AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
This Appeal, at the instance of the New India Assurance Company Limited, has been preferred against the award of the Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal (V Additional Sub-Court), Tiruchirapalli in M.C.O.P. No. 267 of 1983. The 6th respondent herein owned a tractor PTL 8009
and a trailer PL 8063 and they had been insured with the appellant. On June 4, 1983, one Kaliamurthy, husband of the 1st respondent and father
of Respondents 2 to 5, who was employed as a loadman, was proceeding in the trailer, to go to the fields to lift a load of sugars and at that time,
an accident took place resulting in Kaliamurthy falling down and the trailer running over and killing him instantaneously. The case of respondents 1
to 5 was that Kaliamurthy lost his life owing to the rash and negligent driving of the tractor and the trailer belonging to the 6th respondent by its
driver and in respect of that, compensation in a sum of Rs. 50,000 should be awarded to them. This claim was repudiated by the 6th respondent
on the ground that the driver of the tractor drove it cautiously and carefully and that deceased Kaliamurthy was employed only as a cleaner and the
liability to pay compensation in respect of the death of Kaliamurthy would be that of the appellant. The amount of compensation claimed was also
characterised to be excessive. The appellant repudiated the claim of the respondents 1to 5 contending that the 6th respondent was liable to pay
compensation, as under the terms of the policy, the Insurance company was not liable to pay compensation in respect of passengers carried in the
tractor. Further, the appellant also disputed its liability to pay the compensation, as claimed by respondents 1 to 5.
Before the Tribunal, on behalf of the respondents 1 to 5, EX. A-1 was marked and the 1st respondent and another were examined as P.Ws. 1
and 2 while, on behalf of the appellant and the 6th respondent Exs. B-1 to B-11 filed and the 6th respondent and another gave evidence as R.Ws.
1 and 2. On a consideration of the oral as well as documentary evidence, the Tribunal found that the accident resulting in the death of Kaliamurthy
took place only on account of the rash and negligent driving of the tractor and the trailer by the driver of the 6th respondent and that the deceased
was employed under the 6th respondent as a loadman and not as cleaner.
Considering the terms of the policy, Ex. B-1 (same as Ex. B-11), the Tribunal found that the appellant was liable to pay compensation to
respondents 1 to 5 in accordance with the provisions of the Workmen''s Compensation Act and for computing the compensation payable, the
Tribunal took into account the age of the deceased as 35 at the time of the accident and applying Section 4 and Schedule IV to the Workmen''s
Compensation Act, as amended by Act 22 of 1984, determined the compensation awardable to respondents 1 to 5 in a sum of Rs. 23,647.20
and directed the appellant to pay that amount. It is the correctness of the award so passed that is questioned in this appeal.
The only contention urged by learned counsel for the appellant was that the right of respondents 1 to 5 to claim compensation in respect of the
death of Kaliamurthy arose on the day on which the accident took place, viz., June 4, 1983 and the quantum of compensation awardable to
respondents 1 to 5 under the provisions of the Workmen''s Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) got fixed and determined on the
basis of Section 4 and Schedule IV as they then stood and the Tribunal was in error in having applied Section 4 and Schedule IV of the Act, as
amended by Act 22 of 1984, which was operative from July 1, 1984 to quantify the compensation payable to respondents 1 to 5, in respect of an
accident that took place on June 4, 1983. Reliance in this connection was placed by learned counsel for appellant upon the decisions in Oriental
Fire and General Insurance Company Limited v. Bidi 1972 ACJ 187, Pratap Narain Singh Deo Vs. Srinivas Sabata and Another, , Padma
Srinivasan v. Premier Insurance Company Limited 1982 ACJ 191, Kochu Velu v. Purakkattu Joseph 1984 ACJ 630, General Manager, Western
Railway v. Lala Nanda 1985 ACJ 57, Moti Lal v. Thakur das 1985 ACJ 634 U.P. State Transport Corporation v. Abdul Hameed 1985 ACJ
832 and Singareni Collieries v. Commissioner for Workmen''s Compensation 1988 ACJ 940. Based on the principles laid down in the aforesaid
decisions, learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the liability of the appellant would only be Rs. 18,000 and nothing more. On the
other hand, learned counsel for respondents 1 to 5 contended that the provisions of the Act are intended for the benefit and welfare of the
workmen injured in the course of employment and its provisions ought to receive an interpretation beneficial to the workmen, and, therefore, the
view taken by the Tribunal on the quantum of compensation cannot be taken exception to. It was also further contended that at the time when the
Tribunal passed the award, amended Section 4 and Schedule IV to the Act had come into force and that had been given effect to by the Tribunal
and therefore, no infirmity attached to the quantification of the compensation.
Before proceeding to consider the rival contentions put forward, it would be necessary to advert to Section 3 of the Act, which fixes the liability
of the employer for payment of compensation to workman injured in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Thereunder,
the liability of the employer to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II of the Act arises, when personal injury is caused
to a workman by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. In this case, deceased Kaliamurthy had been found by the
Tribunal to be a loadman, who had worked under the 6th respondent and lost his life, in the course of his employment as such workman. The
liability of the 6th respondent for payment of compensation, for the death of Kaliamurthy, arose eb instanti when the accident took place, in which
deceased Kaliamurthy sustained injuries and later died. However the quantification remained to be done in accordance with the provisions
applicable thereto, as on the date on which the accident took place and in which the workmen received injuries. Even so, having regard to the
procedure laid down in the Act, for the computation of the compensation, instant computation is not possible and necessarily, therefore, there is
bound to be a time interval between the sustaining of the injuries by the workman in the course of his employment and the quantification of the
compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Schedule and its award either to the concerned workman or to his dependents.
It would indeed be an ideal state of affairs, if compensations for the injuries sustained by a workman in the course of his employment, is determined
even on the very day of accident and made available to the workman by the employer, but that is not possible if the procedure laid down in the Act
is rigidly adhered to and there are bound to be procedural delays Meanwhile, if there is an alteration in the liability of the employer either under the
provisions of the Act or under the Schedule, the employer cannot be subjected to such variations, as the right to secure compensation in respect of
the injuries sustained by a workman in the course of his employment as well as the quantum, got crystalised even on the date of the accident,
though the quantification is delayed. By the application of amended Section 4 and Schedule IV of the Act in the instant case, it is seen that an
additional or extra liability for payment of compensation in fastened upon the employer in respect of the injuries sustained by the workman in the
course of his employment and in the absence of any clear or specific provision that the amended Section 4 and Schedule IV would be applicable,
resulting in an increase in the liability of the employer to pay compensation, it is difficult to apply amended Section 4 of the Act, viz., Act 22 of the
1984 or the amended Schedule IV, imposing a greater burden on the employer, for no fault of his. In view of the foregoing considerations it
follows that the liability of the 6th respondent to pay compensation for the death of Kaliamurthy, who was a workman under the 6th respondent
and who died in the course of his employment and the quantum thereof, were fixed unalterably under the provisions of the Act and the Schedule,
as they stood on June 4, 1983, when the accident took place. By the Workmen''s Compensation (Amendment) Act, 1984 (22 of 1984), Section
4 and Schedule IV were amended and u/s 1(2) of the amending Act, the provisions of the amending Act came into force on July 1, 1984 by means
of a notification in the Official Gazette. There is no indication in the provision of the amending Act that the amendments were intended to apply to
proceedings, which were pending on July 2, 1984. No doubt, u/s 3 and Section 7 of Act 22 of 1984, it has been provided that for Section 4 and
Schedule IV of the Principal Act, Section 4 and Schedule IV was amended, shall be substituted, but such substitution also, in the absence of a
specific provision in that regard, would only be on and from July 1, 1984 and not from any anterior or earlier point of time. Thus, having regard to
the provisions of Act 22 of 1984 and the scope and ambit of the operation of the provisions therein, it is seen that a proper interpretation of its
provisions would be to hold that the amended Section 4 and Schedule IV would be effective and operative for purpose of computing
compensation in respect of the injuries sustained by the workman, during the course of his employment, on and after July 1, 1984 and not earlier.
Considering the nature of the liability of the employer to pay compensation in respect of injuries sustained by a workman in the course of his
employment, in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata (supra) the Supreme Court pointed out that the employer became liable to pay
compensation as soon as the personal injury was caused to the workman by accident, which arose out of and in the course of his employment and
that it is futile to contend that the claim for compensation did not fall due till it is determined by the Commissioner by an order u/s 19 of the Act.
This decision clearly establishes that the liability of the employer to pay compensation for the injuries sustained by a workman in the course of his
employment arises, when the injury is sustained and the quantum of compensation also should be worked out in accordance with the provisions of
the Act, as they then stand, though the actual quantification may be done at a later point of time after considerable time interval. Oriental Fire and
General Insurance Company Limited v. Bidi (supra) dealt with a case of the effect of the amendment to Schedule IV of the Act, during the
pendency of proceedings, in respect of the injuries sustained by a workman in the course of his employment. Under the amended provisions, the
dependents were entitled to be paid a higher compensation than that on the date of death of the workman under the unamended Schedule and the
Tribunal awarded the higher compensation under the amended Schedule. While holding that the compensation in accordance with the unamended
Schedule alone, which was in force on the date of death of the workman was payable, it was pointed out that the normal rule of construction of
statutes is that its operation is prospective, unless it is made retrospective either expressly or by necessary implication and that rights and liabilities
under the Act got crystalised on the date of death of the workman and the making of an application is only procedural matter and therefore, the
compensation under the unamended Schedule alone should be paid. This decision fully supports the stand of appellant regarding the applicability
the unamended Schedule IV in the matter of determining the quantum of compensation awardable to respondents 1 to 5. Even in case where under
the terms of the policy, the liability of the Insurance company was restricted to Rs. 20,000 but a subsequent amendment to the provisions of the
Motor Vehicles Act, increased such liability of the Insurance Company to RS. 50,000, it was held by the Supreme Court in Padma Srinivasan v.
Premier Insurance Company Limited (supra) that the Insurance Company was liable to pay the higher compensation, for the extent of the liability
of the Insurance Company is determined with reference to the date of accrual of the cause of action i.e. the date of accident. The principle of this
decision would also reinforce the stand of the appellant that the date of accident fixes the liability of the employer and the quantum and not the
provisions in force at the time of the quantification of the compensation. Again in Kochu Velu v. Purakkattu Joseph (supra) the question arose
whether the amendment of Schedule IV of the Act, which was given retrospective effect from October 1, 1975, would apply in respect of a claim
for compensation for the injuries sustained on June 16, 1972 and it was pointed out that the right to receive compensation arose when the injury
was sustained and the law as it then stood, would determine the quantum of compensation and also the obligation of the employer to pay the same.
Referring to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the court pointed out that the rights acquired and the obligations incurred would not be affected
unless there was a different intention and that the legislative intent was clear that it did not affect the rights and obligations acquired prior to that
date. Applying this principle to the facts of this case, it follows that when deceased Kaliamurthy was involved in the accident on June 4, 1983 and
received injuries and died later, the liability of the 6th respondent as an employer for payment of compensation in accordance with the provisions of
Section 4 and Schedule IV as they then stood, got unalterably fixed and determined on that date and the amended Section 4 and Schedule IV,
which came into operation on July 1, 1984, imposing a higher or additional burden on the employer for payment of compensation, would not be
applicable. General Manager, Western Railway v. Lala Nanda (supra) dealt with the scope of Schedule IV, as amended by Act 65 of 1976 in the
case of a workman, who suffered injuries on October 11, 1971 and the amendment to Schedule IV enhanced the compensation payable
retrospectively from October 1, 1975. The Commissioner awarded compensation at the enhanced rates effective from October 1, 1975, though
the injuries had been sustained on October 11, 1971. It was pointed out by the Allahabad High Court that the liability of the employer got
crystalised on the day on which the accident took place and the injuries are sustained and the computation of liability has also to be made in the
light of the existing rates of compensation as found in Schedule IV at the time when the accident took place. To similar effect is Moti Lal v. Thakur
Das (supra) where it had been laid down that the yardstick for the award of compensation was Schedule IV as it stood on the date of the accident
and the amended Schedule IV could not be adopted for quantification of compensation Again in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Abdul
Hameed (supra) dealing with the applicability of the amended Schedule IV by Central Act of 65 of 1976 effective from October 1, 1975 in
respect of an accident that took place on March 29, 1975, it was pointed out that it would be incongruous to say that the accident took place on
March 29, 1975, but that the compensation awarded should be at the rates, which were in force on and from October 1, 1975 and that would
justify and award of compensation as per the provisions of Schedule IV, as they stood on the date of the accident. In Singareni Collieries v.
Commissioner for Workmen''s Compensation (supra) the accident took place on August 12, 1979 and compensation in a sum of Rs. 26,880 was
awarded by the Commissioner. While the employer disputed his liability to pay the amount determined as compensation, the injured worker took
up the stand that he was entitled to the higher compensation as per amended Schedule Iv of the Act. In considering the question whether the claim
for higher compensation made by the workman, was sustainable on the basis of amended Schedule IV under the Workmen''s Compensation
(Amendment) Act, 1984 (22 of 1984,) the Court pointed out that unless there are express provisions in the amending Act or necessary
implications, the amending Act cannot be treated as retrospective increasing the burden of the employer. Referring to Section 4 of the Act and
Section 3 of the amending Act, the Court laid down that the use of the words ""substituted provisions"" could not be read, as if incorporated in the
Act since its inception and that the increase in the liability under amended Section 4 read with Schedule IV would be a pointer in deciding whether
the amendment is retrospective or not and the mere fortuitous circumstances that some matters were pending, cannot be taken advantage of by the
workmen as against other workmen, whose cases had been decided earlier before the coming into force of the amending Act. This decision also
clearly points out that unless the amending Act expressly or by implication makes the amendment retrospective in operation, neither amended
Section 4 of the Act nor the amended Schedule IV could be pressed into service for the purpose of claiming enhanced compensation thereunder,
though the injuries might have been sustained by the workman prior to the amendment. The aforesaid decisions clearly support the stand of the
appellant Insurance Company that compensation should be paid to respondents 1 to 5 at the rates provided under the unamended Schedule IV as
on June 4, 1983 when the accident took place and that again, even according to the appellant, would be Rs. 18,000. It is true that the provisions
of the Act have been enacted with a view to make available compensation to injured and disabled workmen, but the award of such compensation
has to be computed and determined within the four corners of the provisions of the Act and considerations of beneficial legislation or liberal
interpretation cannot be permitted to colour the clear intention of the provisions of the Act and the argument of learned counsel for respondents 1
to 5 cannot, therefore, be accepted.
Thus, on a due consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and also the provisions of the unamended and amended Act and
Schedule IV, it has to be held that the Tribunal was in error in having awarded to respondents 1 to 5 a sum of Rs. 23,647.20. When the correct
amount for which the appellant could be made liable was Rs. 18,000 only and this was also not disputed by respondents 1 to 5 and respondents 1
to 5 would together therefore, be entitled to this sum of Rs. 18,000 together with interest at 9% p.a. on the sum of Rs. 18,000 from October 4,
1985 till the date of deposit of the amount before the tribunal. The C.M.A. is therefore, allowed in part to the extent indicated and the award of the
Tribunal will stand modified accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.