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Judgment
Karuna Nand Bajpayee, Presiding Member
This first appeal has been filed under section 19 of the Act 1986 in challenge to the Order dated 28.02.2019 of the State Commission in appeal no. 39 of 2015 of the State Commission Rajasthan.
Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
Perused the record including inter alia the impugned Order dated 28.02.2019 and the memorandum of appeal.
The brief facts of the case are as follows:
Complainant, which is jeweller, obtained a Jewellers Block Policy from the opposite party insurance company which was valid for the relevant period from 22.07.2010 to 21.07.2011. During the currency of the policy, however, in the intervening night of 28-29.01.2011, during the transit, the said gold bar was stolen. Appellant came to know about the theft on 29.01.2011 and it immediately intimated the insurance company about the theft of the gold bar telephonically. Subsequently, on 31.01.2011 the appellant had also submitted a written intimation to the insurance company about the theft of gold bar. An FIR No. 15 dated 03.02.2011 also seems to have been registered at P.S. Tilak Marg, New Delhi under Section 379 IPC. A number of surveyors were appointed. Eventually, on 19.09.2012 the insurance company repudiated the claim on the ground of negligence on the part of appellant. However, insurance company did not provide any explanation or reason qua negligence. Appellant moved an application under RTI to the insurance company seeking information about the alleged gross negligence on the basis of which its claim was repudiated. The appellant received reply of the RTI application along with the report of the surveyor in July 2013. The appellant provided point-wise explanation of the points raised in the report of the final surveyor and requested the insurance company to review the claim. The request of review of the reputation of the claim of appellant was registered by the Regional Grievance Redressal Committee of the insurance company vide grievance number DG0000032014 dated 27.05.2014. However, vide its letter dated 25.07.2014 the insurance company informed the appellant that Regional Grievance Redressal Committee had reviewed the claim file and refused to reverse the decision of repudiation of the claim.
Thus, aggrieved, the Complainant approached the State Commission with its consumer complaint.
The State Commission vide its impugned Order seems to have dismissed the complaint on the point of limitation, holding the same to have been filed beyond the time prescribed under the Act. It appears that the learned State Commission has tried to adjudicate upon the aspect whether the case at hand involved continued cause of action or not. That seems to have been the focus of its judicial enquiry. It further transpires that as the State Commission did not feel convinced about the continuing nature of cause it found the complaint as time-barred and dismissed the same on that ground. Certain case laws have also been cited which need not to be reproduced all over again here which related to the conspicuous facts of particular cases where the National Commission has held that the cause of action may not be qualified as being ‘continuing cause of action’. After citing certain case laws on this point wherein continuity of action was not upheld by this Commission, the fora below proceeded to dismiss the complaint finding it to have been filed beyond the period of limitation. It may be read in between the lines of the concluding paragraph of the impugned Order that in the present case the State Commission did not find the doctrine or principle of continued case of action applicable. It would suffice to extract out the concluding paragraph of the impugned Order:
“In view of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and National Commission first cause of action arose in the favour of Complainant on the date of theft itself. The maximum time to wait to file complaint would be the date when the claim of the Complainant was clearly repudiated i.e. 19.09.2012. Limitation starts from that day, any correspondence for re-assessment or review of the claim has no judicial merit.
Complaint has been presented on 09.04.2015, which is clearly beyond the period of limitation. Hence, complaint of the Complainant deserved to be dismissed”
Submission of learned counsel for appellant is two-fronged. According to him the facts of the case are such that on the one hand it ought to be deemed to be a case of continuing cause of action and, therefore, the complaint filed before the State Commission ought to have been considered as well within the period of limitation and finding to the contrary in this regard returned by State Commission is erroneous. Another limb of the argument is that the evolution of events which followed the repudiation of the claim, the nature of circumstances which evolved consequentially after the repudiation and the conduct of the appellant and also the corresponding conduct of the respondents altogether give rise to the factual basis which furnishes ‘sufficient cause’ to condone the delay. In order to substantiate the contentions raised in this regard it has been submitted that repudiation letter dated 19.09.2012 simply stated that “based on the above-mentioned claim we want to let you know that the above-mentioned claim is not payable due to your gross negligence. Hence the claim is repudiated. Please be informed.” Such kind of blanket, non-speaking repudiation which scarcely gave out any information about the alleged negligence bewildered the appellant. According to learned counsel the appellant was kept in dark as to how and what kind of negligence was committed by it. All the necessary papers required for settling the claim were duly provided in time to the surveyors appointed by insurance company. But the repeated requests made on behalf of the appellant to reveal the actual reasons for repudiation of claim did not yield any result. When the appellant was not adequately apprised and informed despite its importunings in this regard it was impelled to take recourse to RTI and an application under the same was moved on 02.04.2013 which sought the following particulars from the respondent company:
a) Exact documents / policy conditions/warranties based on which Opposite Party have drawn conclusion that Complainant claim is not admissible due to negligence as alleged in their claim repudiation letter dated 19.09.2012.
b) Copy of policy provisions /warranties etc. whereas it is specifically pointed the type of negligence, which is not covered under the policy.
The attempt of appellant to garner information still remained unresponded and the opposite party did not give any reply. As a result of the same the appeallant further inquired from the officials of the opposite party but they adopted the mode of denial. Hence the appellant once again filed the RTI and physically delivered the application to respondent’s office on 27.05.2013. Thereupon when the response was received, it was discovered to the appellant’s shock that the reports prepared by the surveyors were tainted with conjectures and surmises and completely unsubstantiated indictments were made against appellant without any factual basis as if the repudiation of claim was a pre-determined decision of the respondents. The appellant / complainant seriously disputed the unfounded charges and made a protesting representation to the insurance company vide a detailed letter dated 04.01.2014 with the plea that an impartial honest review must follow and the insurance company must in all fairness review its fallacious decision. It has been emphasized by learned counsel that the protesting representation made by the appellant was duly registered by the Regional Grievance Redressal Committee of the respondent vide grievance no. DG0000032014 and the same was dated 25.07.2014. Consequently, the respondent insurance company did enter into the process of review and re-considered the matter in the view of the facts that were brought to its knowledge. But unfortunately all against the bona fide hope of the appellant, it was informed in following terms by the respondent – “claim file have been reviewed by Regional Grievance Redressal Committee & found that there is no fresh ground for reversal of the decision taken earlier by the authority, which please note.” Submission is that it was in this process that the time got consumed and finally when it was found that the appellant’s claim has been finally turned down, he was left with no option but to file the complaint in the State Commission on 09.04.2015 which was well within the limitation.
Learned counsel for the appelalnt has tried to submit that the peculiar circumstances of the case are such that it is not difficult to see that it is a case of recurring cause of action and there was hardly any time when the cause of action ceased to exist. Contention is that it was the last communication made by the respondent insurance company about its decision not to revise the claim (despite several serious and bona fide objections) which eventually gave rise to the actual causa causans and the finding to the contrary arrived at by the State Commission in this regard is patenly erroneous. Argument is that as such the period of limitation ought to have been reckoned from the final repudiation of the claim by the review committee and not from the repudiation letter which was replete with number of potholes and infirmities. But emphasis has been laid by learned counsel on another limb of the argument raised by him that the entire evolution of events after the initial repudiation of claim till the decision of the review committee is of such nature which is most genuine and legitimate in its substance to furnish sufficient cause for the said delay. The reaction of the appellant upon the fallacious survey reports, the reaction of the appellant to be inquisitive about the fact as to how and in what terms the appellant has been dubbed as being negligent, the assiduous efforts made on the part of the appellant to gather information from the insurance company through RTI applications and its genuine protesting representation made to the respondent company are all such kind of actions which any honest claimant with clean concience is bound to undertake. The factum of the appellant’s representation having been duly registered and the factum of the review committee considering the correctness and the acceptability or validity of appellant’s claim are such facts which constitutes bona fide cause and which actually resulted in the hiatus which followed the repudiation and which preceded the second communication done by the review committee in this regard. Submission is that it is not a case in which some meaningless correspondence was being made by the appellant sporadically or where somehow the appellant was trying to extend the period of limitation by entering into frivolous unsubstantiated correspondence or communications with the insurance company. Submission is that even if for the sake of arguments it is presumed to be not a case of continuous cause of action then also these facts as have been placed forth hereinabove certainly constitute sufficient cause to condone the delay. Contention is that the State Commission has completely ignored this aspect of the matter which renders the impugned Order legally vulnerable.
The Bench has perused the record and the impugned Order in the light of the submission made by learned counsel. This Bench deems this appropriate to keep in perspective Section 24A of the Consumer Protection Act 1986 which may be quoted hereinbelow:
24A. Limitation period.-(l) The District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission shall not admit a complaint unless it is filed within two years from the date on which the cause of action has arisen.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a complaint may be entertained after the period specified in sub-section (1), if the complainant satisfies the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, that he had sufficient cause for not filing the complaint within such period:
Provided that no such complaint shall be entertained unless the National Commission, the State Commission or the District Forum, as the case may be, records its reasons for condoning such delay.
While dealing with the issue in question here regarding the limitation period, its breach and the availability or non-availability of sufficient cause to condone the delay where the complaint has been filed after the lapse of limitation period, the Bench deems it appropriate to first observe that the law on the point of limitation, wherever it is provided, has to be respected and complied with and in no case ought to be shelved with apathy or be blissfully ignored. Eventually, whether or not sufficient cause to condone delay is available or made out turns out to be a question of fact in each case and we have to see and keep in perspective the complete factual matrix and the syllogism of contextual circumstances under which the delay is said to have been occasioned and have to then find whether or not the same constitutes a sufficient cause to justifiably lean in favour of the appellant who prays that its cause should be adjudicated on merits rather than be thwarted at the very threshold on the ground of limitation.
While coming to the present case what we find is that the explanation regarding the delay as furnished on behalf of appellant / complainant appears to be self evident and self speaking and needs no further elaboration. The State Commission has taken a somewhat inclement view of the matter without entirely appreciating the facts and circumstances in the right perspective as a result of which the petitioner’s cause remained unadjudicated on its merits.
When the facts and the circumstances of this case as they emerge out from the record are considered, this Bench feels that they are of such nature which certainly constitutes sufficient cause to deserve condonation of delay. It is certainly not a case in which the consumer in order to bridge up the delay in filing the petition has created some kind of evidence in the nature of an alibi in order to pretend that the cause was continuing and then plead that bar of limitation should not operate. The chain of events which followed and which have been given in detail in the grounds of appeal along with relevant annexures in its support abundantly reveal that there is sufficient factual basis from which emanate legitimate acceptable cause to explain the said delay in filing the complaint. That the perusal of the impugned order makes it apparent that this aspect of the law that is to say the perspective of Section 24A of Consumer Protection Act has somehow been shelved and has not been adequately brought to bear upon and weighed in the impugned Order. It appears that learned State Commission confined its judicial enquiry more on the point as to whether there was continuing cause of action or not. The case law which has been referred to in the impugned Order primarily relates to this aspect of the matter. This Bench deems it appropriate to observe that it feels satisfied that the circumstances of the case are such that the State Commission ought to have condoned the delay for the reason that there was ‘sufficient cause’ available to explain the same. There may be cases where it may be found that the consumer has never been conscious about his rights and has with indifference and apathy almost acquiesced in with its grievance or where it may be found that just as a matter of casual reaction which completely lacked sincerity some of kind of semblance of correspondence has been dropped in after long unexplained gap of time and on the basis of which it has been sought to be pleaded that the cause was of continuing nature or that the cause of action had not terminated or sufficiently matured up. In the ultimate analysis whether the said correspondence or attempt was a meaningless, frivolous, pretentious exercise or whether the events which subsequently occurred and the conduct of the consumer was such which may go to demonstrate that it had a genuine bona fide hue and where it had reason to believe that filing a complaint in the court was not the last option left and his grievance was very likely to be redressed at the other side of the desk itself, these are all questions of fact which have to be seen, assessed and weighed and inferred in correct perspective keeping in view the totality of facts and circumstances of each case in their entirety.
Learned counsel appearing for the respondents has tried to defend the impugned Order, submitting that the view taken by the State Commission that it was not case of continuing cause of action cannot be faulted with. Learned counsel for the respondents could not successfully make any convincing arguments in order to assail the sufficiency of cause which explains the delay in filing the appeal nor could it dispute the factual evolution of events which followed the repudiation as has been placed by the appellant’s counsel.
In view of this finding arrived at by this Bench regarding sufficiency of cause it does not appear necessary to enter into another limb of the argument made by learned counsel whether it was a case of continuing cause of action or not and, therefore, that aspect of the matter is not being adjudicated upon by the Bench.
In the conspicuous facts and circumstances of the case as are emanating from the record the Bench feels that this is a matter in which it would have been better advised that the State Commission should have judiciously deigned to consider the explanatory circumstances of the case as good enough to constitute sufficient cause to condone the delay. The Bench feels, in the peculiar circumstances and facts of this case, that it would result in something less than justice if the cause of the appellant is thrown out at the threshold stage and not be allowed adjudication upon merits. The door of justice ought to have been kept ajar and the matter ought to have been better adjudicated on merits.
In view of above discussion the impugned Order stands set aside. The matter is remitted back to the State Commission with the request to decide the same on merits after providing adequate opportunity to both the sides in accordance with law and treat the said delay as condoned on the ground of sufficient cause behind it. The parties are directed to appear before the State Commission on 30.11.2023.
The Registry is requested to send a copy each of this Order to the parties in the appeal and to their learned counsel within three days. The Order be communicated to the State Commission forthwith by fastest mode available. The stenographer is requested to upload this Order on the website of this Commission immediately.