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Judgment
Rameshwar Singh Malik, J.—The present petition is directed against the order dated 181.2012 (Annexure P-16) and the order dated 28.5.2012 (Annexure P-18) passed by respondent No. 2, thereby directing the petitioner to submit its Self Appraisal Report (''SAR'' for short) afresh, for the purpose of granting accreditation. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner-Trust, who had been running a college namely M.R. DAV College of Education, was granted recognition by the National Council for Teacher''s Education (''NCTE'' for short)-respondent No. 1, for B.Ed course of one year duration, with intake capacity of 100 students, vide Annexure P-1 dated 22.11.2006. Respondent No. 1 also granted recognition to the petitioner for Diploma in Education (D.Ed) for two year duration course, with intake capacity of 50 students, vide Annexure P-2 dated 14.5.2008. Similarly, respondent No. 1 granted recognition to the petitioner for M.Ed course of one year duration with intake capacity of 25 students, vide Annexure P-3 dated 17.10.2009. Intake capacity of 25 students in M.Ed course was later on increased to 35 students.
In the interregnum, NCTE-respondent No. 1, vide it notification dated 31.8.2009, as pointed out in para 3 of the writ petition, made it mandatory for all the institutes having a Master of Education and Master of Physical Education courses, to get accreditation from National Assessment & Accreditation Council (''NAAC'' for short)-respondent No. 2, failing which the recognition shall be withdrawn from the academic session 2012-13. However, the above said default clause was relaxed by NCTE, vide its communication dated 17.7.2012 (Annexure P-4), to the effect that the institutes, who had applied for accreditation to the NAAC prior to 1.4.2012, action need not be taken for withdrawal of recognition. Petitioner applied for accreditation to respondent No. 2, vide letter dated 31.7.2009 (Annexure P-5). When the Petitioner did not get any response, it repeated its request vide letter dated 20.10.2009 (Annexure P-6), which was replied by NAAC, vide communication dated 23.11.2009 (Annexure P-7), intimating the petitioner about the procedure and asked it to submit for the first stage, i.e. Institutional Eligibility for Quality Assessment (IEQA) status.
In compliance of the communication dated 23.11.2009 (Annexure P-7), petitioner applied to NAAC for IEQA status which was acknowledged by NAAC, vide its letter dated 17.2.2010 (Annexure P-8). Petitioner was granted the status of IEQA and was asked to submit for the next stage, i.e. SAR, vide communication dated 29.6.2010 (Annexure P-9), issued by NAAC. Petitioner submitted its SAR along with requisite fee to the NAAC, vide its application dated 13.4.2011 (Annexure P-10), which was acknowledged by NAAC, vide its communication dated 10.5.2011 (Annexure P-11), asking the petitioner to give three slots of dates for the peer team visit. Initially, the peer team visit was finalised for July 6-7,2011, but it seems that the peer team visit was re-scheduled on the basis of mutual understanding between the petitioner and respondent No. 2 for August 23-24, 2011, as per letter dated 20.6.2011 (Annexure P-12). However, the peer team visit was withdrawn by NAAC, intimating the petitioner telephonically on 22.7.2011, pointing out some deficiencies in NCTE approval letter.
Faced with this situation, petitioner wrote to NAAC, vide letter dated 6.9.2011 (Annexure P-13), requesting for pointing out the objections. The petitioner was intimated vide letter dated 29.9.2011 (Annexure P-14) that an undertaking form duly signed by the Head of the institution, was to be submitted. Consequently, the petitioner submitted the undertaking and also intimated respondent No. 2, vide letter dated 5.10.2011 (Annexure P-15), that it had already submitted the SAR and peer team visit could not take place as per the directions of NAAC, intimating on telephone. It seems that peer team visit scheduled for July 6-7, 2011, was got postponed initially at the instance of the petitioner because of some court case. Thereafter, respondent No. 2 vide impugned communication dated 18.1.2012 (Annexure P-16), intimated the petitioner to reimburse the cancellation charges and directing to submit a fresh letter of intent (''LOI'' for short) and IEQA. The petitioner intimated respondent No. 2, vide its letter dated 28.4.2012 (Annexure P-17) that court case was no more pending and request was made for fixing the new date of peer team visit. However, the request made by the petitioner was not accepted by respondent No. 2, while issuing the impugned communication dated 28.5.2012 (Annexure P-18), directing the petitioner to submit fresh LOI and IEQA.
Feeling aggrieved against the above said impugned communication dated 18.1.2012 (Annexure P-16) and 28.5.2012 (Annexure P-18) issued by respondent No. 2, petitioner has approached this Court by way of instant writ petition, under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ in the nature of Certiorari, for quashing the impugned orders. The petitioner also seeks further direction to respondent No. 2, to examine the petitioner institute for the purpose of granting accreditation, on the basis of its application already submitted and for taking final decision thereon, within a reasonable time. That is how, this Court is seized of the matter.
While issuing notice of motion on 31.7.2012, this Court passed the following order:-
Says that the petitioner- Educational Trust had submitted an application prior to 1.4.2012, but still the Trust has been asked to apply fresh. If the application is entertained, then there may not be need of any fresh consideration. Notice of motion for 8.8.2012. Dasti as well.
Having been served, respondents appeared. However written statement was filed only on behalf of respondent No. 2.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that action of respondent No. 2, while passing the impugned orders was unjust and unreasonable, on the face of it. While relying upon the averments taken in para 8 (i) of the writ petition and also Annexure P-19, he submits that numerous identically placed institutes like the petitioner, have been granted the relief sought by the petitioner, where as the same has been denied to the petitioner institute, without disclosing any reason. He further submits that specific averments taken by the petitioner in this regard, have not been denied by respondent No. 2 in the corresponding paragraph of its written statement. He also submits that action of respondent No. 2 was not only arbitrary but discriminatory as well. Finally, he prays for setting aside the impugned orders and acceptance of the writ petition.
Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 submits that having been established as an autonomous body by the University Grants Commission, respondent No. 2 has acted in accordance with the relevant regulations. He further submits that peer team visit was postponed at the asking of the petitioner because of which the petitioner was rightly directed to reimburse the cancellation charges to respondent No. 2, vide order dated 18.1.2012 (Annexure P-16). He also submits that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner while passing the impugned orders. He prays for dismissal of the writ petition submitting that the same was misconceived and without any merit. However, in the alternative, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 submits that if this Court comes to a conclusion that the impugned orders were liable to be set aside, then a reasonable time may be granted, which could be mutually agreed between the parties, for the purposes of peer team visit, dates of visit and for taking the final decision on the application of petitioner.
Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 as well as respondent No. 3 added nothing new, but supported the arguments raised on behalf of respondent No. 2.
Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length, after going through the record of the case and giving thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned orders, being arbitrary as well as discriminatory, are liable to be set aside and the writ petition deserves to be party allowed, for more than one following reasons.
During the course of hearing, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 could not substantiate his arguments as to how and why the petitioner was treated in a discriminatory manner. It has gone undisputed on record that out of total five stages of the whole process, first three stages, which were to be complied with by the petitioner, as a matter of fact, have been duly complied with. The later two stages i.e. peer team visit and final decision, which were only within the domain of respondent No. 2, were yet to be completed. These five important stages, as enumerated by respondent No. 2 in its written statement, are as under:-
i) Online submission of the letter of intent (LOI).
ii) Online submission of Institutional Eligibility for Quality Assessment (IEQA) by the institution.
iii) Preparation of the Self-study/Self-appraisal report (SAR) by the institution and its submission
iv) Peer team visit
v) Final decision
The petitioner has admittedly submitted its SAR, vide Annexure P-10, with requisite amount of Rs. 50,000/-, which has been duly acknowledged by respondent No. 2 vide its communication dated 10.5.2011 (Annexure P-11). Thereafter, even the peer team visit had also been fixed twice, on the dates mutually agreed between the parties. However, both the peer team visits were cancelled, once on the request made by the petitioner and once because of respondent No. 2, due to some administrative reasons, as depicted in the letter dated 6.9.2012 (Annexure P-13). Thus, respondent No. 2 failed to give any reason much less cogent reasons thereof, as to why the peer team visit could not be arranged on any mutually agreed date between the parties.
In this view of the matter, the impugned orders passed by respondent No. 2 asking the petitioner to submit fresh LOI and IEQA followed by SAR, cannot be sustained. However, so far as the petitioner has been asked to reimburse the cancellation charges of peer team visit to respondent No. 2, vide impugned order dated 18.1.2012 (Annexure P-16) is concerned, the same is fully justified.
The petitioner has taken specific averments in para 8 of the writ petition consisting of 6 sub paras, which have gone undisputed on record. The averments taken in para 8 of the writ petition have been denied in a causal manner and very categoric averments highlighting the discriminatory aspect relying upon Annexure P-19, have not at all been denied. It is pertinent to note here that even if the manual has been revised after submission of SAR by the petitioner, the same will not apply retrospectively to the prejudice of the petitioner.
During the course of arguments, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 failed to address the Court on the issue as to why the specific averments taken by the petitioner have not been denied. It is not the case of respondent No. 2 that SAR duly submitted by the petitioner was not up to the mark. The dispute between the parties arose only at the 4th stage, i.e. peer team visit. The peer team visit was also scheduled twice, but the same could not take place, once because of the request made by the petitioner and once because of some administrative reasons on the part of respondent No. 2 itself.
Having said that, this Court feels no hesitation to conclude that there was hardly any serious dispute, particularly when the correctness of the material fact that the petitioner had completed all the three stages which were within its control, is not even disputed. Thus, it is unhesitatingly held that the impugned action on the part of respondent No. 2 is not reasonable because of which it is not sustainable in law.
It is the settled proposition of law that action of the State or its instrumentalities is to be just and reasonable. Every administrative order is supposed to be supported with reasons. In view of the peculiar fact situation of the present case, the impugned orders are not only contrary to the facts of the present case, but the same are unreasonable and unjust, as well. No reasons are forthcoming much less cogent reasons thereof, in support of the impugned orders.
Why it was felt necessary to record reasons in support of any decision This cardinal principle of law came up for consideration before the Hon''ble Supreme Court more than five decades ago. In the beginning, there was a distinction drawn between the administrative orders and quasi judicial orders, in this regard. However, more than five decades ago, the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala and Others, , observed that although the order was administrative order, yet their lordships insisted on the requirement of recording reasons. Again, in the case of Bharat Raja Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others, a Constitution Bench of the Hon''ble Supreme Court examined the question, whether the Central Government was bound to pass a speaking order, while dismissing the revision and confirming the order of the State Government in the context of Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. The Hon''ble Supreme Court again insisted on recording the reasons by the revisional authority under the Act.
However, with the passage of time, even this distinction was also done away with by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of A.K. Kraipak and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, . Thereafter, the law laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak''s case (supra) has been consistently followed in a plethora of judgments. Another Constitution Bench of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of H.H. Shri Swamiji of Shri Amar Mutt and Others Vs. Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department and Others, relied upon a Latin principle, which reads as under: -
Cessante Ratione Legis Cessat Ipsa Lex" and the English version of this Latin principle is as follows:-
Reason is the soul of the law and when the reason of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself.
The above said golden rule of law has again been reiterated by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. and Another Vs. Sh. Masood Ahmed Khan and Others, The relevant observations made by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in para 15 of the judgment, which can be gainfully followed in the present case, read as under:-
The necessity of giving reason by a body or authority in support of its decision came up for consideration before this Court in several cases. Initially this Court recognized a sort of demarcation between administrative orders and quasi-judicial orders but with the passage of time the distinction between the two got blurred and thinned out and virtually reached a vanishing point in the judgment of this Court in A.K. Kraipak and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others,
The Hon''ble Supreme Court, after having discussed the law on this issue referring to a catena of judgments, recorded its conclusion in para 51 of the judgment, which reads as under:-
Summarizing the above discussion, this Court holds:
a. In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.
b. A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.
c. Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.
d. Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.
e. Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.
f. Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.
g. Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior Courts.
h. The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the life blood of judicial decision making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.
i. Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants'' faith in the justice delivery system.
j. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency.
k. If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.
l. Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or ''rubber-stamp reasons'' is not to be equated with a valid decision making process.
m. It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision making not only makes the judges and decision makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100 H.L.R. 731-737).
n. Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions".
o. In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "Due Process.
Respectfully following the law laid by the Hon''ble Supreme Court which applies mutatis mutandis to the fact situation of the present case, this Court feels no hesitation to conclude that respondent No. 2 has committed a serious error of law while passing the impugned orders.
No other argument was raised. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case noted above, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, this Court is of the considered view that the present writ petition deserves to be partly allowed with the following directions:-
i) Pursuant to impugned order dated 18.1.2012 (Annexure P-16), the petitioner shall be liable to reimburse cancellation charges to respondent No. 2, as incurred by respondent No. 2 on account of postponement of peer team visit, at the request of the petitioner.
ii) The remaining offending part of the impugned order dated 18.1.2012 (Annexure P-16) and also the impugned order dated 28.5.2012 (Annexure P-18), are hereby ordered to be set aside.
iii) Consequently, with the consent of both the parties, the time schedule will be as under:-
a) Petitioner shall intimate respondent No. 2 three slots of dates for the peer team visit, within one week from today.
b) After receipt of the three slots of the dates for peer team visit from the petitioner, respondent No. 2 shall ensure the peer team visit within six weeks thereafter.
c) Once the peer team visit is conducted within seven weeks from today, respondent No. 2 shall take the final decision on or before 21.6.2012, by passing an appropriate order, in accordance with law, and shall intimate the same to the petitioner without any further loss of time.
Resultantly, the instant writ petition stands partly allowed in the aforesaid terms, however, with no order as to costs.