M/s. Hindustan Tyre Company, Ludhiana vs Labour Court and others

Harbans Lal, J.—Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were employed as a machine man and a packer respectively in the establishment of the petitioner engaged in the manufacture and sale of cycle tyres and tubes in Industrial Area, ''A'', Ludhiana, Respondent No. 2, Madan Lal, was charge-sheeted on 10th December, 1973 (vide Annexure P. 1), and similarly respondent No. 3 Ram Sabbad, was charge-sheeted on 11th December, 1973 (vide Annexure P. 2). Both these respondents had been suspended and it was one of the conditions of the charge-sheets that both of them will be entitled to the prescribed wages during the period of suspension provided that they reported at the factory gate at 8-30 a.m. daily and received instructions in writing from the management. Enquiry was held against them and as a result of the same their services was terminated, vide orders dated 6th February, 1974 (Annexure P. 3 and P. 4). According to ''these termination orders, both the respondents were deprived of their wages for the suspension period on the ground that they did not report themselves at the factory gate daily to receive instructions and thus the said wages had been forfeited. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 filed separate applications before the Labour Court, respondent No. 1, u/s 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be called the Act), vide Annexures P. 5 and P. 6, claiming wages for the suspension period. Respondent No. 2 claimed wages amounting to Rs 361.95 Paise and the claim of respondent No. 3 was for Rs. 230.32 Paise. The petitioner disputed the right of the respondents to claim these wages and also raised a preliminary objection that the aforesaid applications were not maintainable and that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to dispose of the same u/s 33-C (2) of the Act. The Labour Court dismissed the preliminary objection by its order, dated 16th June, 1975 (vide Annexure P. 11), and held that the applications will be decided on merits. This order is sought to be quashed by a writ of certiorari in this writ petition by the petitioner under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the proceedings u/s 33-C (2) of the Act are in the nature of execution proceedings and the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is only to compute benefits admitted to be accruing to the employee in terms of money. Where a right to this benefit is disputed and is not an existing right, the same has to be the subject-matter of industrial dispute as defined under the Act and the matter has to be adjudicated upon u/s 10 of the Act by the Industrial Tribunal. In order to appreciate the point at issue, it is worth while to reproduce sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of section 33-C of the Act:--

33-C. (1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter V-A, the workman himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf or in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to appropriate Government for the recovery of money due to him and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue:

Provided that every such application shall be made within one year from the date on which the money became due to the workman from the employer:

Provided further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period.

(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount from which such benefit should be computed, then the question may subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government.

(3) For the purposes of computing the money value of a benefit, the Labour Court may, if it so thinks fit, appoint a Commissioner who shall, after taking such evidence as may be necessary, submit a report to the Labour Court and the Labour Court shall determine the amount after considering the report of the Commissioner and other circumstances of the case.

The scope of sub-section (2) of section 33-C was exhaustively considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in The Central Bank of India Ltd. Vs. P.S. Rajagopalan etc., in the background of the legislative history of this revision. In that case some employees of the Central Bank of India were attending to their routine duties as clerks and, in addition, they were operating the Adding Machine provided for use in the Clearing Department of the Branch during the relevant period. For this additional work they claimed the special allowance of Rs. 10/- per month in their applications u/s 33-C (2) of the Act. The employer disputed the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under this provision on the ground that the alleged right of the employees to receive special allowance on account of their having worked on the Adding Machine had been disputed. In these circumstances their Lordships held as under:--

If the said right is not disputed, nothing more needs to be done and the Labour Court can proceed to compute the value of the benefit in terms of money; but if the said right is disputed, the Labour Court must deal with the question and decide whether the workman has the right to receive the benefit as alleged by him and it is only if the Labour Court answers this point in favour of the workman that the next question of making the necessary computation can arise. It seems to us that the opening clause of sub-section (2) does not admit of the construction for which the appellant contends unless we add some words in that clause. The clause "Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit" does not mean "where such workman is admittedly, or admitted to be, entitled to receive such benefit". The appellant''s construction would necessarily introduce the addition of the words "admittedly, or admitted to be" in that clause, and that clearly is not permissible. Besides, it seems to us that if the appellant''s construction is accepted; it would necessarily mean that it would be at the option of the employer to allow the workman to avail himself of the remedy provided by sub-section (2), because he has merely to raise an objection on the ground that the right claimed by the workman is not admitted to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the workman''s application. The claim u/s 33C(2) clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may, in some cases, have to be proceeded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry must be held to be incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the Labour Court by sub-section (2).

It was also held that the scope of section 33-C(2) of the Act was wider than that of section 33-C(l) and that the claims not based on settlements, awards or made under the provisions of Chapter V-A may also be competent u/s 33-C(2). However, it was made clear that in case an employee is dismissed or demoted and the legality of the order of dismissal or demotion is challenged, petition for the recovery or wages after dismissal or demotion cannot be filed u/s 33-C(2). In the aforesaid case the Supreme Court held that the Labour Court had the jurisdiction to consider the question of the right of the employees to claim the special allowance.

The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon K.P.V. Shaik Mohd. Rowther and Co. Vs. K.S. Narayanan and Others, and Shyamsundar Sahu and Co. Vs. Labour Court and Another, . In the first case the workman had been suspended from service as a matter of punishment. Consequently it was held that the question of computation of wages by the Labour Court u/s 33-C(2) did not arise. In the second case the service of a workman had been terminated and the question involved was whether the said termination was justified or not. It was held that the matter had to be adjudicated upon by the Industrial Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of the Act in the first instance, and that the Labour Court did not have the jurisdiction to do so u/s 33-C(2). It will be thus seen that neither of the above decisions renders any assistance to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner.

Lastly, reliance was also placed on Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited Vs. The Workmen and Another, In this case the River Steam Navigation Company, which used to operate a river service from West Bengal to Assam incurred huge losses during the partition of the country. Due to heavy indebtedness to various creditors including the Union of India and the Banks, a winding-up petition was filed in the Calcutta High Court and in consequence of sanction of a scheme a state-owned Corporation was brought into existence. The Corporation in due course appointed a large number of company''s employees by fresh letters of appointment, but all employees could not be absorbed. The scheme of transfer did not compel the Corporation to employ the workmen. It was in these circumstances that the Government of West Bengal made two orders of reference purporting to be u/s 33-C(2) of the Act. The first order related to the computation of benefits by the Labour Court which had been covered by the settlement, and by the second order computation of retrenchment benefits u/s 25FF of the Act was to be made. The Corporation challenged these orders of reference by a writ petition in the High Court. It was held by a Single Judge that the reference orders were misconceived. The Government of West Bengal then made a consolidated reference to the second Labour Court. This was again challenged in the High Court, which struck down a part of the reference and held that the remaining reference was within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. It was in these circumstances that their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the scope of section 33-C(2) of the Act. The ratio of the decision in Rajagopalans case'' (supra) was relied upon and it was held as under:--

The several problems raised by the above contentions involve in effect a major industrial dispute, an investigation into which is quite outside the scope of section 33-C(2) Only on a detailed investigation would it be possible to determine whether the workmen had any right to be benefit and, if so, the Corporation was liable to satisfy the same.

In the present case it was not denied by the petitioner, who is the employer, that the respondents-employees were entitled to the prescribed wages during the period of their suspension. Thus the right to wages during the relevant period is admitted. The case of the employer was only to the effect that the respondents had forfeited their right because they did not present themselves before the factory gate every day and thus did not fulfil the condition. Obviously this is only an ancillary matter incidental to the right of the employees to receive wages during the period of suspension, and the contention of the employer cannot he held to convert the dispute into an industrial dispute so as to make the claim of the workmen as being outside the purview of section 33-C. According to Rajagopalan''s case (supra), an enquiry by the Labour Court before the benefit, to which the workmen are entitled, is computed in terms of money is not outside its jurisdiction. Thus the Labour Court, respondent No. 1, correctly decided that the matter was within its jurisdiction and the preliminary objection raised by the employer-petitioner was rightly repelled. There is no infirmity in the impugned order.

For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petition is without any merit and is dismissed. There will be no orders as to costs.