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Judgment
Raghuvir
In this Writ Petition questions of far reaching importance relating to the user of two Community Halls in the city of Hyderabad namely Mehdipatnam Community Hall and Potti Sriramulunagar Community Hall are raised by the petitioners. The two halls are constructed and owned by the Andhra Pradesh Housing Board, a local authority incorporated under the Andhra Pradesh Housing Board Act 46 of 1956. The users of the balls are the general public who have to observe the conditions prescribed by the Housing Board in their resolution passed. (No. 21926/J3/76) on November 29, 1976. Those who desire to use the halls have to apply in Form I prescribed and before hand, if necessary obtain the necessary permission from the ''City Corporation'' or Police Department'' as the case may be. The application is to be made for allotment to the Estate Officer of the Board indicating whether the ball is intended to be used for ''a celebration of marriage or for social and cultural functions''. The user for ''social or cultural functions'' should further satisfy the Chairman that the functions are not ''objectionable.'' Those who are allotted the balls cannot use the hall for any purpose other than for which it is allotted by the Chairman of the Board. The allotment is not accorded for more than three days. The allottee has to remit Rs. 5/- and hire charges before hand in the State Bank of Hyderabad. Any ''misuse'' of halls entails the cancellation of allotment and forfeiture all payments made. The allottee an use electricity energy for purpose of illumination and not for ''decorative purposes''. The allottee cannot sub-let the halls and is expected to cause no nuisance to ''neighbours''. The Chairman of the Board is the Final arbiter for all disputes arising under the terms of allotment. The second respondent in the writ petition is the Proprietor of M/s New Royal Company, Hyderabad who has been appointed in Proc. No. 10378/HB/AEOI/78 dated July 31, 1978 by the Chairman of the Board as the sole supplier of furniture and crockery for the period from August, 1978 to July, 1979. The appointment, the record produced discloses was made on the ''recommendation'' of the Deputy Director of Industries to whom the second respondent approached by applications on May 23, 1978 and on July 10, 1978. A like request was made by the second respondent to the Housing Commissioner on July 10, 1978. In that application the proprietor of second respondent represented that the firm is a leading supplier of furniture and crockery That the proprietor is a caterer of great reputation and possessed good stock of materials to be supplied and solicited the authorities the firm may be authorised to supply goods to the users of the two halls on ''moderate rates"
The Proprietor studied upto Intermediate and represented that he was financed by Vijaya Bank and had location of business ''between the two halls'' and for him it was convenient to supply goods promptly without any delay in transporation. That he is experienced for he had supplied "to the Government departments. State Bank of Hyderabad Posts and Telegraphs etc and represented that his rates are 30% to 40% less than the market rates. On the application of the proprietor of the second respondent, the Deputy Director of Industries passed the following order:
The applicant is a registered candidate of the Director of Industries under self employment scheme. He may be appointed as the supplier of furniture, tents etc. in the community halls at Vijayanagar and Mehdipatnam as per rates fixed by you.
The Chairman thereupon in proc. No. 10378/HB/AEO. 1/78 date July 31 1978, appointed the second respondent and directed the supplier to charge the following rates for crockery and furniture. The rates prescribed in the impugned order are; (1) chairs per 100: Rs. 18/-: (2) Sofa each set: Rs. 15/--; (3) Carpel each: Rs. 3/-: (4) tents 12 x 6 yards each Rs. 30/ and 8x4 yards each; Rs. 20/; (5) Water drum each Rs. 2-50 Ps. (6) Deg. 10 Kgs. each Rs. 3/: Deg. 20 Kgs. each Rs. 4-50: Deg. 30 Kgs. each Rs. 6/- and Deg. 40 Kgs each Rs. 8/-: (7) Water Jug steel each: Rs. 1/-: (8) glasses bindalium 100 per Rs. 8/-, glasses (tumblers) 100 per Rs. 6/-, glasses (Plastic) 100 per Rs. 5/-(9) table each Re. 1/- and (10 Chowke each Re. 1/-. The order further directed the second respondent not to charge more and under the terms of the order he is responsible for proper installation of tents and furniture. Any damage caused to the halls in the course of installation the conditions speak u/s 53 of the Act damages will be recovered from the firm by the Housing Board.
The first seven petitioners in the writ petition are firms who have business of supply of furniture and crockery in the city of Hyderabad. The other four are individuals who ever to have had the necessity of using the two halls in the recent past. All the petitioners challenged the appointment order of the second respondent as sole supplier as ultravires of the powers of the Chairman. The petitioners 8 to 11 aver when they were allotted the halls by the Chairman they were compelled to have the services of the second respondent because of the impugned order of the Chairman and had to pay the rates fixed by the Chairman which they averred are higher than the market rates. They had no choice, they contended, for they were not permitted to obtain goods from other suppliers in the city.
The appointment order the petitioners contend, created a "monopoly" in favour of the second respondent. The rates are not reasonable for tenders were not called for by the Chairman before they were fixed. There is no power in the Chairman or in the Board or for that matter in the Deputy Director of Industries to have appointed the second respondent as sole supplier for the two halls.
The Estate Officer of the Housing Board filed the counter resisting the writ petition and in that it is averred that to "safeguard" the buildings, sole supplier was appointed by the Chairman so that in the event of damage to the halls the second respondent may be held responsible for damages, tenders were called for before the rates were fixed as the rules do not require to call for the tenders. Speaking of the past experience of the Board it is averred, that "Some unauthorised dealers were permitted" in the past and "the supplier had caused damage to the premises". Therefore the Chairman thought fit to appoint a person like the second respondent in the interests of general public. The respondents further aver that the writ petitioners have no locus standi to question the impugned order and the powers of the Chairman.
The second respondent in his counter reiterated some of the averments made by the Estate Officer and added that the Board is the owner of the halls. The impugned order is not discriminatory. The rates fixed by the Chairman are reasonable and the second respondent had the capacity to supply the goods. This last averment was made in answer to the allegation made by the seven petitioners that the sole supplier had no experience in the business and was not solvent to discharge obligations entrusted to him in the impugned order.
The first question at issue on the above facts is whether the appointment of the second respondent as sole supplier is ultra vires of the power of the Chairman.
The resolution on November 29, 1976 of the Housing Board prescribed no rule for the appointment of a supplier of furniture, and crockery. The terms and conditions do not expressly speak that the users perforce will have to avail the services of a person appointed by the Chairman. The question in such circumstances whether do hors the resolution on November 29, 1976, is there any power which enabled the Chairman to have appointed a sole supplier.
In the course of the debate it is not disputed that the allottees of the halls do not have the option of obtaining the goods i.e., crockery and furniture supplied to them from persons other than the second respondent. The user even if it is to be assumed owned furniture, carpets and cutlery of his own the range of the obligation under the terms of allotment are such that the user cannot avail of his goods and perforce of the order: to obtain the goods from the second respondent. The second respondent thus is the monopolist of supply for it is the Chairman who has appointed him as a supplier. The users are required to pay the prices of goods the Chairman who has prescribed the rates. The goods are supplied to the users at a reasonable price for the Chairman considered the rates are reasonable. The conditions and terms are imposed and binding on the users for the chair man considered it necessary to safe-guard the halls.
The questions at issue thus, focussed on the twain power, power of appointment; power to fix the rates.
There is not such of a debate having regard to the terms of the impugned order and there cannot be on the above facts as to creation of a monopoly in favour of the second respondent. Therefore it has to be seen whether the Housing Board Act 46 of 1956 in any way enables Chairman to appoint a sole supplier.
The creation of Housing Board Act was found expedient by the Legislature to satisfy the needs of housing accommodation to evolve schemes to carry out works necessary for "accommodation". The Board was incorporated by a local authority and in that sense satisfied the definition of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of Constitution of India. The Board was to function subject to the orders of the Government, incur expenditure, undertake works for housing schemes as may be entrusted by the Government. The Schemes enables the Board to acquire property for schemes and to improve and clear slums. The Act does not speak of the amenities to be supplied to the residents, vis-a-vis the materials like crockery and furniture. The provisions of Act 46 of 1956 directly or indirectly do not speak of the powers of the Chairman to appoint a supplier for any building owned by the Board. In the course of the debate it was not argued that any provision in the Act or Rules speak of any power in support of the impugned order. The stand taken on behalf of the first respondent is that "if there is no provision in the Act or Rules, that simply does not mean that the Board has no power to preserve and safeguard their buildings by appointing a supplier." The "safety" of the halls, it was argued, warranted and prompted the chairman to have appointed the supplier.
The learned counsel for the second respondent argued that the halls are the property of the Board and the Board can use, prescribe conditions which the Chairman of the Board deems fit and relied on four cases decided by the Supreme Court. The cases are Achutan vs. State of Kerala 1959 SC 465 ,77
Purxotoma Ramanata Quenim Vs. Makan Kalyan Tandel and Others, Chairman, Ramappa Gundappa Sahakari Samyakta Besava Sangha Ltd. Vs. State of Mysore and Others, and State of Orissa vs. Harinaryana AIR SC 1816. In Achutan vs. State of Kerala 1959 SC 465, he supplied milk to a hospital under a contract. The Government when rescinded the contract he complained in a writ petition that the order was in breach of the contract and violated his fundamental rights. The contentions were negatived and it was observed:
......it is perfectly open to the Government, even as it is to a private party, to choose a person to their liking, to fulfil contracts which they wish to be performed. When one person is chosen rather that another, the aggrieved party cannot claim the protection of Article 14, because the choice of the person to fulfil a particular contract must be left to the Government. Similarly, a contract which is held from Government stands on no different footing from a contract held from a private party. The breach of the contract, if any, may entitle the person aggrieved to sue for damages or in appropriate cases, even specific performance, but be cannot complain that there has been a deprivation of the right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business, such as it contemplated by Article 19 (1) (g).
The above case in no way supports the appointment order of the Chairman. Next a passage at page 858 in the case of Chairman, Ramappa Gundappa Sahakari Samyakta Besava Sangha Ltd. Vs. State of Mysore and Others, is heavily relied on by the learned counsel for the second respondent. The facts in that case show. In 1898 the Provincial Government of Bombay resolved to let out for cultivation land, known as Galper lands, that land was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act for Gokak Storage Works. The Provincial Government let out annually the Galper lands to those from whom the land was acquired. In 1931 by a resolution of the provincial Government rents were enhanced and in 1956 the (Bombay) State Government with a view to evolve an uniform practice in the State, allotted the Galper lands to the landless poor members of a local Co-operative Society. The leases who were the original owners and to whom the land was let out after the acquisition, the Supreme Court held (respondents 4 and 5 let out in 1931) have had prescribed no right in Galper lands to cultivate perpetually and in that connection the following observations relied on by the second respondent have been made:
If every policy statement or direction of Government regarding disposal of State property were construed as inoversible creating right to property in prospective beneficiaries strange consequences would fellow, an administrative decision of the last century would hold Government prisoner perpetually and deny in the power to alter its policies and programmes, according to its understanding of the needs of the people. Moreover, how can an interest in immovable property and that in perpetuity be created by a mere Government proceeding? Nor could the Bombay Land Revenue Code confer such right in real property, merely from the circumstances that seasonal cultivation was permitted by State to be carried on by neighbouring land holders. The Provisions of the Code pressed into inept service by the contesting respondents cannot by statutory operation transform an ephemeral permission to cultivate government land into a permanent estate in it. For we cannot predicate a tenure, much less an unlimited tenure here, as contemplated in Section 68. It is a curious social side light of this erroneous construction that even it tank beds and reserviors get silted up by ploughing up the top soil the State will be helpless to prevent it even though the area is part of the irrigation project. (Para 9).
The above passage in my view does not show that once the property belongs to the State Government that it can do and deal with its property in any manner it likes. The passage is cited to support a contention to the effect. The Supreme Court was not considering in that case the rights of the State Government and the incidents of State property. The above passage does not enumerate the rights of a State Government over the lands, under the Constitution. Such a consideration was given in the two cases of Allahabad High Court in the decision of the case in Rajendra Singh Vs. State AIR 1937 All. 37. That case on appeal by a Division Bench was reversed in Mahant Ram Kishan Das Vs. Badri Bishal and Others, In my view the decision in Rajendra Singh vs. State AIR 1937 All 37 sets out correctly the rights of the State Government in proper perspective. In that case two cases of the United State of America Van Brocklin vs. Anderson 7-117 us 151 and United States vs. Martha Insoley 41-130 45 263 are cited. The following passage in Van Brockline vs. Anderson 7-117 us 151 is apposite:
The United States does not and cannot hold property, as a monarch may, for private or personal purposes. All the property and revenues of the United States mast be held and applied, as all taxes, duties, imports and exercises must be laid and collected to, pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States.
In the other decision United States vs. Martha Insoley 41-130 45 263 it is observed:
In the present caw, the United States hold the title to the property in question, as it holds all other property for public purposes and not for private purpose
(Emphasis Supplied)
A case from Purxotoma Ramanata Quenim Vs. Makan Kalyan Tandel and Others, was next cited by the learned counsel for the second respondent. This case and a case relied on by the writ petitioners in Tahir Hussain Vs. District Board, Muzaffarnagar, both deal with liquor. The State, it is accepted have a monopoly in the business of liquor. The observations made as regards such a business stand on a different footing for in liquor the State possessed a monopoly to deal in that business. Another case in State of Orissa vs. Harinarayana AIR 1972 SC 1318 relied on by the second respondent is also pertaining to liquor where in a Government auction the highest bidder was not accorded the contract notwithstanding such a person was the highest bidder. In that connection it was held the Government could sell their privilege to sell to augment its revenues and it was observed:
Citizens could not have any fundamental right to trade or carry on business in the properties or rights belonging to the Government nor could there be any infringement of Art. 14, if the Government tries to get the best available price for its valuable rights............Raising revenue was one of the important purposes of such provisions. The fact that the price fetched by the sale of country liquor was an excise revenue did not change the nature of the right.
This case also apart from the fact that it arose in a "liquor" contract does not touch upon the issue to be decided in the instant case.
The conclusion on this point of this part of the case is under the Act the Housing Board Act 46 of 1956 there is no power express or implied to enable the Chairman to appoint the second respondent as sole supplier of commodities specified in the order. The further question is whether, such a monopoly can be created de hors the provision in any Statute. In India it is not possible to refer to a particular Statute and hold monopolies are illegal, Monopolies are not favoured in common law. Common law as applicable in India monopolies are not favoured. This aspect of the case requires the general consideration of monopoly and its incidents.
In its etymological sense monopoly means the exclusive privilege of selling something. In all civilisations monopoly for some commodities existed from ancient times. Monopoly existed in China, Babylonia. Hebraw Minoans, Egyptains, Sumerians, Maya, Assyrians, Azetees, Indus, Greek and Roman--in all the twenty two Rivierine Civilisation, which are classified in the study of History (10 Vols) by Arnold Toynbee. Olive oil in Carthage, Gold in Azetee Civilisation monopolies existed. The Roman lawyer Tribonian who prepared digests of Roman law for three long years records of combines of artisans. Justinian in codifying the Roman Law in twelve tablets speak of monopolies. An edict of Zeno issued in 483 perpetuated in the Code of Justinian recites that combinations had by then become frequent, especially among builders." who agreed that none would complete a house begun by another". Glanvil in England published his work in twelfth century and speaks of early stages of artisan guilds and monopolies in England. Braction, in the thirteenth century speaks of monopolies in England. Sir Edward Code in his famous compliance "Institutes" basing the first part on Littleton''s work, defined monopoly. That definition is still followed in Anglo-American decisions. The definition by Coke is as follows:--
A monopoly is an institution or allowance by the King by his grant, Commission, or otherwise, to any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, of or for the sole buying, selling, making, working, or using of anything, whereby any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, are sought to be restrained of any freedom or liberty that they had before, or hindered in their lawful trade. (3 inst. 181).
Littleton of the sixteenth century speaks of Forestalling: Engrossing and Regrating. Sir William Blackstone, who was the first professor of English Law at oxford University, refers to monopolies in his "Commentaries" which appeared in 1965. Blackstone speaks of guilds and monopolies to have had a common growth. In particular illustrations of guilds of Goldsmiths is given as to have existed. "The guild had the power to assay all gold and silver were to destroy that fell below their status and punish their maker". Blackstone further defined the expression Forestalling, Engrossing and Regrating, which are varieties of monopolies. In England by 1623 monopolies generally were abolished., except as to publication of Bible which was considered a State prerogative and exception was created in favour of two publishing houses of Oxford and Cambridge Universities which is extent even to this day. Forestalling is defined as under:
To obstruct a person''s way with force and arms; also to raise the price of certain goods by holding supplies, etc.
Engrossing is defined as under:
(1) Copying a deed at length in readiness for execution;
(2) Buying in quantity corn etc., to sell again at a high price, an offence abolished by 7 & 8, Vict. c. 24.
Regrating is defined as under:
The offence of buying corn, etc., in any market and selling it again in the same place, so as to raise the price. Obsolete. (definitions are obtained from Osborne.)
In Europe speaking of modern times, legislation was promulgated by all nation states against monopolies. The first blow against restraining competition was struck in Scandinavian countries. Norway was the first in the field with the Temporary Price Act of 1920. In that Act it was obligatory to report for registration restrictive business association and groups of enterprises and dominant enterprises." The Price Directorate created under the Act intervened against unreasonable terms of business or too high a rate of profits established through restrictive business arrangements or by dominant enterprises. A Royal decree in 1925 prohibited "resale price maintenance" in that country. In Sweden Antitrust legislation empowered the Government to investigate monopolistic combines. In 1946 a statute was promulgated and in 1953 the Act was further strengthened. In Denmark the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Control Act of 1953 and the Price Supervision Act of 1956 proclaimed similar objectives. In Belgium the Government set up the council for Economic Disputes set up by a Royal Decree in 1935. In 1960 in the public interest the Act curbed the restrictive practices, In France legislation was promulgated "to combat business practices which had the effect of restricting competition and diminished the spirit of enterprise. Ordinance 45 of 1883 was amended on June, 3, 1945 and remedial measures were provided", in Commonwealth countries--in New-Zealand Trade Practices Act of 1958 was enacted. This Act is based on the same pattern on the same lines of U.K. Restrictive and Trade Practices Act of 1956. In Canada there was an Act in 1889 for the prevention and suppression of combines in restraint of trade. This was on the same pattern of Anti-trust Act of U.S.A. for prevention and suppression of combines in restraint of trade. The Act prescribed penal punishments with imprisonment for two years. That Act was further strengthened by Combines Investigation Act of 1923. Thereafter the Dominian Trade and Industry Commission Act of 1935 was passed. "A novel feature of the new law was a provision that if the Commission after investigation came to the opinion that industrial agreement regulating prices and production was necessary to prevent wasteful and demoralising competition and would not be against public interest it would recommend approval of the agreement by the Governor in Council and if the agreement was approved no party to it might be prosecuted under the Combines Investigation Act or the sections of the Criminal Code in which the anti-trust provisions had been incorporated," The Act was further amended in 1960. In Australia the Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906-1950 with similar objects to "repress destructive monopolies and to protect Australian industries." In England the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry & Control) Act in 1948 was passed. The Board of Trade was entrusted "to induce the trade in question to drop the practice disapproved by the Board." Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956 of U.K. contains the following provision which is opposite in the circumstances Section 21 (1) (a) of the said Act reads as under:
For the purposes of any proceedings before the Court under the last foregoing section, a restriction accepted in pursuance of any agreement shall be deemed to be contrary to the public interest unless the Court is satisfied of any one or more of the following circumstances, that is to say.--
(a) That the restriction is reasonably necessary, having regard to the character of the goods to which it applies, to protect the public against injury (Whether to person or to premises) in connection with the consumption installation or use of those goods.
(emphasis Supplied).
This provision has been explained in two cases viz. In Re. Agreement between Members of Chemists Federation 1958 3 All. ER 448 and In Re. Tyre Trade Register Agreement 1963 All. ER 190. A general discussion of the agreements involved in the cases and it is not necessary to delve into details in the instant case. In U.S.A. the rapid development of industries brought for the Sherman Act in 1890 which had the reputation of being "Charter of Freedom for American industry. It was supplemented in 1914 by the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act. The Sherman Act declared illegal "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce." and fines of 50,000 dollars and penal punishments are prescribed. Section 3 of the Act relates to sales of goods "on condition, agreement or understanding" that the buyer will not deal in goods of the seller''s competitor. In the leading case of Standard Oil Co. vs. United States 219-us 619 the definition of Sir Edward Coke was followed and it is observed as under:
Generalizing these considerations, the situation is this
That by the common law, monopolies were unlawful because of their restriction upon individual freedom of contract and their injury to the public.
That as to necessaries of life, the freedom of the individual to deal was restricted where the nature and character of the dealing was such as to engender the presumption of intent to bring about atleast one of the injuries which it was deemed would result from monopoly,--that is, an undue enhancement of price.
That to protect the freedom of contract of the individual, not only in his own interest, but principally in the interest of the common weal, a contract of an individual, by which he put an unreasonale restrain upon himself as to carrying on his trade or business (55) was void. And that at common law the evils consequent upon engrossing, etc., caused those things to be treated as coming within monopoly and sometimes to be called monopoly, and the same consideration caused monopoly, because of its operation and effect, to be brought within and spoken of generally as impeding the due course of, or being in restraint of trade.
(emphasis supplied)
In the case of U.S. vs. E.C. Knight Co. 156-us I 1895 (the Sugar Trust Case) Sherman Act was liberally interpreted but in the following five cases U.S. vs. Women''s Sportswear Manufacturers Association 336 us 460 1949, American Column & Lumber Co., vs. U.S. 257-us 377 1921, U.S. Vs. Columbia Steel Co. us-495 1948, U.S. vs. Dupoint Co. 353-us 586 1957 and Standard Oil Co, California vs. U.S. 337-us 233 1949 a far stricter approach was made and "Vertical integration" was checked.
The above six leading cases in U.S.A. show the doctrinaire approach as opposed to the "Pragmatic approach" followed in United Kingdom, "doctrinaire approach" justifies nationalisation and creation of monopoly irrespective of the fact whether it results in any benefit to the State. In pregmatic approach monopolies are favoured when it is objectively when monopoly is expedient and promotes the economic welfare of the country. In India on the pattern of the U.K. legislation the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 54 of 1969 is enforced from December 27, 1969. The statement and objects and reasons of the Act are as under:
The Bill is designated to ensure that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of economic power to the common detriment and to prohibit such monopolistic and restrictive trade practices as are prejudicial to public interest.
In out constitution Article 39 (b) and (c), it is stated as under:
The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing:--
(b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good; and
(c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment.
Clause six of Article 19 of the Constitution of India was amended by the Fourth Amendment and subsequent to the amendment clause six reads as under:
Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause, shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to (i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practicing any profession or narrying on any occupation, trade or business, or (ii) the carrying on by the State or by a Corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry of service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens of otherwise.
The effect of the fourth amendment to the Constitution was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Akadasi Padhan Vs. State of Orissa, and it is observed as under:--
The amendment made by the Legislature in Art. 19 (6) shows that according to the Legislature, a law relating to the creation of State monopoly should be presumed to be in the interests of the general public.
The above decision in one respect is a landmark for in that case it was held a monopoly cannot be sustained even if it is for public benefit unless the monopoly was supported by the provisions in a statute.
The following passage makes that aspect clear.
Therefore, in our opinion, if a law is passed creating a State monopoly and the working of the monopoly is left either to the State or to the officers of the State appointed in that behalf, or to the department of the State, or to persons appointed as agents to carry on the work of the monopoly strictly on behalf of the State, that would satisfy the requirements of Art. 19 (6) (ii). In other words, the limitations (Limitations are here limitations under the Statute) imposed by the requirement that the trade must be carried on by the State or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State cannot be widened and must be strictly construed and agency can be permitted only in respect of trades or businesses where it appears to be inevitable and where it works within the well recognised limits of agency.
The result of the above discussion is that in all civilised counties monopolies are looked with disfavour. In common law transactions creating monopolies are not considered legal. Therefore, the appointment of the second respondent as the sole supplier in the impugned order cannot be sustained for the Chairman or the Board under the Art 46 of 56 do not have the power to create a monopoly. In the result, the order in proceedings No. 10378/HB/AEO. 1/78 dated July 31, 1978 is hereby quashed. The Writ Petition is allowed as prayed for. There will be no order as to costs.