AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
1) Heard Mr. B.K. Jain, the learned counsel for the petitioner, as well as Mr. O.P. Bhati, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent.
2) By this writ petition under Section 115 read with Section 151 CPC read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged
the first appellate judgment and decree dated 24.09.2014 passed by the learned Civil Judge No. 2, Kamrup (M), Guwahati in T.A. No. 38/2010,
thereby dismissing the appeal and confirming the judgment and decree dated 06.02.2010 passed by the learned Munsiff No. 2, Kamrup (M), Guwahati
in T.S. No. 969/2006, thereby decreeing suit for ejection of the petitioner herein from the suit premises.
3) Although the petitioner has filed this revision by invoking jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC as well as Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as
revisions under Section 115 CPC is entertained against first appellate judgment rendered in eviction suits instituted under Assam Urban Areas Rent
Control Act, 1972, this revision is being decided in terms of Section 115 CPC alone and not under Section 151 CPC or under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.
4) The petitioner herein is a tenant of the respondent in respect of a southern flat on the first floor consisting of four rooms, one store room, one
kitchen, one bathroom and one sanitary latrine, measuring about 991 sq. ft., which is covered by holding No. 20A of Ward No. 19 of GMC, situated at
Kedar Road, Guwahati.
5) The respondent herein had instituted TS No.969/2006 before the Court of the learned Munsiff No.2, Kamrup, Guwahati, for ejection of the
petitioner and for recovery of arrear rent. In the plaint, it was projected that the tenancy was created in the year 1977 by virtue of a written
agreement for 11 months. After the lapse of the said agreement by efflux of time, the tenancy continued under the verbal agreement between the
parties. At the time of filing of the suit, the monthly rent was payable at the rate of Rs.2,301/- and service charge was payable at the rate of Rs.200/-
per month, aggregating Rs.2501/-, payable within first week of the subsequent month. The ejection of the petitioner was sought for on the ground that
he had defaulted in payment of monthly rent for the months of September, 1997 and October, 1997 and that the suit premises was bonafide required
for the growing residential and business requirement of the respondent, who had four daughter-in-laws, five sons out of which four sons are married
and having children and the unmarried son was going to be married very soon. It was projected that the present residence of the respondent in the
second floor of the same building was insufficient for housing the whole family. It was also projected diversification of business had became an
expedient.
6) The petitioner herein, who was the defendant in the suit, had contested the suit by filing his written statement. It was denied that rent was payable
in the first week of subsequent months and the petitioner claimed that there was no stipulation of any fixed period for the payment of rent and that the
respondent or his sons or his representatives used to come and collect rent from the petitioner as per their convenience. It was stated that initially the
rent was Rs.951/- per month which was enhanced from time to time. It was stated that the tenancy was created for a period of 11 months from
15.10.1977 to 14.11.1978 with option for renewal. It was claimed that a sum of Rs.10,000/- was deposited with the respondent as security and it was
agreed that in case of default, rent would be adjusted from the security and the balance would be refunded on expiry of the period of tenancy. It was
stated that the petitioner was not a willful defaulter and at that time negotiation were going on between the parties for enhancement of rent and in
course of negotiation, one Birendra Baid, son of the respondent, refused to accept the rent unless rent was paid at double the then existing rate of rent.
Therefore, after their negotiation had failed and the respondent had finally refused to accept monthly rent from the petitioner, the rent for the months
of September and October, 1997 was deposited in court. Thus, it was claimed that the petitioner was not a willful defaulter. The petitioner denied
there was any bonafide requirement of the suit premises and prayed for dismissal of the suit. The petitioner had also filed an additional written
statement.
7) On the basis of pleadings, the learned trial court prayed the following issues:
1) Whether there is any cause of action for the suit?
2) Whether the defendant is defaulted in payment of rent?
3) Whether the suit premises is bonafide required for the plaintiff?
4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree as prayed for?
5) To what other relief or reliefs the parties are entitled?
8) For proving their respective stand, while the respondent examined himself as PW-1, the petitioner herein had examined three witnesses.
9) In respect of issue No.2, the learned trial court had held that the isolated acceptance of rent for few months would not change the mode of
payment of rent. It was held that the non-judicial cases (‘N.J.’ for short) cases in respect of deposit of rent for the month of September, 1997
and October, 1997 was not brought on record to show whether notices were issued to the respondent in respect of such deposit. Hence, it was held
that the deposit of rent in Court was not valid as per law. The learned trial court also did not accept the plea of the petitioner that rent was adjustable
from the security deposit. By relying on the order sheet of some N.J.case records, viz., Ext.E(1), Ext.E(2), Ext.E(3), Ext.E(4), Ext.E(5) and Ext.E(6),
it was held that there was no order for issuing notice to the landlord. It was also held that the withdrawal of rent by the landlord would not amount to
waiver, and that such withdrawal of rent from Court would not save the tenant from becoming the defaulter unless the requirements of law for
depositing rent in court are fulfilled. Hence, the learned trial court had held that the petitioner was a defaulter.
10) In respect of issue No. 3, by considering the large family of the respondent, the learned trial court had held that the suit premises was bonafide
required by the respondent for his personal use. By holding that “defaulter in paying rent†and “bonafide requirement of the suit premisesâ€
was grounds for eviction of a tenant, as such, it was held that the respondent had a “cause of action†for the suit. In respect of issues No. 4 and
5, it was held that in view of the finding recorded in respect of issues No. 1, 2 and 3, the respondent was entitled to get a decree. Accordingly, the suit
was decreed, directing the petitioner to deliver the khas possession of the suit premises to the respondent within two months. It was also held that the
respondent was entitled to get arrear rent and that as the rent was deposited in court, the respondent may collect it. However, it was clarified that the
withdrawal of rent from court would not mean that the deposits were in accordance with law.
11) Therefore said judgment and decree dated 06.02.2010, passed by the learned trial court was assailed in appeal. The appeal was registered as T.A.
No. 38/2010. The learned Civil Judge No. 2, Guwahati formulated the following point of determination for the appeal- Whether the impugned judgment
and decree passed by the learned court is just and proper and needs interference in this appeal?
12) The learned First Appellate Court concurred with the finding of the learned trial court on issue No. 2 by holding that the ground for defaulter and
bonafide requirement showed the existence of cause of action for the suit. In respect of the decision by the learned trial court on issue No. 2, the
learned First Appellate Court arrived at a finding that the rent for the month of September, 1997 and October, 1997 was deposited in court without
offering the rent to the respondent. The learned First Appellate Court had relied on the cross examination of DW-1, wherein he had stated that he
used to offer rent in the first week of succeeding month. On such admission, the learned first appellate court had held that the acceptance of rent by
the landlord in some occasion beyond the stipulated period was aberration from the usual practice. It was further held that the petitioner had failed to
discharge his obligation of offering rent to the landlord. It was held that in the pleading, the petitioner had not mentioned about offering of rent in
presence of Satya Narayan Sarma (DW-2) and therefore, it was held that the claim that monthly rent was offered to the respondent was
unbelievable. It was further held that the claim for adjustment of rent from security deposit was merely an assertion and no cogent material was found
on record to accept the same. Therefore, it was held that the petitioner herein had failed to establish that he had offered rent to the respondent and
that the respondent had refused to accept rent so tendered. Hence, the learned First Appellate Court concurred with the finding of the learned trial
court by holding that the petitioner was defaulter within the meaning of section 5(4) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972. In respect of
issue No. 3, the learned first appellate Court had accepted the plea of the respondent and it was held that the respondent was the best judge of his
requirement for the suit premises for business and for accommodating the extended family. Thus, the learned first appellate Court had concurred with
the decision of the learned trial court. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.
13) The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner had duly proved the deposit of rent in court for the month of September and
October, 1997 vide Ext.C(1). By referring to Ext.A (also exhibited by the petitioner as Ext.4),i.e. tenancy agreement for 11 months, it was submitted
that a security deposit of Rs.10,000/- was available with the respondent and that as the tenancy had continued even after expiry of the term of the said
written agreement (Ext.A), the said security deposit was retained by the respondent, as such, the petitioner could not have been declared to be a
defaulter, as such deposit was liable to be adjusted against arrear rent, if there be any.
14) It is further submitted that there was no date when the rent had become due. The rent was payable at convenience of both the parties. It is
submitted that it was the burden of the respondent-landlord to prove the due date or the date when the rent fell due. It is further submitted that in the
present case, as the respondent could prove the date when the rent fell due, both the learned courts below had erred on facts and in law in holding that
the petitioner was a defaulter. It is also submitted that his cross-examination, the respondent, who was examined as PW-1 had admitted that he was
having the counter foils for the rent receipts upto August, 1997 and that the counter foils of those rent receipts were not filed. Thus, it is submitted that
the respondent had failed to discharge his burden to prove the due date when rent had became due. By referring to the voluminous cross-examination
of the DW-1, it is submitted the said DW-1 had stated that - “the rent was offered in first week of succeeding monthsâ€. It is submitted that the
said answer was given when the cross-examination was being made in respect of deposit of rent in court. The learned counsel for the petitioner had
submitted that for the purpose of depositing rent in court, some regularity was to be maintained and therefore, for the said purpose the rent was
offered during the first week of the succeeding month and then deposited in the court. In this context, it is submitted that the claim in the plaint was
limited to allegation of default in paying rent for the months of September, 1997 and October, 1997. Therefore, when the petitioner had proved that
previous to the month of September, 1997, rent for a month was generally collected by the respondent after 1 to 2 months, as such, the date when rent
for the months of September and October, 1997 was required to be reckoned from the past conduct of the parties, and not from subsequent conduct
of the petitioner while depositing subsequent rent for the months of September and October, 1997 and onwards. In this regard, it is submitted that both
the learned courts below was only required to decide whether the petitioner had become a defaulter for the months of September and October, 1997
but as both the learned courts had travelled beyond the prayer made in the plaint, the concurrent decree passed by both the learned courts below was
required to be set aside.
15) The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the discarding the evidence of DW-2 by the learned courts below was erroneous because
the evidence of DW-2 was rejected merely because his name was not mentioned in the written statement. In this regard, the learned counsel for the
petitioner has referred to the provisions of Order VI Rule 2 CPC to project that law envisaged that in the plaint, the plaintiff must state concise facts
only and not the evidence. Therefore, the petitioner was not required to divulge the name of his witness in the plaint. It is submitted that DW-2 was an
eye-witness of the refusal by the respondent to accept rent offered by the petitioner and, as such, it is submitted that the learned courts below by
incorrectly discarding the evidence of DW-2, had held the petitioner to be a defaulter.
16) By referring to the evidence of PW-1, wherein the respondent had admitted that rent was paid even in the third week of the succeeding month, it
is submitted that the petitioner had duly proved the existing arrangement between the parties. It is submitted that the specific case of the petitioner
was that the son of the respondent, namely, Sri Birendra Baid had refused to accept the rent for the month of September and October, 1997.
However, in order to disprove the said stand, the respondent did not examine his son and thereby the petitioner had withheld material evidence. Hence,
it is submitted that the learned Courts below had erred on facts and in law by not presuming adversely against the respondent under section 114 Ill.(g)
of the Evidence Act, 1872 that had the respondent produced and examined his said son as a witness, such evidence would have gone against the
respondent. Hence, both the learned courts erred in law by not presuming that the default, if any, in paying rent for the months of September and
October, 1997 was not intentional, but the respondent by dilly-dallying acceptance of rent for the month of September and October, 1997 was trying to
project as if the petitioner was a defaulter.
17) The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the plaint, there was no pleading in respect of any subsequent default by the petitioner in
paying rent beyond the months of September and October, 1997. Therefore, in view of the absence of any pleadings in the plaint, it is submitted that
the learned trial had erred in law by relying on the evidence of allegations of subsequent default, if any. Thus, the judgments of both the courts below
were vitiated because the subsequent default, if any, was not pleaded before the learned trial court. In support of his submission, the learned counsel
for the petitioner has relied on the case of Sobha Biswas and Anr. Vs. Ranjit Lodh, 2006 (1) GLT 479.
18) It is also submitted the respondent had disconnected water supply and that the petitioner herein had apprehended disconnection of electricity
supply to the suit premises, as such, the petitioner had been compelled to approach the learned trial court by filing a Misc. Case under the Assam
Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 for restoration of water and for injunction against disruption of electricity energy supply. Moreover, the petitioner
had also been compelled to seek police help for restoration of water supply. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, these facts,
which were in the record of the learned trial court, was an indication that there was strained relationship between the parties and, as such, it is
submitted that it would have been an empty formality to offer rent from month to month to the respondent despite such strained relationship between
the parties. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the following cases:
a. M/s. Verma Crockery Store & Anr. Vs. Arun Kedia & Son & Anr., CRP 290/2015, decided on 13.06.2016.
b. Swapna Kumar Saha Vs. Biswa Nath Sureka, 2014 (1) GLT 252.
19) By referring to the cross-examination of PW-1 as well as on the affidavit filed by the petitioner on 24.04.2015, it is submitted that the respondent
had got vacant possession of the commercial premises let out to one M/s. Janki Tea Company, which was situated in the ground floor of the same
building. However, the said vacant space was let out to one M/s. Vishal Enterprises of Sri Bimal Kothari and Naresh Kothari. It is submitted that
during his cross examination, the PW-1 had specifically admitted that he had recovered possession of one flat let out to one Sampat Mal Baid and the
PW-1 had also admitted that another flat situated on the first floor was vacated by one Ratni Devi Baid. It is submitted that the respondent did not
occupy the two flats and one shop, which were vacated during the pendency of the suit. It is submitted that there was no pleadings of evidence as to
the nature of business sought to be done from the suit premises. It is also submitted that one of the sons of the respondent, in whose benefit the
petitioner was sought to be evicted on the alleged ground of bonafide requirement of the suit premises was not examined as witness. Therefore, the
nature of claim was very vague and the respondent was not entitled to eviction of the petitioner on such vague grounds.
20) The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it was the burden of the respondent landlord to prove the due date and in the absence of any
evidence to that effect, it must be held that the landlord has not been able to prove that the petitioner tenant was a defaulter. In respect of his said
submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the following cases:
a. Hari Shankar Sahu Vs. Giridharilal Sarmah, (1989) 2 GLR (NOC) 33.
b. Upendra Chandra Deb Roy Vs. Smti. Subhashini Deb & 2 ors., (1989) 2 GLR 7.
21) It is further submitted that the respondent could not prove that the rent become due on a particular date, as such, the learned courts below ought to
have held that rent would become due and payable only on the last date on which such rent could have been paid as per the conduct of the
respondent. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the following cases:
i. Shri Chiraranjan Paul & ors. Vs. Shri Sunil Kumar Choudhury, (1983) 1 GLR 268.
ii. M/s. Rikham Chand Babulal & 3 ors. Vs. M/s. Kunjalal Sureka & Sons HUF, CRP 331/2016, decided on 08.03.2018.
22) The learned counsel for the petitioner had submitted that there was no pleading in the plaint with regard to subsequent default, if any. Hence, the
event of subsequent default, if any, ought not to have been gone into by the learned courts below. It is submitted that as there was no pleadings in the
plaint, there was no defence in the written statement filed by the petitioner. Therefore, the courts below could not have decided the subsequent
default, being not the case pleaded in the plaint. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the case of Sobha Biswas &
Ors. Vs. Ranjit Lodh, 2006 (1) GLT 479.
23) The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the pre-condition for passing a decree for eviction of the petitioner is that the respondent
should not have any other suitable accommodation. However, in the present case in hand, as indicated herein before, the respondent had obtained
possession of three other suitable premises during the pendency of this present suit, i.e. two residential and one commercial premises. Under such
circumstances, as the suit was decreed and the appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed, it must be held that the learned courts below had
erred in law and on facts and the learned courts below ought to have held that bona fide requirement of the respondent had ceased to exist. In this
connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the following cases:-
a. Amarjit Singh Vs. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain, AIR 1989 SC 741;
b. Pokarmal Radhakishan Vs. Mustt. Radha Devi Agarwalla &Ors., (1987) 1 GLR 111;
c. Madhurilata Devi & Ors. Vs. Sri Gourapada Basak, (1984) 1 GLR 392;
d. Satyendra Chandra Gupta Vs. Mahesh Kamal Bhowal, (1982) 2 GLR 463.
24) Per-contra, the learned counsel for the respondent had submitted on the limitations of the power of the High Court while dealing in revision under
Section 115 CPC by submitting that in this case, there was a concurrent finding by both the courts below and, as such, this revision court ought not to
substitute its own view over the concurrent finding on facts as recorded by the learned courts below.
By referring to the evidence of PW-1, it is submitted that PW-1 had denied that there was no fixed date for payment of rent. It is submitted that the
PW-1 had specifically denied that rent for September 1997 was offered in first week of October, 1997, and that the said answer indicated that during
the cross-examination, the PW-1 was asked a question whether the offer of rent was made in the first week of succeeding month and, as such, it is
submitted that the said question proved that it was agreed between the parties that rent for each month would become due and payable within first
week of the succeeding month. By referring to the cross-examination of DW-1, the learned counsel for the respondent has placed heavy reliance on
the statements made by the DW-1, where the said DW-1 had admitted that he used to offer the rent in the first week of succeeding month.
Reference is also made to the cross-examination of DW-1, wherein he had stated that he had gone to offer rent on 03.05.2000 and by referring to the
same, it is submitted that the DW-1 had proved that it was the duty of the tenant to go and offer rent to the landlord and therefore, it is submitted that
having failed to offer rent to the respondent, the petitioner had rightly been held to be a defaulter by both the learned courts below. By referring to
Ext.E(1) to Ext.E(5), Ext.E(7), Ext. E(13) to Ext.E(16), it is submitted that all the said deposit of rent in court were made by persons other then the
petitioner, as such, neither the petitioner had offered rent to the respondent in respect of the said months and that nor the petitioner had filed any Misc.
(NJ) Case petitions in the court for deposit of rent. It is submitted that it must be presumed that only those persons who had signed and verified the
Misc. (N.J.) Case petitions had offered rent to the respondent.
It is also submitted that such deposits also proved that in all cases petitioner did not offer rent to the respondent. It is submitted that in view of the said
evidence, the petitioner was duly proved to be a rank defaulter. By further referring to cross-examination of DW-1, it is projected that the rent for the
months of October, 2001 and September,2002 where admittedly paid in advance, i.e. before such rent had become due, as such, it was submitted that
such deposits were not in accordance with the provisions of section 5(4) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972. Under the
circumstances, it is submitted that the respondent had been able to prove that the petitioner was a defaulter and the suit premises was bona fide
required by the respondent.
25) The learned counsel for the respondent has further submitted that the revisional court has no power to take cognizance of subsequent events
without any amendment of pleadings so as to non-suit the respondent landlord without giving the respondent a reasonable opportunity to lead evidence
in his support. In this context, it is submitted that there was alternative premises available was never pleaded for which there was no occasion for the
respondent to take any defence and to prove such defence. Moreover, it is submitted that the subsequent events was not proved by the petitioner and
therefore, on the basis of unproved allegation, the revisional court ought not to take cognizance of such submission made by the petitioner, which was
made only to escape from the concurrent finding of fact and in this connection, the learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the case
of Om Prakash Gupta Vs. Ranbir B. Goyal, (2002) 2 SCC 256.
26) In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that every year, the Civil Courts are on long vacation during the Durga Puja period and the
Civil Courts normally open after the Diwali festival. Therefore, as the courts were on long vacation, common practice is being followed in all civil
courts in the State of Assam that monthly rent falling only during Durga Puja- Diwali holidays are being deposited in advance. It is submitted that such
practice was not in violation of the provisions of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 because even during those period, rent was
deposited in court only upon refusal of the respondent to accept the rent lawfully tendered by the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner has
drawn attention of this Court on the evidence of DW-3, Gajendra Nath Barman, the Sheristadar of the civil court who was examined at the appellate
stage by invoking the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. It is submitted that the said witness had deposed in his evidence that out of the list
provided, only few N.J. cases could be produced as the remaining N.J. cases could not be traced out. The said DW-3 had also admitted that unless
proper steps were taken, the N.J. cases are not registered. In this regard, it is submitted that the proper steps would mean and include payment of the
process fees, and submission of written-up notices for issuing notice to the respondent-landlord. The said DW-3 had also stated that only after due
service of notice, the respondent had withdrawn the rent deposited in court. It is further submitted that the learned courts below had incorrectly
appreciated the facts as well as the applicable law, as such, the impugned judgment by both the learned courts below was liable to be set aside.
27) From the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for both sides and on perusal of the materials on record, the following points of
determination arise for consideration by the Court in this case:-
a. Whether the concurrent finding by both the courts below on the issue of defaulter is sustainable in view of the fact that the learned first appellate
court failed to discuss the evidence of DW-3 (appellant’s witness No. 1) which was recorded at the appellate stage as additional evidence under
Order 41 Rule 27 CPC?
b. Whether the petitioner cannot be held to be a defaulter in payment of advance?
c. Whether the concurrent finding of fact that the suit premises was bona fide required is liable to be interfered with?
28) On the point of determination No. (a), the focal point which has led to the concurrent finding of fact on the question of defaulter is that the
petitioner had stated during his cross-examination as DW-1 that he used to offer rent in the first week of succeeding month. The contention of the
learned counsel for the petitioner is that at the relevant time of his cross-examination, the petitioner was being asked questions relating to the NJ case
records and in that context he had deposed to the effect that he had offered rent in the first week of succeeding month, as such, the said statement of
DW-1 had been read out of context by the learned courts below and it was held that the previous conduct of the petitioner was that he had been
offering rent in the first week of succeeding month. It was submitted that in the plaint, the allegation was that the petitioner was a defaulter for paying
rent and service charges for the month of September and October, 1997 and therefore, the previous mode of payment as well as the monthly rent
payable for the subsequent months was neither pleaded in the plaint nor answered in the written statement. Therefore, when the prayer in the plaint
was only for recovery of rent and service charges for only for the two months of the month of September and October, 1997, both the learned courts
below had erred in referring to the offer for rent made by the petitioner in the first week of succeeding months during the pendency of the suit.
The decision by the learned courts below has also been assailed because of the failure of the learned first appellate court to discuss the additional
evidence of DW-3 recorded at the first appellate stage in T.A. No. 38/2010. It was submitted that the said DW-3 had not only proved that only few
out of the called records were available but he had categorically stated about the procedure that unless the duly paid rent deposit challans were filed,
no process were issued to landlord. Moreover, he had also proved that the respondent herein had withdrawn the rent deposited in the court, as such, it
was proved that the petitioner had submitted due requisites and steps for issuance of notice of deposit of rent on the respondent, as such, it was
submitted that both the learned courts had erred in law in holding that the petitioner was a defaulter. The counter given by the learned counsel for the
respondent has already been mentioned herein before.
29) On appreciating the evidence on record, it is seen that in various Misc. (NJ) Case records proved by DW-3, some persons other than the
petitioner herein, who had signed, verified and filed such petitions had claimed that they had offered rent to the respondent and that on refusal,
petitions were filed for allowing them to deposit rent in court under the provisions of section 5(4) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972.
It is seen that in the said Misc. (N.J.) Cases, no statement had been made that the persons other then the petitioner signing, verifying and filing such
cases had done so upon being duly authorized. Thus, this court does not find any infirmity in the concurrent finding by both the learned courts below
that the petitioner was a defaulter.
As stated herein before, there is an admission by the DW-1 that he had offered rent to the landlord in the first week of succeeding month. In view of
the concurrent finding of fact on the issue of defaulter, in the opinion of this Court, it is not open for the revisional court to re-appreciate the statements
made by DW-1 in his cross-examination with a view to give its finding as to the intention of the said witness in giving a particular answer in a
particular manner. Such an attempt to be squarely out of the jurisdiction of the revisional court because both the learned courts below had arrived at a
concurrent finding of fact that offer of rent was being made in the first week of succeeding month and based on such finding, it was held that the
petitioner was a defaulter in paying rent as well as service charges to the respondent.
30) Moreover, it is not in dispute that at the time of filing of the suit, the monthly rent for the suit premises was Rs.2,301/- and service charge of
Rs.200/- aggregating to a total sum of Rs.2,501/-was payable by the petitioner to the respondent. It is also not in dispute that there was no written
agreement for tenancy between the parties after the tenancy agreement made in the year 1977 had expired. In this regard, by citing the cases of Shri
Chiraranjan Paul (supra), Hari Shankar Sahu (supra), Upendra Chandra Deb Roy (supra) and M/s. Rikham Chand Babulal (supra), although the
learned Counsel for the petitioner has stressed that the respondent was collecting rent as per his convenience even after 1-2 months, but the law in
this regard appears to be well settled by this Court in the case Ram Karanji More V. Keshar Deo Jalan, (1996) 2 GLT 526, arising under the Assam
Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972. In the said case, it was held that when there is no written contract, the tenancy is always monthly, and the rent
is due at the end of the month. Thus, under the facts of the present case, the ratio of Shri Chiraranjan Paul (supra), Hari Shankar Sahu (supra),
Upendra Chandra Deb Roy (supra), and M/s. Rikham Chand Babulal (supra) cannot be applied as the petitioner had admitted in his cross examination
that he had offered rent to the respondent in the first week of succeeding month.
31) Moreover, it is seen that no plea was ever taken by the petitioner either before the learned trial court or before the learned first appellate court
that there was strained relationship between the petitioner and the respondent, for which if there would be acrimonious situation between them if the
petitioner went to meet the respondent to offer him rent. In this regard, it is seen that the petitioner had called for the records to prove various Misc.
(N.J.) Cases, inter-alia, stating therein that monthly rent was offered to the respondent and on his refusal, NJ cases were filed to allow the petitioner
to deposit rent in court. Under the circumstances, when the petitioner was asserting in the said NJ Cases that he had offered rent to the respondent,
the plea of strained relationship between the petitioner and the respondent, which has been raised for the first time before this revisional Court, cannot
be accepted. Therefore, the ratio of the case of M/s. Verma Crockery Store (supra) and Swapna Kumar Saha (supra), does not appear to apply in the
facts and circumstances of the present case. Moreover, as the petitioner has called various Misc. (N.J.) Cases and had proved such records, the
petitioner had proved his subsequent conduct. Therefore, it is not open for the petitioner to refer to the ratio laid down in the case of Sobha Biswas
(supra) to argue that both the learned courts below ought not to have taken cognizance of subsequent default, which was not the pleaded case of the
respondent. As such, the ratio of the case of Sobha Biswas (supra) is not found to apply under the facts of this case.
32) In view of above, although the failure of the learned first appellate court to discuss the evidence of the DW-3, recorded under Order XLI Rule 27
CPC was definitely an error on part of the first appellate court, but it is seen that such an error has not caused any prejudice to the petitioner because
of the fact that even if the evidence of DW-3 was considered, it would not have made any effect on the finding of fact recorded by the learned courts
below as the concurrent finding of defaulter was based on the admission made by the DW-1 in course of his cross-examination to the effect that he
had offered rent to the respondent in the first week of succeeding month. Strenuous effort was made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to
project that the respondent had refused to accept the rent for the relevant two months of September and October, 1997 as the respondent-landlord
wanted to increase the rent.
As per the evidence of DW-1, namely, Shri Indrachand Harlalka in paragraph-6, he had stated that the son of the respondent, namely, Shri Birendra
Baid had met him in first week of October, 1997 and had informed that rent for the month of September, 1997 would not be collected unless his
representative met the respondent herein regarding enhancement of rent and therefore, the petitioner had met the respondent in the in first week of
October, 1997 itself to offer rent, but it was refused unless the rent was doubled and paid. Hence, in the opinion of this Court, the petitioner was
aware that the respondent had refused to accept the lawful rent tendered in the in first week of October, 1997. Therefore, the petitioner took a
calculated risk of waiting for negotiation to materialize, by which time, even the rent for the month of October, 1997 had fallen due.
33) It is seen that the petitioner had led evidence to prove deposit of rent for the months subsequent to September and October, 1997 vide Ext.E(1) to
Ext.E(16). As per the statements made in the petitions for deposit of rent, the rents were deposited in court in or around the fortnight of the next
succeeding months. Therefore, the statement made by DW-1 in his cross-examination to the effect that rent was offered within first week of
succeeding month, appears to be in consonance with the deposit of rent in court within the fortnight of the next succeeding month. Under the
circumstances, the concurrent finding of fact in respect of holding the petitioner to be a defaulter cannot be faulted with.
34) Moreover, it appears that the learned counsel for the respondent is right in pointing out that some NJ cases from Ext.E(1) to Ext.E(16) were filed
by persons other than the petitioner, all of whom claimed that they have offered rent to the landlord and on the refusal, such rent was deposited in the
court. In this connection, this Court is of the opinion that in the absence of pleading or proof by the petitioner that such persons were is agents having
authority to file NJ Cases in Court, this Court cannot find fault with the conduct of the respondent to refuse to accept rent from such unauthorized
persons.
35) As a result of the discussions above, the first point of determination No. (a) is answered in the affirmative by holding that the concurrent finding by
both the courts below on the issue of defaulter is sustainable. It is also held that the failure of the learned first appellate court to discuss the evidence
of DW-3, recorded at the appellate stage under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, had not caused any prejudice to the petitioner because all the rent deposit
petitions as well as offer of rent relating to the said deposits were not made by the petitioner- tenant but such offer of rent as well as deposit of rent
was made by persons other than the petitioner, whose authority to offer such rent to the respondent-landlord and to file such Misc. (N.J.) Case
petitions in court was not proved by the petitioner, as such, deposit of rent in court by unauthorized persons do not prove due deposit of rent in court.
Thus, the concurrent finding on defaulter by both the learned courts below cannot be faulted with.
36) As regards the plea that the respondent landlord was holding the security deposit given by the petitioner. In the absence of proof that such security
was entitled to be appropriated against the rent during the currency of the tenancy, the only conclusion of the court would be that such security deposit
was not liable to be adjustment against monthly rent, but was liable to be adjusted when the tenant actually vacated the suit premises. If monthly rent
is permitted to be adjusted against advance/ security, the amount offered by way of advance/ security will get dilapidated, which would defeat the very
purpose of keeping an advance/ security. Hence, the said plea raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is found not acceptable by this Court.
Therefore, the point of determination No. (b) is also answered by holding that despite payment of advance to the respondent, as there was no
agreement for appropriation of such advance/ security towards payment of monthly rent due, the petitioner would be considered to be a defaulter for
not tendering monthly rent due for the relevant months within a fortnight of its becoming due, as provided in Section 5(4) of the Assam Urban Areas
Rent Control Act, 1972, despite advance/ security of Rs.10,000/- lying with the respondent.
37) On the next point of determination No. (c) of bona fide requirement, it is seen that while the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that
the respondent had let out the commercial space vacated by M/s. Janki Tea Company, a previous tenant to others. It was also stated that one flat was
got vacated from Sampat Mal Baid and moreover, the petitioner had got another flat situated in the backside of the first floor vacated from another
tenant, namely, Ratni Devi Baid.
38) The petitioner, by filing an affidavit on 24.04.2015, had taken a plea that the commercial space vacated by one M/s. Janki Tea Company was let
out to M/s. Vishal Enterprises of Sri Bimal Kothari and Naresh Kothari. The respondent herein by filing his affidavit on 27.03.2018 had denied the
allegations and he had categorically stated that the respondent and his sons, as partners of M/s. Pratapmal Khemchand, were storing their
merchandise in the said ground floor commercial space. However, it is seen that the said affidavit- in- opposition filed on 27.03.2018 is not verified at
all. Paragraph 7 of the said affidavit filed by the respondent, containing verification reads as follows:-
“7. That the statements made in paragraphs … … (left out blank) are true to my knowledge and those made in paragraphs … … (left out blank)
are true to my information derived from records and rests are my humble submissions and I swear that this my declaration is true, that it conceals
nothing and no part of it is false, so help me God.â€
39) Therefore, in view of the defective verification in support of the affidavit- in- opposition filed on 27.03.2018, no reliance can be placed on such an
un-verified affidavit. Thus, in the absence of a duly verified affidavit, the statements made by the petitioner in the affidavit dated 24.04.2015 is deemed
to be admitted by applying the doctrine of non- traverse. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Deena Nath V. Pooran Lal, (2001) 5 SCC
705, had held there must be an actual and pressing requirement, not mere a whim or fanciful desire and that such requirement of the landlord must be
presenti, and also the landlord should not be in possession of any other reasonably suitable accommodation of his own in the town or city concerned.
Therefore, in the absence of proper verification in the affidavit- in- opposition filed by the respondent on 27.03.2018, this Court is constrained to hold
that the respondent did not bona fide require the suit premises. Moreover, during the pendency of the suit, the respondent had received residential
space vacated by one Sampat Mal Baid and one Ratni Devi Baid and he had also come into possession of a commercial space vacated by M/s. Janki
Tea Company.
Thus, the plea taken in paragraph 4 of the plaint, about requirement of the suit premises for growing residential requirement of the respondent and his
family of 5 sons and for diversification of business had been satisfied. In the cross examination of PW-1 recorded on 23.07.2004, the respondent has
categorically admitted that the suit premises was on first floor of the building and that the other part of the first floor, which was in occupation of Smt.
Ratni Devi Baid had already been vacated one year back by virtue of a court decree. PW-1 had also admitted that he had not informed this Court
about institution of suit for evicting M/s. Janki Tea Company. Therefore, following the ratio laid down in the cases of Amarjit Singh (supra), Pokarmal
Radhakishan (supra), Madhurilata Devi (supra), Satyendra Chandra Gupta (supra), this court finds that the bona fide requirement of the suit premises
got diluted and/or obliterated because during the pendency of the suit i.e. TS 206/97, the respondent has received vacant possession of suitable
premises in his own building.
This Court finds that the respondent had not amended his plaint to bring home the point that the additional vacant space received consequent to two
court cases was still insufficient for meeting the requirements of the respondent. Hence, this court is of the opinion that both the learned courts below
did not deal with the said aspect of the matter. Therefore, the finding recorded by both the learned courts below is found to suffer from non
appreciation of materials available on record, which was proved by the admission of PW-1 that he had received possession of one commercial and
two residential space during the pendency of the suit. In the opinion of this Court, the failure to appreciate the evidence on record amounts to
jurisdictional error, which has led to miscarriage of justice. Thus, the concurrent finding by both the learned courts below in so far as it concerns bona
fide requirement of the suit premises is not found to be sustainable and, as such, the said finding is liable to be interfered with. Hence, the Point of
determination No. (c) is answered in the affirmative by holding that the concurrent finding of fact that the suit premises was bona fide required is
liable to be interfered with, and the said finding is set aside.
40) On the plea by the petitioner that the son of the respondent Birendra Baid has refused to accept rent as such by no examining the said Birendra
Baid, the respondent had withheld material evidence, this Court is of the considered opinion that it was the plea of the petitioner that Birendra Baid had
refused to accept rent from him. Therefore, under the provisions of Section 102 of the Evidence Act, 1872, it would be the burden of the petitioner to
prove such fact, because if no evidence was led by either side the plea of the petitioner would fail. The plea of denial is a negative fact, for which no
proof is required to be given by the respondent. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to accept the plea that non-examination of Birendra Baid by the
respondent was fatal or that it amounted to withholding of material evidence, as alleged.
41) Before parting with the records, it would be pertinent to mention herein that the scope of revision under Section 115 CPC is very limited. This
power cannot be equated to powers exercisable in appeal. The scope of interference is essentially confined to jurisdictional errors and the case of
gross miscarriage of justice resulting from material irregularity committed by the Court in exercise of its jurisdiction. If one needs an authority on the
point, the case of Nabajyoti Mahanta V. Smt. Prabini Majumdar, (1996) 2 GLT 459, may be referred to. In the present case in hand, the learned trial
court is not found to have committed any jurisdictional errors, save and except that although the learned first appellate court had committed
jurisdictional error by not discussing additional evidence of AW-3, recorded under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, it was a vital piece of evidence, in so far
as the learned appellate court is concerned. However, the non-consideration of such vital evidence has not caused any prejudice to the petitioner, as
its consideration would not have made any material effect in the first appellate judgment. Hence, this Court had been compelled to appreciate the
evidence of DW-1, recorded in course of the appellate proceeding.
42) As a result, while the concurrent finding recorded by both the learned courts below that the petitioner is a defaulter is upheld. The petitioner is
liable for being evicted from the suit premises on the ground that he is a defaulter. However, in so far as the finding on bona fide requirement of the
suit premises is concerned, the concurrent finding by both the learned courts below is set aside by holding that the bona fide requirement of the suit
premises by the respondent does not exist in the presenti. Therefore, in view of the finding that the petitioner is a defaulter, this appeal fails. Hence,
except for the finding on bona fide requirement, the concurrent finding of both the learned Courts below i.e. first appellate judgment and decree dated
24.09.2014 passed by the learned Civil Judge No. 2, Kamrup (Metropolitan), Guwahati in Title Appeal No. 38/2010, thereby dismissing the appeal and
confirming the judgment and decree dated 06.02.2010 passed by the learned Munsiff No. 2, Kamrup (Metropolitan), Guwahati in Title Suit No.
969/2006, thereby decreeing suit for ejection of the petitioner herein from the suit premises are both upheld.
43) The parties are left to bear their own cost for this revision.
44) Send back the LCR.
JUDGE
45) Later on, after the order was pronounced in open Court. Mr. B.K. Jain, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has prayed for granting some time
to the petitioner to make alternative arrangements. He has further stated that this was an old tenancy and the petitioner is about 70 years old. Hence,
he is prays for one year’s time to vacate the suit premises.
46) Mr. B. Sharma, the learned counsel for the respondent opposes the prayer on the ground that the respondent has already suffered a long litigation
since the year 2006.
47) On consideration of the prayer made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court is inclined to grant 8(eight) months time from today to the
petitioner to vacate the suit premises and to deliver physical possession thereof to the respondent, which shall be under the following conditions:-
(i) That the petitioner shall furnish a bond/undertaking by way of an affidavit to be filed before the learned trial court i.e. the court of Munsiff No. 2,
Guwahati within a period of 1(one) month from today to vacate the suit premises within the period of 8(eight) months from today i.e. by 31.01.2019.
(ii) During the period, the petitioner shall pay the agreed rent and service
charge of Rs.2,301/- + Rs.200/- = Rs.2,501/- to the respondent within 1st week of succeeding month. The payment of such rent shall not create any
tenancy or any new right on the petitioner on any ground whatsoever.
(iii) The petitioner must also undertake not to part with the possession of the suit premises to any person other than the respondent or his duly
authorized son, and also not to create any sub-tenancy therein.
(iv) On the failure of the petitioner to file such a bond/undertaking within the time allowed, or on any breach of any of the conditions imposed herein,
or on failure to deliver peaceful, khas and vacant possession of the suit premises to the respondent after expiry of 8(eight) months from today, the
respondent shall have a right to get the decree executed in accordance with law.