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Judgment
When the matter was taken up for hearing, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted a memo alongwith copy of Crl.P.No.7735/2015 dated 16.9.2016, whereunder this Court has dismissed the petition filed by the petitioner herein under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking to set-aside the order dated 27.7.2015 passed by the Prl. District & Sessions Judge and Special Judge under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, Chikmagalur in Spl.C.C.No.35/2015 and to quash all further proceedings against the petitioner.
It is seen from the order dated 16.9.2016, the petitioner has sought for quashing the proceedings on the ground that there is no iota of evidence to implicate the petitioner except the alleged statement of accused No.2 which cannot be the basis for prosecuting the petitioner. However, rejecting the contention, this Court has dismissed the criminal petition with the following observation:-
"Notwithstanding the vehement contentions of the petitioner as to the lack of material which would itself vitiate the proceedings, this would be a sound defence of the petitioner in testing the evidence of the prosecution on that circumstance alone and it is quite possible that he would even be acquitted by the court below for lack of evidence. When that prospect is positively available to the petitioner, there is no warrant for interference by this court."
In the present revision, the petitioner has sought to set-aside the order dated 23.3.2016 of framing the charges against him for the offences punishable under sections 7, 13(1) (d) and 13(2) of P.C. Act in Spl.C.No.35/2015.
Crystalised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charges, Court has to prima-facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The Court is not required to appreciate the evidence to conclude whether the material produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. The Special Court having found sufficient material to proceed with the prosecution and this Court having already observed in the aforesaid Crl.P.No.7753/2015 that the contention of the petitioner has to be tested in a full-fledged trial, the petitioner cannot seek to set at naught the above order by taking recourse to Section 397 Cr.P.C.
There is another legal hurdle which comes in the way of the petitioner in maintaining the revision petition after taking recourse to Section 482 Cr.P.C. In this context, it may be useful to refer to the observations of the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of Amit Kapoor -Vs- Ramesh Chander and Another reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460:-
Para 21 "It may be somewhat necessary to have a comparative examination of the powers exercisable by the Court under these two provisions. There may be some overlapping between these two powers because both are aimed at securing the ends of justice and both have an element of discretion. But, at the same time, inherent power under Section 482 of the Code being an extraordinary and residuary power, it is inapplicable in regard to matters which are specifically provided for under other provisions of the Code. To put it simply, normally the court may not invoke its power under Section 482 of the Code where a party could have availed of the remedy available under Section 397 of the Code itself. The inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code are of a wide magnitude and are not as limited as the power under Section 397. Section 482 can be invoked where the order in question is neither an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) nor a final order in the strict sense. Reference in this regard can be made to Raj Kapoor & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. [AIR 1980 SC 258 : (1980) 1 SCC 43]}. In this very case, this Court has observed that inherent power under Section 482 may not be exercised if the bar under Sections 397(2) and 397(3) applies, except in extraordinary situations, to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. This itself shows the fine distinction between the powers exercisable by the Court under these two provisions. In this very case, the Court also considered as to whether the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 stand repelled when the revisional power under Section 397 overlaps. Rejecting the argument, the Court said that the opening words of Section 482 contradict this contention because nothing in the Code, not even Section 397, can affect the amplitude of the inherent powers preserved in so many terms by the language of Section 482. There is no total ban on the exercise of inherent powers where abuse of the process of the Court or any other extraordinary situation invites the court''s jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. The distinction between a final and interlocutory order is well known in law. The orders which will be free from the bar of Section 397(2) would be the orders which are not purely interlocutory but, at the same time, are less than a final disposal. They should be the orders which do determine some right and still are not finally rendering the Court functus officio of the lis. The provisions of Section 482 are pervasive. It should not subvert legal interdicts written into the same Code but, however, inherent powers of the Court unquestionably have to be read and construed as free of restriction."
In the light of the above decision and for the reasons discussed above, the petition is liable to be rejected.
Accordingly, criminal revision petition is dismissed as not maintainable.