Mukesh Kumar Sharma vs Brij Mohan Sood

Ranjit Singh, J.—This order will dispose of Civil Revision Nos. 237 of 2007 Mukesh Kumar Sharma v. Brij Mohan Sood and 1061 of 2007 Anil Kumar Sharma v. Brij Mohan Sood.

The respondent, who is a Non Resident Indian, filed a petition for ejectment of his tenant from a house No. 2191, Sector 22C, Chandigarh, as described in the site plan, Ex.P1. The petition is filed on the grounds of arrears of rent, personal use and occupation and material impairment of value and utility of the demised premises.

The Rent Controller dismissed the rent petition, which was impugned by the respondent by filing an appeal and the Appellate Authority has reversed the order passed by the Rent Controller. The petitioner has, thus, impugned the said order by filing the present revision petition.

Mukesh Kumar Sharma, petitioner, is in possession of one room and kitchen on the rear side of the house whereas Anil Kumar Sharma is in possession of one room and a kitchen on second floor of the demised premises. The case of the petitioner is supported by the evidence given by him wherein he reiterated his pleadings and that of another tenant (petitioner in the second petition). The Appellate Court mainly has directed eviction of the petitioner on the ground that the demised premises is required for use and occupation by the respondent-NRI.

Mr. Amit Jhanji, Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has made two fold submissions before me. He would first submit that the respondent-landlord was not able to prove the bonafide need of the house for personal necessity and as such, has rightly been non-suited by the Rent Controller. He has referred to the finding and observations in the judgment of the Rent Controller to say that the petitioner was able to establish that another house had fallen to the share of the respondent, which was lying vacant. This was sufficient to doubt the assertion made by the respondent in regard to his bonafide need for use of the demised premises.

On the other hand, Mr.A.K.Chopra, learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondent, would refer to the material on record to say that the house, which is being referred to by the Learned Counsel for the petitioner, has fallen to the share of the sister of the respondent and has since been mutated on her name. The counsel would refer to the finding returned by the Appellate Court where the respondent had expressed his willingness to settle in India upon his retirement as a Solicitor. The counsel would also find fault with the observation made by the Rent Controller where he has said that the respondent did not produce his wife in support of his version that he is not keeping good health. This, according to the counsel, is rightly found to be no infirmity on the part of the respondent by the Appellate Court.

I have considered the submissions made by the counsel for the parties. The material and evidence on record is sufficient to support a view that the respondent-landlord is able to satisfy his need for personal use of the demised premises. It is rightly observed by the Appellate Court on the basis of various judgments that the Rent Controller was required to proceed with the presumption that requirement is bonafide and that it is not for tenant to dictate the terms of the landlord as to how he has to adjust himself without getting the possession from the tenant. Even otherwise, counsel for the petitioner has mainly referred to the fact that there is another house, which has fallen to the share of the respondent, as such his bonafide need to get the demised premises vacated is not justified. The house, reference to which is being made, is mutated in the name of his sister of the respondent by their mother. This is on the basis of a Will left by their father. The submission that the house was intentionally allowed to be mutated in the name of the sister of the respondent is certainly a far fetched one. The observation of the Appellate Court that even if this house is vacated, then also the tenant can not make a choice for the landlord is not without basis. I do not find any justifiable reason to interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the Appellate Court.

The revision petitions are accordingly dismissed.