Mr. Rohidas Vishnu Chavan & Ors. vs Mr. Srichand Shamandas Aswani

Heard learned Counsel for the parties.

Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally, with the consent of the parties.

By the present Petition, the Petitioners are challenging the Judgment and Order dated 5^th July, 2025 passed by the District Judge, Pune, in MCA No. 248 of 2023 whereby the Appellate Court allowed the application for interim injunction and quashed and set aside the order dated 30^th June, 2023 passed by the Small Causes Court, Pune, whereby the Trial Court rejected the Application preferred by the Respondent seeking interim injunction. The facts giving rise to the Petition, in brief, are as follows :-

On 02.11.1994, rent agreement was executed between Mr. Bhagwan Chavhan and the Respondent (Original Plaintiff) in respect of a shop admeasuring approximately 300 square feet, situated on the ground floor (“Suit Premises”), at a monthly rent of Rs. 600/-. Notice was issued on 07.05.2004 under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act for acquisition of an area admeasuring 27.90 square meters (approximately 300 square feet) to the tenant Mr. Shrichand Aswani who is the Original Plaintiff (Respondent herein), the owner Mr. Bhagwan Chavhan and other owners of the larger property. On 15.04.2006, an award came to be passed by the Land Acquisition Authority in respect of the lands mentioned therein, which also included the suit premises.

By the letter dated 04.01.2007, the Respondent informed the land acquisition authority that the possession of the suit premises was handed over to the Authority by Gurudev Electronics i.e. the firm of the Respondent on 25.05.2006 and the compensation in respect thereof be paid and the same was paid by the authority on 27.07.2007. During the road widening substantial portion of the suit premises was demolished. However, a small portion of the suit premises remained intact.

Thereafter on 24.02.2011 entire property was partitioned, and respective shares belonging to Bhagwan Chavhan, Kishor Chavhan and Chandrakant Chavhan were sold to the developers, namely, Original Defendant Nos. 8 to 10.

On 30.01.2018, Development Agreement was executed by the Petitioner Nos. 1 to 7 in favour of the Petitioner No. 8, granting development rights in respect of the land which included the suit premises. On 09.02.2021 the PCMC sanctioned development plans in favour of the Petitioner No. 8 - the developer. On 25.02.2023, the Respondent-Plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of tenancy and permanent injunction under Section 33 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act. The Respondent-Plaintiff also filed an application for temporary injunction. On 12.06.2023, the written statement and reply was filed to the injunction application by the Original Defendant Nos. 8 to 10. The erstwhile owners (except Mr. Bhagwan) of the property also filed their written statement adopting the written statement of Original Defendant Nos. 8 to 10. On 30.06.2023, Small Causes Court inter-alia rejected injunction application primarily on the ground that the premises were already acquired and the details regarding the acquisition were suppressed by the Respondent-Plaintiff. The said order dated 30^th June 2023, was challenged by the Plaintiff before the Appellate Court. By the impugned order dated 5^th July 2025, the Appellate Court reversed the order of the Trial Court and granted injunction and the order of the Appellate Court is challenged before this Court in the Present Writ Petition.

In the above facts, the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners submits that the Trial Court rightly refused the injunction and the Appellate Court erred in interfering with the order of the Trial Court. It is submitted that the suit premises have already been acquired by the authorities and that compensation was paid to the owner and the tenant and the Plaintiff have handed over the possession of the suit premises to the authorities. It is also submitted that the Plaintiff had failed to bring all these facts to the notice of the Court in the plaint and there were suppression of facts and for this reason alone the injunction ought to have been refused. It is also submitted that after the entire suit premises were acquired the compensation for which was paid to the Plaintiff and the owners of the land. The Municipal Corporation, while widening of the road had substantially demolished the suit premises, however, a small part of the original premises remained on the ground. The Plaintiff having accepted the compensation for tenancy rights had no right on the said portion of the premises which remained undemolished. The said portion of the land was required to be demolished and the land was to be handed over to the corporation as a set-back area. The Plaintiffs are claiming rights over the small portion of the undemolished suit premises as tenant of the original owner Mr. Bhagwan. However, Mr. Bhagwan is not made party to the plaint.

It is further submitted that the Appellate Court could not have commented upon the validity of the award and passed an order of injunction.

Per contra, the learned Counsel for the Respondent submits that the Appellate Court has rightly granted the injunction. It is submitted that only the portion of the suit property is demolished somewhere in the year 2006 and that qua the remaining property from 2006 till the institution of the suit, the plaintiff paid rent for the undemolished portion of the premises to the landlord and the landlord accepted the same. Thus, the landlord-tenant relation qua the remaining structure continued, notwithstanding the acquisition.

The learned counsel further submits that under the rent control act he has to only prima-facie show that the Petitioner / landlord has been receiving rent from the Plaintiff to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court. The tenancy can be created even over an unauthorized tenement and that the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court was rightly invoked. The Appellate Court having considered the tenancy between the Plaintiffs and the Petitioner / landlord granted Injunction from eviction without following the due process of law.

The learned Counsel for Respondent submits that, the Respondent-Plaintiff has not claim injunction against the Corporation or the State from evicting him as the State has acquired the land. However, the Plaintiff cannot be evicted by the landlord without following the due process of law as the landlord has been receiving rentals from the Plaintiff. Once prima-facie it is demonstrated that the landlord has received rentals from the Plaintiff, the Respondent is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court. He further submits that the Appellate Court has correctly granted injunction and the Writ be dismissed.

Having considered the rival submissions, the question that arises for consideration is, “whether, after the acquisition of the land including the suit premises and the Respondent having accepted the compensation of the tenancy right and having surrendered the tenanted property whether any tenancy right continues in favour of the Respondent on the undemolished portion of the suit premises more particularly when the landlord continued to accept rent of the undemolished portion of the suit premises and whether that such tenancy can be protected under the Rent Control Act?”. Before dealing with the question few facts are necessary to be noted.

In the instant case, the original owner of the land i.e. Mr. Bhagwan is not made a party to the suit and the developer who has acquired his rights is made a party to the suit. The rent receipts are claimed to have been issued by Mr. Bhagwan the original owner / predecessor in-title of the Respondent Nos. 8 and 9. Rent receipts are not issued by the developer to the plaintiffs.

It is also pertinent to note that the Plaintiffs have accepted their compensation towards surrender of tenancy of the entire suit premises and the possession of the entire suit premises is handed over to the State. However, during the expansion of the highway, substantial portion of the suit premises was demolished but not entirely. The question is whether on the remaining portion of the suit premises the tenancy survived since it is claimed that the original owner, Mr. Bhagwan was accepting the rent for remaining portion of the suit premises for around 12 to 13 years.

To understand the effect of acquisition on the tenanted premises, few Judgments are necessary to be noted. This Court in the case of SLAO vs. Rahul Merchant has observed at Paragraph No. 146 & 147 as under :

This Court has held that once the land is acquired and compensation being paid, the protected tenancy/occupancy rights stood extinguished on account of the acquisition. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Bangalore Development Authority & Anr. vs. Brijesh Reddy & Anr., has held that the Civil Court is devoid of jurisdiction to adjudicate upon land acquisition proceedings.

The Supreme Court in the case of Kishore Samrite vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. reported in (2013) 2 SCC 398 has held that the person who approaches the Court for grant of equitable relief or otherwise is under solemn obligation to disclose all material facts which have bearing on the adjudication of the issued raised.

In the case of Wander Limited & Ors. vs. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. the Supreme Court has laid down the parameters for the Appellate Court to interfere in the order of injunction has held that the Appellate Court would not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or perversely or where the Court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunction. The appeal against the exercise of discretion is an appeal against on principle. Appellate Court should not reassess the material to reach a different conclusion.

The Respondent has relied on the Judgment of K. D. Dewan vs. Harbhajan S. Parihar Reported in 2002 SCC 119 wherein the Supreme Court has held that the landlord cannot be treated and equated with owner and has submitted that although Mr. Bhagwan had lost title of the suit premises, the tenancy continued as Mr. Bhagwan was receving rent for the premises even after acquisition.

Having noticed the law on the subject and the facts of this case, it is seen that the land including the entire suit premises stood acquired by the State and the tenant has received compensation for the tenancy rights qua the suit premises and the owner/landlord has also received compensation for the acquired land. The substantial part of the tenanted premises were demolished during the expansion of the highway. However, the small portion of the tenanted premises remained to be demolished and the Plaintiff is asserting his right of tenancy qua the said portion on the basis that he continued to pay rent to the landlord for the undemolished portion.

The said portion of the suit premises is also a set back for the development plan of the developers and no construction on the said place can remain on the ground. The said land belongs to the State and it has to be levelled and handed over to the State/Municipal Corporation. This is so, even assuming that the landlord has continued to accept the rent for the remaining portion of the suit premises. No fresh tenancy can be said to be created qua the portion of the suit property, which was not demolished, although acquired and the compensation for which has been received by the tenant for surrender of his tenancy rights.

The tenancy stood extinguished on the acquisition of the land so also the owners rights over the land stood extinguished. The suit properties, after the acquisition are required to be demolished and the land handed over to the Corporation. Mere contention that the original owner continued to receive rent and even assuming it be so, no injunction can follow as there is no protected right qua the tenancy. The contention of the Respondent that tenancy can be created even on an illegitimate structure and once the landlord has accepted the rent, the relation of landlord-tenant comes into existence cannot be accepted. In the fact situation where compensation is received of the entire premises by the tenant and also by the owner, no fresh tenancy can be created over the same portion. The owner/ landlord is duty bound to the demolition and hand over the acquired premises once the compensation is received for the same. It is also the duty of the owners to surrender the portion of the land on which the suit premises stands. It cannot be said that a fresh tenancy right is created on the undemolished portion even assuming that the Owner has continued to accept the rent qua the undemolished premises. The owner is duty bound to demolish the premises and surrender the land to the Corporation. The landlord is not seeking eviction of tenant from the premises and to retain undemolished premises. The owner is demolishing the premises and the owner is entitled to do so as tenant and the owner has received the compensation from the Corporation for the suit premises and land beneath.

In the event, this Court holds the tenancy rights subsist the owner/ landlord will not be in a position to demolish the premises and hand over the land to the Corporation, although the owner and the tenant has received compensation for the suit premises and the land. The record clearly indicates that the tenant has received compensation qua 300 sq.ft. of land.

The law as regards the principles of interference in the discretionary order passed by the Trial Court is well settled. In the instant case, the Appellate Court has erred in observing that there is a tenancy right over the suit premises and interfered with the judgment of the Trial Court. The tenancy has came to an end on acquisition of the tenanted premises. No rights subsist in the tenant to continue in the possession and no protection can be granted under the Rent Control Act qua the balance portion of the undemolished tenanted premises.

The Judgment of the Appellate Court is set aside and the Trial Court order refusing injunction is maintained.

Writ Petition is allowed. Rule confirmed in above terms.

At this stage, the learned counsel for the Petitioner prays for continuation of interim relief. Interim relief granted earlier to continue for a period of three weeks.