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Judgment
Mahendar Kumar Goyal, J
This writ petition has been filed against the award dated 19.12.2019 passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat, Bharatpur whereby the application filed
by the petitioners for grant of patta has been allowed.
It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that application of the petitioners for grant of patta was pending with it and could not be
submitted for consideration before the Empowered Committee on account of ongoing Parliament and Assembly Elections. He submitted that ignoring
that the application was premature, the Permanent Lok Adalat, Bharatpur has erred in allowing the same.
Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and perused the record.
The reply submitted by the petitioners before the Permanent Lok Adalat reveals that only objection taken therein was that the application filed by
the respondent was premature as the proceedings for grant of patta was pending consideration. No such objection was taken therein that the
respondent was not entitled for grant of patta. When asked pointedly by this Court to show any error on merits in the award impugned herein or
disentitlement of the respondent for grant of patta, learned counsel for the petitioners failed to point out any disqualification in this regard. The learned
Permanent Lok Adalat has passed the award after due consideration of the material on record.
The Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down parameters for interference by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the orders
passed by the learned trial Courts in following terms:-
In Waryam Singh and another vs. Amarnath and another, AIR 1954 SC 45, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:
This power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in ""Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. vs. Sukumar Mukherjee"",
AIR 1951 CAL 193 (SB) 1 (B,) to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the
bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors.
In Bathutmal Raichand Oswal vs. Laxmibai R. Tarta, AIR 1975 SC 1297, the Hon'ble Supreme Court again reaffirmed that the power of
superintendence of the High Court under Article 227 being extraordinary was to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court speaking through Bhagwati J. as his Lordship then was observed thus:
If an error of fact, even though apparent on the face of the record, cannot be corrected by means of a writ of certiorari it should follow a fortiori that
it is not subject to correction by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227. The power of superintendence under Article 227
cannot be invoked to correct an error of fact which only a superior Court can do in exercise of its statutory power as a Court of appeal. The High
Court cannot in guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a Court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right
of appeal and made the decision of the subordinate Court or tribunal final on facts"".
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bathutmal (supra) approved the dictum of Morris L., J. in Res v. Northumberland Compensation Appellate
Tribunal, 1952 All England Reports 122.
In Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani and another vs. Pratapsing Mohansing Pardeshi Deceased through his heirs and legal representatives, JT 1995 (7)
SCC 400, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:
The High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong
decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave
injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes.
In State of Maharashtra vs. Milind & Others, 2001 (1) SCC 4, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:
The power of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, while exercising the power of judicial review against an order of inferior
tribunal being supervisory and not appellate, the High Court would be justified in interfering with the conclusion of the tribunal, only when it records a
finding that the inferior tribunal's conclusion is based upon exclusion of some admissible evidence or consideration of some inadmissible evidence or
the inferior tribunal has no jurisdiction at all or that the finding is such, which no reasonable man could arrive at, on the materials on record.
Again in State vs. Navjot Sandhu (2003) 6 SCC 641, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:
Thus the law is that Article 227 of the Constitution of India gives the High Court the power of superintendence over all Courts and tribunals
throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. This jurisdiction cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the State Legislature.
The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate tribunals within the limits of their authority and to seeing that they obey the law. The
powers under Article 227 are wide and can be used, to meet the ends of justice. They can be used to interfere even with an interlocutory order.
However, the power under Article 227 is a discretionary power and it is difficult to attribute to an order of the High Court, such a source of power,
when the High Court itself does not in terms purport to exercise any such discretionary power. It is settled law that this power of judicial
superintendence, under Article 227, must be exercised sparingly and only to keep subordinate Courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority
and not to correct mere errors. Further, where the statute bans the exercise of revisional powers it would require very exceptional circumstances to
warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the power of superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law. It
is settled law that the jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be exercised as the cloak of an appeal in disguise.
In Mohammed Yusuf vs. Faij Mohammad and others, 2009 (1) Scale 71, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution is limited. It could have set aside the orders passed by the learned trial
Court and revisional Court only on limited ground, namely, illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety"".
In State of West Bengal and others vs. Samar Kumar Sarkar, JT 2009 (11) SC 258, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
Under Article 227, the High Court has been given power of superintendence both in judicial as well as administrative matters over all Courts and
Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It is in order to indicate the plentitude of the power conferred upon the
High Court with respect to Courts and the Tribunals of every kind that the Constitution conferred the power of superintendence on the High Court.
The power of superintendence conferred upon the High Court is not as extensive as the power conferred upon it by Article 226 of the Constitution.
Thus, ordinarily it will be open to the High Court, in exercise of the power of superintendence only to consider whether there is error of jurisdiction in
the decision of the Court or the Tribunal subject to its superintendence.
In Jai Singh and others vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others (2010) 9 SCC 38,5 the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paras 15, 16 and 42 of the
judgment held as under:
We have anxiously considered the submissions of the learned counsel. Before we consider the factual and legal issues involved herein, we may
notice certain well recognized principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
Undoubtedly the High Court, under this Article, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts as well as statutory or quasi judicial tribunals,
exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in
accordance with well established principles of law. The High Court is vested with the powers of superintendence and/or judicial revision, even in
matters where no revision or appeal lies to the High Court. The jurisdiction under this Article is, in some ways, wider than the power and jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is, however, well to remember the well known adage that greater the power, greater the care and
caution in exercise thereof. The High Court is, therefore, expected to exercise such wide powers with great care, caution and circumspection. The
exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well recognized constraints. It can not be exercised like a `bull in a china shop', to correct all errors of
judgment of a court, or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have
been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice.
The High Court cannot lightly or liberally act as an appellate court and re-appreciate the evidence. Generally, it can not substitute its own
conclusions for the conclusions reached by the courts below or the statutory/quasi judicial tribunals. The power to re-appreciate evidence would only
be justified in rare and exceptional situations where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. The exercise of such discretionary
power would depend on the peculiar facts of each case, with the sole objective of ensuring that there is no miscarriage of justice.
Undoubtedly, the High Court has the power to reach injustice whenever, wherever found. The scope and ambit of Article 227 of the Constitution
of India had been discussed in the case of The Estralla Rubber Vs. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., [(2001) 8 SCC 97] wherein it was observed as follows:
The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in
a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals
within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with
any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or
tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and
flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is
also well settled that the High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in
place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the
findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can
possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to.
I find no such illegality or perversity in the order dated 19.12.2019 passed the Permanent Lok Adalat, Bharatpur warranting interference of this
Court under its supervisory jurisdiction vide Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed being devoid of merit.