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Judgment
D.S. Tewatia, J.—These two revision petitions (C. Rs. 1149 and 1150 of 1977) are directed against the order dated, 29.7.77 passed by the Additional District Judge, Amritsar, acting as the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal whereby he attached the properties of the petitioners-Company. The said order has been assailed on the ground that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has no jurisdiction to execute its own award, as the award has got to be executed through a Civil Court. It has been further urged that, in any case, there is no such provision as ''section 41, rule 46, Civil Procedure Code,'' under which the impugned order has been passed.
There is no merit in either of the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioner. As for the power of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to execute its award, that has been conferred on it By notification No. G.S.R/61/C.A.4/39/S.III-A/A-and (1)/61, dated 21.6.-. 1968, by amending the Punjab Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules of 1964 in a manner as to enable it to take a resort to the provisions of Order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code. The matter is not resinitegra. A Division Bench of this Court in Sham Kaur v. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Punjab 1968 A.C.J. 360 had an occasion to consider the jurisdiction of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in this regard. The Bench after making a reference to the notification aforesaid has the following to say�
This rule has been framed u/s 111-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. Therefore, the lacuna, so far it existed regarding the execution of the awards of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, has been removed and the award can now be executed like a degree under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. This position has pot been controverted by the Learned Counsel for the respondents.
As to the second ground of attack, it may be observed that no doubt, the heading of the order runs, ''warrant'' of the attachment for execution u/s 41, rule 46, Civil procedure Code, but that is merely a typographical mistake. The power of attachment is envisaged under Order 21 Rule 46, Civil Procedure Code.
For the reasons aforesaid, there is no merit in these revision petitions (Civil Revisions Nos. 1149 and 1150 of 1977) and the same are dismissed with costs.
Before parting with judgment, I am constrained to observe that the petitioner is a semi-government concern and has not effected payment of the compensation awarded to unfortunate families of the people who had been killed in the accident, even when stay order had hot been granted in appeal by this Court. To say the least the attitude of the petitioner company is highly callous and it is only in exasperation that the claimants were led to seek attachment of the properties of governmental concern. This reflects badly on the attiude of the managers of these concerns.