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Judgment
Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J
The petitioner is a total stranger, who is yet to be ranted permission under Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act to buy land, so as to be governed by the laws governing the State of Himachal Pradesh, but would venture to question the notification issued by the Town & Country Planning Department, more particularly, notification issued on 06.06.2025 (Annexure P-23), whereby Sri Tara Mata Hill has been declared as ‘Green Area’.
Since the petitioner has not been granted any permission to purchase land in this State, as is mandatory for a non-agriculturist, obviously, this petition, that too, at the instance of a Hotel, of which the petitioner claims to be a Director, cannot even file much less maintain this petition. This is because it lacks locus standi, as under no circumstances whatsoever it can be held to be a ‘ party aggrieved’ as it has no interest in the State of Himachal Pradesh being resident of Chandigarh (Director), so as to challenge the laws of this State, more particularly, the aforesaid notification.
It is settled law that a person who suffers from legal injury only can challenge the act/action/order etc. Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable for enforcing the statutory or legal right or when there is a complaint by the petitioner that there is a breach of the statutory duty on the part of the respondents. Therefore, there must be judicially enforceable right for the enforcement on which the writ jurisdiction can be resorted to. The Court can enforce the performance of a statutory duty by public bodies through its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of the said right is the condition precedent to invoke the writ jurisdiction.
A Bench of four learned Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed and others [(1976) 1 SCC 671] had to examine the scheme of Bombay Cinemas Regulation Act 1953 and a rule therein with a view of finding out whether a rival cinema owner could appeal against a No objection Certificate grated to an applicant who wanted to establish a cinema theatre of his own. Sarkaria, J., speaking for the Court observed that under the relevant provisions of the Regulations no right was conferred by way of special interest on such a rival cinema owner as he did n t satisfy the test of 'person aggrieved'. Nor could he be treated to be a valid objector being resident of the locality or person to whom any special right of objection was conferred by the statutory scheme. Thus he was merely a rival cinema owner who was likely to be adversely affected in his commercial interest if another cinema theatre got established and came to be run in the light of the No objection Certificate. That such an interest was considered to be too remote to clothe the objectors with a right to object to the No Objection Certificate to run a cinema under the Rules. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that only a person who is aggrieved by an order, can maintain a writ petition. The expression "aggrieved person" has been explained by the Court observing that such a person must show that he has more particular or peculiar interest on his own beyond that of general public in seeing that the law is properly administered.
It shall be apt to reproduce paras 13 to 47, which read as under:-
This takes us to the further question: Who is an "aggrieved per son" and what are the qualifications requisite for such a status ? The expression "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic, and, to an extent, an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. At best, its features can be described in a b oad, tentative manner. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nat re and extent of the petitioner's interest, and the nat re and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him. English Courts have sometimes put a restricted and sometimes a wide construction on the expression "aggrieved person". However, some general tests have been devised to ascertain whether an applicant is eligible for this category so as to have the necessary locus standi or 'standing' to invoke certiorari jurisdiction.
We will first take up that line of cases in which an "aggrieved person" has been held to be one who has a more particular or peculiar interest of his own beyond that of the general public, in seeing that the law is properly administered. The leading case in this line in Queen v. Justices of Surrey, (1870) 5 QB 468 decided as far back as 1870. There, on the application by the highway board the Justices made certificates that certain portions of three roads were unnecessary. As a result, it was ordered that the roads should cease to be repaired by the parishes.
E, an inhabitant of one of the parishes, and living in the neighbourhood of the roads, obtained a rule for a certiorari to bring up the orders and certificates for the purpose of quashing them on the ground that they were void by reason of the notices not having been affixed at the places required by law. On the point of locus standi (following an earlier decision Hex v. Taunton St. Mary, (1815) 3 M&S 465 the Court held that though a certiorari is not a writ of course, yet as the applicant had by reason of his local situation a peculiar grievance of his own, and was not merely applying as one of the public, he was entitled to the writ ex debito justitiae.
It is to be noted that in this case was living in the neighbourhood of the roads were to be abandoned as a result of the certificates issued by the Justices. He would have suffered special inconvenience by the abandonment. Thus had shown a particular grievance of his own beyond some inconvenience suffered by the general public. He had a right to object to the grant of the Certificate. Non-publication of the notice at all the places in accordance with law, had seriously prejudiced him in the exercise of that legal right.
The ratio of the decisi n in Queen v. Justices of Surrey (supra) was followed in King v. Groom and ors. Ex Parte (1901) 2 KB 157. There, the parties were rivals in the liquor trade. The applicants (brewers) had persistently objected to the ju isdic ion of the justices to grant the ` license to one J. K. White in a particular month. It was held that the applicants had a sufficient interest in the matter to enable them to invoke certiorari jurisdiction.
A disting ishing feature of this case was that unlike the appellants in the present case who did not, despite public n tice, raise any objection before the District Magistrate to the grant of the No-objection Certificate, the brewers were persistently raising objections in proceedings before the Justices at every stage. The law gave them a right to object and to see that the licensing was done in accordance with law. They were seriously prejudiced in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of the jurisdiction on the part of the Justices.
The rule in Groom's case was followed in The King v. Richmond Confirming Authority, Ex parte Howitt (1921) 1 KB 248. There, also, the applicant for a certiorari was a rival in the liquor trade. It is significant that in coming to the conclusion that the applicant was a 'person aggrieved', Earl of Reading C.J. laid stress on the fact that he had appeared and objected before the Justices and joined issue with them, though unsuccessfully, "in the sense that they said they had jurisdiction when he said they had not".
In R. v. Toames Magistrate Court Ex parte Greenbaum (1957) 55 LGR 129 there were two traders in Goulston St., Stepney. One of them was Gritzman who held a license to trade on pitch No. 4 for S days in the week an pitch No. 8 for the other two days. The other was Greenbaum, who held a licence to sell on Pitch No. 8 for two days of the week, and pitch No. 10 for the other days of the week. A much better pitch, pitch No. 2, in Gulston St. became vacant. Thereupon, both Gritzman and Greenbaum applied for the grant of a licence, each wanted o to give up his own existing licence and get a new licence for pitch No. 2. The Borough Council considered and decided in favour of Greenbaum and refused Gritzman who was left with his pitches 4 and 8.
Gritzman appealed to the magistrate. He could not appeal against the grant of a licence to Greenbaum, but only against the refusal to grant a licence to himself. Before the magistrate, the Borough Council opposed him. The magistrate held that the Council were wrong to refuse the licence of pitch No. 2 to Gritzman. The Council thereupon made out a licence for Gritzman for pitch No. 2 and wrote to Greenbaum saying that his licence had been wrongly issued. Greenbaum made an application for certiorari to court . The court held that the magistrate had no jurisdiction to hear he appeal. An objection was taken that Greenbaum had no locus standi. Rejecting the contention, Lord Denning observed:
"I sho ld have thought that in this case Greenbaum was certainly a person aggrieved, and not a stranger. He was affected by the magistrate's orders because the magistrate ordered another person to be put on his pitch. It is a proper case for the intervention of the court by means of certiorari."
It is to be noted that the Council had duly allotted pitch No. 2 to J'' Greenbaum in the exercise of their administrative power. The Magistrate's order pursuant to w ich the Council cancelled the allotment. and re-allotted t at pitch to Gritzman, was without jurisdiction By this illegal cancellation and reallotment Greenbaum's interest to trade on pitch No. 2, which had been duly licensed out to him was directly and prejudically affected by the impugned action.
R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee (1952) 2 QBD1413, is another case belonging to this group. lt was held that the applicants therein were "persons aggrieved" because they were grieved by the failure of the Legal Aid Committee to give them prior notice and hearing to which they were entitled under Regulation 15(2). Thus it could be said that they had suffered a legal wrong.
In Regina v. Liverpool Corporation, Ex parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet operators' Association(1972) 2 QB 299, the City Council in exercise of its powers under the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, limited the number of licences to be issued for hackney carriages to 300. The Council gave an undertaking to the associations representing the 300 existing licence holders not to increase the number of such licence holders above 300 for a certain period. The Council, disregarding this undertaking, resolved to increase the number. An Association representing the existing licence-holders moved the Queens' Bench for leave to apply for orders of Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari. The Division Bench refused. In the Court of Appeal, allowing the Association's appeal, Lord Denning M. R. Observed ar pp. 308, 309:
"The taxicab owners' association come to this Court for relief and I think we should give it to them. The writs of prohibition and certiorari lie on behalf of any person who is a "person aggrieved" and that includes any person whose interests may be pre judicially affected by what is taking place. It does not include a mere busybody who is interfering in things which do not concern him; but it includes any person who has a genuine grievance because something has been done or may be done which affects him: See Attorney-General of the Gambia v. N'Jie [1961] A.C. 617 and Maurice v. London County Council [1964] 2 Q.B. 362, 378. The taxicab owners' association here have certainly a loc s standi to apply for relief."
It may be noted that in this case, the whole question turned n the effect in law of the undertaking, and whether the applicants had been treated fairly.
Emphasising the "very special circumstances" of the case, the court read into the statute, a duty to act fairly in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Thus, a corresponding right to be treated fairly was also imported, by implication, in favour of the' applicants. Viewed from this standpoint, the applicants had an interest recognised in law, which was adversely affected by the impugned action. They had suffered a wrong as a result of the unfair treatment on the part of the corporation.
In Regina v. Paddington Valuation Officer, Ex Parte Peachy Property Corporation Ltd.,(1966)1 QBD 880, ratepayers were held to have the locus standi to apply for certiorari, notwithstanding the fact that it could not be said that the actual burdens to be borne by the applicants fell more heavily on them than on other members of the local community.
In Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar(1975) 2 SCC 702, Bench of seven learned Judges of this Court considered the question whether the Bar Council of a State was a 'person aggrieved' to maintain an appeal under s. 38 of the Advocates' Act, 1961. Answering the question in the affirmative, this Court, speaking through Ray C.J., indicated how the expression "person aggrieved" is to be interpreted in the context of a statute, thus:
"The meaning of the words "a person aggrieved" may vary according to the context of the statute. One of the meanings is that a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one "a person aggrieved". Again a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. The meaning of the words "a person aggrieved" is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of legal rights. A more liberal approach is required in the back ground of statutes which do not deal with pr perty rights but deal with professional conduct and m rality. The role of the Bar Council under he Advocates' Act is comparable to the role of a gua dian in professional ethics. The words "person aggrieved" in sections 37 and 38 of the Act are of wide impo t and should not be subjected to a restricted inter pretation of possession or denial of legal rights or b rdens or financial interests.
In Rex v. Butt and anr. Ex Parte Brooke (1921-22) 38 TLR 537, a person who was merely a resident of the town, was held entitled to apply for certiorari. Similar is the decision in Regina v. Brighton Borough Just ices Ex Parte Jarvis (1954) 1 WLR 203.
Typical of the cases in which a strict construction was put on the expression "person aggrieved", is Buxton and ors. v. Minister of Housing and Local Government(1961) 1 QB 278. There, an appeal by a Company against the refusal of the Local Planning Authority of permission to develop land owned by the Company by digging chalk, was allowed by the Minister. Owners of adjacent property applied to the High Court under s. 31(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1959 to quash the decision of the Minister on the ground that the proposed operations by the company would injure their land, and that they were 'persons aggrieved' by the action of the Minister. It was held that the expression 'person aggrieved' in a statute meant a person who had suffered a legal grievance; anyone given the right under s. 37 of the Act of 1959 to have his representation considered by the Minister was a person aggrieved, thus section 31 applied, if those rights were infringed; but the applicants had no right under the statute, and no legal rights had been infringed and therefore they were not entitled to challenge the Minister's decision. Salmon J. quoted with approval these observations of James T. J. in In Re Sidebothem(1980) 14 Ch.D 458.
"The words 'person aggrieved' do not really means a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made A 'person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance,`a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrong fully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something."
Ex Parte Stott(1916) 1 KB 7, is another illustration of a person who had no legal grievance, nor had he sufficient interest in the matter. A licensing authority under the Cinematography Act, 1901, granted to a theatre proprietor a licence for the exhibition of cinematograph films at his theatre. The licence was subject to the condition that the licensee should not exhibit any film if, he had notice that the licensing authority objec ed o it. A firm who had acquired the sole right of 1 exhibi ion of a certain film in the district in which the theatre was si ua ed entered into an agreement with the licensee for the exhibition of the film at his theatre. The licensing a tho ity having given notice to the licensee that it objected to the exhibition of the film, the film applied for a writ of certiorari to bring up the notice to be quash ed on the gr und that the condition attached to the licence was unreasonable and void, and that they were aggrieved by the notice as 'being destructive of their property. It was held that whether the condition was unreasonable or not, the applicants were not persons who were aggrieved by the notice and had no locus standi to maintain the application.
Similarly, King v. Middlesex Justices(1832) 37 RR 594, it was held that the words "person who shall think imself aggrieved" appearing in the statute governing the grant of licences to innkeepers mean a person immediately aggrieved as by refusal of a licence to himself, and not one who is consequently aggrieved, and that though the Justices had granted a licence to a party to open a public house, not before licensed, within a very short distance of a licensed public house, the occupier of the latter house could not appeal against such grant.
Other instances of a restricted interpretation of the expression "person aggrieved" are furnished by R. v. Bradford on-Avon Urban District Council Ex Parte Boulton (1964) 2 All. E. R. 492, Gregory v. Camden London Borough Council (1966) 1 WLR 899,; R. v. London O.E. Ex parte West-Minister Corporation(1951) 2 KB 508; Regina v. Cardiff Justices Ex parte Cardiff Corporation(1952) 2 QB 436.
This Court has laid down in a number of decisions that in order to have the locus standi to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, an applicant should ordinarily be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject matter of the application, though (1) the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule is relaxed or modified. In other words, as a general rule, in fringement of some legal right or prejudice to some legal interest in hearing the petitioner is necessary to give him a locus standi in the matter. (see The State of orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta(); Calcutta .
The expression "ordinarily" indicates that this is not a cast-iron rule. It is flexible enough to take in those cases where the applicant has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority, r even though he has no proprietary or even a fiduciary interest in the subject-matter. That apart, in excepti nal cases even a stranger or a person who was not a party to the pr ceedings before the authority, but has a subs an ial and genuine interest in the subject matter of the proceedings will be covered by this rule. The principles enuncia ed in the English cases noticed above, are not inconsistent with it.
In the United States of America, also, the law on the point is s bstantially the same.
"No matter h w seriously infringement of the Constitution may be called into question, "said Justice Frankfurter in Coleman v. Miller(1939) 307 US 433 "this is not the tribunal for its challenge except by those who have some specialized interest of their own to vindicate apart from a political concern which belongs to all". To have a "standing to sue", which means locus standi to ask for relief in a court independently of a statutory remedy, the plaintiff must show that he is injured, that is, subjected to or threatened with a legal wrong. Courts can intervene only where legal rights are invaded(11). "Legal wrong" requires a judicially enforceable right and the touch stone to justiciability is injury to a legally protected right. A nominal or a highly speculative adverse affect(12) on the interest or right of a person has been held to be insufficient to give him the "standing to sue" for judicial review of administrative action. Again the "adverse affect" requisite for "standing to sue" must be an "illegal effect''(l). Thus, in the undermentioned cases, it was held that injury resulting from lawful competition, not being a legal wrong, cannot furnish a "standing to sue" for judicial relief.
It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i) 'person aggrieved'; (ii) 'stranger'; (iii) busybody or meddlesome interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more than spoking the wheels of administration. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the threshold.
The distinction between the irst and second categories of applicants, though real, is not always well-demarcated. The first categ ry has, as it were, two concentric zones; a solid central z ne of certainty, and a grey outer circle of lessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an ou ermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling within the central zone are those whose legal ights have been infringed. Such applicants undo btedly stand in the category of 'persons aggrieved'. In the grey outer-circle the. bounds which separate the first category from the second, intermix, interfuse and verlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction.
All pers ns in this uterzone may not be "persons aggrieved.
To distinguish such applicants from 'strangers', among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in w ich the matter falls to be considered. These are: Whether t e applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed ? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense that his interest, recognised by law. has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of ? Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person "against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something" ? Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public ? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority ? Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of-the words "person aggrieved" is being considered. a social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community ? or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular individuals ?
Now let us apply these tests to the case in hand The Act and the Rules with which we are concerned, are not designed to set norms of moral or professional conduct for the community at large or even a section thereof They only regulate the exercise of private rights of an individual to carry on a particular busness on his property. In this context, the expression "person aggrieved" must receive a strict construction.
Did the appellant have a Legal right under the statutory provisions or under the general law, which has been subjected to or threatened with injury. ? The answer in the circumstances of the case must necessarily be in the negative.
The Act and he Rules do not confer any substantive justiciable ight on a rival in cinema trade, apart from the option in common with the rest of the public, to lodge an objection in response to the notice published under Rule 4. The appellant did not avail of this option. He did not lodge any objection in response to the notice, the due publicati n f which was not denied. No explanation has been given as to why he did not prefer any objection to the grant of the Objection Certificate before the District Magistrate or the Government. Even if he had objected before the District Magistrate and failed, the Act would not give him a right of appeal. Section 8A of the Act confers a rig t of appeal to the State Government, only on any person aggrieved by an order of a licensing authority refusing to grant a license, or revoking or suspending any licence under section 8. Obviously, the appellant was not a "person aggrieved" within the contemplation of Section 8A.
Section 8B of the Act provides that the State Government may either of its own motion, or upon an application made by "an aggrieved person", call for and examine the record of any order made by a licensing authority under this Act, and pass such order thereon as it thinks just and proper. Assuming that the scope of the words "aggrieved person" in Section 8B is wider than the ambit of the same words as used in Sec. 8A, then also, the appellant cannot, in the circumstances of this case, be regarded as a "person aggrieved' having. the requisite legal capacity to invoke certiorari jurisdiction.
The Act and the Rules recognise a special interest of persons residing, or concerned with any institution such as a school, temple, mosque etc. located within a distance of 200 yards of the site on which a cinema house is proposed to be constructed. The appellant does not fall within the category of such persons having a special interest in the locality. It is not his case that his cinema house is situated anywhere near the site in question, or that he has any peculiar interest in his personal, fiduciary or representative capacity in any school, temple etc. situated in the vicinity of the said site. It cannot therefore be said that the appellant is "a person aggrieved" on account of his having a particular and substantial interest of his own in the subject matter of the litigation, beyond the general interest of the public. Moreover the appellant could not be said to have been, in fact, aggrieved. As already noticed, he, despite adequate opportunity, never lodged any objection with the District Magistrate, nor went in revision be ore the State Government. Thus the present case is not in line with the decisions which are within the ratio f Queen v, Justices of Surrey (supra).
Having seen hat he appellant has no standing to complain of injury, actual or po ential, to any statutory right or interest, we pass on to consider whether any of his rights or interests, recognised by the general law, has been infringed as a res lt of the grant of No-objection Certificate to the respondents ? Here, again, the answer must be in the negative.
In Paragraph 7 of the writ petition, he has stated his cause of action, thus:
"The petitioner submits that .. he owns a cinema theatre in Mehmadabad which has about a small population of 15000 persons as stated above and there is no scope for more than one cinema theatre in the town. He has, there fore, a commercial interest in seeing to it that other persons are not granted a no-objection certificate in violation of law."
Thus, in substance, the appellant's stand is that the setting up of a rival cinema house in the town will adversely affect his monopolistic commercial interest, causing pecuniary harm and loss of business from competition. Such harm or Loss is not wrongful in the eye of law, because it does not result in injury to a legal right or a legally protected interest, the business competition causing it being a lawful activity. Juridically, harm of this description is called demnum sine injuria, the term injuria being here used in its true sense of an act contrary to law(1). The reason why the law suffers a person knowingly to inflict harm of this description on another, without holding him accountable for it, is that such harm done to an individual is a gain to society at large.
There is no dispute regarding the legal proposition that the rights under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be enforced only by an aggrieved person except in the case where the writ prayed for is for habeas corpus or quo warranto. Another exception in the general rule is the filing of a writ petition in public interest. The existence of the legal right of the petitioner which is alleged to have been violated is the foundation for invoking the jurisdicti n f the High Court under the aforesaid article.
The party has to satisfy as to what is the legal injury caused by that violation of law for the redressal of which the party has approached the Court.
The legal position is that when we are enquiring on a question as to who is a person aggrieved, we are, in fact, asking a wider question as to who has the locus standi. As a true logical concept, it is locus standi which is required to be analysed in each case, whether it is an original proceeding such as a writ petition or an appeal.
As observed above, the petitioner does not possess the requisite locus standi, as he is not a person aggrieved, as it is settled law that a ‘person aggrieved’ does not really mean a person, who is disappointed of a benefit, which he might have received in some other order had been made. A ‘person aggrieved’ must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance. ‘Locus’ is generally accepted as the right of filing an action on the ground of deprivation of a legal right or sustaining injury on a legally-protected interest. Locus standi is also satisfied when it is shown that a decision has affected the petitioner’s title to something or where the petitioner has been subjected to a legal wrong.
Since the petitioner has n t acquired any interest within the State of Himachal P adesh and his rights are not in any manner affected nor even governed much less by the provisions of the Town & Co ntry Planning Act or the notification dated 06.06.2025, bvi usly, the petitioner does not have the locus standi to file the writ petition as a ‘person aggrieved’ or otherwise.
Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed in l mini, so also pending applications, if any.