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Judgment
Mohan, J.—The writ petitioner seeks to quash the proceedings of the first respondent, dated 10th December 1976 in and by which the petitioner''s Secondary School Leaving Certificate was cancelled. The facts are as follows--The petitioner appeared as a private teacher-candidate for the S.S.L.C. examination held in March 1950 and also in October 1950. According to the marks obtained by him in the said examinations he was declared eligible to appear for T.S.L.C. (secondary grade). Subsequently, he appeared for the same examination between 1953 and 1955, and he obtained pass marks. He was also declared to have passed the T.S.L.C. examination (secondary grade).
He entered service as a teacher under the service of the Corporation of Madras on 2nd September 1946. On 22nd October 1958 he was promoted as Secondary Grade teacher. Later he was upgraded as Headmaster on 22nd July 1961, and he was holding that post till 21st December 1976. In or about 1970, police seized from the petitioner his Secondary School Leaving certificate and T.S.L. certificate in connection with the criminal proceedings taken against a number of conspirators who had fraudulently altered the mark list in the Secondary School leaving certificate and in the T.S.L. Certificate and also issued bogus certificates. In that case, the petitioner was examined as P.W. 89. Based on that judgment in the criminal case, wherein the Secondary School Leaving certificate of the petitioner was marked as Ex. P. 243, the petitioner was called upon to show cause as to why his Secondary School Leaving certificate should not be cancelled, in view of the tampering of the marks as shown below--
The petitioner wanted time to peruse the records available in the department. He was granted permission and he did peruse certain records on 27th July 1976. Then again he wanted a further opportunity. He was asked to come on 27th November 1976, but he would write a letter on 25th November 1976 stating that it was not possible for him to go over in view of the heavy rains and the dislocation of traffic. Finding that the petitioner was trying to prolong the enquiry, the impugned order came to be passed on 10th December 1976. This is how the present writ petition arises.
Learned counsel for the petitioner urges the following points before me: (1) that the petitioner was not responsible for the alteration. In fact, there is no finding to that effect. In such cases alone rule VII(3) of the S.S.L.C. scheme could be used against the petitioner. (2) The order entirely relies upon the judgment in the criminal court, which cannot constitute legal evidence; (3) Even if that evidence were to be relied upon, persons who deposed so in the criminal court should have been made available for cross-examination in an enquiry conducted. Lastly, it is urged that no adequate opportunity was given to the petitioner to peruse the records. In fact, he had pleaded his inability on 26th November 1976 on a valid ground. Therefore, the matter should have been postponed, and the petitioner ought to have been permitted to peruse the records instead of concluding that the petitioner was trying to protract the proceedings.
Learned Government Pleader points out that the show cause notice itself clearly refers to the evidence against the petitioner tendered in the criminal court, and further states that the Secondary School Leaving Certificate forming the subject matter of writ petition issued in favour of the petitioner was marked as Ex. P. 243. There is no bar to rely upon the findings of the criminal court in departmental proceedings. Strict rule of law of evidence will not apply to departmental proceedings. As a matter of fact, even hearsay evidence, which the courts unhesitatingly reject, can be used as evidence in departmental proceedings. It has been so held in the case reported in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh AIR 977 S.C. 1512 . It is not necessary to examine any person as a witness. The finding as rendered by the criminal court itself was relied upon, of which the petitioner was fully made aware in the show cause notice. Nothing prevented the petitioner from adducing his evidence. On the contrary, the conduct of the petitioner would clearly show that he did not want to utilise the the various opportunities afforded to him. In the first instance, he was directed through dailies to appear on 12th July 1976, and on that day he did not appear. He was permitted by the Office Memorandum of the first respondent dated 13th July 1976 to peruse the records on 27th July 1976. He did peruse the records on 27th July 1976, and wanted one more opportunity. He was granted such an opportunity to peruse the records on 27th November 1976, but he would merely write a letter pleading his inability to attend owing to heavy rains. On that date, i.e., 27th November 1976, there was no rain at all to disable the petitioner to come and attend the enquiry. Therefore, it was only the petitioner''s fault not to have taken advantage of various opportunities. Hence, he cannot complain of violation of the principles of natural justice.
This court has taken the view in--V Krishnan v. Director of Secondary Education and Chairman of the Board of Examinations Madras W.P. No. 3750 of 1976, that rule VII (3) of the S.S.L.C. scheme is wide enough to cover cases of this character, and it is not necessary that the petitioner must be directly responsible or the fraudulent alterations. That judgment will squarely apply to this case.
I may straightway refer to the judgment of the criminal court in so far as it relates to the certificate of the petitioner. In paragraph 25 of the judgment in C.C. 6 of 1965 on the file of the Special Judge, Madras, it is stated--
M.R. Govindan (P.W. 89) another school teacher of a Corporation School had also appeared for the said examination in that year. The two persons namely Sabapathi and Govindan, were not sure about their success in the examination. Govindan informed Sabapathi about Selvaraj (A.6) and that the said Selvaraj had influence in the office of the Director of Public Instruction and might help him in getting the required marks in the examination. Then the two persons met Selvaraj (A6) and enquired him whether he would help A6 told them that he had known a clerk in the D.P.I''s office and through him he can get the required marks entered in the certificates and for that purpose he must be paid a sum of Rs. 150 for each certificate. Ultimately it was agreed that Sabapathi and Govindan would pay Rs. 100/- each Ex. to A-6 Sabapathi, paid the said amount to A 6 through Govindan a day later after the abovesaid meeting. This was in November 1986. In December next A.6 called one Sabapathi and gave him the certificate. Ex. P. 403 is the certificate which shows pass marks in the October 1950 examination for Sabapathi. The relevant entry in the tabulation register is Ex. P-404-a, which shows that the marks given in the certificate are false, Sabapathi having really obtained low marks and failed. After the above success in getting pass marks at the hands of A-6, Sabapathi had become an intermediary for bringing customers to A-6. He introduced Rajamanikkam (A-13) to A-6 and since then A-13 used to be seen with A-6. When A-14 who had appeared for the S.S.L.C. as a teacher candidate approached Sabapathi for help saying that Rajamanickam of Cuddalore, A-13 was also doing the business of entering required marks in the certificates but A-14 had no confidence in him and that he learnt that some person in Madras was doing the same work. A-14 enquired Sabapathi whether he knew that person at Madras who would help. Sabapathi undertook to make the necessary arrangements and asked for a sum of Rs. 125 for that purpose. A.14 paid that amount two days later. His S.S.L.C. mark sheet was also handed over to Sabapathi. He took a sum at Rs. 26 out of the same and paid Rs. 100 to A-6 and also passed on the certificate to him for entering the required marks. About a week thereafter, A-14 brought his brother A-15 for a similar purpose. In this case also Sabapathi took a sum of Rs. 125 and the certificate and taking for himself a sum of Rs. 25, gave Rs. 100 and the certificate to A-6. About a week later A-6 gave back the certificate after entering the required marks. He also represented that these marks had been duly entered in the records of the D.P.I.''s office. The certificates were finally handed over to A-14.
Item No. 87 of the chart, found at page 41 of the said judgment, relates to a certificate issued in favour of the petitioner, marked as Ex. P-243 therein. The entries are--
S. No.
Ex. No. of the certificate of the entry in T. Register
No. given by expert
Handwriting expert opinion about the authorship of handwriting
Other witnesses who speak about handwriting
Whose hand writing according to the witnesses
Remarks.
37
P. 243 _________ 404-b
100-a
100-b & c
T. register, Ex. P.404 relating to this certificate tampered with facsimile signature of Ranganayakulu made by the stamp used for producing the same signature in Ex. P. 403.
This clearly shows that the Tabulation Register, Ex. P. 404 relating to the certificates had been tampered with. I have myself perused the Tabulation register. It does contain alterations. Those alterations are to the advantage of the petitioner. Under these circumstances, the judgment of Ramanujam, J. rendered in W.P. 4365 of 1975 T.E. Vinthakasi v. Director of Govt. Examinations, Madras W.P. 4365 of 1975 of this court, would squarely apply. Therein, the learned judge held--
Having regard to the fact that the alteration is for the benefit of the petitioner and nobody else is interested in making such a false entry, the conclusion is Irresistible that the petitioner should have been instrumental or responsible for making the alteration in the marks.
In fact, how cleverly the alterations have been carried out is set out in a very detailed fashion in the impugned order. I am in entire agreement with this finding.
It is well settled under law that in departmental enquiries the principles of ''Law of evidence'' have no application. That is why in State of Haryana and Another Vs. Rattan Singh, their Lordships of the Supreme Court are of the view that even hearsay evidence could be accepted in a departmental enquiry. Therefore, the nature of the admissibility of a judgment rendered in criminal proceedings cannot be pressed much. There is prima facie evidence against the petitioner.
Turning to Rule VII(3) of the S.S.L.C. scheme, it reads as follows:--
Where evidence to laid before the Director of Public Instruction showing that any person to whom a certificate has been or is proposed to be given under the rule, has been guilty of malpractice at the Public examination or convicted by a court of law at what in his opinion is a serious offence, or that any person to whom certificate has been given has made erasures or unauthorised or fraudulent alterations in the certificate, the Director may himself cancel or withhold or suspend the certificate with due regard to the offence.
Concerning this rule I found in W.P. 3650 of 1976 of this Court, thus :--
This is a case in which it is clear beyond doubt. that the marks obtained by the petitioner in English viz., 20 has been altered to 39. In fact, in the criminal proceedings, the petitioner''s certificate was also one of the Exhibits which was sent for chemical examination to the State Forensic Laboratory and from there the expert opinion was obtained that it was clearly an alteration. This alone would be sufficient to brio the petitioner within the mischief of rule VII(3). Added to that, the learned Special Judge had also occasion to note the evidence of the petitioner that he had bribes the second accused in that case and paid a sum of Rs. 100 for causing this alteration. This again, would mean that the petitioner, to whom a certificate has beet given, has made unauthorised or fraudulent alteration in the certificate. Therefore, there is absolutely no escape for the petitioner from this rule.
the case is on all fours to the one or hand. Therefore, the impugned order which relies upon direct as well as substantial evidence, is fully supported in law.
The impugned order itself dearly states as to how repeated opportunities were granted in favour of the petitioner, and yet he would not avail of the same. The said portion reads-- In the first instance he was directed through dailies to appear on 12th July 1976 for an enquiry before the Secretary to the Board of Secondary Education, Madras 6, but he did not turn up for the enquiry on 12th July 1976. Then there were no rains. He was again permitted in this office Memorandum of even No. dated 13th July 1976 to peruse this office records on 27th July 1976 with a view to giving him an opportunity for the personal enquiry. He came and perused this office records on 27th July 1976 and he again wanted one more opportunity which was given but he did not avail.
This is a clear case of adopting delay tactics by the teacher with a view to gain time for what purpose known only to himself. Thus, he has been given full and complete opportunities to peruse this office records In person.
It is therefore evident that he is simply adopting unwarranted delay tactics probably with an ulterior motive to stultify the proceedings of this office to the effect that no orders against him can be passed merely because he does not allow it to be passed by requesting permission to peruse this office records again and again or to protract the issue to evade punishment.
Accepting this finding, I should necessarily hold that the petitioner alone has to be blamed for his own laches and the complaint based on lack of opportunity is an invented one.
In the result, I conclude there are no merits in this writ petition, which is hereby dismissed with costs. Counsel''s fee Rs. 150.