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In this writ petition, the petitioner has assailed the validity of Section 421 of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as, “the GHMC Act”), on the ground that the same is violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 300A of the Constitution of India. The petitioner also seeks quashment of the notice dated 04.03.2009 issued by the Additional Commissioner (Advertisements), Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC), and the notice dated 11.08.2009 issued by the Commissioner and Special Officer, GHMC, demanding a sum of Rs.7,60,743.68 as advertisement fee.
Facts giving rise to filing of this writ petition briefly stated are that the petitioner is a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, for the purposes of opening retail outlets for various goods and essential commodities. The petitioner company purchased 27 retail outlets in the city of Hyderabad. The boards have been erected in front of the premises of the petitioner company. The said name boards are fixed with lights for visibility at night and had been fixed for the purpose of the location of the retail outlets by the customers.
The Deputy Commissioner of GHMC issued notices to the petitioner through the agency authorised for collection of advertisement taxes on 06.12.2008 and 28.01.2009 demanding advertisement fee as required under Section 421 of the GHMC Act. Thereafter, another notice dated 04.03.2009 was issued by the Additional Commissioner (Advertisements), GHMC, by which a sum of Rs.7,60,743.68 was demanded from the petitioner. The respondent No.3 visited the premises of the petitioner company situated at Raj Bhavan Road and forcibly removed the name board. The petitioner thereupon has filed this writ petition.
A Bench of this Court while entertaining the writ petition has granted an ad interim order on 02.09.2009 and has directed that in case the petitioner deposits 1/4th of the amount demanded from it within a period of four weeks, there shall be interim stay. The respondents have not filed any counter affidavit to the writ petition.
We have perused the record.
Section 421 of the GHMC Act deals with regulation and control of advertisements. A written permission is required to erect, exhibit, fix or retain any advertisement. The Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (2002) 4 SCC 219 has dealt with the expression “sky-sign” used in Section 328 and 328A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1988. The said decision was distinguished in ICICI Bank Limited v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (2005) 6 SCC 404, wherein in paragraphs 15 to 18 it was held as under:
An advertisement is a matter that draws attention of the public or segment of public to a product, service, person, organisation or line of conduct in a manner calculated to promote or oppose directly or indirectly that product, service, person, organisation or line of conduct intended to promote sale or use of product or range of products. An advertisement is an information that the producer provides about its products or services. An advertisement tries to get consumers to buy a product or a service. An advertisement is generally of goods and services and is an information intended for the potential customers and not a mere display of the name of the company unless the same happens to be a trade mark or trade name.
It is well settled that ordinarily the words used in the statute are to be understood in their natural, ordinary and popular sense. The broad principles underlying the construction and interpretation of the word or phrase in the statute is succinctly extracted from the leading authorities and work of authors and compiled in the book Principles of Statutory Interpretation (9th Edn., 2004) by Justice G.P. Singh, Chapter 2, p. 86 which reads:
“When it is said that words are to be understood first in their natural, ordinary or popular sense, what is meant is that the words must be ascribed that natural, ordinary or popular meaning which they have in relation to the subject-matter with reference to which and the context in which they have been used in the statute. Brett, M.R. called it a ‘cardinal rule’ that ‘whenever you have to construe a statute or document you do not construe it according to the mere ordinary general meaning of the words, but according to the ordinary meaning of the words as applied to the subject-matter with regard to which they are used’. ‘No word’, says Professor H.A. Smith ‘has an absolute meaning, for no words can be defined in vacuo, or without reference to some context’. According to Sutherland there is a ‘basic fallacy’ in saying ‘that words have meaning in and of themselves’, and ‘reference to the abstract meaning of words’, states Craies, ‘if there be any such thing, is of little value in interpreting statutes’. In the words of Justice Holmes:‘A word is not a crystal transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.’ Shorn of the context, the words by themselves are ‘slippery customers’. Therefore, in determining the meaning of any word or phrase in a statute the first question to be asked is — ‘What is the natural or ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the statute? It is only when that meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intention of the legislature, that it is proper to look for some other possible meaning of the word or phrase’.”
Section 328-A prohibits without prior permission of the Commissioner, erection, exhibition of advertisement. The advertiser need not ask for permission if the advertisement is not illuminated or is not a sky-sign, provided it is exhibited in the window of any building, or relates to trade or business carried on within that land or building or when it relates to sale or letting of that property or in reference to any sale, entertainment or meeting organised therein, or it relates to business of a railway company. Exceptions referred in the provision clearly have a nexus and relevance to the business or trade or commercial activities.
The context in which the word advertisement has been used in Section 328-A of the Corporation Act and in the commercial and ordinary parlance it must have direct or indirect connection with the business, trade or commerce carried out by the advertiser. It must have some commercial exposition. The advertisement would be for the purpose of directing or soliciting customers to the product or service prominently shown in the advertisement. If ordinary parlance meaning is not given to the word advertisement in Section 328-A it will create anomalous position, inasmuch as a simple name board put on the house to indicate who is residing in the premises, would also be an advertisement; a name board or signboard of a trader visible to the public or identifying the place of business would also be an advertisement. In our considered opinion advertisement within the meaning of Section 328-A of the Corporation Act must primarily have a commercial purpose and should be indicative of business activity of the displayer with a view to attract the attention of people to its business.
The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision held that illuminated ATM board at various sites which has been put up with an object to tell the existing customers and others about the location of the ATM centres cannot be treated as an advertisement.
In the instant case, the petitioner company has put the sign boards in front of the retail outlets run by it. The aforesaid name boards have been put up for the purpose of identification of the location by the customers and are illuminated for visibility at night.
Therefore, the aforesaid name boards cannot be treated as advertisement boards within the meaning of Section 421 of the GHMC Act.
For the aforementioned reasons, the impugned notices dated 04.03.2009 and 11.08.2009 are hereby quashed.
In the result, the writ petition is allowed.
Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.