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Judgment
P. Jyothimani, J.—Both the writ petitions are filed by the same petitioners, the former is for a Mandamus forbearing the respondents from
interfering with the petitioners'' possession of the properties to an extent of 2.06 Acres along with industrial building comprised in Survey No.
1542/1A (0.62 acres); Survey No. 1542/1B (0.24 acres); and Survey No. 1542/3 (1.20 acres) in Sriperumpudur village, VRP Chatram,
Bangalore Trunk Road, Sriperumpudur taluk except in accordance with the procedure envisaged under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, while the
latter is filed challenging the award passed by the second respondent in Award No. 3/99, dated 29.11.1999 and to direct the respondents 1 to 4
to cancel the encumbrance created pursuant to the Award No. 3/99 including the allotment order given to the respondents 5 and 6 or any lis made
on the petitioners'' properties.
In the writ petitions, while explaining survey number and extent of the properties, the petitioners have chosen to state the survey numbers in the
first writ petition and the revised survey numbers in the second writ petition, as under:
S No. Survey number as stated Survey Number as stated
in W.P. No. 34469 of 2005 in W.P. No. 19705 of 2008
1 S No. 1542/1A, 0.62 acres S No. 1542/1A2B, 0.25.0 hectares
2 S No. 1542/1B, 0.24 acres S No. 1542/1B2, 0.09.5 hectares
3 S No. 1542/3, 1.20 acres S No. 1542/3A, 0.09.5 hectares
and 1542/3B, 0.39.0 hectares
The issue involved in this case relates to the acquisition of the abovesaid lands under the Land Acquisition Act (Central Act, 1894). Certain
admitted facts are, the notification u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was published in G.O.Ms No. 257, Industries (MID.II) Department,
dated 24.9.1997. In the said notification the Government has also invoked the urgency provision u/s 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act dispensing
with the enquiry u/s 5A of the Act. As it is stated in the said G.O., in survey No. 1542/1A2B, an extent of 0.25.0 hectares is stated to have
belonged to the petitioners. That apart, in survey No. 1542/1B2, an extent of 0.09.5 hectares is stated to have belonged to the petitioners.
3(a). According to the petitioners, the abovesaid two survey numbers in respect of which 4(1) notification has been issued relate to the original
survey Nos. 1542/1A to an extent of 0.62 acres and 1542/1B to an extent of 0.24 acres. Again, survey No. 1542/2B to an extent of 0.39.0
hectares, stated to have belonged to the petitioners. In 4(1) notification it forms part of the original survey No. 1542/3 to an extent of 1.20 acres. It
is also seen in the said 4(1) notification that Survey No. 1542/3A to an extent of 0.09.5 acres is stated to have belonged to one Natwarlal
Harishankar Doria and N.M.Parthasarathy who are not the petitioners. The said extent, according to the petitioners, forms part of remaining extent
of survey No. 1542/3, 1.20 acres.
3(b). The said 4(1) notification has been published in ""Malai Malar"" dated 5.10.1997 and ""Malai Kathir"" dated 5.10.1997; both are Tamil dailies.
The locality publication of 4(1) notification has been made on 27.10.1997, as it is seen at page 539 of Volume IV of the documents produced, and
by way of beat of tom-tom, the local publication was effected on 4.11.1997, as certified by the Village Administrative Officer and attested by the
person who made the ''tom-tom'' apart from the signatures of 20 residents of the village. These are all the particulars which are seen in the original
files produced by the respondents.
The draft declaration u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act has been approved in G.O.Ms No. 315, Industries (MID-II) Department, dated
12.11.1997 and the same has been published in the Tamil daily, ""Malai Murasu"" on 26.11.1997 and another Tamil daily, ""Malai Kathir"" dated
26.11.1997. Even though the copy of publication in ""Malai Murasu"" is available, a reference to the publication in ""Malai Kathir"" is found available
in various communications and proceedings of the second respondent. The declaration u/s 6 has also been effected in the manner in which 4(1)
notification was made.
The locality publication of the declaration u/s 6 dated 2.12.1997 in respect of the lands including four items of new survey numbers given by the
petitioners, viz., S.Nos. 1542/1A2B, 1542/1B2, 1542/3A and 1542/3B, has been made in the village by beat of tom-tom on 4.12.1997 as
certified by the Village Administrative Officer, Sriperumpudur, attested by 13 residents of the village as witnesses, one Durai who is stated to have
beaten ''tom-tom'' has also signed. This fact is also found in the original records, Vol. IV, at page Nos. 755 to 762 of the documents produced.
Therefore, the locality publication of declaration u/s 6 has been effected, as it is seen in the records.
It is not in dispute that the award in this case has been passed on 29.11.1999 in Award No. 3/99. Therefore, the contention of the learned
senior counsel for the petitioners, Mr. V.Prakash that the period between the declaration u/s 6 and the award is more than 2 years and therefore,
the acquisition proceedings lapsed u/s 11-A of the Act is not sustainable. The locality publication in respect of declaration u/s 6 has been made on
4.12.1997 as it is found in the records, duly certified by the Village Administrative Officer and attested by 13 villagers, apart from the signature of
the person who beat the ''tom-tom'' and the award having been passed on 29.11.1999, the period between these two falls well within two years
and therefore, by virtue of Section 11-A of the Act which is as follows,
Section 11-A. Period within which an award shall be made. - The Collector shall make an award u/s 11 within a period of two years from the date
of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse:
Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984,
the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement.
Explanation. - In computing the period of two years referred to in this Section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in
pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded], the land acquisition proceedings in the present case does not
get lapsed. The first point raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners is answered against the petitioners.
In this regard, it is also relevant to note that u/s 17(1) of the Act, in case of emergency, after notice by the Collector, on direction by the
appropriate Government, being published as per Section 9(1) of the Act and on expiry of 15 days from the date of said publication, the Collector
can take possession of the land, even though no award has been passed in which event the land shall vest with the Government free from all
encumbrances.
Again, u/s 17(4) of the Act, if such emergency requires, the appropriate Government can dispense with the enquiry u/s 5A of the Act and
straight away issue declaration u/s 6 of the Act.
Section 17. Special powers in cases of urgency. (1) In cases of urgency, whenever the [appropriate Government] so directs, the Collector, though
no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9, Sub-section (1),
[take possession of any land needed for public purpose]. Such land shall thereupon [vest absolutely in the [Government], free from all
encumbrances].
(2) ...
(3) ...
(4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the [appropriate Government], the provisions of Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) are
applicable, the [appropriate Government] may direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may
be made u/s 6 in respect of the land at any time [after the date of the publication of the notification] u/s 4, Sub-section (1)].
After declaration u/s 6 of the Act, the Collector shall issue notice u/s 9(1) of the Act and the said Section 9(1) is as follows:
Section 9. Notice to persons interested. - (1) The Collector shall, then, cause public notice to be given at convenient places on or near the land to
be taken, stating that the Government intends to take possession of the land, and that claims to compensation for all interests in such land may be
made to him.
In the present case, the Collector has issued notice u/s 9(1).
u/s 10, the Collector may also require the persons concerned to deliver statements and the said Section 10 reads as follows:
Section 10. Power to require and enforce the making of statements as to name and interests. - (1) The Collector may also require any such person
to make or deliver to him, at a time and place mentioned (such time not being earlier than fifteen days after the date of the requisition), a statement
containing, so far as may be practicable, the name of every other person possessing any interest in the land or any part thereof as co-proprietor,
sub-proprietor, mortgagee, tenant or otherwise, and of the nature of such interest, and of the rents and profits (if any) received or receivable on
account thereof for three years next preceding the date of the statement.
(2) Every person required to make or deliver a statement under this Section or Section 9 shall be deemed to be legally bound to do so within the
meaning of Sections 175 and 176 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act XLV of 1860).
On the facts of the case, it is seen that the Collector has in fact issued notice u/s 9(1) of the Act on 9.12.1997 after the locality publication of
Section 6 declaration was made. It is also seen that the said notice u/s 9(1) of the Act has been published in the village on 10.12.1997. The award
enquiry was conducted on 2.1.1998 and on 13.11.1999, 80% of the award amount has been deposited as required u/s 17(3-A) of the Act which
is as follows:
Section 17. Special powers in case of urgency.-
(1) ...
(2) ...
(3) ...
(3-A) Before taking possession of any land under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2), the Collector shall, without prejudice to the provisions of
Sub-section (3), -
(a) tender payment of eighty per centum of the compensation for such land as estimated by him to the persons interested entitled thereto, and
(b) pay it to them, unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in Section 31, Sub-section (2)
and where the Collector is so prevented, the provisions of Section 31, Sub-section (2), (except the second proviso thereto), shall apply as they
apply to the payment of compensation under that Section. Thereafter, possession is stated to have been taken on 17.11.1999. As stated above,
the award came to be passed on 29.11.1999. Therefore, a perusal of the entire facts of the case, in the light of the provisions of the Act as stated
above shows that there is no material irregularity or illegality in the procedure followed in the land acquisition proceedings in question and a
substantial compliance of the Act has been made.
The next contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, Mr. V.Prakash is that there is violation of G.O.Ms No. 686, Revenue
Department, dated 8.5.1985. It is seen that the Government has issued certain administrative instructions to be followed for invoking the
emergency provision of Section 17(1) and (2) of the Act. In that, following the earlier G.O.Ms No. 1838, Revenue Department, dated 21.9.1968
and G.O.Ms No. 1444, Revenue Department dated 22.8.1984, under G.O.Ms No. 686, Revenue Department dated 8.5.1985, the Government
has given instructions to make certain amendments with regard to the procedure to be followed while issuing 4(1) notification and the said
instructions are found in clause 3(iv)(a) of the said G.O. which is as follows:
3(iv)(a) that the 4(1) notification shall be published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette and in the two daily newspapers circulating in locality
one of which shall be in the regional language and then the substance of it shall be published by the Land Acquisition Officer at convenient places in
the locality. The Land Acquisition Officer shall intimate the Government, telegraphically, the last of the dates of such publication.
A reading of the said instructions shows that they are administrative in nature which alone may not be in normal circumstances sufficient for
vitiating the land acquisition proceedings since, as I have stated earlier, there has been substantial compliance of the statutory provisions, viz., 4(1)
notification was published in Government Gazette apart from publishing the same in two dailies one of which in regional language and the substance
of the notification has been published in the convenient places of the locality. It is true that the instructions also state that the Land Acquisition
Officer shall telegraphically inform to the Government about the last date of such publication of the 4(1) notification. A bare reading of the
instructions makes it clear that it is only for the Land Acquisition Officer to inform about the compliance of 4(1) notification to the Government
giving the last date of such notification. It is only to enable the Government to pass declaration u/s 6 of the Act by dispensing with the enquiry u/s
5A of the Act in compliance of Section 17(4) of the Act and in that context, the Land Acquisition Officer has to intimate the same to the
Government. Even assuming that such communication is not sent to the Government, the same would not vitiate the acquisition proceedings when
all other procedures required under the substantial law and the statutory rules are followed.
In any event, a reference to the files in Volume IV, page 559 shows that the Land Acquisition Officer, namely, the District Revenue Officer,
SIPCOT, Sriperumpudur, in Rc.1186/97/A4, dated 5.11.1997 has communicated to the Special Secretary to the Government, Industries
Department, Chennai through Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration, Chennai-5 about the various dates relating to 4(1)
notification including the locality publication of 4(1) notification dated 4.11.1997. The said letter which is in page 559 of Volume IV is as follows:
From
To
Thiru.S.Natarajan, M.Sc., The Special Secretary District Revenue Officer, (LA)to Government,
SIPCOT, Sriperumbudur. Industries Department,
Secretariat, Chennai-9.
Through:The Spl. Commissioner and Commissioner of Land
Administration, Chepauk, Chennai - 5.
Rc No. 1186/97/A.4/ dated 5.11.97.
Sir,
Sub: LAND ACQUISITION - Kancheepuram District - Sriperumbudur Taluk - Sriperumbudur ''C'' Village - Block No. 2 - S No. 1536 etc., -
23.79.0 hectares - 4(1) Notification published - Reg.
Ref:1.G.O.Ms No. 257 Industries (MID-II) Department dated
2.Spl. Tahsildar (LA), Unit No. III, SIPCOT, Sriperumbudur RC No. 32/97/A, dated 4.11.97.
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I submit that the Notification u/s 4(1) of the L.A.Act. 1894 (Central Act I of 1894) in respect of lands involved in Block No. 2 in Sriperumbudur
''C'' Village, Sriperumbudur Taluk, Kancheepuram District has been approved in the G.O. Ist cited. The Special Tahsildar(LA) has reported that it
has been published as follows:
Tamil Nadu Government Extraordinary Gazette No. 479, dt.25.09.97. Part II Section 2 @ pages 16 to 19.
Tamil Dailies:
Malai Malar, dt.5.10.97
Malai Khadir, dt.5.10.97.
Locality 4.11.97.
This submitted for favour of information and I request that the D.D., u/s .6 of L.A. Act may be arranged to published in the T.N.G.G.and News
Papers early.
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-xxxxxx 5.11.97
DistrictRevenueOfficer, (LA)
Sriperumbudur.
Even assuming otherwise, the Land Acquisition Officer has in fact intimated to the Government though not telegraphically about the last of
publication of 4(1) notification and only thereafter Section.6 declaration was approved on 12.11.1997. Therefore, there is absolutely no substance
in the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that the non-sending of telegraphic communication to the Government by the Land
Acquisition Officer would vitiate the land acquisition proceedings.
On record, it is seen that by the proceedings dated 13.11.1999, the Land Acquisition Officer, viz., the second respondent has informed that
the petitioners have not appeared in spite of various notices and therefore, he deposited a sum of Rs. 1,39,05,000/- at State Bank of India,
Sriperumpudur and the original files show that both the petitioners have in fact received the said communication dated 13.11.1999 on 27.11.1999
having duly acknowledged the same. The said letter even though is dated 13.11.1999, in the body of the letter, it says that interested persons may
appear on 17.11.1999 for seeking compensation, which may obviously be a mistake. But the fact remains that on 27.11.1999 when both the
petitioners received the said communication dated 13.11.1999 they were aware at least for the first time if not they were informed earlier that their
lands were acquired in respect of which award was subsequently passed.
It is also seen in the original file that on 17.11.1999, the Village Administrative Officer [the Revenue Inspector (Land Acquisition), SIPCOT
Unit III, Sriperumpudur] has handed over various lands comprised in survey numbers including the lands belonging to the petitioners and the
SIPCOT officials have taken over the same on 17.11.1999 in the presence of two witnesses. Handing over and taking over was in the form of
land delivery receipt and it is seen that such receipts in original kept in the file are relating to the properties comprised in the said area including the
lands of the petitioners. There is no reason to disbelieve the land delivery receipts which can certainly be equated to memorandum for the purpose
of handing over and taking over, as observed by the Apex Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. The Industrial Development
Investment Co. Pvt Ltd., and others, in paragraph 16 which is as follows:
After the award u/s 11 of the Act was made by the Collector he is empowered u/s 16 to take possession of the land, if the possession was not
already taken, exercising power u/s 17(4). Thereupon, the land shall vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. It is well-
settled law that taking possession of the land is by means of a memorandum (panchnama) prepared by the Land Acquisition Officer and signed by
panch witnesses called for the purpose. Subsequently, the Collector hands over the same to the beneficiary by means of another memorandum or
panchnama, as the case may be.
It is relevant to point out at this stage that the petitioners having received the said communication dated 13.11.1999 on 27.11.1999, have in
fact filed a writ petition challenging the said communication dated 13.11.1999 in W.P No. 19713 of 1999 and obtained an interim order on
13.12.1999 regarding stay of dispossession and therefore, they certainly cannot plead ignorance as if they were not aware of the land acquisition
proceedings. The said letter dated 13.11.1999 which was challenged by the petitioners in the said writ petition is as follows:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SPECIAL TAHSILDAR (LA), SIPCOT, UNIT-III, SRIPERUMBUDUR SCHEME, SRIPERUMBUDUR.
PRESENT: A. SRINIVASAN.
Rc No. 32/97 Dated: 13.11.1999.
Sub: Land Acquisition - Kancheepuram District - Sriperumbudur Taluk - Sriperumbudur ''C'' Village - Block No. II. Survey Nos. 1542 & Extent
4.46.0 Hectares Acquisition of Lands for setting up of an Industrial Complex by SIPCOT - Draft Declaration u/s 6 of the Act - Publication
Direction u/s 7 of the Act approved invoking urgency provision, payment 80% compensation u/s 17(7) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 to the
Land owners and interested persons - orders - issued.
Ref: 1) This office proceedings No. 32/97, dated 25.8.1999.
2) G.O.Ms No. 61, Industries (MID-II) Department dated 5.3.98.
3) District Revenue Officer (L.A.), SIPCOT, Sriperumbudur Lr No. 1262/97(B4) dated 30.8.99.
4) District Revenue Officer (LA) SIPCOT, Sriperumbudur Lr No. 1186/97(B4), dated: 12.10.99.
5) And other connected records.
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ORDER:
In this office proceedings first cited, orders were issued for taking possession of the land shown in the annexure after a tendering 80% of the
compensation amount to the Land Owners/interested persons on 17.11.99 the Land Owners have not appeared to receive the payment.
Since the land owners/interested persons have not appeared so far to receive the 80% compensation amount as detailed in the annexure the
compensation (80%) as mentioned in Col.13 an amount of Rs. 4,70,164/- (Rupees Four lakh Seventy Thousand one hundred and sixty four only)
is ordered to be kept under Revenue Deposit in Sub-Treasury, Sriperumbudur.
Necessary funds for an amount of Rs. 1,39,05,000/- (Rupees one crore thirty nine lakh five thousand only) which was allotted to this office by the
District Revenue Officer (LA), SIPCOT, Sriperumbudur vide proceedings third cited is kept available in the following head of account which was
adjusted at the State Bank of India, Sriperumbudur on 13.10.97, 16.12.98, 30.8.99 in Ch No.
K.Deposit - K -Advances - Deposits not bearing interest - 8443 - 00 - Civil Deposits - 101 - Revenue Deposit - AA Revenue Despots DPC
8443 - 00 - 101 - AA 000F.
The amount now ordered is debitable to the following Head of Account.
64 lands - DPC No. 2053 - 00 - 094 - 06406.
Encl. Statement:
1) The Land Owners/Interested persons,
2) Copy to the Sub-Treasury, Sriperumbudur along with a copy of statement.
3) Copy submitted to District Revenue Officer (LA)
4) Copy to Bill.
Sd/- xxxxxxxxxx
13.11.99.
SPECIAL TAHSILDAR (LA)
SIPCOT,UNIT - III,
SRIPERUMBUDURSCHEME, SRIPERUMBUDUR.
A reference to the subject of the letter itself makes it clear that the lands including survey No. 1542 which belongs to the petitioners are subject
matter of acquisition and on the backside of the said letter, in fact, the amount of compensation which has been deposited is also mentioned.
Even though in the said writ petition, while it was finally disposed of by this Court on 13.10.2001, the petitioners were permitted to give
representation and to explain that the lands have not been acquired, a reference to the communication dated 13.11.1999 itself makes it abundantly
clear that it can never be believed that the petitioners were not aware of the land acquisition of their lands as per the communication dated
13.11.1999.
It is interesting to note that subsequent to the disposal of the said writ petition, the petitioners have made a representation to the Land
Acquisition Officer on 19.11.2001 wherein a reference has been made by the petitioners in the last paragraph about G.O.Ms No. 61, Industries
(MID-II) Department dated 5.3.1998, as it has been reference to in the earlier communication dated 13.11.1999. The said paragraph 4 is as
follows:
We see that there is neither proper nor legal land acquisition proceedings against our property above-stated and the present attempts or
proceedings are illogical and contrary to facts and records. We hereby demand an explanation as to the legality and propriety of past proceedings
and proposed future proceedings. We state that we do not have any interest in receiving the amount as our lands are not acquired as per G.O.Ms
No. 61, Industries (MID II), dated 5th March, 1998 and as contained in your letter Rc No. 32/97 dated 13.11.99.
The said G.O.Ms No. 61, Industries (MID-II) Department, dated 5.3.1998 is the administrative sanction granted by the Government for the
purpose of acquisition of lands. In fact, the said Government Order about which the petitioners should be aware even on 27.11.1999 since the
communication dated 13.11.1999 speaks about the said G.O., shows clearly about various lands which are subject matter of acquisition. Even
thereafter, it is interesting to note that the petitioners have chosen to file W.P No. 34469 of 2005 for Mandamus forbearing the respondents from
interfering with their possession and it is only after three years, the other writ petition came to be filed in W.P No. 19705 of 2008 challenging the
land acquisition proceedings. Therefore, it is clear that the petitioners who were aware of the land acquisition proceedings in respect of their lands
even on 27.11.1999, have chosen to file the writ petition challenging the land acquisition proceedings in the year 2008 only and there is absolutely
no difficulty to come to the conclusion that the petitioners are liable for undue laches since the delay has not been properly explained at all. The
mere statement by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that it was due to the reason that 4(1) notification and Section 6 declaration were
published in two newspapers published in Tamil, the petitioners were not aware of the land acquisition proceedings and if one of newspapers was
in English, there would have been possibility for the petitioners to be aware of the land acquisition proceedings is only a ruse device to explain the
undue delay which cannot be accepted by any stretch of imagination on the factual matrix of this case.
In the present case, the writ petitions are filed much after the award came to be passed on 29.11.1999 and it has been categorically held by
hierarchy of judgements consistently by the Hon''ble Supreme Court that the writ petition cannot be entertained after the award has been passed.
In The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Another Vs. Shah Hyder Beig and Others, the Supreme Court has dealt with the aspect of delay and
also the non-availability of writ jurisdiction after the award was passed in the following manner:
The High Court has thus misplaced the factual details and misread the same. It is now a well-settled principle of law and we need not dilate on
this score to the effect that while no period of limitation is fixed but in the normal course of events, the period the party is required for filing a civil
proceeding ought to be the guiding factor. While it is true that this extraordinary jurisdiction is available to mitigate the sufferings of the people in
general but it is not out of place to mention that this extraordinary jurisdiction has been conferred on to the law courts under Article 226 of the
Constitution on a very sound equitable principle. Hence, the equitable doctrine, namely, ''delay defeats equity'' has its fullest application in the
matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The discretionary relief can be had provided one has not by his act or conduct given
a go-by to his rights. Equity favours a vigilant rather than an indolent litigant and this being the basic tenet of law, the question of grant of an order
as has been passed in the matter as regards restoration of possession upon cancellation of the notification does not and cannot arise. The High
Court as a matter of fact lost sight of the fact that since the year 1952, the land was specifically reserved for public purposes of a school
playground and roads in the development plan and by reason therefor, the notification to acquire the land has, therefore, been issued under the
provisions of the Act as stated above.
...
...
In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder. This
has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of the recent cases C. Padma and Others Vs. Dy. Secretary to the Govt. of T.N. and
Others, this Court observed as below: (SCC p.628, para 4)
The admitted position is that pursuant to the notification published u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ''the Act'') in GOR No.
1392 Industries dated 17-10-1962, total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in Madhavaram Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpattu District in Tamil
Nadu was acquired under Chapter VII of the Act for the manufacture of Synthetic Rasina by Tvl. Reichold Chemicals India Ltd., Madras. The
acquisition proceedings had become final and possession of the land was taken on 30-4-1964. Pursuant to the agreement executed by the
company, it was handed over to Tvl. Simpson and General Finance Co. which is a subsidiary of Reichold Chemicals India Ltd. It would appear
that at a request made by the said company, 66 cents of land out of one acre 37 cents in respect of which the appellants originally had ownership,
was transferred in G.O.Ms No. 816 Industries dated 24-3-1971 in favour of another subsidiary company. Shri Rama Vilas Service Ltd., the 5th
respondent which is also another subsidiary of the Company had requested for two acres 75 cents of land; the same came to be assigned on
leasehold basis by the Government after resumption in terms of the agreement in GOMs No. 439 Industries dated 10-5-1985. In GOMs No. 546
Industries dated 30-3-1986, the same came to be approved of. Then the appellants challenged the original GOMs No. 1392 Industries dated 17-
10-1962 contending that since the original purpose for which the land was acquired had ceased to be in operation, the appellants are entitled to
restitution of the possession taken from them. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have held that the acquired land having already
vested in the State, after receipt of the compensation by the predecessor-in-title of the appellants, they have no right to challenge the notification.
Thus the writ petition and the writ appeal came to be dismissed.
Similar is the view in an earlier decision of this Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. The Industrial Development
Investment Co. Pvt Ltd., and others, . Incidentally, the decision last noted was also on land acquisition and requisition under the Maharashtra
Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 and in para 29 of the Report this Court observed: (SCC p.520)
It is thus well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings
have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of
the Constitution to quash the notification u/s 4(1) and declaration u/s 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic
consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is
a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third-party rights were created in
the case is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the
learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches.
As I have stated earlier, the mere mistake in the letter dated 13.11.1999 wherein it is stated that the parties were directed to appear on
17.11.1999 itself is not sufficient to hold that the land acquisition proceedings is vitiated, especially when there is substantial compliance of
procedural requirements under the Act.
On the facts of the case, since I do not find any irregularity or illegality in the decision making process by the authorities concerned under the
Land Acquisition Act as elicited from the original files and in the absence of any illegality or irrationality or procedural impropriety, the decision of
the Apex Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Darius Shapur Chenai and Others, on which reliance was placed by the learned
senior counsel for the petitioners is not of any help to the petitioners. In fact, as pointed out by the Apex Court in the said judgement, when an
order is passed by a statutory authority, the same must be supported either on the reasons stated therein or the grounds available therefore in the
record. A statutory authority cannot be permitted to support its order relying on or on the basis of the statements made in the affidavit de hors the
order or for that matter de hors the records and the recourse clearly reveals that the procedure has been followed properly, it is not possible for
this Court at this long lapse of many years to interfere with the land acquisition proceedings.
At this stage, it is also relevant to point out the judgement of the Supreme Court in General Manager, Telecommunication and Another Vs. Dr
Madan Mohan Pradhan and Others, wherein it was held by the Apex Court that when the land vests with the Government free from
encumbrances, there is no justification to quash 4(1) notification and Section 6 declaration on the ground that the exercise of powers u/s 17(4) was
not proper. The operative portion of the judgement is as follows:
The crucial question that arises for consideration is whether the High Court was right and justified in interfering with the acquisition. It is seen that
out of the extent of Ac. 3.589, the claim of the respondents is only Ac. 0.240 dec. In other words, only around 1162 sq. yards. All others had
accepted the award, a few of them under protest. It is common knowledge that possession would always be taken under a memo and handing
over also would be under a memo. It is a recognised usual practice in all the acquisition proceedings. By operation of Section 17(1) even before
award could be made, the Land Acquisition Officer is entitled to take possession of the land. He did so. The time mentioned in Section 9 stood
expired by then. Even otherwise, award was made on 2-11-1976. By operation of Section 16 of the Act right, title and interest in the land vested
in the Government absolutely free from all encumbrances. Thereby the Government became the absolute owner with effect from 12-4-1976. This
Court in the case of Satendra Prasad Jain and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, had held that once possession has been taken validity of the
notification u/s 4(1) and declaration u/s 6 cannot be gone into and Section 11-A does not apply.
It is already seen that the possession having already been taken on 12-4-1976 and vested in the Government free from all encumbrances and
many others having accepted the award and some had received the compensation under protest, the High Court was wholly unjustified in
interfering with the acquisition. We have seen the plan produced before us which would indicate that the land acquired comprises the establishment
of officers building and 2000 electronic exchange. Under these circumstances, it would be highly inconvenient to exclude this land from acquisition.
The purpose of enquiry u/s 5-A is only to show that any other convenient and suitable land would be available other than the land sought to be
acquired, or there is no public purpose. This issue would become an academic once the construction started and was in progress. The ratio in the
case of Oxford English School Vs. Government of T.N. and Others, has no application to the facts of these appeals. In that case, neither the
award was made before the amendment act has come into force nor was possession taken. In these circumstances, this Court held that declaration
u/s 6 was invalid and direction given by the High Court to conduct enquiry u/s 5-A, after three years had expired, is illegal. Section 4(1) also stood
lapsed by operation of proviso to Section 6 of the Act. Therefore, the ratio is clearly inapplicable to the facts of these appeals.
However, it is relevant to point at this stage that there is no violation of the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Act on the facts and circumstances of
the present case.
The next limb of argument of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners is about the publication of 4(1) notification as well as Section. 6
declaration in two dailies in Tamil. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to Sections 4(1) and 6(2) of the Land Acquisition Act,1894 which are as
follows:
Section 4. Publication of preliminary notification and powers of officers thereupon. --
(1) Whenever it appears to the (appropriate Government) that land in any locality (is needed or) is likely to be needed for any public purpose (or
for a company), a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette (and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of
which at least one shall be in the regional language) and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at
convenient places in the said locality (the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as
the date of the publication of the notification).
Section 6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose.--
(1) ...
(2) (Every declaration) shall be published in the Official Gazette, (and in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality in which the land is situate
of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such declaration to be given at
convenient places in the said locality (the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as
the date of the publication of the declaration), and such declaration shall state) the district or other territorial division in which the land is situate, the
purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area, and, where a plan shall have been made of the land, the place where such plan may be
inspected.
The said notification and declaration must be published in two newspapers out of which at least one should be in the regional language which
cannot be construed that there should be publication in English. The word, ''at least'' is relevant in the sense that if the publication is effected in two
dailies of regional language, it will not vitiate the publication and by virtue of the word, ''at least'', is that one of the dailies must be in the regional
language. In any event, on the factual matrix of this case, it is not as if the petitioners have missed the communication regarding the land acquisition
proceedings for want of communication in English. On the facts of the case, the petitioners, immediately after receipt of communication dated
13.11.1999, approached this Court at the earliest point of time, but without challenging the land acquisition proceedings pretending that they were
not aware of the land acquisition proceedings. Therefore, the judgement of the Hon''ble Apex Court in Arumugha Mudaliar rep. By the Power of
Attorney Agent V.K. Chellakutti v. The State of Tamil Nadu rep. By the Secretary to Government, Housing and Urban Development Department,
Fort St.George, Madras 600 009 and Anr. 2002 (1) CTC 28 on which reliance was placed by the learned senior counsel has no application to
the facts of the present case.
In any event, I am of the considered view that Sections 4(1) and 6(2) of the Act which mandate that publication should be effected in two of
daily newspapers out of which at least one should be in regional language cannot be construed to mean that either one of the dailies should be in
English language. The purpose behind it is that if the lands under acquisition are situate along the borders of various States like, Andhra Pradesh,
Kerala, Karnataka, etc., whatever action initiated in such cases must be made known to those people residing in such areas and therefore, apart
from effecting publication in the regional language Tamil, the Government may effect publication in such other languages like, Kannada, Telugu, etc.
and it is for that purpose, the term, ''at least'' is used and not for the purpose of connoting that one should be in English. If that is the idea of the law
makers, nothing prevented them in explicitly stating that the publication should be effected in one English daily newspapers.
Inasmuch as I have found on records that the gap between the date of last locality publication of Section 6 declaration and the date of award is
within two years, there is no question of violation of Section 11A of the Act. As correctly submitted by Mr. K.M. Vijayan, learned senior counsel
appearing for the respondents 5 and 6 who were impleaded to whom lands have been handed over by the Government for industrial purposes, by
the conduct of the petitioners, there is certainly constructive res judicata as the petitioners who have earlier filed the writ petition in 1999
challenging the communication dated 13.7.1999 which relates to the Land Acquisition Act, have not raised any point challenging the acquisition
proceedings and hence, it is not open to them to raise it now. That is also the view taken by the Hon''ble First Bench of this Court in W.A No.
1019 of 2007 (C. Augustine Jacob v. Union of India and Ors.). That was a case arose under the provisions of National Highways Act and the
petitioner therein originally challenged the notification on the ground that no enquiry was conducted and that came to be dismissed on the basis that
in fact enquiry was conducted and thereafter the petitioner filed another writ petition on the ground that notification was issued by an incompetent
authority and the Hon''ble First Bench has held that the petitioner therein was barred by constructive res judicata since he had not raised the same
in the first writ petition itself. The operative portion of the judgement of the Division Bench is as follows:
The appellant has again approached this Court by filing the present petition challenging the notifications issued under Sections 3A and 3D of the
Act, mainly on the ground that the notifications under Sections 3A and 3D of the Act were issued by the Deputy Secretary, who is not the
competent officer. The petition is obviously barred by constructive res judicata inasmuch as the appellant ought to have raised this ground in the
earlier writ petition. In any event, we find absolutely no merit in the objection raised to the authority of the Deputy Secretary. The argument is that
the power to issue notifications under Sections 3A and 3D of the Act can be exercised only by the Head of the Department, namely, the Secretary
and not by any one else and the Government could not have further delegated its statutory functions to the Deputy Secretary. There is no
delegation of powers in this case and all that happened is that the Government has authorised the Deputy Secretary to issue the notifications under
Sections 3A and 3D of the Act. A similar objection was expressly negatived by the Supreme court in the case of Ishwarlal Girdharlal Joshi etc. Vs.
State of Gujarat and Another, . Thus we do not find any illegality in the notifications.
Applying the said ruling as pointed out by the learned senior counsel Mr. K.M.Vijayan, there is no difficulty to come to the conclusion that the
petitioners are barred by constructive res judicata in filing the latter writ petition.
Again, as pointed out by Mr. K.M.Vijayan, learned senior counsel for the respondents 5 and 6, when the award has been passed, there is no
question of this Court exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That was the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Swaika
Properties Pvt. Ltd. and Another Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, . In that case, the Hon''ble Apex Court has taken the view that even if it is
disputed that possession has not been taken when award has been passed which has become final, there is no reason to disbelieve the claim of the
State Government that possession has been taken. The Apex Court has also held that after the award is passed, the proceedings would become
final. In that case, the Hon''ble Apex Court, after referring to other case-laws, has held as follows:
Insofar as the contention regarding the possession having not been taken is concerned, the respondents submit that the possession of the land
in dispute has already been taken. Be that as it may, the award in respect of the land having become final, the State Government is vested with the
powers to take possession of the land concerned and, therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve the claim of the State Government that the
possession had been taken before the filing of the writ petition. Moreover, the appellants sought enhancement of compensation by filing reference
application u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Simultaneously, the appellants filed writ petition before the High Court of Rajasthan after
passing of the award.
This Court has repeatedly held that a writ petition challenging the notification for acquisition of land, if filed after the possession having been
taken, is not maintainable. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. The Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt Ltd., and others, ,
where K. Ramaswamy, J. speaking for a Bench consisting of His Lordship and S.B. Majmudar, J. held: (SCC p.520, para 29)
It is thus well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings
have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of
the Constitution to quash the notification u/s 4(1) and declaration u/s 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic
consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is
a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third-party rights were created in
the case is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the
learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches.
In the concurring judgement, S.B. Majmudar, J. held as under: (Industrial Development Investment case, SCC pp.522-23, para 35)
Such a belated writ petition, therefore, was rightly rejected by the learned Single Judge on the ground of gross delay and laches. The
respondent-writ petitioners can be said to have waived their objections to the acquisition on the ground of extinction of public purpose by their
own inaction, lethargy and indolent conduct. The Division Bench of the High Court had taken the view that because of their inaction no vested
rights of third parties are created. That finding is obviously incorrect for the simple reason that because of the indolent conduct of the writ
petitioners land got acquired, award was passed, compensation was handed over to various claimants including the landlord. Reference
applications came to be filed for larger compensation by claimants including writ petitioners themselves. The acquired land got vested in the State
Government and the Municipal Corporation free from all encumbrances as enjoined by Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act. Thus right to get
more compensation got vested in diverse claimants by passing of the award, as well as vested right was created in favour of the Bombay Municipal
Corporation by virtue of the vesting of the land in the State Government for being handed over to the Corporation. All these events could not be
wished away by observing that no third-party rights were created by them. The writ petition came to be filed after all these events had taken place.
Such a writ petition was clearly stillborn due to gross delay and laches.
Similarly, in State of Rajasthan v. D.R. Laxmi2 following the decision of this Court in Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay (it was held: (
State of Rajasthan and Others Vs. D.R. Laxmi and Others,
When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material
factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third-party rights were created in the case, is
hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned
Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches.
To the similar effect is the judgement of this Court in The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Another Vs. Shah Hyder Beig and Others, ,
wherein this Court, following the decision of this Court in C. Padma and Others Vs. Dy. Secretary to the Govt. of T.N. and Others, held: (Shah
Hyder case, SCC p.55, para 17)
In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder. This
has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of the recent cases C. Padma and Others Vs. Dy. Secretary to the Govt. of T.N. and
Others,
In the present case also, the writ petition having been filed after taking over the possession and the award having become final, the same
deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. Accordingly, the orders of the learned Single Judge and that of the Division Bench are
affirmed to the extent of dismissal of the writ petition and the special appeal without going into the merits thereof. This appeal also deserves to be
dismissed without going into the merits of the case and is dismissed as such. No costs.
In these circumstances, there is no difficulty to conclude that the petitioners have come to this Court not only belatedly without explaining the
undue delay, but also have approached under Article 226 without clean hands affected by the constructive res judicata, and in such situation, both
on materials which have been perused from the original files and on legal issues, the petitioners are not entitled to any relief as claimed.
Accordingly, these writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.