Mrs Meme Basar & Ors. vs The State Of Arunachal Pradesh

(A.M. Kalita, J)

Heard Mr. Tagum Jamoh, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. Token Ete, Additional Public Prosecutor for the State of Arunachal Pradesh.

The instant application under Section 482/528 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973/BNSS, 2023, has been filed jointly by the petitioners, praying for quashing and setting aside of the charge-sheet No. 07/1993, dated 20.03.1993, under Section 394 of IPC, 1860 and its corresponding proceedings initiated as GR Case No. 66/1992, (corresponding to Naharlagun PS Case No. 46/1992), pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class (Junior Division), Yupia, District Papum Pare.

The petitioner No. 1 in the instant case is the victim in GR Case No. 66/1992, arising out of charge-sheet No. 07/1993 dated 20.03.1993 and the petitioner No. 2 is the complainant in the aforesaid case. The complainant, i.e., Dr. Marbom Basar is the husband of petitioner No. 1. The petitioners Nos. 3 to 6 are accused persons in the aforesaid case.

The brief fact of the case is that on 01.09.1992, in the evening, the petitioner No. 2, who is the husband of the petitioner No. 1, went to attend a party on the occasion of a local festival. Petitioner No. 1 along with their cook was staying in their quarter located in G-Extension at Naharlagun, Papum Pare District. Around 2:15 PM, some unknown persons entered into the house of the petitioner No. 1 and inquired from the cook about the whereabouts of the petitioner No. 2. When the cook replied that the petitioner No. 2 was not available in the house, the unknown persons entered into the bedroom of petitioner No. 1 and assaulted her by throwing some acid on her body and also stolen a suitcase containing Rs. 70,000/-(Rupees Seventy Thousand).

Accordingly, an FIR was lodged on 02.09.1992, before the Officer-in-Charge, Naharlagun Police Station by the petitioner No. 2, which was registered as Naharlagun PS Case No. 42/1992, under Section 394 of Indian Penal Code. After completion of the investigation, the charge-sheet No. 7/1993 dated 20.03.1993 was submitted against the petitioner Nos. 3 to 6, under Section 394 of IPC. Though the charge-sheet was submitted in the year 1993, nothing progressed in the trial. However, after almost 32 years, the petitioners have received the summons for appearance before the Trial Court and the last of the summons was received in the month of February 2025, wherein the petitioners have been directed to appear before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate First Class, Yupia, Papum Pare District on 06.05.2025.

Being aggrieved, the petitioners have jointly filed the instant criminal petition praying for quashing of the proceedings in GR Case No. 66/1992, along with the charge sheet dated 23.03.1993 as well as the FIR dated 02.09.1992.

On 25.04.2025, this Court has issued notice and pending disposal of the petition, suspended the proceedings of GR Case No. 66/1992.

Mr. T. Jamoh, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, submits that the incident occurred in the year 1992 and nothing happened for the last more than 32 years, and the petitioners were, therefore, under the impression that the case has been closed. The learned counsel submits that the case against the petitioner nos. 3 to 6 has been filed only on suspicion, as the same can be apparent from the FIR dated 02.09.1992. He submits that in the statement under Section 161 CrPC before the police, the complainant neither implicated the petitioner No. 3 nor petitioner Nos. 4 to 6 of being involved in the case. The complainant simply stated that petitioner No. 3 may be involved in the incident. The learned counsel primarily submits that since the summons have been issued only after 32 years, which indicates that the completion of trial will take a further few years, in these circumstances, since petitioner Nos. 3 to 6 being the accused persons having rights to speedy trial, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of cases, if the proceedings in the instant case are allowed to go, the same will violate Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, he submits that in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the instant proceedings in GR No. 66/1992, pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class (Junior Division), Yupia, should not be allowed to go ahead and the same should be quashed and set aside. The learned counsel has also submitted that the petitioners, including the victim, complainant, and the accused persons, have amicably settled the issue, and the victim as well as the complainant has agreed to forgive the accused persons, i.e., the petitioner Nos. 3 to 6, by executing a deed of settlement. He submits that the victim as well as the complainant has decided to close the matter for all as they are not willing to pursue the case, since they have genuinely forgiven the accused persons. He submits that in terms of the settlement, the petitioners executed a deed of settlement dated 20.03.2025, wherein they have expressed their views about settling the dispute, and to close the issue forever. The learned counsel submits that in view of the long delay in the trial, which is pending more than 32 years, and is definitely going to take couple of years more, the constitutional mandates have been violated in the instant case, and therefore, the FIR dated 02.09.1992 and the consequential charge-sheet and the proceedings pending before the learned JMFC, Yupia, should be quashed.

The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in support of his submission that right to speedy trial is included in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and denial of such right vitiates the whole proceeding, has referred to the following decisions: -

To buttress his argument that since the victim, complainant, and the accused persons have already settled their grievances by way of an agreement, and have amicably decided to close and compound the case, this Court should allow the petition, has referred to the following cases: -

Mr. T. Ete, the learned Addl. PP, on the other hand, submits that the offence relates to throwing acid on the victim, petitioner No. 1, and due to which the petitioner No. 1 had suffered 30% burn injuries on her body, as well as certain injuries in other parts of the body. He submits that the nature of crime as alleged in the instant case is something which is not private in nature, having potential of impacting the public at large and society. Therefore, he opposes the prayer of the petitioners in the instant petition.

Mr. T. Ete, the learned Addl. PP, has submitted that in a similar case, where the victim has suffered 40% injury due to acid attack, a coordinate bench of this Court in the case of Ms. Maning Baki and Another versus State of Arunachal Pradesh, (Criminal Petition No. 101/2026), decided on 13.08.2026, has rejected the prayer for quashing the FIR and proceedings even though there was a compromise between the parties.

It is a settled law that the right to speedy trial is a part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in catena of cases, has held that no person shall be deprived of his life or his personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, which is provided under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

In a case of long trial, the mental agony, expense, and strain which a person has to undergo, coupled with delay, may result in impairing the capability or ability of the accused to defend himself. This aspect of the matter has been considered by the Constitutional Courts of this country and held that the right to speedy trial, a manifestation of fair, just, and reasonable procedure, is enshrined in Article 21. Speedy trial would encompass within its sweep all its stages including investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision, and retrial, expiring with the final verdict.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while recognizing the principle that denial of an accused's right of speedy trial may result in a decision to dismiss the indictment or in reversing of a conviction, went on to state that of course no length of time is per se too long to pass scrutiny under this principle, nor the accused can be called upon to show the actual prejudice by delay of disposal of cases. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in various cases that if an accused is not tried speedily, his fundamental right to speedy trial would be violated, and consequence of such delay would be that the prosecution case would be liable to be quashed. It is also held that any inordinate delay in conclusion of a criminal trial undoubtedly has a highly deleterious effect on the society generally, and particularly on the two sides of the case. In such cases, the victim may suffer even more than the accused, which may lead to denial of justice to the victim due to such delay in trial.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay (supra) has laid down certain guidelines regarding the right of speedy trial of an accused person. From the guidelines, the followings can be arrived at: -

Similarly, in the case of Pankaj Kumar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that it is well settled that right to speedy trial in all criminal prosecutions is an inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution. This right is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in court, but also includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well. The right to speedy trial extends equally to all criminal prosecutions and is not confined to any particular category of cases. It is held that where a right of speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the court has to perform the balancing act, taking into consideration all the attending circumstances and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. Where the court comes to a conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or conviction, as the case may be, may be quashed unless the court feels that having regard to the nature of offense and other relevant circumstances, quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. It is held that in such a situation, it is open to the court to make an appropriate order as it may deem just and equitable, including the fixation of time for conclusion of trial.

In the case of Vakil Prasad Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the exposition of Article 21 in Hussainara Khatoon (1) case was exhaustively considered afresh by a Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay (supra). Referring to a number of decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court and the American precedents on the Sixth Amendment of their Constitution, making the right to a speedy and public trial a constitutional guarantee, the court formulated as many as eleven (11) propositions with a note of caution that those were not exhaustive and were meant only to serve as guidelines.

Since this court has already discussed about the aforesaid guidelines laid down in the case of A.R. Antulay (supra), the same are not repeated herein again.

The Hon’ble Apex Court further held that it is well settled that the right to speedy trial in all criminal prosecutions is an inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. From the principles laid down and observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is discernible that right to speedy trial has been made a constitutional right available to an accused. This right of an accused person for speedy trial has been elaborately discussed in the context of constitutional rights and other rights available under various laws by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena of cases. And after consideration of the various aspects and stakes, have formulated the guidelines in the case of A.R. Antulay (supra). The guidelines and principles laid down in the case of A.R. Antulay (supra) have been followed in various cases as has been discussed above.

From the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as discussed above, in every case, the facts and attending circumstances can be different and whether a delay has been really caused and right to speedy trial has been denied to the accused or not has to be examined, and the court is required to do a balancing act while doing such analysis. It has already been discussed about the attending facts such as time taken in the investigation, filing of the charge sheet, trial, retrial, revision, appeal, and after that, the final verdict. All these aspects are important aspects which are part of a trial and, therefore, these issues are required to be duly considered by a court.

On the background of the above principles as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, if the facts of the instant case are taken, it is seen that an FIR was lodged on 02.09.1992 for offences under Section 394 IPC, wherein the allegations were causing grievous hurt by throwing acid, wherein the victim suffered 30% burn on the body as well as some other parts of the body. It was also alleged that during the incident, the accused persons had stolen Rs. 70,000/-from the house of the victim. After completion of the investigation, the police filed the charge-sheet on 23.03.1993. Surprisingly, after the charge-sheet was filed, nothing happened until 22.10.1993, wherein the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Itanagar, framed charges against petitioner no. 3 and petitioner no. 6. Thereafter, on 12.09.2024, summons to witness, i.e., Dr. Marbom Basar (petitioner no. 2), has been issued to appear before the Court on 24.09.2024 by the JMFC, Yupia. On 24.09.2024, the accused persons were present, however, the complainant and the victim remained absent. Accordingly, the learned JMFC, Yupia, issued summons again to the absent witnesses. On 27.02.2025, summons was again issued to the complainant, petitioner no. 2, by the JMFC, Yupia, for appearance on 06.05.2025.

As stated above, thereafter, the petitioners have approached this Court by filing the instant criminal instant criminal petition, wherein this Court, vide order dated 25.04.2025, suspended the proceedings before the JMFC, Yupia.

From the above facts, it is clear that that from the filing of the FIR, and thereby inception of the criminal case, it took 32 years to issue summons to the witnesses in the instant case, and this cannot be termed with any other word except “huge delay” in the trial.

It is seen that when the incident occurred 32 years back, all the accused persons, i.e., petitioner no. 3 to 6, were young persons who have become middle-aged persons now. There is no explanation from the side of the prosecution as to why such delay has occurred. Be that as it may, it is also a fact that since the appearance of the witnesses are yet to begin, the completion of the trial will certainly take further some more time, maybe years. Therefore, this Court is unhesitant in its conclusion that the right to speedy trial, as envisaged under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which has been underlined by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above-mentioned cases, has been violated in the instant case. The impact of such violation, in the opinion of this court, may be huge as the accused persons, i.e., the petitioner nos. 3 to 6, after 32 years of an alleged incident, have to face the trial again. The long delay in the instant case in completion of the trial is clearly in violation of the right to speedy trial, which is a constitutional right of the petitioners, including the victim and the complainant.

On the basis of the above factual matrix and the discussions on the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this court finds that the rights of speedy trial of the petitioners have been violated in the instant case, and therefore, at this stage, if the proceeding is allowed to go on, there will be more injustice to the petitioners than justice.

It is also seen that the victim, the complainant, and the accused persons who are all petitioners in the instant petition, have executed a settlement deed wherein it has been specifically stated that the victim as well as the husband of the victim (petitioner no. 1 and 2) do not have any grievances against the petitioner nos. 3 to 6 (accused persons) and they have forgiven the accused persons.

The law relating to inherent powers of High Court under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023, to quash criminal proceedings involving non-compoundable offenses in view of compromise arrived at between parties, has been well settled in the case of Gian Singh (supra), Narender Singh (supra) as well as catena of other cases.

In view of the finding arrived at by this court regarding infringement of the right of the petitioners regarding speedy trial which goes to the root of the matter, vitiating the entire trial, this court does not find it necessary to go into the aspect of compromise between the parties out of the court, though this court has taken a note of the same.

This court has also considered the statements of various PWs including the victim, complainant, and other accused persons. On perusal of the same, it is found that the statements also do not prima facie inspire the prosecution case as neither the victim nor the complainant has specifically named petitioner no. 3 (main accused) in the instant case. As far as the commission of offense by petitioner nos. 4 to 6 is concerned, there is no eyewitness. The cook who was present in the house when the incident occurred, also, could not name any particular person of committing the offences.

Taking into account the nature of offences committed, the probability of conviction, the 32 years’ time taken to issue summons to the witnesses for appearance, and further the factor of time that may be taken for completion of the trial, this court is of the considered opinion that the instant petition deserves to be allowed by quashing the FIR and subsequent proceedings in the instant case.

Accordingly, the FIR dated 02.09.1992, charge-sheet dated 20.03.1993, and the entire proceeding of GR No. 66/1992, pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class (Junior Division), Yupia, are hereby quashed and set aside.

The instant criminal petition is disposed of in terms of above direction.

TCR to be sent back.