collector to comply with 1984 G.O. when the authorities failed to comply with the same, and they were clubbed along with the representations made by the petitioners while passing the impugned 1992 G.O. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner-society has never made any representation to the Government to review 1984 G.O. This position has not been controverted to by the learned Govt. Pleader for Revenue. In these circumstances, it is clear that 1992 G.O. was passed only on the representations made by the 4th respondent-Association, nearly after 6 to 8 years. Therefore, not only it was barred by time but was also an unjust order because in addition to the constructions, which had already come up before 1984 G.O. (which facts are referred to in 1984 G.O.) and after 1984 G.O. also, many of the members of the petitioner-society have put up their constructions on the plots allotted to them by the petitioner-society and they are at different stage of constructions. Many of them have been completed. At this juncture, to upset 1984 G.O. by modifying the same in 1992 G.O. would cause great hardship and loss to the members of the petitioner-society; they have also already invested huge amounts out of their life savings, anticipating the formal orders of the Government pursuant to 1984 G.O. In fact, it is not seriously disputed that in the entire area, houses have comeup. The electricity and water supply have been provided and now, the entire area is known as ''Jagjeevanram Colony''.
The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that as per the report, dated 26-6-1973 submitted by the District Social Welfare Officer in the year 1973 itself, the petitioner-society had allotted sites to 265 members. However, the said report further stated that the names of 121 members only were found in some register and the balance of 144 members were not found. Having regard to these circumstances only, the Collector by its letter dated 2-5-1992, vide reference No. 5 in the impugned 1992 G.O., sought clarification from the Government. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the allotment has been made to 265 members. He submitted that what enquiry has been held, it was not made known to the members of the petitioner-society because the alleged enquiry was behind their back. He submitted mat, whatever it may be, the allotment that is claimed is only in regard to 265 members and nothing more, and in pursuance of 1984 G.O. the Collector had to regularise the allotment made in favour of 265 members of the petitioner- society. Moreover, the Collector (2nd respondent herein) by the said letter sought further clarification, whether such allotment should be on the basis of income of Rs. 6,000/-or more or less as per G.O. Ms. No. 331, dated 21-4-1991. But the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that this was an erroneous approach of the 2nd respondent/Collector in making such a proposal before the Government. The Government could not have incorporated in the impugned 1992 G.O. the said proposal of the 2nd respondent to find out the eligibility of the allottees of the petitioner-society on the basis of the G.O.Ms.No.331, dated 21-4-1991. The said G.O. has only prospective operation and it cannot be given retrospective operation to the allotment made in favour of the members of the petitioner-society in the year 1974. Thus, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned 1992 G.O., even otherwise, is also highly arbitrary, and impermissible under Sections 166 (1) (a) (b) and (c) of the Land Revenue Act. It is not the case in which a new evidence has come as all the facts pleaded in the review proceedings were already present in the earlier proceedings and the impugned proceedings are not the one in which there was some mistake or omission or any other reasonable grounds for review. Therefore, the 1992 G.O. is liable to be set aside, even on the merits of the case.
As against this, it is submitted on behalf of the respondents that pursuant to 1984 G.O. no orders have been passed by the 2nd respondent regularising the allotment of sites in favour of the members of the petitioner-society. Apart from that, the 4th respondent-association has pleaded new facts and also stated that the members of the petitioner-society have misused their position and some members have got allotted more than one plot. He further contended that in 1984 G.O. the fact that the members of the 4th respondent were allotted sites by the Revenue Divisional Officer in 1982 has been omitted to be considered. Thus, there is new evidence and also the omission in terms of Sections 166 (1) (a) (b) and (c), there is a just cause also and thus, the first respondent/Government have rightly reviewed its earlier order. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that such an alleged benami transaction is a vague allegation and there is absolutely no evidence. Moreover, the plea of the 4th respondent that its members also were allotted plots in the same survey number in the year 1982 also was one of the facts mentioned in 1984 G.O. Therefore, he contended that absolutely there is no new material nor any omission or a just cause in terms of Section 166 (1) (a) (b) and (c) of the Land Revenue Act.
From the reading of 1984 G.O. and also the judgment of this court dated 2-7-1987 in W.P.No.2500/85 referred to above, it is clear that the fact that the members of the 4th respondent-Association were allotted plots in the year 1982 is specifically pleaded, but the same has not been accepted in 1984 G.O. nor by this Court in the said writ petition. From the report of the District Social Welfare Officer of the year 1974, it is clear that the allotment was made to 265 members of the petitioner society out of the land allotted to the petitioner-society. From the material on record, it is clear that the property in question was kept at the disposal of the District Social Welfare Officer for being distributed to 150 families. The said Officer by his proceedings dated 15-4-1974 extracted above, has handed over possession of the same to the petitioner-society, which consisted of the displaced persons of the cantonment area. It was one Muthyala Rao, who was a Member of the Parliament, who took a lead and formed the petitioner-society and after his name, "Muthyala Rao Co-operative Housing Society Limited" was constituted and registered in the year 1967. In the year 1974, the possession of this Ac.30.00 was handed over to the petitioner-society for being allotted in favour of its members. From the report of the District Social Welfare Officer of the year 1974, it is revealed that 265 members have been allotted plots and out of them, many of them put up their constructions over the plots allotted to them. This position of 1974 has been confirmed in 1984 G.O. by holding that such allottees have become the owners. Hence, to disturb such a position in the year 1992 under the impugned G.O. is unjust and arbitrary. Even applying the G.O.Ms.No.331, Revenue, dated 21-4-1991 to find out the eligibility of the persons for allotment would also be unreasonable. When the members were allotted plots long back by the petitioner-society pursuant to the letter of the District Social Welfare Officer, dated 15-4-1974 extracted above., it would be unreasonable to apply this eligibility rule of the year 1991. In Paragraph-4 of 1984 G.O. it has been specifically stated as finding of fact that:-
"In view of the aforesaid reasons, all the members to whom the society in question had allotted the house site plots in S.No.218/l& 3 situated at Ramakrishnapuram, H/o. Malkajgiri, Secunderabad, as per its bey-laws and the clear directions given by the District Collector in Social Welfare Wing, they have become virtual owners of their respective house-site plots."
The Government further held that the eviction proceedings initiated against them were irregular, null and voidab initio. To treat such persons as encroachers or unauthorised persons under G.O.Ms.No.331, Revenue, dated 21-4-1991 for the purpose of finding eligibility and also for the purpose of collecting market rate at the present value, would also be highly unreasonable. 1984 G.O., noted all the contentions submitted by the 4th respondent- Association including their alleged allotment to their members in the year 1982 by the Revenue Divisional Officer. At this juncture, it is to Denoted that this Ac.30.00 in question, which was kept at the disposal of the Social Welfare Department, has not been resumed back in favour of the Revenue Department for such alleged allotment in the year 1982. Therefore, the disputed land never reverted back to the Revenue Department at any point of time under any Government Orders. Keeping in view of these facts only, in Paragraph-4 of 1984 G.O., it was held that such allottees of the petitioner-society have become virtual owners. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents, particularly that of 4th respondent, that there was a new evidence and a new fact, etc., in terms of Section 166 (1) (a) (b) and (c) of the Land Revenue Act cannot be accepted. The allegation against some of the members of the petitioner-society indulged benami transaction and got more than one plot allotted to them could be considered, by holding a specific enquiry, with regard to those members only. So far as the other members are concerned, when they were allotted long back and when they are already in posssession by putting up some construction or the other, it would be unjust to upset their said possession after 28 years on any ground. It should be made clear that if there are any other persons, who are in occupation of some peice of land in the survey number in question, apart from the 265 members referred to in the report of the District Social Welfare Officer of the year 1974, they could be treated as encroachers or trespassers either for the purpose of eviction or for the purpose of regularisation in terms of G.O.Ms.No.131, Revenue, dated 21-4-1991. In these circumstances, I pass the following Order:-
The impugned G.O.Ms.No.1049, Revenue (ASN-III) Department, dated 15-10-1992 is hereby quashed subject to the observations made above. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed, but in the circumstances of the case, without costs.