Mrs. Manpreet Arora vs Jagan Nath

V.S. Aggarwal, J.—The present revision petition has been filed by Mrs. Manpreet Arora, hereinafter described as "the petitioner" directed against the judgment of the learned Appellate Authority, Chandigarh, dated 23.9.1991. By virtue of the impugned judgment, the learned Appellate Authority had set aside the order of the learned Rent Controller, Chandigarh dated 31.5.1989 and instead dismissed the petition for eviction filed by the petitioner.

The relevant facts are that the petitioner seeks eviction of the respondent from the property in question. It was asserted that the property in question had been let to the respondent at a monthly rent of Rs. 600/- and that the petitioner requires the suit premises for her own use and occupation. She has two school going children and she wants to settle along with them at Chandigarh. Her husband was in the Air Force and has to shift frequently from one place to another. She pleaded that she does not occupy any other building in the urban area of Chandigarh nor has she vacated any such building without any sufficient cause.

The respondent contested the petition for eviction. The relationship of landlord and tenant was denied. According to the respondent, the house was owned by Surinderjit Kaur and Manpreet Arora. The petitioner was only one of the co-owners and not the landlady. It was denied that the petitioner bona fide require the demised premises for herself and for members of her family referred to above.

The learned Rent Controller had framed the issues. It was held that there is a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. As regards the requirement of the petitioner, the learned Rent Controller concluded that the petitioner has two children aged 11-1/2 and 7-1/2 years old. They were studying in class 6th and third. Her husband in the Air Force and is liable to be transferred. Since it is a transferable post, the petitioner is justified in insisting that she would like to stay with her children at one place. It is the wish of the landlord to settle with her family members at Chandigarh and accordingly an order of eviction was passed.

The respondent preferred an appeal. The learned Appellate Authority concluded that it is not the mere wish of the landlord that makes the ground of eviction available. It was further held that there are Central School all over the country and senior Air Force Officers got good educational facilities comparable to Chandigarh. The petitioner, therefore, does not require the suit premises. The appeal was allowed and the eviction petition was dismissed.

Aggrieved by the same, present revision petition has been preferred.

During the pendency of the present revision petition, the respondent preferred an application for taking subsequent events into consideration. It was asserted that earlier the husband of the respondent was serving in the Air Force. He has retired and has joined a private airline, namely, Gujarat Airways Limited, having its office at Baroda. The petitioner and her husband are staying at Baroda and they are permanently settled there. The children of the petitioner have since grown up. She now does not require the demised, property. Reply was filed by the petitioner in which it was admitted that the husband of the petitioner has taken a premature retirement from the Air Force. Since the family of the petitioner was not able to get possession of the house, therefore, her husband had taken the job at Baroda. The said arrangement was stated to be purely a temporary arrangement. The moment the house is vacated, the petitioner would shift to Chandigarh. She further pointed out that in view of the present crisis like Kargil, under the Air Force Regulations, the husband of the petitioner can be called to defend the nation at any time.

On behalf of the petitioner, reliance was strongly placed on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Sudesh Jain v. Parkash Chand Gupta 1988(1) RLR 398. In the cited case, under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, a petition for eviction was filed. It was filed under summary procedure i.e., Section 14(1)(e) of the said Act. It is akin to section 13 A of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, as applicable to Union Territory, Chandigarh. The landlady had three sons. They were living in one room. Her husband was a Squadron Leader in I.A.F. She wanted the house to be vacated because of the fact that education of the children does not suffer. It was held that the requirement was bona fide. It is abundantly clear that it was the facts of the case which prompted the Court to record the said decision because the landlady was already residing with her children in one room. The children were already studying in the Central School at Andrew Ganj, New Delhi. It is not so in the present case. Therefore, the cited decision will not come to the rescue of the petitioner.

While adjudicating the question in controversy the Court has to see and to take into consideration all the subsequent events. Reference in this connection can well be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Baba Kashinath Bhinge v. Samast Lingayat Gavali, 1995(1) RCR 518. It was concluded that decree for eviction cannot be granted if need does not continue to exist at the time of passing of the order.

What is the petition herein? Admittedly, when the petition for eviction was filed, the husband of the petitioner was working in the Air Force. It was a transferable post. The children were young. The petitioner wanted the demised premises for residing at Chandigarh for the education of the children. Presently, the husband of the petitioner, admittedly, had taken premature retirement and is serving in Baroda in Gujarat Airways. It is no more a transferable post. With the passage of time, young children are now grown up. It was anybody''s guess as to what educational qualifications they possess and what further study they wanted to do at Chandigarh. The contention of the petitioner in this regard is conspicuous. Therefore, it is obvious that once the petitioner is living with her husband at Baroda and the Children have grown up, the very basis of the requirement of the house in question has come to an end. It cannot, therefore, be termed to be bona fide. There is, thus, no ground to interfere in the impugned judgment.

For these reasons, the revision petition must fail and is accordingly dismissed.