Mrs. Krishna Gupta vs State Bank of India and Others

S.K. Mookherjee, J.—This appeal arises out of Order No. 3, dated February 17, 1994, passed by the learned Second Assistant District Judge, Alipore, in Title Suit No. 10 of 1994. By the impugned order, the learned judge, while issuing notice upon the present defendant/appellant, granted an interim order for maintenance of status quo on the basis of a prayer, made on behalf of the plaintiff/respondent, inter alia, seeking to restrain the defendant/appellant from disposing of, depleting, encumbering or dealing with the suit property. While disposing of an application for interim order, in connection with the present appeal, a Division Bench of this court permitted the appellant to realise the subsidy but directed that the realised amount be deposited in a nationalised bank and prevented the appellant from withdrawing the same without specific order from this court.

Before us, in course of hearing of the present appeal, a preliminary objection was taken as to the jurisdiction of this court to so hear because of the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act").

We have heard Mr. Anindya Mitra, in support of the appeal and Mr. Subrata Roy, on behalf of the respondent-bank. Admittedly, the suit, out of which the present appeal arises, is one for recovery of the alleged debts of the appellant/defendant to the bank. The suit was instituted in the year 1994 and the Tribunal under the said Act was established on 27th April, 1994, i.e., after the institution of the suit. In terms of Section 17 of the Act the Tribunal shall have, inter alia, jurisdiction to entertain and decide application for recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions. In terms of Sub-section (2) the Appellate Tribunal shall have authority to entertain appeals against any order by a Tribunal under this Act. "Application" in terms of Clause (b) of Sub-section (2), means an application u/s 19 of the said Act. Section 31 of the said Act by Sub-section (1) provides for transfer of a pending suit or other proceeding to the Tribunal on the date of establishment of the Tribunal; by the proviso thereto the operation of Sub-section (1) has been excluded from applying to appeals pending before any court immediately before such date of establishment of a Tribunal. In the instant case, the Tribunal was established on April 27, 1994, whereas the appeal was presented before this court on April 8, 1994. In the first place, because of the clear language of the proviso, the present appeal is entertainable by this court. Secondly, since there is no confusion in the language used by the Legislature, the word "pending" should be given its ordinary literal meaning as has been accepted by the apex court in a number of cases, namely, that it is not concluded and the court can make orders in it. References for authorities may be made to the cases of Asgarali Nazarali Singaporawalla Vs. The State of Bombay, ; R.R. Chari Vs. State of U.P., and Lt. Col. S.K. Kashyap and Another Vs. The State of Rajasthan, . The fact of the appeal being not admitted prior to April 27, 1994, is of no consequence,

For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that this court has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and we dispose of the preliminary point accordingly.

B.N. Mitra, J.

I agree.

[On the prayer, made by Mr. Mitra, we treat the appeal as on day''s list dispensing with all further formalities.

We have considered the submissions made by Mr. Mitra, whose client is the respondent before us, and who succeeded before the trial court. Upon hearing such submission, we are of the view that the order impugned in the appeal cannot stand in law being directly contrary to the ratio of the decision of the apex court in the case of Shiv Kumar Chadha and Others Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Others, . We, accordingly, set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal to that extent. The application for interim relief may now be heard by the appropriate authority before whom the proceeding is pending upon reasonable opportunity being given to the contesting parties. The records may be sent down forthwith.

There will be no order as to costs.]