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Judgment
Through the medium of the present Original Application filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant has called in question the legality and validity of Order No.1582 of 2025 dated 22.08.2025 issued by the Additional Director General of Police, Armed, J&K, whereby the applicant was detached from Sub Police Hospital, Zewan and directed to report to his parent Battalion, the consequential relieving order dated 25.08.2025 issued by the Commandant, JKAP 9th Battalion, as well as the speaking order bearing No.1713 of 2025 dated 24.09.2025, whereby the representation submitted by the applicant pursuant to the directions of this Tribunal came to be rejected. The applicant has further prayed for consequential directions commanding the respondents to permit him to continue as Dental Hygienist at Sub Police Hospital, Zewan, with all consequential service benefits. During the pendency of the Original Application, the applicant has also instituted M.A. No.431/2026 seeking release of the salary allegedly withheld by the respondents. Since the controversy raised in the Miscellaneous Application is intrinsically connected with the issues involved in the Original Application, both matters were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
The facts, giving rise to the present litigation, are not substantially in dispute. The applicant was appointed as a Constable in the Jammu and Kashmir Armed Police and has been serving in the Police Department for more than three decades. While he was serving in the Armed Police, the Police Headquarters issued Circular No. Pers-A-52/2008/17075-275 dated 24.11.2008 inviting applications from police personnel possessing technical and paramedical qualifications for their deployment in Police Hospitals and Medical Inspection Rooms functioning under the control of the Police Department. The object of the said exercise, as projected by the applicant, was to utilize technically qualified police personnel in specialized medical establishments instead of assigning them ordinary policing duties.
**03.**The applicant, being possessed of a Diploma in Dental Hygienist Course, submitted his candidature through the proper channel pursuant to the aforesaid circular. His qualification was verified by the competent authorities and his case was forwarded to the Police Headquarters for consideration. Thereafter, Police Headquarters issued Order No.3853 of 2010 dated 09.12.2010, whereby several police personnel possessing technical qualifications were deployed in different Police Hospitals and Medical Inspection Rooms. In terms of the said order, the applicant came to be deployed as Dental Hygienist in the Medical Inspection Room attached to IRP 14th Battalion, Naidkhai. The applicant asserts that the deployment was made by the Police Headquarters after due scrutiny of his technical qualification and was not a mere temporary attachment liable to be altered at the whims of subordinate authorities.
**04.**The applicant has laid considerable emphasis upon one of the conditions incorporated in the aforesaid deployment order, which specifically provided that the services of the personnel deployed under the said order shall not be disturbed by any subordinate formation without prior approval of the Police Headquarters. According to the applicant, the said stipulation conferred exclusive authority upon the Police Headquarters to regulate the deployment of such technically qualified personnel and simultaneously prohibited subordinate formations from disturbing the same without obtaining prior approval. It is pleaded that the said condition remained operative throughout and was never withdrawn or superseded by any subsequent order issued by the competent authority.
**05.**It is further averred that after his deployment, the applicant continuously discharged his duties as Dental Hygienist for almost fourteen years. During the said period, his services were utilized exclusively in the medical establishment and he acquired considerable experience in the field of dental care. According to him, the respondents themselves repeatedly recognized him as a Dental Hygienist and permitted him to continue in the said capacity without interruption for more than a decade.
**06.**The applicant has further pleaded that the Police Headquarters thereafter issued another order dated 03.08.2018 whereby certain transfer orders issued by the Armed Police Headquarters in respect of paramedical personnel were cancelled. According to the applicant, the said order reaffirmed that matters concerning deployment of technical staff working in Police Hospitals continued to remain within the exclusive domain of the Police Headquarters. It is, therefore, contended that the departmental practice itself demonstrates that subordinate authorities were never authorized to disturb such deployments independently.
The controversy, however, arose when respondent No.3 issued Order No.1582 of 2025 dated 22.08.2025, whereby the applicant, along with several other officials, was detached from Sub Police Hospital, Zewan and directed to report to his parent unit i.e., IRP 19th Battalion. Consequent thereto, the Commandant, JKAP 9th Battalion, issued consequential relieving order dated 25.08.2025 formally relieving the applicant from Sub Police Hospital, Zewan. Feeling aggrieved, the applicant approached this Tribunal by filing O.A. No.959/2025. The said Original Application came to be disposed of by directing the respondents to treat the Original Application as a representation and decide the same by passing a reasoned order in accordance with law, while observing that if the applicant had not already been relieved, he shall not be relieved till such consideration.
Since the grievance of the applicant still remained unaddressed and the relieving order had also been issued, the applicant again approached this Tribunal by filing O.A. No.1021/2025. The Tribunal, while disposing of the said Original Application, again directed the respondents to consider the representation of the applicant by keeping in view his qualifications as well as the experience gained by him while working as Dental Hygienist for nearly fourteen years and to pass a speaking order within the stipulated period.
Pursuant to the aforesaid directions, respondent No.3 passed Speaking Order No.1713 of 2025 dated 24.09.2025 rejecting the claim of the applicant. The speaking order proceeds on the premise that the applicant was originally appointed as a Constable in the General Cadre of the Armed Police, that he continued to hold his lien in the Armed Police, that he had merely been attached to the Medical Inspection Room and that the Armed Police Headquarters, being the controlling authority of the Armed Police Battalions, possessed the competence to repatriate or detach him to his parent Battalion in the interest of administration and operational exigencies. The speaking order further records that the applicant had already been relieved prior to the orders passed by this Tribunal in the earlier Original Applications and that another official had already joined against the post held by him. On the said reasoning, the claim of the applicant came to be rejected.
Challenging the aforesaid orders, learned counsel appearing for the applicant contended that the impugned action is ex facie without jurisdiction. It is argued that once the Police Headquarters itself deployed the applicant as Dental Hygienist under Order No.3853 of 2010 and simultaneously prohibited subordinate formations from disturbing such deployment without prior approval of the Police Headquarters, respondent No.3 lacked the competence to issue the detachment order. According to the learned counsel, no material has been placed on record by the respondents to demonstrate that the Police Headquarters ever granted such approval or independently decided to repatriate the applicant.
Learned counsel further submits that the speaking order dated 24.09.2025 is legally unsustainable for an additional reason. It is argued that respondent No.3, who himself issued the impugned detachment order dated 22.08.2025, proceeded to decide the representation pursuant to the directions issued by this Tribunal. According to the learned counsel, the very authority whose action was under challenge could not have assumed the role of an adjudicating authority over the correctness of his own decision. Such an exercise, according to him, is contrary to the settled principles of fairness in administrative decision-making and renders the speaking order vulnerable in law.
It is also submitted that the respondents have sought to justify their action by placing reliance upon PHQ Order No.1375 of 2013 dated 21.05.2013. According to the applicant, the said order merely transferred the applicant from IRP-7th Battalion to JKAP-9th Battalion while continuing his deployment in the Medical establishment and nowhere records that the conditions incorporated in Order No.3853 of 2010 stood withdrawn or superseded. It is contended that the respondents have attempted to read into the subsequent order something which it does not provide. In the absence of any express withdrawal of the condition requiring prior approval of the Police Headquarters, it is argued that the respondents could not legally assume jurisdiction to disturb the applicant's deployment.
Learned counsel for the applicant further placed reliance upon the judgment of the Full Bench of the Hon'ble High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in Syed Hilal Ahmad v. State of J&K is SWP No. 1476 of 2014, decided on August 31, 2015 to contend that although transfer is an incidence of service, judicial review is permissible where the impugned action is shown to have been taken by an incompetent authority or in violation of binding statutory or administrative instructions. Reliance was also placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405, to contend that an administrative order must stand or fall on the reasons contained therein and cannot subsequently be supplemented by fresh reasons furnished through affidavits. It was, therefore, submitted that the respondents could not improve the impugned speaking order by filing the compliance affidavit during the pendency of the present proceedings.
Per contra, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the respondents opposed the Original Application and submitted that the applicant has attempted to project a simple administrative detachment as if it were an illegal interference with a permanent posting. According to the respondents, the applicant was initially appointed as a Constable in the General Cadre of the Jammu and Kashmir Armed Police and, notwithstanding his deployment in the Medical Inspection Room, continued to hold his substantive post, lien, seniority and promotional avenues in the Armed Police Cadre. It is submitted that the applicant was granted two functional/in-situ promotions by the Armed Police Headquarters only because he continued to remain borne on the strength of the Armed Police and, therefore, the contention that the Armed Police Headquarters lacked jurisdiction to regulate his deployment is wholly misconceived.
Learned Deputy Advocate General further submitted that although the applicant was initially deployed in the Medical Inspection Room under Order No.3853 of 2010, the said deployment did not create any indefeasible or permanent right in his favour to continue at the same place indefinitely. Attention was invited to Condition No.(iii) incorporated in the very same order, wherein it was specifically provided that the deployment would not confer any preferential right upon the deployed officials to claim permanent absorption in the para-medical stream. According to the respondents, the intention of the Police Headquarters was only to utilize the services of technically qualified personnel in medical establishments as long as administrative exigencies so warranted, and not to permanently separate such personnel from the Armed Police Cadre.
The principal defence set up by the respondents, however, rests upon PHQ Order No.1375 of 2013 dated 21.05.2013. It is contended that the applicant, who was earlier deployed in the Medical Inspection Room attached to IRP-14th Battalion, Naidkhai, was subsequently transferred by the Police Headquarters itself to JKAP-9th Battalion (Sub Police Hospital, Zewan) under the aforesaid order. Unlike Order No.3853 of 2010, the subsequent order did not incorporate any of the conditions contained in the earlier order, particularly the stipulation requiring prior approval of the Police Headquarters before disturbing the posting of the deployed personnel. According to the respondents, once the Police Headquarters itself transferred the applicant under Order No.1375 of 2013 without reiterating the earlier conditions, those conditions automatically ceased to govern the service position of the applicant and, consequently, the Armed Police Headquarters became fully competent to regulate his deployment in accordance with administrative requirements.
It is further pleaded that the detachment order dated 22.08.2025 was issued purely on account of acute operational and administrative exigencies. The respondents have asserted that there was an urgent requirement of manpower in the Armed Police Battalions for field duties and maintenance of law and order in view of the expansion of the railway network to the Kashmir Valley and the increasing deployment commitments of the Armed Police. According to them, the continuation of a large number of Armed Police personnel outside their parent Battalions for indefinite periods had adversely affected the operational preparedness and manpower management of the organization, necessitating their repatriation to the parent units. It is in these circumstances that as many as nineteen officials, including the applicant, were detached from their places of attachment and directed to report back to their respective parent units.
The respondents have also maintained that the applicant continued to remain a member of the Armed Police Cadre and that the Armed Police Headquarters, being the supervisory and controlling authority over the Armed Battalions, possessed ample administrative authority to regulate the deployment, utilization and repatriation of its personnel. It is contended that the detachment order falls squarely within the scope of the powers exercised by the Armed Police Headquarters for ensuring discipline, administrative efficiency and optimum utilization of manpower. The respondents have, therefore, asserted that the impugned orders are not only legally valid but are also fully justified on administrative considerations.
It is further the stand of the respondents that the applicant had already been relieved from Sub Police Hospital, Zewan on 25.08.2025 in pursuance of the detachment order and, immediately thereafter, another official had joined against the post occupied by the applicant. Consequently, by the time O.A. No.959/2025 and thereafter O.A. No.1021/2025 came to be decided by this Tribunal, the applicant had already stood relieved and a substitute had assumed charge. It is submitted that the Tribunal, while disposing of the earlier Original Applications, had merely directed consideration of the applicant's representation and had nowhere directed that the newly posted incumbent be displaced or that the applicant be restored to his earlier position. On this basis, the respondents contend that the interim protection granted by this Tribunal could not be interpreted as conferring upon the applicant a right to rejoin the post from which he had already been relieved.
Pursuant to the interim order dated 23.12.2025 passed by this Tribunal directing the Director General of Police, J&K, to clarify the position regarding the competence of the authority to issue the impugned detachment order, a compliance affidavit dated 10.02.2026 came to be filed by Shri Anand Jain, IPS, Additional Director General of Police, Armed J&K, explaining the stand of the respondents regarding the authority exercised by the Armed Police Headquarters in issuing the impugned order. In the said affidavit, it has been reiterated that although Order No.3853 of 2010 contained a stipulation requiring prior approval of the Police Headquarters before disturbing the deployment of the officials mentioned therein, the said conditions ceased to govern the case of the applicant once he was transferred by the Police Headquarters itself under Order No.1375 of 2013. It is asserted that the subsequent order constituted an independent order of transfer and did not preserve or incorporate the earlier conditions. Consequently, according to the respondents, the applicant thereafter became liable to be dealt with in accordance with the normal administrative powers of the Armed Police Headquarters.
**21.**Thereafter, another compliance affidavit dated 09.03.2026 also came to be filed by Shri Sandeep Wazir, IPS, on behalf of the Director General of Police, J&K, reiterating that the applicant continued to belong to the Armed Police Cadre; that all his promotions had been granted within the Armed Police hierarchy; that no order of permanent absorption in the para-medical establishment had ever been issued in his favour; and that the impugned order merely directed him to report back to his parent Battalion without affecting his substantive appointment or service conditions. It is, therefore, contended that the impugned order is in the nature of a routine administrative deployment which does not warrant interference by this Tribunal in exercise of its power of judicial review.
**22.**Insofar as M.A. No.431/2026 is concerned, the applicant has pleaded that despite the interim order passed by this Tribunal directing maintenance of status quo, the respondents have withheld his salary from February, 2026 onwards without any formal order and without assigning any lawful justification. The respondents, on the other
hand, have opposed the application by contending that, upon completion of the pre-promotion course, the applicant neither reported to his parent Battalion nor actually discharged duties at the place where he claims to have remained posted. It is, therefore, contended that withholding of the applicant’s salary is fully justified on the principle that salary is payable only for duties actually performed, and not otherwise. These rival claims, according to the parties, are consequential to the principal controversy involved in the Original Application and would necessarily depend upon the determination of the legality of the impugned detachment order.
Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant has, at all times, remained willing to discharge his duties. It was further contended that the respondents themselves continued to treat him as deployed at Sub Police Hospital, Zewan. In support of his submission, reliance was placed upon the communication dated 08.12.2025 issued by the Incharge, Sub Police Hospital, Zewan seeking instructions regarding the applicant's joining, the communication dated 20.11.2025 issued by the Commandant, IRP 19th Battalion acknowledging the applicant's deputation for the pre-promotion course, and the wireless communication dated 09.03.2026 wherein the respondents themselves reflected the applicant's place of deployment as Sub Police Hospital, Zewan. It was, therefore, contended that the respondents could not simultaneously continue to treat the applicant as deployed at Sub Police Hospital, Zewan and yet deny him salary without any lawful order.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length, perused the pleadings, examined the documents placed on record and given thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties.
Upon consideration of the pleadings and the material placed on record, it emerges that the controversy in the present case does not merely concern the transfer of an employee from one place to another. The principal issue which falls for determination is whether respondent No.3 possessed the legal competence to issue Order No.1582 of 2025 dated 22.08.2025 notwithstanding the condition incorporated in PHQ Order No.3853 of 2010 and, if so, whether the subsequent orders relied upon by the respondents had the effect of superseding or rendering inoperative the said condition. Closely allied to this issue is the legality of the speaking order dated 24.09.2025 and the consequential claim of the applicant for release of salary during the pendency of the Original Application.
The principal question which arises for consideration before this Tribunal is not whether the applicant is holding a transferable post. Equally, it is not in dispute that transfer is an incidence of service and that ordinarily a Government servant cannot claim a vested right to continue at a particular place of posting. These propositions are too well settled to admit of any debate. The controversy in the present case, however, lies in a much narrower compass. The issue requiring determination is whether respondent No.3 possessed the authority in law to issue the impugned detachment order dated 22.08.2025 in the face of the conditions incorporated in PHQ Order No.3853 of 2010, or whether such power continued to vest exclusively with the Police Headquarters?
Before adverting to the rival submissions, it would be advantageous to examine the nature of the applicant's deployment. It is not disputed that the applicant was initially appointed as a Constable General Cadre in the J&K Armed Police. It is equally undisputed that the applicant possessed the technical qualification of Dental Hygienist. Another undisputed fact is that Police Headquarters had issued a Circular dated 24.11.2008 inviting applications from technically qualified police personnel for utilization in Police Hospitals and Medical Inspection Rooms. Pursuant thereto, the Police Headquarters issued Order No.3853 of 2010 dated 09.12.2010 whereby the applicant, along with several other technically qualified officials, was deployed in different medical establishments of the Police Department.
A careful reading of the aforesaid order reveals that it was not a routine transfer order issued in the ordinary course of service. Rather, it was a policy decision taken by the Police Headquarters to utilize technically qualified police personnel in specialized medical institutions established within the Department. Such deployment was preceded by verification of qualifications and recommendations received from the respective units. The object was obviously to ensure optimum utilization of technical manpower available within the Police Department itself.
More importantly, the said order contained four conditions governing such deployment. One of those conditions specifically stipulated that the services of the personnel deployed under the order shall not be disturbed by any subordinate formation without prior approval of the Police Headquarters. The language employed therein is plain, unambiguous and leaves little scope for any other interpretation. The restriction is not advisory in nature; rather, it constitutes a clear embargo upon subordinate formations from independently altering the deployment of the officials covered by the order.
The respondents do not dispute the existence of the aforesaid condition. Their entire defence, however, proceeds on the premise that the said condition ceased to operate after issuance of PHQ Order No.1375 of 2013 dated 21.05.2013 whereby the applicant was transferred from IRP-7th Battalion to JKAP-9th Battalion (Sub Police Hospital, Zewan). According to the respondents, since the subsequent order did not reproduce the conditions incorporated in Order No.3853 of 2010, the earlier conditions automatically stood effaced.
I am unable to subscribe to the aforesaid submission for more than one reason.
Firstly, Order No.1375 of 2013 nowhere records that it supersedes, modifies or withdraws the conditions incorporated in Order No.3853 of 2010. Neither does it contain any recital indicating that the Police Headquarters intended to revoke the protection earlier granted to technically qualified personnel deployed in medical establishments. In administrative law, an executive instruction or condition governing service rights cannot ordinarily be presumed to have been impliedly withdrawn merely because a subsequent order is silent on the subject. If the competent authority intended to remove the embargo imposed upon subordinate formations, nothing prevented it from expressly stating so.
Secondly, the transfer effected under Order No.1375 of 2013 was itself issued by the Police Headquarters. Thus, even assuming that the applicant was shifted from one medical establishment to another, such shift was effected by the very authority which originally exercised control over his deployment. The issuance of another order by the same authority cannot, by itself, lead to the inference that the authority intended to divest itself of the exclusive power which it had consciously reserved under the earlier order. On the contrary, the issuance of transfer/deployment order under the same very authority itself reinforces the applicant’s contention that the authority to determine and regulate his deployment continued to vest exclusively with PHQ (DGP J&K).
**34.**Thirdly, the subsequent conduct of the Police Headquarters also assumes significance. The record placed before this Tribunal shows that even in the year 2018, the Police Headquarters intervened and cancelled certain transfer orders issued by the Armed Police Headquarters affecting paramedical personnel. Such intervention lends considerable support to the case set up by the applicant that matters relating to deployment of technical personnel in Police Hospitals continued to be regulated at the level of the Police Headquarters and were not left to the discretion of subordinate formations. This contemporaneous departmental practice is wholly inconsistent with the stand now sought to be projected by the respondents in these proceedings. Had the respondents' interpretation been correct, there would have been little occasion for the Police Headquarters to interfere with transfer orders issued by the Armed Police Headquarters in respect of such personnel.
Further, during the course of arguments, the applicant placed reliance upon the detachment Order No.58 of 2026 dated 06.01.2026, whereby personnel posted in the medical establishment at Sub Police Hospital, Zewan where the applicant is serving were detached to their parent unit, for further duties. The said order expressly records that it was issued with the approval of DG-P. The aforesaid order does not appear to be in consonance with the stand taken by the respondents that deployment or detachment orders can be issued by formations subordinate to the PHQ.
The respondents have also relied upon Condition No.(iii) contained in Order No.3853 of 2010 to contend that the deployment did not confer any preferential right upon the applicant to claim permanent absorption in the para-medical stream. There can be no quarrel with the said proposition. Indeed, the applicant has not sought declaration of permanent absorption in the para-medical Cadre. The issue before this Tribunal is altogether different. The applicant does not claim a right of absorption; he questions the competence of the authority which disturbed his deployment. The distinction between the two concepts is fundamental and cannot be overlooked.
Learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance upon the Full Bench judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in Syed Hilal Ahmad (supra). Since the controversy in the present case also concerns the competence of the authority issuing the impugned order, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by the Full Bench. Paragraph 12 reads thus:
"It is also a settled proposition of law that transfer is an incidence of service and a government servant is subject to orders of transfer on administrative exigencies. A government servant cannot insist that he is entitled to continue in a particular station/post for a definite period. Interference in the orders of transfer by the Courts are very limited i.e. only on three grounds orders of transfer can be interfered, namely, if the order of transfer is passed in violation of any statutory Rule, or on mala fide reasons or by an incompetent authority".
Considerable emphasis was also laid by the respondents upon the principle that transfer is an incidence of service and that an employee has no vested right to remain posted at one place. The proposition is unexceptionable. However, it is equally well settled that while the power of transfer ordinarily falls within the exclusive domain of the employer, such power must nevertheless be exercised by the authority competent to do so and in conformity with the governing statutory rules, executive instructions or departmental orders. Judicial review is not directed against the wisdom of the transfer but against the decision-making process and the competence of the authority passing the order. Therefore, where an order is alleged to have been issued by an authority lacking jurisdiction, the Tribunal is not precluded from examining such issue merely because the matter relates to transfer.
Another aspect which requires consideration is the validity of the speaking order dated 24.09.2025 passed by respondent No.3 pursuant to the directions issued by this Tribunal in O.A. No.959/2025 and O.A. No.1021/2025. A perusal of the earlier orders passed by this Tribunal would show that the respondents were directed to treat the Original Applications as representations and consider the grievances projected by the applicant by passing a reasoned and speaking order. More particularly, while disposing of O.A. No.1021/2025, this Tribunal had specifically directed the respondents to consider the qualification possessed by the applicant as well as the experience gained by him during the fourteen years he had served as a Dental Hygienist.
The speaking order dated 24.09.2025 reveals that the representation came to be decided by the very authority who had earlier issued the impugned detachment order dated 22.08.2025. The Additional Director General of Police (Armed), respondent No.3, who passed the order of detachment, himself examined the legality and correctness of his own decision while disposing of the representation. The question, therefore, is not merely whether the order contains reasons but whether the authority deciding the representation could have objectively adjudicated upon the validity of his own administrative action.
The principles governing administrative fairness are too well entrenched to require elaborate discussion. One of the fundamental canons of fair decision-making is that an authority called upon to reconsider an action should approach the matter with an open and unbiased mind. Although departmental authorities may, in appropriate circumstances, reconsider their own administrative orders, where a superior judicial forum directs reconsideration of a grievance against a particular administrative action, the purpose of such direction is to ensure an effective, fair and meaningful consideration of the representation. Such purpose would stand substantially diluted if the very authority whose action is under challenge proceeds to examine the legality of his own decision without there being any independent scrutiny by the competent superior authority.
**42.**In the present case, the applicant had specifically asserted before this Tribunal that respondent No.3 lacked the jurisdiction to disturb his deployment in view of the conditions contained in PHQ Order No.3853 of 2010. Therefore, the issue before the respondents was not confined to the administrative desirability of the detachment but extended to the very competence of respondent No.3 to pass the order. In such circumstances, the question of jurisdiction ought to have received independent consideration at the level of the competent authority instead of being examined by the officer whose competence itself had been questioned. The impugned action is in clear violation of the well- established principle of natural justice encapsulated in the maxim nemo judex in causa sua, which postulates that no one should be judge in his own cause.
Learned counsel for the applicant has further relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill (supra). Since the respondents have attempted to justify the impugned order by filing a compliance affidavit before this Tribunal, it would be appropriate to notice the law laid down therein:
"8.The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanji:
"Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself." Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older".
Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case, this Tribunal is unable to accept the respondents' attempt to sustain the impugned speaking order by assigning additional reasons in the compliance affidavit filed during the pendency of these proceedings. Whether respondent No.3 possessed the authority to disturb the applicant's deployment was required to be demonstrated from the impugned speaking order itself. The deficiency therein cannot be cured by subsequently advancing explanations through affidavits.
The above principle fully supports the distinction already noticed by this Tribunal. The applicant has not questioned the transfer on the ground that he has a right to remain posted at a particular place. His challenge is confined to the competence of respondent No.3 to disturb a deployment governed by the conditions incorporated in PHQ Order No.3853 of 2010. The controversy, therefore, falls within the limited scope of judicial review recognized by the Full Bench.
This Tribunal also cannot ignore the subsequent departmental communications placed on record by the applicant. The communication dated 08.12.2025 issued by the Incharge, Sub Police Hospital, Zewan clearly sought instructions from the Commandant, IRP 19th Battalion regarding the applicant's joining after reference to the orders passed by this Tribunal. Likewise, the communication dated 20.11.2025 issued by the Commandant, IRP 19th Battalion records that the applicant had been deputed for the pre-promotion course and had been relieved directly by the Sub Police Hospital authorities. These communications unmistakably demonstrate that even amongst the departmental authorities existed uncertainty regarding the applicant's proper place of posting.
This Tribunal also cannot lose sight of the proceedings which took place during the pendency of the present Original Application. When the matter initially came up for consideration, this Tribunal specifically called upon the respondents to clarify the competence of the authority who had issued the impugned order in the light of the condition contained in PHQ Order No.3853 of 2010, whereby it had been stipulated that the services of the deployed personnel shall not be disturbed by subordinate formations without prior approval of the Police Headquarters.
The compliance affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No.3 substantially reiterates the reasoning already assigned in the speaking order. However, neither the speaking order nor the compliance affidavit refers to any subsequent order issued by the Police Headquarters expressly rescinding, modifying or withdrawing the condition contained in the 2010 order. On the contrary, the entire defence rests upon an inference sought to be drawn from the silence of the 2013 order.
The compliance affidavits filed during the pendency of the proceedings seek to explain that the conditions incorporated in Order No.3853 of 2010 stood impliedly superseded by Order No.1375 of 2013. However, no such reasoning finds place in the impugned speaking order dated 24.09.2025. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill (supra), the validity of the impugned order has to be tested on the reasons contained therein and cannot be supplemented by fresh explanations furnished through affidavits.
In the considered opinion of this Tribunal, such an inference cannot furnish a legally sustainable foundation for assuming jurisdiction. Jurisdiction cannot ordinarily be inferred by implication where the governing administrative order expressly imposes a restriction upon the exercise of such power. In the absence of any express order issued by the Police Headquarters withdrawing the embargo or granting prior approval in the case of the applicant, the respondents have failed to place before this Tribunal any material demonstrating that respondent No.3 acquired the competence to independently disturb the applicant's deployment.
**51.**It is true that administrative exigencies may justify the transfer or repatriation of an employee. It is equally true that no Government servant can insist upon serving at a particular station merely because he has continued there for a considerable period. However, administrative necessity cannot override the requirement that the decision must emanate from the authority competent to take it. If the competent authority considers it necessary, in public interest or administrative exigency, to repatriate the applicant to his parent Battalion, nothing prevents it from doing so in accordance with law. What is under scrutiny before this Tribunal is not the desirability of the decision but the authority by whom the decision has been taken.
The respondents have repeatedly emphasized that the applicant continues to hold his lien in the Armed Police Cadre and that his promotions have also been granted within the said cadre. This factual position has never been disputed by the applicant. Nevertheless, retention of lien in the parent cadre does not answer the principal issue raised in the present proceedings. The existence of lien determines the substantive service rights of the employee; it does not, by itself, dispense with compliance of the departmental conditions governing specialized deployments made by the Police Headquarters.
Equally significant is the wireless communication dated 09.03.2026 issued by the Commandant, IRP 19th Battalion in connection with the Annual Range Classification. In the said communication, the applicant's name appears at Serial No.5 and his place of deployment is specifically shown as "Sub Police Hospital, Zewan". This official record emanating from the respondents themselves prima facie indicates that even several months after issuance of the impugned detachment order, the applicant continued to be reflected in the departmental record as deployed at Sub Police Hospital, Zewan. This circumstance assumes relevance while considering the respondents' stand that the applicant was not entitled to salary on the ground that he was not serving at the said place.
The Tribunal is, therefore, of the considered view that the respondents have failed to satisfactorily demonstrate either that the condition incorporated in PHQ Order No.3853 of 2010 stood expressly withdrawn or that prior approval of the Police Headquarters had, in fact, been obtained before issuance of the impugned detachment order. Consequently, the very foundation upon which respondent No.3 assumed jurisdiction to pass Order No.1582 of 2025 dated 22.08.2025 remains unsupported by the material placed on record.
Having arrived at the aforesaid conclusion, the next question which arises for consideration is the effect of the speaking order dated 24.09.2025. As already noticed, the said order is primarily founded upon the assumption that respondent No.3 was competent to issue the detachment order dated 22.08.2025 and that the conditions incorporated in PHQ Order No.3853 of 2010 no longer governed the service position of the applicant after issuance of PHQ Order No.1375 of 2013. Since this Tribunal has found that the respondents have failed to establish the legal basis for such assumption, the reasoning contained in the speaking order cannot be sustained.
A speaking order derives its legitimacy not merely from the reasons recorded therein but equally from the correctness of the legal foundation on which those reasons rest. Once the basic premise regarding the competence of the authority is found to be unsupported by the governing departmental orders, the consequential order rejecting the representation cannot survive independent of the original action. Consequently, Speaking Order No.1713 of 2025 dated 24.09.2025 also becomes liable to be interfered with.
At the same time, this Tribunal is conscious of the settled legal position that transfer and deployment of personnel in disciplined forces ordinarily fall within the exclusive administrative domain of the employer. Courts and Tribunals are expected to exercise restraint while interfering with such matters unless the impugned action is shown to be vitiated by lack of jurisdiction, violation of statutory provisions, mala fides or patent arbitrariness. The interference by this Tribunal is not because the applicant has any vested right to continue at Sub Police Hospital, Zewan, or because this Tribunal seeks to substitute its own view regarding administrative requirements. The interference is confined solely to the question of competence of the authority issuing the impugned orders.
The respondents have consistently sought to justify the impugned action by referring to operational requirements, shortage of manpower and administrative exigencies. There can be no dispute that such considerations legitimately fall within the administrative domain of the employer. However, where the decision itself is shown to have been taken by an authority whose competence has not been established, administrative exigency alone cannot sustain the action. Nothing prevented the Police Headquarters, being the competent authority, from independently examining the matter and taking an appropriate decision in accordance with law.
Learned Deputy Advocate General had also argued that another official has already joined in place of the applicant and that restoration of the applicant would disturb the existing administrative arrangement. This submission, though relevant from an administrative standpoint, cannot validate an order which otherwise suffers from want of jurisdiction. Administrative convenience cannot cure an action found to be contrary to the governing departmental framework. The appropriate course, therefore, is to set aside the impugned orders while reserving liberty to the competent authority to take a fresh decision in accordance with law.
In these circumstances, Order No.1582 of 2025 dated 22.08.2025, the consequential relieving order dated 25.08.2025 and Speaking Order No.1713 of 2025 dated 24.09.2025 are hereby quashed and set aside. However, the competent authority DGP, J&K Police Headquarters is directed to examine the question of the applicant's deployment afresh, strictly in accordance with the applicable departmental orders, and on its own merits, keeping in view the observations made herein. Such consideration shall be undertaken upon an independent application of mind to the issues raised by the applicant. The competent authority shall also consider the applicant's specific contention that his deployment under Order No.3853 of 2010 could not have been disturbed without the prior approval of the Police Headquarters and shall record specific findings thereon. While undertaking such exercise, the competent authority shall also keep in view that the applicant is a qualified Dental Hygienist, has been discharging duties in the medical establishment for more than fourteen years, has acquired considerable practical experience in the specialized field and is presently at the verge of retirement.
**61.**Insofar as M.A. No.431/2026 is concerned, this Tribunal finds that the applicant's claim for release of salary is a direct consequence of the controversy arising out of the impugned detachment order. The respondents have justified the withholding of salary on the ground that the applicant did not discharge duties after completion of the pre-promotion course. The applicant, on the other hand, relies upon the departmental communications dated 20.11.2025, 08.12.2025 and the wireless communication dated 09.03.2026 to contend that the respondents themselves continued to treat him as deployed at Sub Police Hospital, Zewan. These rival claims cannot be satisfactorily adjudicated without examination of the relevant service records by the competent authority.
**62.**Accordingly, for release of salary, Police Headquarters through the Director General of Police (respondent No.2) shall decide the applicant's claim by passing a reasoned order in the light of the observations made hereinabove. Such consideration shall specifically take into account the interim order dated 23.12.2025 passed by this Tribunal, the communication dated 08.12.2025 issued by the Incharge, Sub Police Hospital, Zewan, the communication dated 20.11.2025 issued by the Commandant, IRP 19th Battalion, the wireless communication dated 09.03.2026 reflecting the applicant's deployment at Sub Police Hospital, Zewan and all other relevant service records.
**63.**Resultantly, the Original Application stands allowed in the aforesaid terms. The respondents shall comply with the directions contained in paragraphs 60 to 62 of this judgment within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. Till such compliance and the fresh decision by the competent authority, the applicant shall be permitted to continue at his present place of deployment, Sub Police Hospital, Zewan and the same shall not be disturbed.
M.A. No.431/2026 shall also stand disposed of in terms of the directions contained in paragraphs 61 and 62 of this judgment.
Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. Interim direction(s), if any, shall stand merged. There shall be no order as to costs.
Registry shall consign the record to the Record Room after due completion.
