Mrs. Manjita Srivastava vs The Chancellor and Others

U.C. Sharma, J.—In this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for quashing the order dated 1.10.1981 pasted by the Chancellor, Ranchi University (Annexure-1) and the order dated 28.9.1981 passed by the Birla Institute of Technology, Mesra (B. I. T. for short) terminating the petitioner''s services (Annexure-2). The further prayer was for issuance of a Writ of mandamus commanding the Ranchi University to apply the directive (Annexure-7), issued by the Chancellor for regularisation of the services of purely temporary lecturers, to the staff of B. I. T. and to consider the petitioner''s case for the purpose. The petitioner was initially appointed as Assistant Professor in the Department of Electronic and Communication Engineering in the B. I. T. on 14.4.1977 for a period of six months which was extended from time to time. Last time she was appointed on 1.11.1980 for one year on contract basis. By Annexure-2, she was informed that her contract appointment would expire on October 31, 1981 and that she should hand over charge in due course. This has been challenged on the ground that after the passing of the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976, the B. I. T. had ceased to be an autonomous institute and she would be governed by the Ranchi University statutes, and as such she was entitled to the benefit of the Government directive (Annexure-7). It appears that by a resolution dated 14.2.1981 (Annexure-6), Strate of the Ranchi University decided that the statutes of the University be applicable to the B. I. T. B. I. T., therefore, filed an application before the Chancellor challenging the resolution of the University. By order dated 1.10.1981, the Chancellor was pleased to direct that the, status quo as obtained prior to the resolution of the Ranchi University dated 14.2.1981, be maintained till further orders (Annexure-1). This order of the Chancellor has been assailed as being illegal. Other details shall be referred to in due course.

A counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the B. I. T. (respondents No. 3 and 4), who contested the petitioner''s assertion that B. I. T. had ceased to be an autonomous institution. It has been submitted that the Institute still enjoyed its autonomous character and it has not been affected by any subsequent legislations or Statutes framed by the University and as such the rules framed and the Statutes approved by the Chancellor, for the Institute under the 1972 Ordinance still continued to be in force and to govern the B. I. T. That being so, the Institute was perfectly entitled to terminate the petitioner''s service on expiry of the term of the contract, and she was not entitled to the benefit of the Government Directive (Annexure-7).

Another counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the Ranchi University (respondent No. 2) in which it was submitted that no relief has been claimed against the University and, therefore, it was not a necessary party. It was also said that the petitioner had an alternative remedy before the Chancellor or by way of suit and, therefore, this application was not entertained. As regards the order contained in Annexure-1, it was submitted that the Chancellor had full authority in the matter and the order was in accordance with law and, there fore, it was unassailable. It was also submitted that the petitioner had no right to challenge the said order as she was not a party to the proceeding nor was she, in any way, aggrieved by the same.

The petitioner was initially appointed as Assistant Professor (equivalent to the post of Lecturer) in the Department of Electronics and Communication Engineering in the Birla Institute of Technology on 14.4.1977 for a period of six months, which was extended from time to time. On 1st of November, 1980, she was appointed on a contract basis for a period of one year. In the same year, the Governor of Bihar promulgated the Bihar Inter University Board Third Ordinance, 1980 (Bihar Ordinance No. 150 of 1980, which came into force on 11.8.1980. u/s 5 (2) of this Ordinance, the Chancellor issued a directive (Annexure-7) providing for absorption of temporary lecturers in the regular service of the University or of a college. I shall deal with this directive later. Suffice it to say for the present that the petitioner claimed that she was temporary lecturer in the B. I. T. and was entitled to the benefit of the directive. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that the B. 1. T. was an autonomous institution and the directive would not apply to it and the petitioner was not entitled to the benefit there under. Therefore, the main question for consideration in this case is whether the B. I. T. was an autonomous college.

The undisputed facts are that the B. I. T. was previously affiliated to the Ranchi University under the Bihar State Universities (Bihar, Bhagalpur and Ranchi Universities) Act, 1960 (Bihar, Act 14 of 1960). This Act was amended by the Bihar Universities (Universities of Bihar, Bhagalpur and Ranchi) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972 (Bihar Ordinance No. 18 of 1972), which came into force on 10.3.1972. By this ordinance, among other amendments, a proviso to section 2(D) and a new section 49(A) was added to the Act. Proviso to section 2(D) was in these terms :--

Provided that the Birla Institute of Technology, Mesra, shall be deemed to be an autonomous college within the Ranchi University from the date of commencement of the Bihar State University (University of Bihar, Bhagalpur and Ranchi) Amendment (Ordinance) 1972.

Under section 49(A), the B. I. T. ceased to be an affiliated college of the Ranchi University. The decisions of the Syndicate, Senate, Finance Committee or any other authority of the Ranchi University were not to apply to the B. I. T. and the provisions of the Statutes, the ordinances, the rules and regulations, made by the Ranchi University were not applicable to the B. I. T. The Ranchi University, however, was to continue to confer degrees, diplomas, certificates etc; to persons, who pursued the approved course of study in the B. I. T. and carried out research. It is thus clear that by this Ordinance, the B. I. T. was given an autonomous status and it ceased to be affiliated to the University. The Chancellor was, however, empower red to make rules to carry out the administration and regulate the activities of the B. I. T. In accordance with this prevision, the Chancellor framed rules on 16.3.1979. Rule 23 (1) of the said Rules empowered the Board of Directors of the B. I. T. to frame statutes with the previous approval of the Chancellor. The B. I. T. framed statute, which was approved by the Chancellor on 1.2.1973. The B. I. T. thus became full fledged autonomous institution.

In the year 1974, another ordinance, namely the Bihar Ordinance No. 54 of 1974 was promulgated, which came into force on 14.3.1974. This ordinance deleted the proviso to section 2(D) and section 49(A) from the Act of 1960. Mr. R. K. Gerg, learned senior counsel, appearing in support of the application, contended that the effect of detection of proviso to section 2(D) and section 19(A) was that the autonomous status, which was conferred on the B. I. T. by the Ordinance of 1972, came to an end. The B. I. T., however, continued to be an autonomous institution inspite of the said deletion as the later developments and discussion would show. The new Ordinance of 1974 inserted a provision in the Act, namely, section 58(A), which reads thus :--

Not with standing anything contained in any provision of this Act, the University may, subject to its overall supervision, grant in the manner prescribed in the relevant statutes to an institute or college of outstanding calibre which satisfies the prescribed conditions, the privileges of modifying or changing for its students the courses of studies prescribed by the University, and of holding its own examinations in the courses so modified, and such other privileges in management or in any other respect as it may consider appropriate, and such institute or college, shall be declared to be an autonomous Institute or college as the case may be.

It is obvious that under this section, the University was empowered to declare a college or institute as autonomous institution. In accordance with this provision, the Vice Chancellor issued a Notification on 16th March, 1974 (Annexure-5) declaring the B. I. T. as an autonomous college within the Ranchi University with effect from 15.3.1974 on certain conditions, namely, that the B. I. T. should continue to be governed by the Rules made by the Chancellor on 16.3.1972, the statutes made there under and the ordinance and regulations made by the Technical Council. Paragraph-2 of the said notification laid down that the decisions of the University bodies, and the provisions of the statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations of the University, unless specifically made for the B. I. T. shall, as before, be not applicable to the B. I. T. Thus even under the 1974 Ordinance, the B. I. T. continued to be an autonomous institution and to be governed by its own statutes. The deletion had, therefore, no adverse effect on the status of the B. I. T. Even if it be held that the autonomous status of the B. I. T. came to an end as a result of the deletion, autonomy was created under the 1974 Ordinance. The position, therefore, remained the same.

in 1976, the Bihar Legislature passed an Act known as the Bihar State University Act, 1976 (Bihar Act XXIII of 1976) repealing all the earlier ordinances and laws. It, however, incorporated a provision in section 73 similar to the one in section 58(A) of the 1974 Ordinance. The Saving Clause 81 (2) further provided :--

Not with standing such repeal, anything done or any action taken in exercise of the powers conferred by or under the said Acts or Ordinances, shall be deemed to have been done or taken in exercise of the powers conferred by or under this Act, as if this Act were in force on the date on which such thing Was done or action taken.

The effect of section 81 (2) was that the status conferred on the B. I. T. under the earlier provision was maintained under this Act.

In the year 1977, the Ranchi University framed Statute u/s 73 of the Act, which was duly approved by the Chancellor. The Statutes came into force in August, 1977. Chapter XXVII of the Statutes contains a provision in relation to the autonomous college or institute. Purporting to act under Chapter XXVII, the Registrar of the Ranchi University wrote a letter on 5.3.1979 directing the B. I. T. to constitute Academic Council and other bodies. The B. I. T. filed an application against the said direction before the Chancellor on 17.3.1979. It was prayed that the said letter be annulled and the B. I. T. be allowed to continue to function as before and be governed by the Rules made by the Chancellor. The Chancellor, by his order dated 16th of July, 1979 (Annexure-5), quashed that letter. It was, however, observed that the quashing of the letter was without prejudice to the rights of the University to apply its Statutes to the B. I. T. in accordance with paragraph-2 of the Notification dated 16th March, 1974 (Annexure-3). Thereafter, on 18.2.1981, the Registrar of the Ranchi University again wrote a letter to the Director, B. I. T., Mesra, informing him that the Senate of the R Ranchi University, at a meeting, held on 14.2.1981, had resolved and decided that the Statutes as framed under Chapter XXVII would apply to the B. I. T.and directed that an Academic Council and other bodies be formed. The B. I. T. again filed a representation against the said resolution of the Senate before the Chancellor, who, by his order dated 10.1.1981, directed that the status quo as obtained before 14.2.1981 be maintained till further orders (Annexure-1). The result is that the autonomous character of the B. I. T., which was conferred in 1972, is still continuing. This is what the evolution of the law with regard to the autonomy of the B. I. T. shows.

Mr. Garg, however, submitted that section 58(A) of the 1974 Ordinance or section 73 of the 1976 Act did not repeal the Statutes, Ordinances and other orders of the University nor its power to frame the same although they destroyed the autonomy of the B. I. T. and repealed its destructive consequences and the same cannot be revived in the guise of the Notification (Annexure-3). The argument was that the Notification was invalid and, therefore, the B. I. T. would be governed by the University Statutes etc. It is no body''s case that the effect of section 58(A) or section 73 was to destroy the power of the University to frame Statutes, Ordinances etc. or that the Statutes framed by the University were destroyed. The circumstances, in which the Notification was issued, have also been stated. The only question, therefore, for consideration, is whether the provisions aforesaid destroyed the autonomy of the B. I. T. Section 58(A) conferred right on the University to declare certain institutions of specified kind as autonomous institute or college. The University was also authorised to confer upon such institute or college the powers to make changes or modification in the courses of studies prescribed by the University for its students and the privilege to take examination in such modified courses of studies and management thereof and such other powers in respect of other matters, as to the University may deem fit and appropriate. These powers were given to the University under the law. In exercise of that power, the University issued Notification (Annexure-3). Power is one thing and its exercise is another. It has not been said that the University had no power to issue Notification. Therefore, the only thing, which has to be seen, is whether the University properly exercised the power conferred by the Statute in issuing the Notification. Where the question of exercise of power under Statute arises in a case, the Court has to be satisfied that the power given covers the purported exercise of it, in other words, the question is whether the Notification issued is in conformity with the powers given. The House of Lords in (1873) LR 5 PC 92 laid down the following tests to apply in considering whether the rules are within the powers of the rule making authority under a Statute :--

(i) Whether the rules are reasonable and convenient for carrying the Act into full effect;

(ii) Whether the rules relate to matters arising Under the provisions of the Act;

(iii) Whether they relate to matters not in the Act otherwise provided for; and

(iv) Whether they are consistent with the provisions of the Act.

Statutory Rules or Notification is issued under a Statute and, therefore, the tests, which apply in judging the validity of the Rules, may apply in the case of a Notification. There does not seem to be any difference in principle. The tests laid down by the House of Lords are salutary and, in my view, hold good even to the present situation. It has not been shown that these tests would not apply or any other tests would apply in the present case. Applying the tests for determining the validity of the Notification, it would appear, the Notification relates to a matter arising under the provision of the law and not to a matter not provided for in the Statutes. It is quite consistent and in conformity with the provision and since the University declared what the law authorised, it con not be said to be unreasonable. The only argument, that was advanced in this connection, was that the Ordinance of 1974 destroyed the autonomy of the B. I. T. and its destructive consequences, but the Notification did precisely what was denied and forbidden by the Ordinance and, therefore, the Notification was not only unreasonable, but arbitrary and illegal. The argument, in my view, proceeds on the assumption that by the Ordinance of 1974, the autonomy of the B. I. T. was brought to an end. We have discussed the evolution of the law with regard to the autonomy of the B. I. T. Neither the Ordinance of 1974 nor the Act of 1976, by express words, struck down the status of the B. I. T., rather, they gave discretion to the University to preserve it. It cannot be said nor has it been said that the power given did not cover the purported exercise of it nor is the validity of the delegation of power to the University u/s 58(A) in question before us. If, therefore, in proper exercise of the statutory power the University issued the Notification (Annexure-3), it cannot be assailled.

It was then argued that paragraph. 2 of the Notification (Annexure-3) was beyond the power conferred on the University. It was said that the University under the delegated powers could not, by its executive order, change or modify the law. In paragraph-2 of the Notification, the Vice Chancellor laid down that no decision of the University or its bodies nor its Statutes, Ordinances etc., unless specifically made or framed for the B. I. T., shall be applicable to the B. I. T. The question is whether the self-imposed limitation or restriction with regard to the applicability of the decisions of the University or its Statutes to the B. I. T. was beyond the power of the University or did it affect any change or modification in the law. The whole purpose of the law in section 58(A) was to authorise the University to declare an institution as an autonomous college. The University considered the B. I. T. to be a fit institution to be conferred the autonomous status and it did so by issuing the Notification in question. So far, there is no inconsistency. Once the B. I. T. was given the autonomous status, it could frame its own Statutes, of course, under the supervision of the University. That being so, the University Statutes would not automatically apply to the B. I. T. unless it was made specifically applicable. This is what has exactly been done by the University in paragraph. 2 of the Notification (Annexure-3). It is obvious that paragraphs is neither inconsistent nor incompatible with the provisions of the law nor with the powers conferred on the University. The question of change or modification of the law, by the Notification, in my view, apparently does not arise. Even if, there be any seeming or oblique change or modification or inconsistency, that is permissible so long as the so calle change or modification does not destroy the wars conferred on the University in essential eaftur. This view was approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Rajnarain Singh Vs. The Chairman, Patna Administration Committee, Patna and Another, in the following terms :--

In our opinion, the majority view was that an executive authority can be authorised to modify either existing or future laws but not in essential feature. Exactly what constitutes essential feature cannot be enunciated in general terms, and there was some divergence of views about this in the former case, but this much is clear from the opinions set out above......It cannot include a change of policy......It follows that when'' a section of an Act is selected for application, whether it is modified or not, it must be done so as not to elect any change of policy, or any essential change in the Act regarded as a whole.

In that case, the Supreme Court declared a Notification ultra vires, as, in its opinion, it affected a radical change in the policy of the Act and travelled beyond the authority conferred by the law. In the instant case, the policy of the law was to confer autonomous status on certain institution. The direction in paragraphs of the Notification does not run counter to that policy nor does it, in any way, effect change or modification in the law in essential feature. I do not think, this case helps the learned counsel. In my view, the Notification is quite consistent with the policy of the law and as such the University Statutes can have no automatic application to the B. I. T.

It was also argued that the Notification (Annexure-3) was issued u/s 58(A) and ho such Notification has been issued u/s 73 of the 1976 Act and, therefore, the foundation for the claim of statutory autonomy by the B. I. T. if any lapsed with the repeal or 1974 Ordinance and the same cannot be treated as one issued u/s 74 of the 1976 Act. It may be stated in this connection that the Ordinance of 1974 was repopulated from time to time till ultimately it was repealed by the Act of 1976, but any right created, anything done or any action taken in exercise of the power conferred under the earlier Ordinance was saved under the saving provision section 81 of the Act. The issue of Notification (Annexure-3) was an Act done or action taken under the repealed Ordinance and, therefore, it would be deemed to have been issued or be in forced under the Act by virtue of the provisions of section 81 (2) even after the passing of the 1976 Act. Is those circumstances, the issue of a fresh Notification u/s 73 of the Act would have been superfluous or redundant. It, therefore, cannot be said that the foundation for the claim of autonomy by the B. I. T. had become non-existent by reason of non-issue of Notification under the new Act.

Having disposed of the question raised, I may now advert to the main argument of Ms Gerg, namely, that the effect of the earlier legislation stood automatically destroyed by reason of the coming into force-of the subsequent legislations. It was pointed out that the B. I. T. was conferred autonomous status under the Ordinance of 1972. Subsequently, there was an Ordinance of 1974 and ultimately Act was passed in 1976. These subsequent legislations, according to him, wiped out and obliterated the effect of 1972 Ordinance. This, if I may say so with respect, is too general a statement of the legal position. The correct legal position, in my view, is that when a law is repealed, by reason of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the rights created, act done or action taken, is saved and preserved notwithstanding the repeal unless an express provision was other, wise made in the repealing law. It does not ipso facto obliterate altogether the operation of the effect of the repealed law. In order to determine the effect of repeal, various factors have to be taken into account, such as what right, liability or obligation was created under the repealed law, was it of temporary or lasting nature, object and intention of the repealed law, intention of the repealing law etc. That being so, it would be wrong to say that in every case of repeal, the effect of the repealed provision would be rendered ineffective. No general or inflexible rule in this regard, perhaps, can be laid down. The answer to the question raised, in my view, would depend on the applicability of the various considerations arising in a case. Ordinarily, unless the right created, the act done or action taken validly under the past law, was specifically obliterated or by necessary implication wiped out by subsequent legislation, the effect of the old law would continue. The reason is that all laws are prospective in nature, i.e., they come into force on or from the date of their commencement unless they are made retrospective. Therefore, the law will apply only after it comes into operation and it will not apply to the acts done in the past. The effect of repeal was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Keshavan Madhava Menon Vs. The State of Bombay, though in somewhat different context. It was held:--

It has no retrospective effect and if therefore, an act was done before the commencement provisions of any law which, after the Constitution, becomes void, with respect to the exercise of any of the fundamental rights, the inconsistent law is cot wiped out so far as the past act is concerned, for to say that it is, will be to give the law retrospective effect. So far as the past acts are concerned, the law exists notwithstanding that it does not exist with respect to the future exercise of fundamental rights.

In the case of the State of Orissa Vs. Bhupendra Kumar Bose, , their lordships pointed out the factors, which may be taken into consideration in determining the effect of repeal. It was held :--

In our opinion, what the effect of the expiration of a temporary Act would be must depend upon the nature of the right or obligation resulting from the provisions of the temporary Act and upon their character whether the said right and liability are enduring or not.

Further --

Therefore, even as regards the effect of repealing of an earlier Act made by a temporary Act, the intention of the temporary Act is repealing the earlier Act will have to be considered and no general or inflexible rule in that behalf can be laid down.

In the instant case, the B. I. T. was conferred autonomous status by the Ordinance of 1972. It is difficult to say that the Ordinance of 1972 intended to create a right in the B. I. T. for a specified period. If that was not so, in absence of anything provided in the subsequent legislation in derogation of that right, the status of the B. I. T. will continue. The right or status conferred by a Statute is, by its very nature, of lasting and enduring character. The Ordinance of 1974 or the Act of 1976 did not, by express words, deprive the B. I. T. of its status. Rather, the subsequent legislations gave power to the University to maintain and preserve the autonomy of the B. I. T. This power was, as a matter of fact, exercised by the University in favour of the B. I. T. It is difficult, in the circumstance, to accept the contention that the status of the B. I. T. came to an end, as soon as the 1972 Ordinance was repealed and that the subsequent legislations abrogated the autonomous status of the B. I. T. The autonomy of the B. I. T., therefore, would continue. For the same reason the effect of 1974 Ordinance would continue after its repeal by 1976 Act. It follows from the above discussion that there can be no automatic destruction, in every case, of the rights conferred, action taken or acts done under the earlier legislation simply because there has been a subsequent legislation. Probably for all these reasons, the petitioner herself admitted in her writ application as also in her rejoinder that the Rules framed by the Chancellor, Statutes framed there under by the Board of Directors Of the B. I. T. remained in operation for the Governance of the Institute till 14.2.1981. On this date, however, the University Senate passed a resolution extending its Statutes to the B. I. T. But the same was stayed by the Chancellor by order dated 1.10.1981 (Annexure-1). The petitioner challenged this order in the writ application. But no contention was raised against this order at the time of hearing. The Chancellor is the head of the University and has power to annul all resolution of the Senate. The power of the Chancellor has not been challenged before us. If the Chancellor has power to annul a resolution, he has also power to pass interim order. The result is that the autonomous character of the B. I. T. is still continuing and it is being governed by its own Statutes and not the Statutes of the University. Therefore, the situation, which was obtaining till 14.2.81, is still continuing. The Ranchi University appeared in this case through its councel Mr. Umesh Prasad Singh. He did not claim that the University Statutes would govern the B. I. T. If the University does not claim that right it is difficult to understand how is it open to the petitioner to claim that right for the University. In my opinion, the argument has no substance.

It follows, therefore, that the B. I. T. being an autonomous institution, is not governed by the decisions and Statutes of the University nor is it affiliated to it. The petitioner was appointed in the B. I. T. at a time when it was an autonomous institution governed by its own Statutes. Can she get the advantage of the Directive (Annexure-7) ? Mr. S. B. Sanyal, senior counsel, appearing for the B. I. T., contended that the Directive cannot be extended to the B. I. T. His alternative argument was that even if the Directive is applied to the B. I. T., the petitioner was not entitled to its benefit, inasmuch as it was only in 1980 that the post, which the petitioner was holding, was, for the first time, advertised, but the selection committee did not find her suitable (vide Annexure-E). However, the selection committee felt that the petitioner may be considered for appointment on contract basis for one year. It was said that she was never duly appointed as temporary Lecturer in the B. I. T. The argument of Mr. Gerg, on the other hand, was that whatever may be the position, the fact reamins that the petitioner was appointed, as a temporary Assistant Professor and was working in that capacity since 1977. She had completed a period of 24 months, the B. I. T. was governed by the University Statutes and, therefore, she was entitled to the benefit, of the Directive (Annexure-7). In the year 1980, the Governor of Bihar promulgated an Ordinance, namely, the Bihar Inter University Board Third Ordinance, 1980 (Bihar Ordinance No. 150 of 1980). u/s a (2) of the said Ordinance, the Chancellor issued a Directive (Annexure-7) for regularisation of the services of purely temporary Lecturers in the regular service of the University or the college admitted to the University on certain conditions. :The condition, among others, was that he must be in service of a college admitted to the University as lecturer and must have completed a total period of 24 months in that capacity on 31.12.1980. Whether the petitioner completed 24 months as required, is a question, on which the parties are at variance and I do not propose to go into it. On the findings in this case, however, it is clear that the B. I. T. was an autonomous institution and was not at any material time a college admitted to the University. The Directive, therefore, in terms does not apply to the B. I. T. nor has it been specifically extended to an autonomous institution. The petitioner being a lecturer in the B. I. T., assuming she had completed the period of 24 months, cannot claim any benefit there under. In this circumstance, no other question falls to be considered in this connection. The whole argument of Mr. Gerg seems to be based on the assertion that the B. I. T. would be deemed to be governed by the University Statutes. It has, however, been found that neither as a matter of fact nor in point of law, the University Statutes were ever extended to the B. I. T. The argument has, thus, no legs to stand up on. The appointment of the petitioner was made under the Statutes of the B. I. T. on contract basis for a period of one year, which, was going to expire and if in those circumstances, the B I. T. informed her by Annexure-2 that her contract appointment would expire on October 31, 1981, I do not think any illegality was committed. Annexure-2, therefore, cannot be assailed.

Mr. Gerg also submitted that the B I. T. is "the State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and, therefore, amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. On this basis, it was urged that the order of termination of the petitioner''s service was illegal, arbitrary and discriminatory. There is no material on the record to show that she was differently treated from those similarly situated. Her appointment was on contract basis. She was given due notice of the termination of the period fixed under the contract. There seems to be no element of arbitrariness. This is not a case of dismissal or removal from service or termination thereof. In this view of the matter, there is no question of infringement of her constitutional rights. Her rights, if any, were those created under the contract. For enforcing those rights, perhaps, no writ would lie. Several decisions were cited at the Bar on the point relating to the applicability of Article-12 of the Constitution. The law on the subject, however, is settled that if an institution is held to be an instrumentality or agency of the Government, it Will be deemed to be an "authority" under Article 12 of the Constitution and, therefore, "the State" and was amenable to the writ jurisdiction. The question, therefore, is whether the B. I. T. is an instrumentality or agency of the State". Mr. Gerg relied on the assertions in the affidavits that the B. I. T. was receiving substantial aid from the Government. This assertion has been denied on behalf Of the B. I. T. and it was said that the B. I. T. was receiving only a meagre amount from the State and as such by no stretch of imagination can it be said that the B. I. T. is "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. In my view, the materials on the record are not sufficient to come to any definite conclusion on this point. The question, raised, is a disputed question of fact. However, since the application is going to fail on other grounds, it is not necessary to decide this question in this case. In the result, the application fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstance, without costs.