High CourtsSINGLE BENCH(2017) 04 RAJ CK 0068

Mushtaq Ahmed S/o Shri Ali Baksh vs Mohd. Akhtar

Rajasthan High Court · Decided on 3 April 2017

HON’BLE JUDGES
Prakash Gupta
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
555 of 1999

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Judgment

403 paragraphs · 4,461 words
1.

The instant Civil Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC

has been filed by the appellants aggrieved by the judgment and

decree dated 30.9.1999 passed by learned Addl. District Judge

No.9, Jaipur City, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as the ''appellate

court'') in Civil Regular Appeal No.54/1999 whereby the ''appellate

court'' has quashed and set aside the judgment and decree dated

19.03.1987 passed by the learned Civil Judge No.5, Jaipur City

(hereinafter referred to as the `trial court'') and decreed the civil

suit filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants for declaration of

the sale-deed dated 6.9.1968 as null and void, possession of the

property etc.

2.

The facts in brief for the purpose of deciding the appeal

are that plaintiffs-original respondents No.1 to 4 filed a suit for

declaration, seeking possession and injunction for the disputed

property i.e. shop.

3.

The case of the plaintiffs before the trial court was that

the disputed property i.e. a shop described in para of the plaint

was gifted by Ms. Bashiram W/o Abdul Samad, defendant No.1

(since dead) and Abdul Rehman son of Ellahibux to the father of

the plaintiffs Mohd. Ibrahim vide the gift deed dated 08.02.1958

(Ex.3) and the plaintiffs being the heirs of Mohd. Rehman were

entitled to the property. It is also the case of the plaintiffs that the

sale deed dated 06.09.1958 (Ex.A-11) executed by the defendant

No.1 to 6 in favour of the defendant Nos.7 to 9 was void as

against the right of the plaintiffs as the defendant No.1 had

already gifted the disputed property, therefore, she had no right to

sale that property. It is also prayed that the defendants be

restrained by permanent injunction from raising any construction

in the disputed shop.

4.

On the other hand, the case of the appellants-

defendants was that the alleged gift deed dated 08.02.1958 (Ex.3)

was forged and fabricated document and the disputed property

had rightly been sold by the defendant Nos.1 to 6 to defendant

Nos.7 to 9 by a registered sale deed dated 06.09.1968 and

therefore, they were entitled to that property.

5.

On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, learned

trial court framed necessary issues. To prove the issues, both the

parties produced oral as well as documentary evidence.

Thereafter, the learned trial court after hearing the parties

dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs against the defendants for

declaration etc. vide impugned judgment and decree dated

19.3.1987. Against which the plaintiffs filed appeal before the

lower appellate court.

6.

The learned trial court after the close scrutiny of the

facts, evidence and the law on the subject found that the

plaintiffs had failed to prove the execution of (Ex.3) and even if

it is taken to have been duly executed, it being a

contemporaneous document, needed to be registered and since

admittedly, the document was not registered, it could not have

been taken into evidence. Accordingly, the learned trial court

dismissed the suit.

7.

The learned appellate court did not agree with the

findings of the learned court of the first instance and found that

gift had been made earlier and the (Ex.3) was prepared

afterwords only to evidence the fact of gift and the document was

not contemporaneous one and therefore need not be registered.

Accordingly, the learned first appellate court by the impugned

judgment and decree dated 30.09.1999 allowed the first appeal

filed by the plaintiffs and set aside the decree and judgment of the

trial court and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs holding

the sale deed (Ex.A-11) to be void.

8.

Hence, the present appeal.

9.

On 24.8.2000, this Court admitted the second appeal

on the following substantial questions of law:-

1.

Whether according to Mohammedan law if the gift is made through writing it does not require compulsorily registration? 2. Whether the version of oral gift which is an unregistered document i.e. Bakshisnama Ex.3 can be preferred against the registered document i.e. sale deed executed by defendants No. 1 to 6 in favour of defendants No. 7, 8 & 9? 3. Whether Ex.3 can be relied upon when the so called donor i.e. Bashiran defendant No.1 has specifically denied in her written statement to have gifted her share to Mohd. Ibrahim, father of the plaintiff ? 4. Whether the alleged gift by Mst. Bashiran and Abdul Rehman to Mohd. Ibrahim is according to Mohammedan Law and Ex.3 is in memory of oral gift when this fact was not pleaded in the plaint ? 5. Whether the findings recorded by trial court on issues Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11 and 13 have been rightly and legally reversed by the lower appellate court after evaluating the evidence available on record ?

10.

Having heard learned counsel for both the parties, I

have gone through the material and evidence available on the

record.

11.

It is submitted by Shri Z.A. Naqvi, learned counsel for

the appellants that the impugned judgment and decree are totally

against the law, facts and the evidence available on record. The

learned first appellate court without meeting out the reasoning

recorded by the learned trial court has reversed the same and

thus, the learned lower appellate court has committed material

illegality. Shri Naqvi submits that the alleged gift deed (Ex.3) was

not proved by the plaintiffs and the same is also an unregistered

document which is not admissible in evidence as the same is

required to be registered under Section 17 of the Registration Act.

In (Ex.3), there is no mention regarding acceptance of gift. It is

further submitted that no such evidence is available on record

from which the factum of making gift and acceptance of the same

can be proved which is a condition precedent for gift. If the gift

deed was written in writing at that time in that situation the same

required to be registered because by virtue of the same the

interest, right and owner ship come into play. It is contended that

as per the Mohammadan law any property can be gifted by oral

gift but for that declaration of the donor, consent of the donee and

possession over the same are required to be proved. As per the

counsel for the appellants, the alleged gift-deed (Ex.3) was

allegedly executed by Bashiran but Bashiran herself has

completely denied this fact. It is also not the case of the plaintiffs

that oral gift was made and thereafter the gift deed was executed.

No document has been produced by the plaintiffs on record either

to prove their possession over the disputed property or the date of

their dispossession from the same to show that they were in

possession of the same. It is also submitted that in the criminal

case also, there was no mention about the gift deed (Ex.3).

Therefore, it is clear that (Ex.3) is forged one which is allegedly of

8.2.1958. By this document, the plaintiffs claimed their right over

the disputed property. Had this been true, no question did arise

to write the letter (Ex.4) on 15.2.1954. From this also, it is clear

that the gift-deed dated 8.2.1958 is a forged document. In

support of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellants has

placed reliance on the following judgments:

12.

AIR 1974 Jammu and Kashmir 59, Ghulam Ahmad

Sofi Vs. Mohd. Sidiq Dareel & Ors., AIR 1975 Andhra

Pradesh 271, Chota Uddandu Sahib Vs. Masthan Bi (died) &

Ors., AIR 1926 Lahore 372, Maula Bukhsh Vs. Hafiz-ud-Din

& Ors., AIR 1973, Madras 280, S.M. Usman Ali & Anr. Vs.

O.B. Kubendra Bai & Anr., (1999) Western Law Cases (Raj.)

U.C. 118, Sardar Dan Singh Vs. Sardar Bhag Singh, AIR

1959 Supreme Court 31, Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos

Vs. Thukalan Paulo Avira & Ors., AIR 1968 Supreme Court

1413, Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar Vs. Mohamed Haji Latif &

Ors., 1961 Rajasthan Law Weekly 36-Smt. Jannat Bai Vs.

Firm, Janee Khusalji Jethaji.

13.

Per contra, Shri MM Ranjan, Sr. Advocate, appearing for

the respondents has submitted that (Ex.3) in fact is an agreement

which was written by Bashiran and Abdul Rehman to the effect

that the property had been gifted before writing of gift deed

(Ex.3). As per Section 129 of Transfer of Property Act, the

provisions of Registration Act do not apply to the gift deed

executed by a Mohammaden. The plaintiffs have fully proved the

execution of (Ex.3) and also the fact that when Bashiran had

handed over possession of the disputed property to the father of

the plaintiff, she could not have remained owner of the property

and question of selling the same to respondent Nos. 7 to 9 on

6.9.1968 did not arise. The plaintiffs have proved this fact by

giving cogent evidence that defendant Nos. 7 to 9 forcefully took

the possession of the disputed shop on 06.09.1968 by breaking

the lock. After executing gift deed (Ex.3) and rent deed (Ex.4), it

goes to prove that possession of the disputed property was

handed over to the father of the plaintiffs. It is also proved that on

8.2.1958 the property was gifted orally and (Ex.3) was executed

on 8.2.1958 to remember the same. Badruddin (PW.2) has fully

proved this fact and no effective cross-examination was made on

behalf of defendant Nos. 7 to 9. The learned lower appellate court

has properly, minutely and thoroughly examined the evidence

available on record and holding (Ex.3) to be proved held that

Bashiran had gifted the disputed property to the father of the

plaintiffs and while doing so, the learned first appellant court

committed no error or illegality.

14.

In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the

respondents has placed reliance on the following decisions:-

15.

AIR 1995 Supreme Court 1205, Mahboob Sahab

Vs. Syed Ismail & Ors., AIR 1996 Patna 156, Bibi Riajan

Khatoon & Ors. Vs. Subera Sadrul Alam & Ors., AIR 1964

Madras 373, Johara Bibi Vs. Bibi & Ors., AIR 1998 Kerala

134, Chavittumparakkal Thamasikkum Dappayil Akkutty''''s

daughter Pathumma Vs. Pokku & Ors., AIR 1964 Supreme

Court 275, Valia Peedikakandi Kutheessa Umma & Ors. Vs.

Pathakkalan Narayanath Kumhamu (deceased) & Ors.,

Abdul Rahim & Ors. Vs. Sk. Abdul Zabar & Ors., (2009) 6

Supreme Court Cases 160, Gulamhussain Kutubuddin

Maner Vs. Abdulrashid Abdulrajak Maner & Ors. (2000) 8

Supreme Court Cases 507.

17.

I have considered the rival submissions made by the

learned counsel for both the parties and perused the material on

record and rulings cited at the bar.

18.

Essential conditions of a valid gift in Muslim Law:-

The question is not res integra. The essential conditions for a valid gift in Muslim law are now well settled. In para 13 of the judgment in Abdul Rahim & Ors. v. S.K. Abdul Zabar & Ors ., (2009) 6 SCC 160, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held as under: "13. The conditions to make a valid and complete gift under the Mohammadan law are as under:

(a) The donor should be sane and major and must be the owner of the property which he is gifting.

(b) The thing gifted should be in existence at the time of hiba.

(c) If the thing gifted is divisible, it should be separated and made distinct.

(d) The thing gifted should be such property to benefit from which is lawful under the Shariat.

(e) The thing gifted should not be accompanied by things not gifted i.e. should be free from things which have not been gifted.

(f) The thing gifted should come in the possession of the donee himself or of his representative guardian or executor.

19.

While arriving at the above conclusions, the Hon''ble the

Apex Court has noticed the definitions of gift given in various

treatises on Mohammadan law like Mulla''s Principles of

Mohammadan Law, Syad Ameer Ali''s Commentary on

Mohammadan Law Faiz Badrudidin Tyabji''s Muslim Law-

The Personal Law of Muslims in India and Pakistan and

Dorrul Mokhtar''s Book on Gift and has also referred to its

earlier judgment in Maqbool Alam Khan v. Khodaija, AIR

1966 SC 1194. Therefore, I need not to burden this judgment by

citing and analyzing further precedents. For the present purpose,

suffice is to say that in Muslim law tender, acceptance and

possession of property makes a gift valid.

Whether the deed of gift is compulsorily registrable:

In Ghulam Ahmad Sofi v. Mohd. Sidiq Dareel & Ors., AIR 1974 J & K 59, it has been held that sections 123 and 129 of the Transfer of Property Act do not supersede the Mohammadan law on matter relating to making of oral gifts and therefore registered instrument is not necessary. But if there is executed an instrument and its execution is contemporaneous with the making of the gift then in that case the instrument must be registered as provided under Section 17 of the Registration Act. If, however, the making of the gift is an antecedent act and a deed is executed afterwards as evidencing the said transaction that does not require registration as it is an instrument made after the gift is made and does not therefore create, make or complete the gift thereby transferring the ownership of the property from the executants to the person in whose favour it is executed.

In Chota Uddandu Sahib v. Masthan Bi (died) & Ors., AIR 1975 AP 271, it has been held that if all the formalities, as prescribed by Mohammadan Law, regarding the making of gifts are satisfied, the gift is valid notwithstanding the fact that it is oral and without any instrument. If there is a contemporaneous document it should be registered. But if the gift is antecedent and the deed is subsequent merely evidencing the past transaction, it does not require registration because it does not itself make or complete the gift.

20.

From the above judgments, I may readily draw the following conclusions:

(i) If gift is made orally and an instrument is executed afterwards only for the purpose of evidencing the transaction of gift, then such instrument need not be registered under the provisions of the Registration Act .

(ii) If the gift is made through an instrument that is to say if the gift is made in writing and the instrument itself makes and completes the gift by transferring the ownership of the property to the donee, then such instrument needs to be registered compulsorily under the Registration Act .

21.

The learned Counsel for the respondents has heavily

placed reliance on following lines from the judgment of the

Hon''ble Supreme Court in Mohboob Sahab v. Syed Ismail &

Ors ., AIR 1995 SC 1205, to buttress the argument that the

registration of gift deed in Mohammadan law is not necessary.

"Though gift by a Mohammadan is not required to

be in writing and consequently need not be registered

under the Registration Act ;"

22.

First of all it would be worth mentioning that the

question of registration of the gift deed was not in issue in the

said case as the deed of gift was already registered in that case.

Secondly, if I carefully read the observation, it nowhere says that

if the gift is in writing, it would not be required to be registered. It

simply says that gift by a Mohammadan is not required to be in

writing and if it is not in writing, it need not be registered.

23.

In view of the above position of the law, it becomes

essential to determine whether the gift deed (Ex.3) was an

instrument which itself created, made and completed the gift or it

was an instrument merely evidencing the transaction of gift

executed after an oral gift having previously been made.

24.

All the substantial questions of law raised in this

appeal revolve around the gift deed (Ex.3). Therefore, for the

adjudication of the above questions, the position of gift deed

(Ex.3) needs to be clarified. I would like to first ascertain that

how the lower courts interpreted this document and what their

conclusions were.

25.

The learned trial court approached this document

from two angles, one from execution point of view and other

from content point of view. Delving upon the execution, the

learned trial court finds that there are serious contradictions in

the statement of the sole witness-(PW.2) examined to prove the

document. Besides the witness was interested one. Other two

persons, who were alive and had witnessed the execution of gift

deed (Ex.3) were not called for examination. Defendant No.1,

who is alleged by the plaintiffs to have executed gift deed

(Ex.3), had categorically denied the execution in her written

statement but the plaintiffs neither refuted her statement by

filing counter reply nor tried to compare her thumb impression

to prove the execution. The plaintiffs did also not exhibit the

register in which the alleged gift deed (Ex.3), was entered at the

time of execution. In these circumstances, the learned trial court

did not find (PW.2) to be reliable and draw adverse inference

against the plaintiffs for not examining the other two witnesses

of the execution and for not exhibiting the register in which the

document was entered. Adverting to contents of (Ex.3), the

learned trial court has extensively quoted from the contents of

(Ex.3) and stressing the following phrases viz. " "VERNACULAR MATTER OMITTED"

concluded that the document was contemporaneous one and in

the light of precedents required registration.

26.

Dealing with the first of the above two aspects i.e.

(Ex.3), the learned appellate court held that (PW.2) was an

important witness as he lived in front of the disputed property

and his testimony could not have been rejected only on the basis

of certain technical discrepancies. However, the learned

appellate court has said nothing about the non-examination of

other two witnesses of the execution and non-proving the

register in which gift deed (Ex.3) is alleged to have been

entered. Coming to the contents of gift deed (Ex.3), the learned

appellate court has held that the trial court has over-looked the

fact that it mentions that Mohd. Ibrahim was looking after

defendant No.1- Abdul Rehman which indicates that Mohd.

Ibrahim was living with the donors, defendant No.1 and Abdul

Rehman. Therefore, Mohd. Ibrahim was in possession of the

property. The appellate court has also supported its conclusion

with the statement of (PW.2) to the effect that defendant No.1

had adopted Mohd. Ibrahim and he lived with defendant No.1

and Abdul Rehman. The appellate court has clarified that the

word ''adopted'' in the statement should not be taken in its

technical sense and its over all effect should be seen, which

according to the appellate court means that Mohd. Ibrahim was

living with the donors. Thus, the disputed property had already

been donated to Mohd. Ibrahim and Mohd. Ibrahim was living

with the donors, therefore, there was no need to give him

possession of the property and (Ex.3) was only a subsequent

document evidencing the gift made earlier.

27.

With due difference to the learned appellate court, it

may be said that any witness does not become important or

reliable only for the reason that he was living in front of the

disputed property. While determining the reliability of a witness

his relation with the parties to the suit and consistency of his

statement are relevant factors. These factors can be and should

be taken into consideration before relying upon the testimony of

the witness. I am of the considered view that trial court has

minutely examined the statements of (PW.2) and has rightly

taken into account the relationship of him with the plaintiffs and

has not committed any error in not relying on his statement. The

learned trial court has also not committed any illegality in

drawing adverse inference against the plaintiffs for not

examining the two important and available witnesses of

execution of deed gift (Ex.3).

28.

Thus, I find no fault in trial court''s conclusion that the

plaintiff had failed in proving the execution of document (Ex.3).

29.

The trial court after thoroughly discussed the

evidence available on record, recorded the following findings:-

"VERNACULAR MATTER OMITTED"

30.

In view of the above findings to which I fully agree, it

is proved that execution of the gift deed gift (Ex.3) was not

proved by the plaintiffs.

31.

Coming to the second aspect of (Ex.3) i.e. whether it

was contemporaneous or subsequent to the fact of alleged gift. I

am afraid that the learned appellate court has travelled beyond

the pleadings of the plaintiffs. They have not pleaded in their

plaint that gift had been made earlier and the document (Ex.3)

was written subsequently to evidence the transaction. Besides

this, it may also be kept in mind that witness may lie but the

document not. I cannot brush-aside the contents of the

document only because they were written by some other person

or the executor or by a layman and therefore technicalities

cannot be expected of him. When someone transfers his

property, I cannot assume that he acts negligently or reluctantly.

Neither does he imagine the litigation and the situation arising

from that. Therefore, he generally rights what he intends to

right. Therefore, it is safer to rely on the contents of a

document which was written much earlier than the real

litigation. As far as the issue of living of Mohd. Ibrahim with

defendant No.1 and Abdul Rehman is concerned, it proves

nothing. Even it does not prove possession. For proof of

possession, animus of possession is must and there is nothing

on the record which may show that Mohd. Ibrahim was living

with defendant No.1 and Abdul Rehman as a holder of

possession. Contrary to it, (Ex.3) clearly mentions that he was

living with defendant No.1 and Abdul Rehman to serve them.

Learned trial court has quoted extensively from (Ex.3) and

phrases stressed by the trial court goes to show that donation of

property and its possession and writing of the gift deed were

contemporaneous and the following phrase further fortifies its

conclusion.

"VERNACULAR MATTER OMITTED"

32.

From the above, it is clear that the document speaks

in present and does not refer to any past transaction. Besides, it

clearly shows that until the document was drawn the property was in possession of donor (Party No.1) and possession of the

suit property was handed over simultaneously with the execution

of the instrument in question.

33.

Thus, I have no doubt in my mind that the (Ex.3) is a

contemporaneous instrument which itself made, created and

completed the gift, therefore, it was a document compulsorily

registrable under the provisions of the Registration Act and it is

an admitted fact the document is not registered. Hence it could

not be admissible in evidence.

34.

There is not even a single word in (Ex.3) which may

reflect that the document is subsequent to the gift and had been

written to evidence the transaction. Neither has any witness said

that gift was made orally and the document was written

subsequently. If I read the (Ex.3) dispassionately and as a

whole, it gives clear impression that it is a contemporaneous

instrument which itself makes, creates and completes the gift.

The following phrases used in the instrument clearly show the

intention of the executors and circumstances at the time of

execution.

"VERNACULAR MATTER OMITTED"

(emphasis supplied by me)

35.

This clearly shows that the agreement was written as

a gift deed and it was intended to complete the gift. In view of

this, I am of the considered view that while holding the gift deed

as contemporaneous one the learned trial court has not

committed any error or fact of law.

36.

As has been mentioned above, it is settled position

of law that a contemporaneous gift deed in Mohammadan Law

requires registration and it cannot be taken into evidence unless

it is registered. The trial court has gone through a number of

precedents and has rightly drawn the principle of law laid down

therein. Now, when I have reached to the conclusion with

respect of (Ex.3) that the learned trial court has not committed

any error or fact of law in arriving at the conclusion that gift

deed (Ex.3) was neither proved nor was it registered and

therefore cannot be read as evidence and when the whole claim

of the plaintiffs is based on the said aspects and the conclusion

arriving at by appellate court are devoid of merit.

37.

In view of the above questions of law framed at the

time of admission of the appeal as quoted above may be

answered as under:-

"(1)(i) If the gift is made orally and an instrument is

executed afterwards only for the purpose of

evidencing the transaction of gift, then such

instrument need not to be registered under the

provisions of the Registration Act .

(ii) If the gift is made through an instrument that is

to say, if the gift is made in writing and instrument

itself makes and completes the gift by transferring

the ownership of the property to the donee, then

such instrument needs to be registered compulsorily

under the Registration Act .

(2) There are impeccable findings of fact of the

learned trial court that the execution of the

Bakshisnama (Ex.3) has not been proved and even if

it is taken that the document had duly been

executed, its contents clearly indicate that it was a

contemporaneous document and therefore, it needed

registration and admittedly the document is not

registered and there is also no evidence which may

show that Mohd. Ibrahim had accepted the gift

purported to have been made by the said gift deed

(Ex.3) and as such transaction of gift was not

completed as per Mohammadan Law. In view of the

above, the document (Ex.3) has no value in the eye

of law and therefore, no question of preference

arises."

(3) As discussed above, the execution of the

document (Ex.3) gift deed was not proved and one

of the reasons of the said conclusion is that the

plaintiffs had not refuted the statement of

respondent No.1, the simple reply is that in such

circumstances, document could not have been relied

upon.

(4) As discussed above, besides the absence of the

pleadings, its contents also clearly indicated that it

was a contemporaneous document intended to

complete the gift.

(5) As discussed above, the findings recorded by the

trial court have no infirmity, either from the

appreciation of evidence point of view or from the

application of law point of view. Therefore, the

appellate court was not justified in reversing the

findings of the trial court on the said issues."

38.

As a result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment

and decree dated 30.09.1999 passed by the first appellate court

are hereby set aside and decree and judgment of the trial court

dated 19.03.1987 is hereby restored. No order as to costs.