M/S. Gharonda Builders & Developers vs M. Agaiah

The present revision petition has been filed against the order dated 14.07.2017 of the Telengana State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission ( in short, the State Commission) vide which the appeal of the petitioner being appeal no. 133 of 2017 against the order of the District Forum dated 24.10.2016 in CC No. 247 of 2015 was dismissed on the ground that appeal had been delayed by 62 days and no sufficient cause for condonation of delay could be shown by the petitioner. The present revision petition against the impugned order is also delayed. As per the registry, delay is of 264 days. In the application IA No. 12250 of 2017 filed for condonation of delay by the petitioner, the petitioner has not disclosed the number of days by which his present revision petition has been delayed while seeking condonation of such period of delay. It is settled proposition that it is for the petitioner to give sufficient reasons / causes for condonation of delay. The expression 'sufficient cause' has been described by the Hon'ble Supreme in the case of Basavraj & Anr. V. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, 2013 AIR SCW 6510" has explained the meaning of sufficient cause which is as under:

"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See: Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336; Lala Matadin v. A. Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953; Parimal v.Veena @ Bharti AIR 2011 SC 1150; and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai AIR 2012 SC 1629: (2012 AIR SCW 2412)

It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."

In the case of "Ram Lal and Ors. vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361", the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that nobody has a right for condonation of delay and it is the bounden duty of the person seeking condonation of delay to show sufficient reasons and where sufficient reasons are not shown, the Courts / Commission has no other discretion but to dismiss the application. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said matter has held as under :

"It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant."

The test to be applied is whether petitioner has been able to explain the delay and thus entitled for condonation, has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "R. B. Ramlingam vs. R. B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) CLT 188 (SC). The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that true guide is whether the petitioner had acted with reasonable diligence in prosecution of his appeal / revision. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:

"We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition."

In the case of "Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, (2011) 14 SCC 578," the Hon'ble Supreme Court has cautioned this Commission to keep in mind while dealing with the application for condonation of delay the special period of limitation provided under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 ( in short, the Act) and also the special nature of the proceedings under the Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:

"It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer Fora."

Therefore, it is well settled that it is for the petitioner to explain the delay of each and every date while seeking its condonation. The application of the petitioner seeking condonation is silent about the number of days of which condonation is sought. The grounds shown in the application also are very vague. The grounds taken by the petitioner are that after receiving the certified copy of the order, he contacted the counsel who advised him to prefer the revision petition and also advised him that he ( advocate) needed to take second opinion from his senior and, therefore, kept the papers. It is apparent that name of the counsel whom the petitioner had contacted has neither been disclosed nor it is shown as to why he was not consulted and approached till 2nd week of June, 2018. He (Petitioner) for the first time contacted him ( advocate) after May 2018. It is also stated that counsel lost the file and same could not be traced till 3rd week of June 2018. It is also not clear as to why the petitioner did not think of challenging the impugned order, copy of which he received in July 2017. He, according to his own submission, contacted the counsel for the first time in May, 2018, obviously, after the expiry of period of limitation. There is no explanation in the application as to why no efforts were made by the petitioner for filing the revision petition within the period of limitation. Once the period of limitation expires, it cannot be revived by any subsequent act. As per own contention, efforts for filing the revision petition were made by the petitioner after the expiry of period of limitation. It is clear that petitioner had not acted diligently and had acted with lethargy. His casual conduct is also apparent that his appeal was also dismissed on account of being filed after the expiry of period of limitation. We are satisfied that petitioner has failed to give any reasonable grounds for condonation of delay. Application for condonation of delay is dismissed. As a consequence, Revision Petition is also dismissed as barred by limitation.