High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 11 DEL CK 1370

Mr. Alexander Thomas & Anr. vs Ireo Grace Realtech Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

Delhi High Court · Decided on 5 November 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Amit Mahajan, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
W.P.(C) 16607/2026 & CAV 528/2026, CM APPL. 77832/2026, CM APPL. 77833/2026

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Judgment

26 paragraphs · 2,047 words

AMIT MAHAJAN, J. (Oral)

1.

The present petition is filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, assailing the impugned order dated 14.09.2026 passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (‘NCDRC’) in Revision Petition No. NC/RP/833/2026, whereby the order dated 27.05.2026 passed by the Delhi State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (‘DSCDRC’) declining to take the written statement of Respondent no. 1 on record, was set aside.

2.

Succinctly stated, it is the case of the petitioner, that the petitioners had instituted a consumer complaint before the DSCDRC

3.

On 27.08.2025 and the Respondent No. 1 was served with the notice of the complaint on 24.09.2025. The petitioners contend that, despite the expiry of the period prescribed under Section 38(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, Respondent no. 1 failed to file its written statement within the permissible period i.e. before 08.11.2025 and that the written statement was ultimately placed on record only in February, 2026.

4.

The case set up by Respondent no. 1, on the other hand, was that the written statement had already been electronically tendered on 04.11.2025, i.e. within the period of 45 days (i.e. 30 days statutory period + 15 days statutory grace period) prescribed under the aforesaid provision. It was further explained that, owing to a technical glitch in the filing process, the written statement had to be tendered again on 06.11.2025 which is also within the statutory grace period. Respondent no. 1 relied upon the electronic filing reference numbers generated on the respective dates in support of its explanation.

5.

The State Commission, vide order dated 27.05.2026, declined to accept the explanation furnished by Respondent no. 1 and rejected its application seeking condonation of delay. It proceeded on the basis that the written statement had been filed on 20.02.2026, substantially beyond the period prescribed under Section 38(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, and consequently directed that the written statement be taken off the record.

6.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, Respondent no. 1 approached the NCDRC in revision. During the proceedings before the NCDRC, the specific issue which arose for consideration was whether the written statement had, in fact, been electronically tendered before the State Commission on 04.11.2025. The NCDRC, vide order dated 01.09.2026, directed its IT Section to make an appropriate inquiry and verify the electronic filing from the State Commission. The matter was thereafter considered upon hearing the parties and examining the material placed before it.

7.

By the impugned order dated 14.09.2026, the NCDRC accepted the explanation furnished by Respondent no. 1 that the written statement had been electronically tendered on 04.11.2025, within the prescribed period, and that the subsequent filing was occasioned by a technical glitch. Thus, noting that substantive compliance was made and procedural defects were not delved into by the SCDRC, the NCDRC, set aside the order passed by the SCDRC and permitted the written statement to be taken on record. The relevant extract is reproduced hereinbelow: -

“18.

We have considered the submissions raised and we also find that the State Commission vide impugned order has presumed that the filing was after 151 days. With the aforesaid facts on record, the admitted position is that the reply was e-filed on 04.11.2025, but the delay condonation application in a combined format was filed on 06.11.2025 itself. This has been confirmed by the IT section, and is also evident from the pleadings of the parties. Para 8 of the reply of the respondent quoted above admits of the delay condonation having been filed on 06.11.2025. The objection taken by the respondent that it could not have been filed in a combined way, and therefore the same cannot be accepted in view of the provisions prescribed by the Delhi High Court and the Rules framed thereunder. We will not enter into the issue of the applicability of the rules, but even applying the principles indicated therein, the filing of a delay condonation application in a combined format is only an alleged procedural defect. The heading of the filing portal as “subsequent filing” will not dissolve the fact of actual filing. Once it is admitted that the delay condonation IA had been filed and re-uploaded on 06.11.2025. there is substantive compliance. The calculation made by the State Commission of a delay of 151 days is incorrect as indicated above. The notice stood served on 24.09.2025 and therefore the 30th day falls on 24.10.2025. The reply having been filed on 04.11.2025 and the application for condonation along with the reply having been re-uploaded on 06.11.2025 confirms the filing on the 13th day after the expiry of 30 days.

19.

In our opinion, the delay condonation application had therefore been clearly filed within the 15 days grace period on 06.11.2025, and the cause had been shown in the delay condonation application. The State Commission has noticed the explanation given for the delay in paragraph 9 of the impugned order, but did not consider either the sufficiency or insufficiency of the cause shown and proceeded to assume the delay of 151 days without adverting to the cause shown by simply using the phrase “be that as it may”. We find this to be a material irregularity, in as much as the issue as to whether there was any technical fault or procedural defect as debated before us hereinabove has not even been discussed by the State Commission. The State Commission had simply brushed aside the said facts, which were a matter of record whereas the State Commission could itself have inquired into the correct status of the filing, which it did not choose to do. We find this to be once again a material irregularity that has caused prejudice to the petitioner whose written version had been filed, in our opinion well within the 15 days of grace period beyond 30 days, as laid down in the procedure prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 and as explained by the Apex Court in the case of New India Assurance Company Ltd. Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra). It is trite that procedure is only a handmade of justice and therefore the same should come to the aid of adjudication as far as permissible under law. We find that substantial compliance has been made by the petitioner and therefore rejection of the written version / reply of the petitioner, filed within the grace period of 15 days, would work injustice in the event the submission raised on behalf of the respondents are accepted. The fundamental rules of natural justice, in our opinion, deserve to be observed on the facts of the present case by providing opportunity to the petitioner to plead his case. The arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents, therefore, are untenable and are accordingly rejected.

20.

The delay, in our opinion, had been sufficiently explained, but the State Commission even though having noted it in para 9 of the impugned order, failed to consider the same and therefore this error amounts to an omission and failure to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with law. The delay having been sufficiently explained, and being within the 15 days grace period, the interim application moved by the petitioner to condone the delay deserves to be allowed. We therefore hold that the impugned order suffers from an illegality based on an erroneous calculation as discussed above that deserves to be cured and we allow IA No. 497 of 2026 filed by the petitioners praying for condoning the delay of taking their written submission on record.

21.

For all the reasons stated hereinabove, the impugned order dated 27.05.2026, insofar as it relates to the petitioner, is set aside and the State Commission shall take the written version filed by the petitioner on record.

22.

The respondent complainant shall have three weeks' time to file a rejoinder to the same, and the parties shall appear before the State Commission on 05.10.2026. The State Commission shall then proceed to grant time as per its discretion to allow the parties to file their evidence and then proceed accordingly.”

8.

This Court has perused the impugned order, the reasoning adopted by the NCRDC and the material placed on record.

9.

Undisputedly the statutorily prescribed limit is of 30 days for filing the written statement, which is extendable up to an additional 15 days i.e. the grace period. There can be no dispute with the proposition that the period prescribed under Section 38(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, for filing the written statement/reply is required to be adhered to.

10.

However, the narrow controversy, in the present case, is only whether the written statement had, in fact, been tendered within the said period.

11.

In this regard, the table encapsulating the filing history as per the petitioner itself, would be beneficial, which is reproduced herein below: -

Exhibit reproduced from the original judgment
12.

A bare perusal of the above demonstrates that, it remains undisputed that the Notice was received on 24.09.2025 and the period of 30 days expired on 23 – 24.10.2025, while the additional grace period of 15 days extended up to 08 – 09.11.2025. Thus, the Written Statement/reply was to be filed before 08/09.11.2025. Notably, the Petitioner does not dispute that the Reply was e-filed on 04.11.2025, and only a technical objection has been raised that the same was not properly filed i.e. with a condonation of delay application. It is further the petitioner’s own case that on 04.11.2025 itself, the condonation of Delay Application was also filed, however, no I.A. number was generated as the same was not filed under the proper field. Then again on 06.11.2025, the Reply was filed physically; and the Reply along with the condonation of delay was also filed, though, as per the petitioner, no number was generated since it was filed in the wrong field.

13.

Thus, considering the above, even taking the best case of the Petitioner, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the approach adopted by the NCRDC, that once it is admitted that the Reply was filed within the 45 days period i.e. before 08 – 09.11.2025, the same has also been verified from the IT Section, substantive compliance was done, and the delay was sufficiently explained by the Respondent, the procedural defect does not dissolve the fact of actual filing before the expiry period. The Respondent should not be prejudiced only due to difficulties in the electronic filing process.

14.

The objections raised by the petitioners essentially invite this Court to undertake a fresh examination of the filing history and the procedural aspects relating to the registration of the written statement and the accompanying application. This Court does not find it appropriate to re-examine the matter in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

15.

It is also relevant to note that the controversy concerns the taking on record of the written statement filed. The same merely sets out the defence of the opposite party and does not, in itself, determine the rights of the parties in the consumer complaint. The petitioners would have adequate opportunity to controvert the defence raised therein and advance their own submissions before the State Commission. No prejudice warranting interference with the impugned order has been demonstrated.

16.

The object of prescribing timelines for filing written statements before Consumer Commissions is to ensure expeditious adjudication of consumer disputes. That very object would be defeated if interlocutory disputes concerning the procedural aspects of filing result in successive rounds of litigation, thereby delaying adjudication of the consumer complaint itself. In the facts of the present case, this Court finds no justification to prolong the controversy any further.

17.

In view of the foregoing, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the impugned order dated 14.09.2026 passed by the NCDRC. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

18.

It is clarified that the observations made herein are confined to the issue of taking the written statement on record and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the consumer complaint. All contentions of the parties in that regard are left open.

19.

Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

20.

The order be placed forth the appropriate authority for compliance and for fixing a date to appear before the State Commission.