Ms. Satyadevi Alamuri vs Stera Engineering (India) Pvt Ltd

ORDER

i)

Pass an order approving the Resolution Plan dated 10.10.2024 read with Addendum dated 16.11.2024 submitted by the Successful Resolution Applicant in respect of the Corporate Debtor, under Section 31(1) of the code and declare that the same shall be binding on the Corporate Debtor and its employees, members and all creditors (including the Central government State government or any local authority to whom a debt in respect of the payment of dues arising under any law for the time being in force such as authorities to whom statutory dues are owed), guarantors and all others stakeholders of the corporate Debtor.

ii) May pass an order for allowing the reliefs and concessions requested by the resolution applicant in the Section 9 of the CoC Approved resolution plan.

2. ABOUT THE CORPORATE DEBTOR

3. CORPORATE INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION PROCESS OF STERA ENGINEERING (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED (STERA)

4. DELIBERATION OF THE COC ON THE FEASIBILITY OF THE PLAN

RESOLVED that in accordance with the provisions of Section 30(4) and other applicable provisions, if any of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 read with its Regulations, the Resolution plan submitted by M/s. Subhlaxmi Investment Advisory Private Limited having CIN U17221WB2008PTC127538 in respect of STERA ENGINEERING INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED UNDER CIRP as circulated with the agenda was opened at the 5th CoC meeting held on 19.8.2024, circulated at the 6th CoC meeting on 26.8.2024 and at the 7th CoC meeting held on 10.10.2024, revised plan circulated at the 8th CoC meeting held on 12.11.2024 (meeting not held)and placed before the 9th CoC meeting on 21.11.2024 along with clarificatory addendum discussed, debated and approved by the Committee of Creditors having 90.883% voting power by all the members present, after considering its feasibility and viability, the manner of distribution proposed and taking into account the order of priority amongst creditors as laid down in subsection (1) of Section 53, including the priority and value of the security interest of the Creditors

5 . DETAILS OF THE SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION APPLICANT

8. PAY-OUT TO STAKEHOLDERS AS PROPOSED IN THE PLAN

FINANCIAL PROPOSAL SUMMARY:

Payment Schedule:

10. MANAGEMENT OF THE CORPORATE DEBTOR

11. MANDATORY COMPLIANCE UNDER IBC & REGULATIONS

MANDATORY CONTENTS OF THE RESOLUTION PLAN IN TERMS OF REGULATION 38 OF CIRP REGULATIONS.

12. JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT IN RELATION TO APPROVAL OF A RESOLUTION PLAN

‚19…….In the present case, however, our focus must be on the dispensation governing the process of approval or rejection of resolution plan by the CoC. The CoC is called upon to consider the resolution plan under Section 30(4) of the I&B Code after it is verified and vetted by the resolution professional as being compliant with all the statutory requirements specified in Section 30(2).

62.

………In the present case, however, we are concerned with the provisions of I&B Code dealing with the resolution process. The dispensation provided in the I&B Code is entirely different. In terms of Section 30 of the I&B Code, the decision is taken collectively after due negotiations between the financial creditors who are constituents of the CoC and they express their opinion on the proposed resolution plan in the form of votes, as per their voting share. In the meeting of the CoC, the proposed resolution plan is placed for discussion and after full interaction in the presence of all concerned and the Resolution Professional, the constituents of the CoC finally proceed to exercise their option (business/commercial decision) to approve or not to approve the proposed resolution plan. In such a case, non-recording of reasons would not per-se vitiate the collective decision of the financial creditors. The legislature has not envisaged challenge to the ‚commercial/business decision‛ of the financial creditors taken collectively or for that matter their individual opinion, as the case may be, on this count.‛

‚55. Whereas, the discretion of the adjudicating authority (NCLT) is circumscribed by Section 31 limited to scrutiny of the resolution plan ‚as approved‛ by the requisite per cent of voting share of financial creditors. Even in that enquiry, the grounds on which the adjudicating authority can reject the resolution plan is in reference to matters specified in Section 30(2), when the resolution plan does not conform to the stated requirements. Reverting to Section 30(2), the enquiry to be done is in respect of whether the resolution plan provides: (i) the payment of insolvency resolution process costs in a specified manner in priority to the repayment of other debts of the corporate debtor, (ii) the repayment of the debts of operational creditors in prescribed manner, (iii) the management of the affairs of the corporate debtor, (iv) the implementation and supervision of the resolution plan, (v) does not contravene any of the provisions of the law for the time being in force, (vi) conforms to such other requirements as may be specified by the Board. The Board referred to is established under Section 188 of the I&B Code. The powers and functions of the Board have been delineated in Section 196 of the I&B Code. None of the specified functions of the Board, directly or indirectly, pertain to regulating the manner in which the financial creditors ought to or ought not to exercise their commercial wisdom during the voting on the resolution plan under Section 30(4) of the I&B Code. The subjective satisfaction of the financial creditors at the time of voting is bound to be a mixed baggage of variety of factors. To wit, the feasibility and viability of the proposed resolution plan and including their perceptions about the general capability of the resolution applicant to translate the projected plan into a reality. The resolution applicant may have given projections backed by normative data but still in the opinion of the dissenting financial creditors, it would not be free from being speculative. These aspects are completely within the domain of the financial creditors who are called upon to vote on the resolution plan under Section 30(4) of the I&B Code. 58. Indubitably, the inquiry in such an appeal would be limited to the power exercisable by the resolution professional under Section 30(2) of the I&B Code or, at best, by the adjudicating authority (NCLT) under Section 31(2) read with Section 31(1) of the I&B Code. No other inquiry would be permissible. Further, the jurisdiction bestowed upon the appellate authority (NCLAT) is also expressly circumscribed. It can examine the challenge only in relation to the grounds specified in Section 61(3) of the I&B Code, which is limited to matters ‚other than‛ enquiry into the autonomy or commercial wisdom of the dissenting financial creditors. Thus, the prescribed authorities (NCLT/NCLAT) have been endowed with limited jurisdiction as specified in the I&B Code and not to act as a court of equity or exercise plenary powers.‛

42.

………Thus, it is clear that the limited judicial review available, which can in no circumstance trespass upon a business decision of the majority of the Committee of Creditors, has to be within the four corners of Section 30(2) of the Code, insofar as the Adjudicating Authority is concerned, and Section 32 read with Section 61(3) of the Code, insofar as the Appellate Tribunal is concerned, the parameters of such review having been clearly laid down in K. Sashidhar (supra).

‚73. There is no doubt whatsoever that the ultimate discretion of what to pay and how much to pay each class or sub-class of creditors is with the Committee of Creditors, but, the decision of such Committee must reflect the fact that it has taken into account maximizing the value of the assets of the corporate debtor and the fact that it has adequately balanced the interests of all stakeholders including operational creditors. This being the case, judicial review of the Adjudicating Authority that the resolution plan as approved by the Committee of Creditors has met the requirements referred to in Section 30(2) would include judicial review that is mentioned in Section 30(2)(e), as the provisions of the Code are also provisions of law for the time being in force. Thus, while the Adjudicating Authority cannot interfere on merits with the commercial decision taken by the Committee of Creditors, the limited judicial review available is to see that the Committee of Creditors has taken into account the fact that the corporate debtor needs to keep going as a going concern during the insolvency resolution process; that it needs to maximise the value of its assets; and that the interests of all stakeholders including operational creditors has been taken care of. If the Adjudicating Authority finds, on a given set of facts, that the aforesaid parameters have not been kept in view, it may send a resolution plan back to the Committee of Creditors to re-submit such plan after satisfying the aforesaid parameters. The reasons given by the Committee of Creditors while approving a resolution plan may thus be looked at by the Adjudicating Authority only from this point of view, and once it is satisfied that the Committee of Creditors has paid attention to these key features, it must then pass the resolution plan, other things being equal.‛

76.

The expositions aforesaid make it clear that the decision as to whether corporate debtor should continue as a going concern or should be liquidated is essentially a business decision; and in the scheme of IBC, this decision has been left to the Committee of Creditors, comprising of the financial creditors. Differently put, in regard to the insolvency resolution, the decision as to whether a particular resolution plan is to be accepted or not is ultimately in the hands of the Committee of Creditors; and even in such a decision-making process, a resolution plan cannot be taken as approved if the same is not approved by votes of at least 66% of the voting share of financial creditors. Thus, broadly put, a resolution plan is approved only when the collective commercial wisdom of the financial creditors, having at least 2/3rd majority of voting share in the Committee of Creditors, stands in its favour.

77.

In the scheme of IBC, where approval of resolution plan is exclusively in the domain of the commercial wisdom of CoC, the scope of judicial review is correspondingly circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 31 as regards approval of the Adjudicating Authority and in Section 32 read with Section 61 as regards the scope of appeal against the order of approval.

77.1.

Such limitations on judicial review have been duly underscored by this Court in the decisions above-referred, where it has been laid down in explicit terms that the powers of the Adjudicating Authority dealing with the resolution plan do not extend to examine the correctness or otherwise of the commercial wisdom exercised by the CoC. The limited judicial review available to Adjudicating Authority lies within the four corners of Section 30(2) of the Code, which would essentially be to examine that the resolution plan does not contravene any of the provisions of law for the time being in force, it conforms to such other requirements as may be specified by the Board, and it provides for: (a) payment of insolvency resolution process costs in priority; (b) payment of debts of operational creditors; (c) payment of debts of dissenting financial creditors; (d) for management of affairs of corporate debtor after approval of the resolution plan; and (e) implementation and supervision of the resolution plan.

77.2.

The limitations on the scope of judicial review are reinforced by the limited ground provided for an appeal against an order approving a resolution plan, namely, if the plan is in contravention of the provisions of any law for the time being in force; or there has been material irregularity in exercise of the powers by the resolution professional during the corporate insolvency resolution period; or the debts owed to the operational creditors have not been provided for; or the insolvency resolution process costs have not been provided for repayment in priority; or the resolution plan does not comply with any other criteria specified by the Board

77.6.1.

The assessment about maximization of the value of assets, in the scheme of the Code, would always be subjective in nature and the question, as to whether a particular resolution plan and its propositions are leading to maximization of value of assets or not, would be the matter of enquiry and assessment of the Committee of Creditors alone. When the Committee of Creditors takes the decision in its commercial wisdom and by the requisite majority; and there is no valid reason in law to question the decision so taken by the Committee of Creditors, the adjudicatory process, whether by the Adjudicating Authority or the Appellate Authority, cannot enter into any quantitative analysis to adjudge as to whether the prescription of the resolution plan results in maximization of the value of assets or not. The generalised submissions and objections made in relation to this aspect of value maximisation do not, by themselves, make out a case of interference in the decision taken by the Committee of Creditors in its commercial wisdom

78.

To put in a nutshell, the Adjudicating Authority has limited jurisdiction in the matter of approval of a resolution plan, which is well defined and circumscribed by Sections 30(2) and 31 of the Code read with the parameters delineated by this Court in the decisions above referred. The jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority is also circumscribed by the limited grounds of appeal provided in Section 61 of the Code. In the adjudicatory process concerning a resolution plan under IBC, there is no scope for interference with the commercial aspects of the decision of the CoC; and there is no scope for substituting any commercial term of the resolution plan approved by the CoC. Within its limited jurisdiction, if the Adjudicating Authority or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, would find any shortcoming in the resolution plan vis-à-vis the specified parameters, it would only send the resolution plan back to the Committee of Creditors, for re-submission after satisfying the parameters delineated by Code and exposited by this Court.

49.

Rainbow Papers (Supra) did not notice the ‘waterfall mechanism’ under Section 53 – the provision had not been adverted to or extracted in the Judgement. Furthermore, Rainbow Papers (Supra) was in the context of a resolution process and not during liquidation. Section 53, as held earlier, enacts the waterfall mechanism providing for the hierarchy or priority of claims of various classes of creditors. The careful design of Section 53, locates amounts payable to secured creditors and workmen at the second place, after the costs & expenses of the liquidator payable during the liquidation proceedings. However, the dues payable to the government are placed much below those of secured creditors and even unsecured creditors. This design was either not brought to the notice of the Court in Rainbow Papers (supra) or was missed altogether. In any event, the Judgment has not taken note of the provisions of the IBC which treat the dues payable to secured creditors at a higher footing than dues payable to central or state Government.

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