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Judgment
Dr. Inder Jit Singh, Presiding Member
The present Revision Petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the order dated 20.10.2022 of the State Commission Uttar Pradesh in FA No. 1224 of 2017. The Revision Petition has been filed with a delay of 75 days. An IA No. 7747 of 2023 dated 03.04.2023 has been filed seeking condonation of delay. In the said IA, following reasons for delay / grounds for condonation have been mentioned :
(a) There was some correction in the impugned order dated 20.10.2022 and, therefore, an application for correction was filed and impugned order was corrected vide order dated 16.12.2022.
(b) Contact number of the counsel for the Petitioner got deleted due to some technical problem and thus was not able to contact him.
( c) Counsel for the Petitioner at State Commission did not inform the Petitioner about passing of the order dated 16.12.2022 and Petitioner was not having updates about the matter.
(d) Petitioner came to know about passing of the aforesaid order in the second week of March, 2023 when he went to Lucknow and met his counsel at Lucknow and, thereafter, he got arranged complete file from his counsel at State Commission U.P.
We have carefully gone through the reasons for delay / grounds for condonation mentioned in IA No. 7747 of 2023 as well as those adduced during the hearing. The reason for delay / grounds for condonation are not found convincing.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattcharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [(2013) 12 SCC 649], while dealing with the issue of condonation of delay, after taking note of various authorities/earlier judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, culled out broad principles for considering the condonation of delay applications and also added few more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. Relevant paras of these are reproduced below:-
“15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:
x x x x
ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.
x x x x
iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
x x x x
vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual
xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:
x x x x
c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.
d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.”
In Sridevi Datla vs. Union of India & Ors. [(2021) 5 SCC 321], Hon’ble Supreme Court observed,
· 25. Much later, in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy this court referred to a large number of previous judgments, and observed that adoption of a strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protect public justice and it may result in public mischief. Other decisions have highlighted that there cannot be a universal formula to judge whether sufficient cause has, or has not been shown and the exercise is necessarily fact specific; in Improvement Trust v. Ujagar Singh, the court held:
“16. While considering [an] application for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is prescribed to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not.”
The court also emphasized that each case has to be balanced on the basis of its facts and the surrounding circumstances in which the parties act and behave.”
In view of the foregoing, we find that sufficient and good grounds have not been made out by the Petitioner in the instant case for condonation of delay of 75 days. Accordingly, IA No. 7747 of 2023 is dismissed. Consequently, Revision Petition is also dismissed being barred by limitation.