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Judgment
Anand Byrareddy, J.—Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Counsel for the respondents. The petitioner is said to be operating automobile showrooms and workshops at land bearing Survey No. 26/4B, measuring 2299 Square Metres at Subramanya Nagar, Bangalore.
It transpires that the Government of Karnataka had notified the land for an industrial area under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (Hereinafter referred to as the ''KIAD Act'', for brevity) vide preliminary notification dated 13.11.2006, which was followed by a final notification u/s 28(4) of the KIAD Act dated 20.8.2008. The same was challenged by way of a writ petition in WP 15138/2008, which was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner had not filed his objections within the prescribed period. The second respondent thereafter sought to enter on the property and demolish the buildings
Being aggrieved by the order dated 17.8.2011, the petitioner had preferred a writ appeal in WA 15252/2011, before this court and there was an order of status-quo restraining the respondents from taking possession. The Division Bench had directed the second respondent to provide a right of access of a 15 feet road to the property of the petitioner. Thereafter, on the writ appeal being disposed of on merits, the respondents were directed to provide easementary right of access by way of a 15 feet road to the property of the petitioner by virtue of the acquisition of that portion of the property, which was under challenge.
The petitioner, however, had even questioned the order of the division bench by way of a SLP and the SLP was disposed of by an order dated 8.5.2012. Immediately on disposal of the said petition, the respondents are said to have taken forcible possession of the property on the next day, that is on 9.5.2012 This was not preceded by any notice on the petitioner. It is in this background that the present petition is filed.
Though several grounds were urged in the present writ petition, insofar as the challenge to the acquisition having attained finality, there is little scope for consideration of the grounds raised as to the validity of the acquisition proceedings. The prayer however, in seeking a declaration that the manner, in which the respondents had taken possession of the property, being illegal and contrary to law and to direct the respondents therefore, to restore possession of the schedule property to the petitioner and for damages, may warrant consideration. In this regard, it is to be noticed that the manner of taking possession under the KIAD Act insofar as acquired land is concerned, is prescribed u/s 28(6) of the KIAD Act, which contemplates a 30 day notice on the occupier of the land. Though such a notice was issued in the first instance, which was subject matter of challenge in the acquisition proceedings, the respondents having chosen to take possession immediately on disposal of the matter before the apex court on the very next day, within a 24 hour period from the proceedings reaching culmination, would certainly deprive the petitioner of opportunity to relocate himself, which would be the object contemplated u/s 28(6) of the KIAD Act, which does provide for a breathing-time for an occupier to relocate himself, in the light of the impending dis-possession. This object is set at naught by virtue of the summary manner in which the respondents have proceeded to take possession.
Though in the eye of law, it can be contended by the respondents that there was no irregularity or illegality in the respondents proceeding in the manner that they have in the light of the fact that there were no orders of any court restraining the respondents from exercising such a right, the fact remains that the occupier of the land is ejected without being given the minimum period required for a person to relocate himself. The petitioner being a commercial establishment is, all the more, required to be put on adequate notice, if not of 30 days, but at least of a few days'' notice of the impending ejectment. Therefore, it can certainly be said that the petitioner having been deprived of possession of the land within a 24 hour period from the date on which the Supreme Court disposed of the petition by the petitioner, certainly results in injustice.
Further, it is also on record that during the course of the proceedings, the respondent, which is constructing a major railway line, had undertaken to provide an alternative road within a period of 15 months from the date of order of the Supreme Court. That deadline was crossed in the first week of August 2013. It is now stated at the bar that the respondent -Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Limited (BMRCL), would be in a position to provide an alternative road latest by the last week of February 2014. In this regard, the petitioner is certainly put to much inconvenience. It is also stated by the petitioner that the remaining land of the petitioner was in the occupation of certain tenants, who have since vacated the premises by virtue of the inconvenience of there being no convenient access to the properties. This has caused further loss to the petitioner. In view of the summary manner in which the petitioner had been ejected, which, in the opinion of this court, is not in accordance with law, and certainly not in accordance with justice, the petitioner would have to be adequately compensated in a fair amount of damages not only on account of such summary ejectment, but also on the continuing losses that the petitioner suffers. Therefore, in the totality of the circumstances of the case, the petition is allowed in part. The respondents are directed to pay damages at a nominal rate of Rs. 25,000/- per month from August 2013 to February 2014 (inclusive of both the months) and the respondents shall be obliged to pay further damages at a similar rate in the event of any further delay in the completion and handing over of a 15 feet road for the exclusive and private use of the present petitioner. The amount of damages now directed to be paid shall be paid forthwith, in any event, within a period of four weeks from today.
It is also to be noticed that the compensation amount, which is legitimately due to the petitioner, is yet to be disbursed by the third respondent. There is no reason put forth for the delay in disbursing such compensation. Hence, the third respondent is also directed to disburse the compensation forthwith, subject to the petitioner executing such documents, as may be required by the respondents.