Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs J.B. Bottling Company Pvt. Ltd.

(1) The following question has been referred by the learned Judges of the Division Bench (Jagjit Singh and M. S. Joshi, JJ) by their order of reference dated August II. 1975.for decision of the full Bench :

" WHETHER holding one or more shares in the Municipal Corporation Cooperative Stores Limited or in any other cooperative society or company, engaged in the manufacture, importer sale of any article of food, amounts to having financial interest in the manufacture, import or sale of articles of food for purposes of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 9 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,1954".

(2) Lala Bishambar Dayal, learned counsel for the appellant in the criminal appeal out of which the present reference has arisen, raised a preliminary objection that the reference itself is incompetents this question does not arise on the facts of this case. It was submitted by the learned counsel that the question, whether the Food Inspector who took the sample in the present case was duly appointed or not, was not raised in the courts below and, Therefore, it cannot be raised in the present appeal and even if the appointment of the Food Inspector is invalid within the meaning of section 9(1) of the prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, it cannot be raised during the hearing of the criminal appeal. It was also submitted that on the facts of this case, it would have no effect and, Therefore, the full Bench should decline to answer the question.

(3) Whether the respondents can raise these questions or wither these questions will arise in the criminal appeal are matters for decision of the Division Bench who hears the appeal. We would be enlarging the scope of reference if we go into the preliminary objections raised bythe learned counsel which, we are afraid, we are neither competent to go into nor are we inclined to go into at this stage. These are all matters which the appellant would be free to urge before the Division Bench which hears the appeal and our answer to the reference would in no way prevent the learned counsel to make his submissions before the Division Bench after the reference has been answered.

(4) It appears that the reference has been made by the learned Judges of the Division Bench in view of the conflict in the observations of this Court (Rangarajan and Prakash Narain, JJ) in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Takhat Ram (1974 Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases 232) (1) and the decision of the Chief Justice Falshawand Mehar Singh, J. in an unreported decision in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Rajev and another : (Criminal Appeal No. 169-D of1962 decided on 11-2-1965) (2). Whereas the decision of the learned Judges of this Court in the aforesaid case of Takhat Ram related to the interpretation of proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 9 in relation to the appointment of Food Inspector, the decision of the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court related to the interpretation of an identical proviso to Section 8 in relation to the appointment of a public analyst.

(5) The relevant provisions of Sections 8 and 9 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act")may be reproduced for facility of understanding and determining the scope of relevant provisos :

"8.Public Analysts :-The Central Government or the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint such persons as it thinks fit, having the prescribed qualifications to be public analysts for such local areas as may be assigned to them by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be :

PROVIDED that no person who has any financial interest in the manufacturer, import or sale of any article of food shall be appointed to be a public analyst under this section :

PROVIDED further that different public analysts may be appointed for different articles of food.

(6) Food inspectors :-(1) The Central Government or the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette ,appoint such persons as it thinks fit, having? he prescribed qualifications to be food inspectors for such local areas as may be assigned to them by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be :

PROVIDED that no person who has any financial interest in the manufacture ,import or sale of any article of food shall be appointed to be a food inspector under this section".

It will be noticed that the operative part the first proviso to Section 8 and the operative part of the proviso to Section 9(1) of the Act are identical and the substantive provisions of Section 8 and Section 9(1) are also similar. Whereas Section 8 deals with the appointment of Public Analysts, Section 9 deals with the appointment of Food Inspectors .The substantive part of Section 8 and the substantive part of Section 9(1) deal with the powers of the Government to appoint Public Analysts and Food Inspectors having the prescribed qualifications respectively but the powers of appointment in respect of both the sets of officers are subject to identical limitations.

(7) The question which arises out of the order of reference relates to the meaning of the expression "any financial interest" in the aforesaid provisos .

(8) Lala Bishambar Dayal who appeared on behalf of the appellant submitted that the expression "any financial interest" means "substantial direct financial interest" in the manufacture or sale of any article of food and does not include within the said expression the indirect insignificant financial interest that a share-holder may have in the manufacture ,import or sale of such article of food.

(9) The learned counsel further submitted that the purpose of the aforesaid provisos in Section 8 and Section 9(1) is that the Public Analyst and/or the Food Inspector should not be a biased person and unless the Public Analyst or the Food Inspector has a substantial direct financial interest in the manufacture, import or sale of any article of food ,he cannot be said to be biased and would consequently not suffer from the disability as contemplated by the aforesaid provisos.

(10) In support of his submission, Lala Bishambar Dayal relied on the following passage from "Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes" Eighth Edition, at pages 54-55 :

" BUT it is in the interpretation of general words and phrases that the principle of strictly adapting the meaning to the particular subject-matter with reference to which the words are used finds its most frequent application. However wide in the abstract, they are more or less elastic, and admit of restriction or expansion to suit the subject-matter. While expressing truly enough all that the Legislature intended, they frequently express more, in their literal meaning and natural force; and it is necessary to give them the meaning which best suits the scope and object of the statute without extending to ground foreign to the intention. It is, Therefore, a canon of interpretation that all words, if they be generaland not express and precise, are to be restricted to the fitness of the matter. They are to be construed as parti-Relying on the aforesaid passage, the argument of the learned counsel proceeded like this :

(11) It was submitted that the object of sections 8 and 9 of the Act was (i) to confer power on the Central Government or the State Government to appoint Public Analysts and/or the Food Inspectors and (.ii) to put a limitation on the said power so that persons with bias are not appointed. It was also submitted that looking at the subject-matter of these provisions the expression "any financial interest" in the aforesaid proviso has to be interpreted in the light of the subject-matter and, Therefore, the expression "any financial interest" should be interpreted as "substantial direct financial interest" inasmuch as if the expression "any financial interest" is interpreted literally in a restricted sense than the interpretation would not suit the subject-matter under reference and thus supported the observations of the Division Bench in the case of Takhat Ram (supra).

(12) Bawa Gurcharan Singh, learned counsel for the accused, on the other hand, submitted that the expression "any financial interest" is precise and unambiguous and there is no necessity of giving theman extended meaning. The Legislature has declared its intention clearly .

(13) The aforesaid passage from Maxwell appeared in ''Eighth Edition and relied on the observations in the following cases : Wordsworth Board of Works v. United Telephone Co. 13 O.B.D. 904, 920(3); Cox v. Hakes (1890) 15 AC 506 and ViscountassRhondda''s Claim (1922) 2 A.C. 339. We shall deal with these cases presently.

(14) It goes without saying that the solution of a particular problem of interpretation is often determined by which principle or principles the court chooses to apply. Among the general principles of interpretation ,there is a primary rule : literal construction''.

(15) In the aforesaid treatise on the Interpretation of statutes, Twelfth Edition, at pages 28-29, it is observed as under :

" THE rule of construction is "to intend the Legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed "The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, "but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used," for "it is well accepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame acts of Parliament cannot make the law".

" WHERE the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise." The decision in this case," said Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gestin a revenue case, "calls for a full and fair application of particular statutory language to particular facts as found. The desirability or the undesirability of one conclusion as compared with another cannot furnish a guide in reaching a decision." Where, by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the legislature, it must be enforced however harsh or absurd or contrary to common sense the result may be. The interpretation of a statute, is not to be collected from any notions which may be entertained bythe court as to what is just and expedient: words are not to be construed, contrary to their meaning, as embracing or excluding cases merely because no good reason appears why they should not be embraced or excluded. The duty of the court is to expound the law as it stands, and to "leave the remedy (if one be resolved "upon) to others "

(16) Apart from the aforesaid primary rule of literal construction'', there are various other main principles of interpretation, namely, the'' mischief rule'' as expounded in Heydon''s case or the ''golden rule'' as expounded in Backe v. Smith: (1836) 2 M &W 191, and noticed by Maxwell in his 12th edition at page 43 of the treatise. It is observed by the learned author at page 43 of the aforesaid treatise that :

THE so-called ''golden rule'' is really a modification of the literal rule. It was stated in this way by Parke B : "IT is a very useful rule, in the construction of a statute, to add here to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and to the grammatical constriction ,unless that is at variance with the intention of the Legislature, to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance ,in which case the language may be varied or modified ,so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further".

The learned author has also observed at page 39 of the same treatise as under:

" BUT since there is not in English Law any settled hierarchy governing the order in which the various can one and presumptions of construction are to be employed, the existence of these principles does not make it possible to predict with certainty the result which will be reached IN a given case."

(17) We may state at the outset that the expression "any financial interest" is both precise and unambiguous and can be understood in its natural and ordinary sense and means literally what the expression says .Its meaning is covered by the primary rule of construction as stated above. The primary rule i.e. literal construction'' is also in consonance with the afore-quoted ''golden rule''.

(18) Coming to the rule of interpretation as expounded in Wordsworth Board of Works (supra), even the test of finding the'' meaning with reference to the scope and object of the statute is also fulfilled .

(19) It will be noticed that the provisos to the aforesaid Sections 8 and 9 of the Act bar the eligibility of persons having the prescribed qualifications on the ground of what may be called'' financial bias ''as opposed to the other forms of bias like being personally interested or being a Judge in its own cause or legal bias. Both the Public Analyst and the Food Inspector perform important duties in relation to satisfactory enforcement of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and also any prosecution there under. Where a person with prescribed qualifications is made non-eligible due to financial interest and, Therefore, bias on that account, there is no measure to determine it. Even if we go in the principle of interpretation relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant i.e. interpreting the general words and phrases used in the Statute in the light of the scope and object of the Statute, it does not admit of any restricted or expanded meaning for, as we have stated earlier, in considering the object of the provision as ruling out persons due to bias on account of financial interest, there is no measure to determine it. The slightest interest disqualifies them.

(20) There are numerous cases relating to Justices being disqualified on account of financial interest from being competent to sit in a trial. By way of illustration some of the following cases may be seen with advantage : (1) Reg v. Hammond and another: 140 R R 824, (2) Reg v. Recorder of Cambridge : 112 RR 724, (3) Reg. v. The Justices of Hertfordshire : 66 Revised Reports 556 (9) and (4) in re: P. A. Rodrigues : I.L.R 20 Bom 502. In fact, such cases can be multiplied infinitely.

(21) It is true that these cases relate to judicial decisions being given by Justices who could be said to be biased due to pecuniary interest but the principle is applicable once a person is statutorily required to be excluded due to financial bias.

(22) In the case of Wordsworth Board of Works v. United Telephone Co : 13 C.B.D. 904 a question arose as to the meaning of the word "street" in Section 96 of the Metropolis Management Act,1855. An action was brought for an injunction to restrain the defendants from retaining or placing any wire for the purpose of telegraphic or telephonic communications over, along or across any street vested in or under the control of the plaintiffs, the Board of Works for, the Wandsworth District. u/s 96 of the afore-said Act, the streets vested in the District Boards. Bowen, L.J. observed at page 919 as under :

" PARLIAMENT can do exactly what it pleases, and the only matters to be borne in mind in construing the section are two rules. It seems to me, first, that words of popular meaning must be taken in their popular sense, unless there is something in the context to alter it, and secondly, that if a word in its popular sense and read in an ordinary way, is capable of two constructions, it is wise to adopt such a construction as is based upon the assumption that Parliament merely intended to give so much power as was necessary for carrying out the objects of the Act, and not to give any unnecessary powers."

(23) The "street" was construed in the aforesaid case according to the purposes of the Act and the suit failed.

(24) In Cox v. Hakes (1890) 15 AC 506 a question had arisen whether an appeal lay to the Court of appeal from an order of discharge on a writ of habeas corpus u/s 19 read with section 47 of the Judicature Act, 1873. Lord Halsbury speaking for the majority view held that no appeal lay. In construing the provisions of the Act, the learned Lord Chancellor went into the history of habeas corpus in England and took the view that in spite of the general words being used in Section 19, it did not preclude inquiry into the object of the Statute or the mischief which it was intended to remedy and held that no appeal was competent.

(25) In Viscountess Rhondda''s Claim : (1922) 2 A.C. 339(5),Viscountess was made a peeress of the United Kingdom and she claimed right to receive a writ of summons to Parliament. The matter was heard by the Committee for Privileges of the House of Lords. Dealing with the history of the constitution of the House of Lords and the members who were entitled to summons and consequently sit in the House, the Committee for Privileges took the view that inspire of Section 1 of the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act, 1919the Viscountess was not entitled to writ of summons to Parliament. The House of Lords went into the rights and privileges of persons entitled to sit and vote in the House of Lords and took the view that for many centuries women had not sat in the House of Lords although during those centuries there had been women who possessed peerage dignities .The case of the Viscountess was that the fact that they had not sat was due to the ordinary disqualification imposed by common law upon persons of female sex and that that disqualification had been removed by the aforesaid Act. The Privileges Committee of the House of Lords went into the question and negatived this submission and took the view that in spite of Section 1 of the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act, 1919, the Viscountess Rhondda was not entitled to writ of summons to Parliament as the disqualification was not due to the common law of England but due to the historical reasons .

(26) We have already taken the view that whether the primary rule of literal construction is applied or the rule of interpretation based on the test of finding the meaning with reference to the scope and object of the statute is applied, the answer is the same.

(27) The Division Bench in Takhat Ram''s case (supra) made an observation supporting the view as contended for on behalf of the appellant and it appears that the considered view of the Division Bench in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Raje and another : (supra) was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench in Takhat Ram''s case. In Takhat Ram''s case the Division Bench at page237 of the report observed :

" WE now come to the contention regarding the claim of the respondents that Shri Kochar had a .financial interest in the Cooperative Society which used to run a store in which articles of food were sold. According to Mr. GurcharanSingh a financial interest means getting of financial benefit. His argument is that a shareholder gets dividend andother pecuniary benefits in a cooperative society which by itself would mean having financial interest. We are not impressed by this argument. The bar in proviso to section 9(1) is to the appointment of a person having any financial interest in the manufacture, import or sale of any article. This interest must be a direct interest and the indirect interest that a shareholder may have cannot be regarded as a bar to his appointment as a Food Inspector. It is really not necessary to examine this question in detail''.''

(28) With all due respect to the learned Judges in Takhat Ram''s case ,we have not been able to persuade ourselves to agree to the said observations as to the interpretation of the expression "any financial interest" occurring in proviso to Section 9(1) of the Act. We may make it clear that we are not expressing any opinion, whatsoever, as to what would be the effect of our view on the prosecution case .

(29) The result of the aforesaid discussion is that our answer to the question referred to the full Bench is in the affirmative and the reference is answered accordingly.