M/s. Shakambri Industries Private Limited vs State Of Jharkhand

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

The writ petitioner/appellant herein and one Pakur Large Area Multi Purpose Society (Lamps), Pakur both were facing the proceedings under

the Public Demand Recovery Act, 1914 under Certificate Case No. 46/2016-2017 before the Additional Collectorcum- Certificate Officer for

recovery of certificate amounts as cost of Paddy, weighing 3346 quintals lying with the Pakur Lamps. Pakur Lamps, approached this Court in WPC

No. 5773 of 2016 challenging the letter no. 353 dated 24.08.2016 issued by District Cooperative Officer, Pakur (resolution no. 1 dated 01. 08. 2016)

whereunder it was directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 47,17,460/- as cost of paddy of 3346 quintals. The present appellant was also impleaded as a party

but not noticed. During the pendency of that writ application, the Certificate Officer held Pakur Lamps and the present writ petitioner jointly liable for

payment of the public demand.Â

The learned Writ Court by order dated 17.8.2017 refused to interfere with the matter while reserving the liberty with the petitioner therein to

approach the appellate authority under section 60 of the Act and raise all the issues including the issue regarding maintainability of the order fixing

the liability jointly on the parties ( Annexure-A). This order was brought on record as part of supplementary counter affidavit of the respondent-State,

in this case. The learned Single Judge in the case of the present writ petitioner followed the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the case of

Pakur Lamps in WPC No. 5773 of 2016 and refused to interfere in the matter. Petitioner, herein had approached for quashing of letter no. 423

dated 26.10.2016 whereby the District Cooperative Officer, Pakur requested the Deputy Commissioner, Pakur to initiate a certificate proceedings

against the Chairmancum- Member Secretary of the Pakur Lamps as well as the petitioner for realization of the dues. It also sought quashing of the

letter no. 477 dated 10.12.2016 whereby the District Cooperative Officer, Pakur requested the Certificate Officer Pakur to initiate Certificate

Proceedings against the petitioner as well as the officers of the Lamps, Pakur for realization of the dues. Petitioner sought quashing of the entire

certificate proceeding being Certificate Case No. 46 of 2016-2017 including the notices issued thereunder. During the pendency of the instant writ

petition, the Certificate Officer decided the public demand by order dated 01.08.2017 which was also challenged through I.A. No. 6592 of 2017.

Learned counsel for the appellant has questioned the impugned order essentially on the plea of the maintainability stating that the nature of recovery

does not fall within the meaning of public demand as conceived under section 3(6)Â Â read with Schedule 1 of the Public Demand Recovery Act,

1914. Learned counsel for the appellant has made reference to the agreement dated 19.01.2016 (Annexure-1) entered into between the District

Manager, Jharkhand State Food Supply Corporation Limited, Sahibganj and the Proprietor of the petitioner firm which incorporates certain terms and

conditions read with notification/memo no. 7208/ Ranchi dated 30.11.2015 of the Department of Food, Public Distribution and Consumer Affairs,

Government of Jharkhand. Learned counsel for the appellant has tried to impress that realization of price of the paddy against advances made to

the Pacs by the respondent-department do not fall within the meaning of Public Demand under any of the Articles of Schedule-1. Appellant had good

reasons not to lift the paddy from the Pakur Lamps as also communicated through its letter dated 06.07.2016 and evident from the Inquiry Report at

Annexure4 of the District Manager, Jharkhand Food Corporation Limited, District Cooperative Officer, Pakur, District Agriculture Officer, Pakur.

The Certificate Officer should not have entertained the certificate proceeding if the demand did not fall under Public Demand. Learned Counsel for

the appellant has referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of   Carona Ltd. Vs. Parvathy Swaminathan & Sons reported in

(2007) 8 SCC 559, Para 26 to 30. He submits that the jurisdiction of a tribunal would be dependent on the existence of a particular state of affairs

which may be described as preliminary  or collateral to the merits of the issue. If at the inception of any inquiry by an inferior tribunal, a challenge

is made to its jurisdiction, the tribunal has to make up its mind whether to act or not and can give a ruling on the preliminary or collateral issue, that

ruling is not conclusive. Distinction can be drawn between jurisdictional fact and adjudicatory fact. Adjudicatory fact is a fact in issue and can be

determined by a court, tribunal or authority on merits on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties but at the same time, it is difficult to distinguish

jurisdictional fact and fact in issue or adjudicatory fact. Nonetheless the difference between the two cannot be overlooked. The appellant approached

the writ court in Certiorari jurisdiction questioning the maintainability of the certificate proceedings as demand did not fall in the category of public

demand. The certificate officer was precluded from ruling on this jurisdictional issue which ought to have been decided by the learned Single Judge.

This issue was not squarely addressed by the writ court in the writ petition filed by Pakur Lamps Limited earlier.

 Learned counsel for the State has also relied upon the agreement dated 19.01.2016 whereunder the liability was upon Pacs to lift the

paddy from the farmers and petitioner in turn from the Pakur Lamps. Petitioner was required to process it in their Mills and then transport it to

the Godown of the Food Corporation. Since huge quantity of paddy were not lifted by the Petitioner’s Rice Mill from the Pacs/Lamps, the paddy

became unfit for use and in turn the advances made to the Pacs went in vain. This amounted to loss of public exchequer which had been sought to be

recovered from both the Duty Holders i.e. Pacs/Lamps and the Rice Mill owner. He submits that the learned Single Judge has, in the facts of the

case, taken a consistent view with its predecessor as the Certificate Proceedings are the same and a remedy of appeal is already provided under the

Act. He submits that the appellate forum has the jurisdiction to examine all contentions which have been left open by the learned Single Judge even in

the case of Pakur Lamps vide order dated 17.8.2017. The impugned order, therefore, needs no interference.Â

We have given anxious consideration to the plea of the parties, more so because a question of maintainability of the Certificate Proceeding has been

raised on the ground that the demand does not fall in the category of public demand. Various articles of the Schedule (1) of the Act of 1914 have been

enumerated by the learned counsel for the parties in support of their respective contentions. We may, at this stage, only observe that the plea raised by

the appellant does not appear to be a case of patent lack of jurisdiction which on the face of it could be discernable from the documents on record.

The appellant case of lack of jurisdiction may be a latent one which could be discernible only upon determination of facts on merits. Various

document including the  agreement between the parties, the letter dated 30.11.2015 of the department of Food Public Distribution & Consumer

Department, Government of Jharkhand laying down the guidelines and conditions for the transactions have to be examined. In the factual background

of the case, we are strengthened by the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Central Coalfields Ltd vs. State of Jharkhand and others reported

in (2005) 7 SCC 492, para-10. The Apex Court, while dealing with a challenge to the maintainability of Certificate Proceedings under the Bihar and

Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914 for payment of Surface Rent had observed that the powers of the appellate authority under the Bihar and

Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914 are very wide and the appellant may raise all contentions including the contention as to the jurisdiction of

the State Government and/or its officers in initiating certificate proceedings against the Company. Relegation to an alternative remedy in that light

does seem to be proper course adopted by the learned Single Judge. The learned writ court has also quoted such observation of the coordinate bench

in WPC No. 5773 of 2016.

We, therefore, do not want to disturb the finding of the writ court leaving it open to the appellant to invoke the statutory remedy available under the

Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914. Appellant is allowed 10 days time, as prayed for, to approach the statutory forum under the Public Demands

Recovery Act, 1914 within which period no coercive steps be taken against them. The appeal stands disposed of. I.A. No. 5053 of 2018 stands

closed.Â