Tribunals and CommissionsSingle Bench(2024) 03 DRAT CK 0017

M/s. K. Sumathi Mohan vs Citiwide Financial Services Limited

Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal · Decided on 11 March 2024

HON’BLE JUDGES
Anil Kumar Srivastava, Chairperson
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Appeal Diary No. 69 Of 2024

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Judgment

19 paragraphs · 629 words

Anil Kumar Srivastava, Chairperson

THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL :

For Admission

Heard the Learned Counsel for Appellant and perused the record.

It appears that an order dated 22nd February, 2023 was passed by the Learned DRT wherein Misc Application 88 of 2022 was dismissed. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned order, Appellant herein preferred the instant appeal on 23rd January, 2024.

I.A. 46 of 2024

Application, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.

It is apparent from the record that O.A. 319 of 2022 was proceeded ex parte on 16.11.2022 and subsequently ex parte decree was passed in November, 2022.

In paragraph 2 of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act it is stated Appellant approached his Counsel for clarification who advised him that the petition was dismissed on 22.02.2023 after verification. Thereafter application for certified copy was moved on 28.12.2023. Certified copy was notified to be prepared on 2.1.2024 and delivered on the same date. Thereafter, appeal was filed.

It has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sheo Raj Singh -vs- Union of India & Another [(2023) 10 SCC 531] as under:

“30. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of private parties and the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due to technical considerations of delay. However, these decisions notwithstanding, we reiterate that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts. exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial.

31.

Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an "explanation" and an "excuse". An "explanation" is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an "excuse".

No doubt Appellant has to show sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal. In the present case no cause has been shown by the Appellant except for mentioning that Appellant approached her Counsel for clarification and was advised that the O.A. was decreed ex parte on 22.2.2023. After verification of the same, application for certified copy was moved on 28.12.2023 and certified copy was prepared and delivered on 02.01.2024. The period between 22.02.2023 till 28.12.2023 is neither explained nor disclosed in the affidavit. A litigant cannot claim as of right for condonation of delay in preferring an appeal; rather he has to show sufficient cause. There is a difference between sufficient cause and excuse. In the present case neither any sufficient cause nor any excuse is mentioned.

Accordingly, after considering the arguments advanced by the Learned Counsel for Appellant and the materials on record, I am of the considered view that the Appellant failed to show any sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.

Accordingly, I.A. 46 of 2024 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is dismissed.

Consequently, the appeal, being Appeal No. 69 of 2024, also stands dismissed as time barred.

Copy of the order be supplied to Appellants and the Respondent Bank and a copy be also forwarded to the concerned DRT.

File be consigned to Record room.

Order dictated, signed, and pronounced in open Court.