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Judgment
B.S. Yadav, J.—The Plaintiff-firm (for short the firm) installed a 30 H.P. electric motor for the purposes of running painja machines in a building situated in Amritsar. It applied, to the Municipal Corporation (for short the Corporation) for granting a licence for carrying on the business which was granted to them on 25th September, 1980. This licence was for the period 1980-81 expiring on 31st March, 1981. On 8th December, 1980 Health Officer of the Corporation issued a show cause notice Exhibit P. 19 dated 8th December, 1980, u/s 343 of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act (for short the Act) to the Firm stating therein that the working of painja machines was creating great noise and tremor and was thus a hazard to the health of the neighbours and that by ginning the waste cotton the cotton wool fibres flew in the air and fell in the eatables of neighbors easing harm to their health and therefore, within seven days such steps may be taken so that there may be no hazard to the health of the neighbours failing which recommendation would be made to the higher authorities for revoking the licence. The Firm sent reply Exhibit P. 20 dated 11th December, 1980 to the show cause notice. The reply was not found satisfactory by the Corporation. The Health Officer issued another notice Exhibit P21 dated 31st December, 1980 for showing cause within 15 days as to why the licence should not be revoked and in case no reply was received then it would be considered that they did not want to give any reply to it. Instead of giving reply to this later notice, the Firm filed the instant suit arraying the Corporation and its Commissioner as Defendants for permanent injunction restraining the Defendants from revoking or cancelling the licence or otherwise interfering in the working of the machines. It was alleged in the plaint that the factory was situated at a place which was surrounded by other factories. Electric motors were installed practically in all the factories situated on either side of the Firm''s factory as well as on the opposite side. The factory of the Firm was not causing any nuisance nor it was cresting vibrations or noise. The factory was neither hazardous to the neighbours nor it was affecting their health. The licence which had been granted after due verification and hearing objections of the persons concerned, could not be revoked and, therefore, the notices issued were ultra vires, without jurisdiction, mala fide, illegal and unforcible in the eyes of law.
During the pendency of the suit the Firm had applied for the renewal of the licence for the period 1981-82 but the corporation refused to do so. On 19th October, 1981 the Plaintiffs applied for amendment of the plaint which was allowed by the trial Court. Thereupon the Plaintiffs amended their plaint and prayed for grant of mandatory injunction requiring the Corporation to renew the licence with effect from 1st April, 1981 on the ground that the renewal had been illegally and arbitrarily refused by the Corporation.
The suit was contested by the Defendants Preliminary objections were taken to the effect that the suit for mandatory and permanent injunction was not maintainable as the Corporation had discretion to grant or revoke the licence according to the circumstances of the case. Mandatory injunction otherwise could not be granted in the absence of the notice u/s 396 of the Act. Civil Court had no jurisdiction to interfere in the powers of the Corporation which has power to see whether any business was nuisance to the neighbours and the inhabitants of the locality The suit of the Plaintiffs had become infructuous after 31st March, 1981.
On merits it was pleaded by the Defendants that the Firm got the licence by misrepresentation without obtaining no objection certificates from the immediate neighbours. There was no residential accommodation adjoining the other factories nor there was any complaint from the inhabitants regarding the nuisance created by the working of those factories. Neighbours of the Plaintiffs'' factory had made a complaint and, therefore, notice was issued to the Firm on 8th December, 1980 to remove the cause of complaint. The notice dated 31st December, 1980 was in the nature of a show-cause notice u/s 357 of the Act and it had been rightly issued after inspecting the site as per complaint made by the immediate occupants of the premises on the back of the factory. The factory of the Plaintiffs in which a big Painja machine had been installed was nuisance and hazard to the health of the neighbours and their property. The powers of the renewal of the licence was within the discretionary powers of the Corporation and it had to see if the renewal of the licence would cause a nuisance to the neighbours or not. In the present case there was a complaint made by the neighbours of the Plaintiffs'' factory regarding nuisance.
Upon the allegations of the parties the learned trial court framed the following issues: -
Whether the notice served by the Defendant on the Plaintiff dated 8-12-1980 and 31-12-1980 are without jurisdiction, null and void as alleged in para 5 of the plaint ?
Whether the suit of the Plaintiff is premature ?
Whether the Civil Court has got no jurisdiction to entertains the present suit ?
Whether the plaint does not disclose any cause of action ?
Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the injunction prayed for?
5(a) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the renewal of licence which expired on 31-3-1981?
5(b) Whether the mandatory injunction can be granted in the absence of statutory notice as provided u/s 396 of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act ?
6(b) Whether the suit for mandatory and permanent injunction is not maintainable ?
6(c) Whether the suit of the Plaintiff has become infructuous?
Relief.
Under issue No. 1 it was held that the notices served by the Corporation upon the Firm were without jurisdiction, null and void as the Corporation had no arbitrary or unbridled discretion to revoke the licence. Under issue No. 2 it was held that as the vested rights of the Firm were being threatened so the suit was not premature. Under issue No. 3 it was held that the Court had jurisdiction to grant mandatory injunction. Issue No. 4 was found in favour of the Plaintiffs. Under issue No. 5 it was held that the action sought to be taken by the Corporation was not bonafide one and, therefore, the Plaintiffs were entitled to the injunction prayed for. Under issue No. 6(a) it was held that mandatory injunction could be granted in the present case in the absence of the notice as provided u/s 396 of the Act. Under issue No. 6(b) it was held that the suit filed for permanent injunction and mandatory injunction was maintainable. Under issue No 6(c) it was held that the suit had not become infructuous as amendment had been made in the plaint for the grant of mandatory injunction requiring the Corporation to renew the licence of the Firm. As a result of the above findings, the suit of the Plaintiffs was decreed The Corporation was restrained from cancelling or revoking the licence granted to the Plaintiffs and also directing the Corporation to renew the licence. Feeling aggrieved, the Defendants filed an appeal which was heard by learned Additional District Judge, Amritsar. He did not find any force in the appeal and dismissed the same. The Defendants have now come to this Court in Second Appeal.
Before I proceed further I may notice here certain relevant provisions of the Act. Section 343 lays down that no person shall use or permit to be used any premises for any of the purposes enumerated in that section without or otherwise than in conformity with the terms of a licence granted by the Commissioner in this behalf. That section further lays down that the terms of the licence may be prescribed. Section 357(3) of the Act deals with the suspension or revocation of licences and written permissions. It reads as follows:-
Save as otherwise provided in this Act or any bye-law made thereunder any licence or written permission granted under this Act or any bye-law made thereunder may at any time be suspended or revoked by the Commissioner or by the officer by whom it was granted, if he is satisfied that it has been secured by the grantee tnrough misrepresentation or fraud or if any of its restrictions or conditions has been infringed or evaded by the grantee, or if the grantee has been convicted for the contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or any bye-law made thereunder relating to any matter for which the licence or permission has been granted:
Provided that:
(a) before making any order of suspension or revocation reasonable opportunity should be afforded to the grantee of the licence or the written permission to show cause why it should not be suspended or revoked;
(b) Every such order shall contain a brief statement of the reasons for the suspension or revocation of the licence or the written permission.
The learned Counsel for the Appellants argued that the licence was granted to the Plaintiffs under the Act for the year 1980-81 and on the expiry of that period the licence automatically stood expired or revoked and the Corporation was not bound to renew it. In support of his contention reliance was placed upon Kewal Krishan v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1972) 74 P.L.R.D. 336. That case relates to Delhi Municipal Corporation Act (for short Delhi Act). Section 321 of that Act provides that no person shall except with the permission of the Commissioner and on payment of such fee as he in each case thinks fit, place or deposit upon any street stall chair or other thing whatsoever so as to form an obstruction thereto, or encroachment thereon. Permission to the Plaintiff was granted under the law for carrying on the trade of Auto Insurance business by squatting on the footpath. The Plaintiff regularly paid Teh Bazari fee to the Delhi Municipal Corporation (for short Delhi Corporation) from 1948 upto the end of March, 1968 for use of the land. Thereafter the Delhi Corporation did not grant any further licence and the Plaintiff urged that the same amounted to revocation or suspension of the licence which could not be done by the Corporation without affording him an opportunity to be heard. The Delhi Corporation contested the suit and pleaded that the Plaintiff had no legal right to occupy the land or to the grant of any relief. During the pendency of the suit the Plaintiff filed an application for the grant of adinterim injunction which was dismissed by the trial Court. His appeal was also dismissed. He filed revision in the High Court. It was remarked:
The construction of Sub-section (3) would be clearer by reference to Sub-section (4) which reads as follows:-
When any such licence or written permission is suspended or revoked or when the period for which the same was granted has expired, the grantee shall, for all purposes of this Act or any bye-law made thereunder, be deemed to be without a licence or written permission until such, time as the order suspending or revoking the licence or written permission is rescinded or until the licence or written permission is renewed.
A comparison of the language of the two Sub-sections shows that Sub-section (4) comes into play not only when a licence or written permission is suspended or revoked, but also when the period for which the same was granted has expired. The proviso to Sub-section (3) on the other hand is attracted only when it is sought to pass an order of suspension or revocation of a subsisting licence or the written permission and this order of revocation or suspension would require a brief statement of the reasons to be given. It is obvious that if the period for which the licence or permission had been granted has expired, no question of issuing a show cause notice or giving of reasons for terminating or not renewing a licence can arise. The expiry of the period occurs in terms of the licence or permission already granted and failure to renew the licence will not confer any right on the licensees to have reasonable opportunity to show cause. The Plaintiff did not have any right to squat on the public footpath and on the expiry of the permission granted to him, he cannot claim any right to continue to occupy it. I, therefore, entirely agree with the lower appellate Court in its observation that the Plaintiff does not have any prima facie case and it is not entitled to the grant of interim injunction.
Of course, Sub-section (4) as exists in Delhi Act also exists in the Act but in that case the Plaintiff had not challenged that the licence could not be suspended or revoked. His contention was that the same could not be done without affording to him an opportunity to be heard u/s 433 of the Delhi Act. It was found that the licence had neither been suspended nor revoked. In the present case the Plaintiff filed the suit when they apprehended that the licence was sought to be revoked.
There is a difference between different kinds of licences. Some licences can be revoked at the licencee''s will but the other cannot be. This distinction has been drawn in State of Punjab and Others Vs. Raghunath Dass, , wherein it was remarked (in Para 28):
The next point urged on behalf of the State Government is, that the matter involves the issuance of a licence; and ex vi termini, a permit in the nature of a licence is revocable at Government''s pleasure to use Mr. Doabia''s words-without rhyme or reason. This contention is entirely misconceived. It may be true of a very limited class of licences which are usually called ''bare licence'' or ''mere licence''; and the attribute of such a licence is, that it is personal, revocable, and unassignable. A licence not for profit, but for pleasure, is countermand able, as it offers a personal privilege without creating any interest in the licensee, but revocability is not the attribute of a licence, where the licensee has been induced to expend money towards its enjoyment or which is accompanied with a grant. A right does not cease to be vested merely, because it is styled a licence. Excise licences are not ''bare licences'' but they are coupled with interest and as such are not revocable at pleasure. There is a clear distinction between a ''bare licence'' which is revocable brevi manu, at the licensor''s will, and a licence coupled with interest, or with a grant which is not revocable. There is also a distinction drawn between licences granted by a Government agency and those granted by private persons. The object of granting the former is either regulation of, or taxation on, professions, trades or occupations. These licences are granted in exercise of the State''s police power, in the interest of health and moral welfare etc. Excise licences more aptly fall in this class. It is no doubt a general rule that a privilege granted by means of a licence may be withdrawn at the discretion of the grantor. But a licence usually contains provisions for its revocation in specified eventualities.
In the present case the licence which was granted to the Plaintiffs was not a ''bare licence.'' He was granted a licence to run a business for the setting of which he must have spent a huge amount.
The learned Counsel for the Respondent-firm argued that as the statutory provision i.e. Section 357(3) of the Act has been made for the revocation or suspension of the licence under the Act, the corporation could not act otherwise than in conformity with those provisions and in the present case the notices issued by the Corporation to the Firm did not state that the grantee secured licence by misrepresentation or fraud or any of its restrictions or conditions has been infringed or evaded by the grantee nor there is allegation that the grantee had been convicted for the contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or any bye-law made thereunder relating to any matter for which the licence or permission had been granted to him. I am of the opinion that the said argument has force. In the show-cause notices Exhibits P. 19 and P. 21 issued by the Corporation to the Firm, the only material allegation is that nuisance was created by the working of the painja machines. None of the grounds mentioned in Sub-section (3) of Section 357 of the Act finds mention in those notices. Therefore, the Corporation exceeded its statutory jurisdiction by issuing those notices. In this respect reference can be made to Raghunath Dass''s case (supra) wherein it was remarked:
Where a licence is granted under a statutory provision, by a statutory authority, the right of revocation is confined within the statutory limits. Where a statute enumerates causes for revocation, the licence cannot be cancelled on grounds other than those specified therein. The same is true where licences emanate from a contract. In the words of the Privy Council in Canadian Pacific Rly. v. R, 1931 AC 414 (432),-
''Whether any and what restrictions exist on the power of a licensor to determine a revocable licence must, their Lordships think, depend upon the circumstances of each case.''
Following the above quotation, Lord Green in Millennium Production Ltd. v. Winter Garden Theatre (London) Ltd., (1946) 115 LJ Ch (297) (298), said
Even if it is said that a licence is a thing which, if artificially taken by itself and in isolation, is in its nature, revocable, the contract must be examined to see whether that rule applies to the particular licence under consideration.''
Courts do not countenance countermanding such a licence for an undisclosed cause or, for a cause which is de hors the statutory inhibition. Where procedure for cancellation or suspension is prescribed, that alone must be pursued. The authority empowered to revoke a licence cannot do so outside the statutory grounds, far less arbitrarily or capriciously. It must be for a prescribed cause. The word ''cause'' is to be understood in the sense of a valid and reasonable ground, and not as a mere excuse or pretext for doing so.
The learned Counsel for the Appellants argued that other party might have spent the money in establishing business but that fact cannot stand in the way of the Corporation to revoke or not to renew the licence. He has relied upon Shri K. Ramadas Shenoy Vs. The Chief Officers, Town Municipal Council, Udipi and Others, . In that case the Municipal Committee had sanctioned the plan for conversion of a building into a Cinema in violation of the Town Planning Schemes. Their Lordships remarked:
An illegal construction of cinema building materially affects the right to or enjoyment of the property by persons reading in the residential area. The Municipal Authorities owe a duty and obligation under the statute to see that the residential area is not spoilt by unauthorised construction. The scheme is for the benefit of the residents of the locality. The Municipality acts in aid of the scheme. The rights of the residents in the area are invaded by an illegal construction of a cinema building. It has to be remembered that a scheme in a residential area means planned orderliness in accordance with the requirements of the residents. If the scheme is nullified by arbitrary acts in excess and derogation of the powers of the Municipality the courts will quash orders passed by Municipalities in such cases.
It was further remarked:
An excess of statutory power cannot be validated by acquiescence in or by the operation of an estoppel. The Court declines to interfere for the assistance of persons who seek its aid to relieve them against express statutory provision. Lord Selborne in Maddison v. Alderson, (1833) 8 A C 467 said that courts of equity would not permit the statute to be made an instrument of fraud. The impeached resolution of the Municipality has no legal foundation.
Clearly the facts of that case are not applicable to the present case. The licence was granted to the Firm after due inspection by the officers of the Corporation. It is not the case of the Corporation that the licence was granted to the Firm in derogation of any of the provisions of the Act.
A Municipal Corporation or a Committee has not got unbridled or arbitrary powers to do whatever it likes AIR 1934 1011 (Lahore) , relates to a case where the Municipal Committee had sanctioned the building plan of the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs raised the proposed construction. The Municipal Committee thereupon issued notice to them requiring them to remove the construction. It was remarked:
No bye-laws have been framed u/s 188, Punjab Municipal Act, empowering the Municipal Committee to impose conditions while granting sanction u/s 172 (1) of the Act. I adhere to the view expressed by me in 1930 Lah. 246 (2), and hold that no conditions could be imposed upon the grantee of the permission. Furthermore, a sanction once granted cannot be revoked; vide Kirpa Ram v. Notified Area Committee, Pindi Bhatian, 1927 Lah. 891. See also Damodhar Dass v. Municipal Committee, Delhi, 27 P.R. 1901.
In AIR 1945 81 (Lahore) , sanction had been granted by the Municipal Committer to the Plaintiff to construct the building on a plot owned by him in a low lying area. The Plaintiff made some construction but as he failed to erect the building within two years, he again applied for sanction but it was refused on the ground that the area where the building was proposed to be built was a low lying area and could not be properly drained. The Plaintiff thereupon filed a suit for injunction restraining the Municipal Committee from interfering with the construction of the building according to the rejected plan. Bhandari J. who was one of the members of the Full Bench remarked:
The Civil Courts have no right to question the propriety of an order which is strictly limited by the terms of the statute granting power to make it, but if, as in the present case, the order does not conform to the terms of the statute or is arbitrary or oppressive, or involves an unjustifiable interference with the private rights of the citzen, it is obviously the duty of the Courts to interfere.
From the above authorities it is clear that public bodies created by a statute for a public purpose, cannot act arbitrarily They have to conform to the terms of the statute under which those have been created As noticed earlier, the Commissioner of the Corporation has been given a right to revoke the licence, granted to a person to carry on business in certain premises, within the four corners of the provisions giving that power. The learned Counsel for the Appellants was not able to persuade me that any of the conditions enumerated in Section 353(3) of the Act has existed in the present case.
The learned Counsel for the Appellants argued that before a licence is granted to run a business in certain premises, the person seeking licence has to produce ''no-objection certificate'' from the immediate neighbours of the premises and in the present case the houses of three persons are adjoining the premises of the Plaintiff but ''no objection certificate'' was produced from only one person i.e. D,W. 1 Janak Raj. In the notices issued to the Firm in connection with revocation of the licence, it was not mentioned that it had obtained the licence by practicing fraud upon the Corporation or by making any misrepresentation. In fact, the Corporation could not make such allegations as the licence was granted after the officers had visited the premises in which the Firm was to install painja machines.
The learned Counsel for the Appellants further argued that the running of the painja machines is causing nuisance to the neighbours as is clear from the Defendants'' evidence. It is to be remembered that it is not a suit filed by a person residing in the neighbourhood of the Firm complaining nuisance. A neighbour has independent rights and he can seek the help of the court if nuisance is created near his dwelling place. In the present case it is Corporation which is trying to revoke the licence on the ground that the running of painja machines was causing nuisance. It has not been proved by the Corporation that any such restriction or condition had been incorporated in the licence of the grantee. The Corporation could revoke the licence if any condition or restriction of the licence was infringed by the grantee.
The learned Counsel for the Appellants next argued that the present suit is not maintainable as notice u/s 396 of the Act had not been given by the Firm to the Corporation before filing the suit. That provision reads as follows :
396(1). No suit shall be instituted against the Corporation or against the Commissioner or against any Corporation Officer or other Corporation employee or against any person acting under the order or direction of the Corporation or the Commissioner or any Corporation Officer or other Corporation employee, in respect of any act done, or purporting to have been done, in pursuance of this Act or any rule, regulation or bye-law made thereunder, until the expiration of two months after notice in writing has been left at the Corporation Office and in the case of such officer, employee or person unless notice in writing has also been delivered to him or left at his office or place of residence, and unless such notice states explicitly the cause of action, the nature of the relief sought, the amount of compensation claimed, and the name and place of residence of the intending Plaintiff, and unless the plaint contains a statement that such notice has been so left or delivered.
(2) No such, suit as is described in Sub-section (1) shall, unless it is a suit for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto, be instituted after the expiry of six months from the date on which the cause of action arises.
(3) Nothing in Sub-section (1) shall be deemed to apply to a suit in which the only relief claimed is an injunction of which the object would be defeated by the giving of the notice or the postponement of the institution of the suit.
The present suit is clearly covered by Sub-clause (3) of the above section. The term injunction used in Sub-section (3) does not make any distinction between prohibitory as well as mandatory injunction. The object of the suit would have been defeated by giving the notice or the postponement of the institution of the suit as by that time the licence granted to the Firm would have been revoked. The learned Counsel for the Appellants has cited certain authorities but those are under the Punjab Municipal Act. Section 49 of that Act provided for giving one month''s notice to the Municipal Committee before filing a suit in respect of the matter enumerated therein. The proviso appended to that section leads as follows:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any suit instituted u/s 54 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877.
Section 54 of the old Specific Relief Act dealt with perpetual injunctions. Mandatory injunctions were granted u/s 55 of that Act. Therefore, in the authorities cited by the learned Counsel for the Appellants, it was held that a suit for mandatory injunction was not maintainable in the absence of the requisite notice.
It was next argued by the learned Counsel for the Appellants that usually a suit is deemed to have been instituted when the plaint is amended. In the present case the Plaintiffs had filed a suit for permanent injunction on 8th January, 1981 for injuncting the Corporation from revoking or cancelling the licence issued for the period 1980-81. However, when the licence was not renewed for the year 1981-82, the Plaintiffs applied for amendment of the plaint on 9th October, 1981 so as to introduce the relief of mandatory injunction. According to them, there was sufficient time from April, 1981 to October, 1981 for giving requisite notice under the Act. There is nothing on the file to show that on which date the renewal was refused to the Firm. Moreover, in the reply filed by the Corporation to the amendment application it was nowhere pleaded that the amendment should not be allowed as no notice had been given. However, notice u/s 396 of the Act will be necessary only if any act is done or purported to have been done in pursuant of the Act. In Shri K. Ramadas Shenoy Vs. The Chief Officers, Town Municipal Council, Udipi and Others, which relates to a case of Municipal Committee it was held that where the Municipality acts in excess of the powers conferred by the Act or abuses those powers then in those cases it is not exercising its jurisdiction irregularly or wrongly but it is usurping powers which it does not possess. In Govindji Vithaldas and Co. Vs. The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Others, it was remarked that a discretion vested in an authority can be exercised so as to effectuate the policy of law but if a discretion is not exercised in that manner then there is no exercise of the powers at all but there is abuse of powers and the court has ample jurisdiction to rectify that power. Of course, the power to renew the licence vests in the Corporation but the discretion to renew a licence already granted is to be exercised to effectuate the policy of the Act. In the present case when the Firm had not committed any act which called for the revocation or suspension of the licence, the renewal ought to have been allowed when a demand was made by the Firm for that purpose. As the refusal to renew the licence was arbitrary, it cannot be said that the Corporation was acting or purporting to act under the Act. Therefore, the suit for the grant of mandatory injunction for renewal of the licence for the year 1981-82 without giving requisite notice was maintainable.
Lastly the learned Counsel for the Appellants argued that a mandatory injunction is issued to compel performance of the requisite acts and for that purpose first the party requiring performance of certain acts must make a demand. In support of his contention he has cited Manilal Gangaram Sindore Vs. Nasik-Deolali Electric Supply Co. Ltd., wherein it was remarked:
Lastly, it is contended by Mr. Desai for the Appellants that even if the Court came to the conclusion that the Defendant, company was under no statutory obligation to allow the transfer of service connections after obtaining Government permission, it should have at least granted a mandatory injunction against the company, directing it to forward the requisitions to Government for orders. In our opinion, the submission must fail, since there was no demand from the Plaintiffs on the Defendant company that they should forward the requisitions to Government for orders and consequently there has been no refusal of any such damand by the company. The mandatory injunction cannot be granted unless there is a demand and a refusal of that demand.
He, therefore, argued that in the present case the Firm did not apply for the renewal of the licence at the end of March, 1982. He further pointed out that the prayer for mandatory injunction prayed for in the suit was for requiring the Defendants to renew the licence of the Plaintiffs with effect from 1st April, 1981 which renewal was only for one year. As there has been no prayer for renewal of the licence from 1st April, 1982 the suit had become infructuous thereafter. He further drew my attention to Sub-section (4) of Section 357 of the Act which reads as follows: -
When any such licence or written permission is suspended or revoked or when the period for which the same was granted has expired, the grantee shall, for all purposes of this Act or any bye-law made thereunder, be deemed to be without a licence or written permission until such time as the order suspending or revoking the licence or wrirten permission is rescinded or until the licence or written permission is renewed.
I am of the opinion that the above arguments of the learned Counsel for the Appellants have force. As the Firm had not made any demand for renewal of the licence for the year commencing from 1st April, 1982 the Firm will be deemed to be without a licence thereafter. The learned courts below were not justified in directing the Corporation to renew the licence of the Plaintiffs for eternity.
Lastly the learned Counsel for the Appellants also argued that the issue of mandatory injunction would enjoin upon the Corporation to renew the licence and no discretion would be left with the Corporation in that matter. According to him, the said injunction would amount to interference in the matter of function of the Corporation. In support of his contention he has cited Union of India (UOI) Vs. D.S. Bajaj, The facts of that case are entirely different and I need not discuss that authority. It has already been held that though a Committee has discretion to grant or renew a licence but that discretion has to be exercised to effectuate the policy of the Act. The Corporation cannot act arbitrarily or capriciously.
For the foregoing reasons I partly allow the present appeal. The decree granted by the learned trial court restraining the Corporation from cancelling the licence granted to the Plaintiffs and directing the Corporation to renew the licence of the Plaintiffs is maintained subject to the condition that the direction shall be deemed in respect of the renewal of the licence for the year commencing from 1st April, 1981 to 31st March, 1982. The Corporation is unburdened with the obligation under the decree after that date. However, it is made clear that in case the Firm applies for renewal of the licence for subsequent years, the Corporation will deal with the matter in accordance with the law. 1 make no order as to costs