High CourtsSingle Bench(2008) 01 MAD CK 0025

Mr. A.K. Kandaswamy vs The State Bank of India and Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Limited

Madras High Court · Decided on 8 January 2008

HON’BLE JUDGES
P. Jyothimani, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No. 41049 of 2005, WPMP No. 44088 of 2005 and 8955 of 2006 and WVMP No. 91 of 2007

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Judgment

142 paragraphs · 3,082 words

P. Jyothimani, J.—This writ petition is directed against the resolution passed by the Executive Committe of the Central Board of State Bank

of India, namely, the first respondent dated 02.12.2005 for sale to ARCIL the financial assets in so far as it relates to the petitioner M/s. Sri Ranga

Industries and his family held company M/s. Llasar Flow Controls Pvt. Ltd. stated as Item Nos. 11 and 12 to the Annexure to the said resolution.

2.

The petitioner has availed a financial facility of about Rs. 64 lacs in the form of term loan, working capital finance and cash credit facility from the

first respondent State Bank of India in the year 1982. The petitioner''s closely associated company, namely, M/s. Llasar Flow Controls Pvt. Ltd.,

has also availed financial facility of about Rs. 56 lacs from the first respondent State Bank of India in the year 1986. According to the petitioner, he

has been repaying promptly the amount in respect of both the loans to the Bank upto 1989. However, due to certain practical difficulties, namely,

the steep rise in the cost of raw materials, the petitioner was unable to continue the repayment. According to the petitioner, the liability as on

27.12.1990 of the petitioner company as per the books of the first respondent was Rs. 77.80 lacs and his associated company was Rs. 72.77

lacs. The first respondent Bank has instituted a Civil Suit bearing O.S. No. 72 of 1991 on the file of Sub-Court, Coimbatore on 03.2.1991. After

the Debt Recovery Tribunal was constituted in Coimbatore City, the said suit was transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal and renumbered as

T.A. No. 2038 of 2002 and the same is pending. The said application pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal relates to the claim of the first

respondent Bank against both the companies as stated above.

3.

It is the further case of the petitioner that the petitioner''s group company, namely, Llasar was referred to BIFR and ultimately, the AIFR has

recommended winding up of the said company and the assets have been sold by M/s. Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd., in

respect of the amount due to them. Therefore, according to the petitioner, the security, which has been given to the first respondent Bank by the

said Llasar Flow Controls Private Limited as a second charge becomes inoperative by the action taken by TIIC. It is the further case of the

petitioner, the petitioner has approached the first respondent Bank for one time settlement and based on the agreement, the petitioner has paid a

sum of Rs. 2.50 lakhs to the first respondent Bank on 15.3.2005. According to the petitioner, the first respondent Bank has accepted for Rs. 50

lakhs as repayment under one time settlement scheme. The petitioner to show his bonafide, has paid the sum of Rs. 2.50 lakhs as part payment of

the one time settlement. It is not in dispute that the first respondent has returned the said amount on 18.11.2005. The case of the petitioner is that

even though the proposal of one time settlement was pending between the petitioner the first respondent Bank, the first respondent has passed the

impugned resolution by which the rights of the first respondent Bank has been assigned to the second respondent, namely, The Asset

Reconstruction company (India) Limited as per Section 5 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security

Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ''SARFAESI Act'').

4.

The petitioner''s case is that the impugned resolution by which the rights of the first respondent Bank was assigned to the second respondent is

malafide and according to the petitioner when once the dispute is pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, which is initiated by the first

respondent Bank itself, in all fairness the first respondent Bank ought to have approached the Debt Recovery Tribunal before entering into such an

agreement with the second respondent on 2.12.2005. It is also not in dispute that as per the resolution passed on 2.12.2005, the second

respondent had stepped into the shoes of the first respondent by acquiring the rights of the first respondent against the petitioner. In that stage, the

present writ petition has been filed along with an interim application seeking stay of the impugned resolution.

5.

Learned single Judge of this Court by an order dated 16.3.2007 in WPMP No. 44088 of 2005 has granted interim stay on the basis that the

property mentioned as item Nos. 11 and 12 were sold by the first respondent Bank for a sum of Rs. 40 lakhs, while the petitioner himself was

willing to pay a sum of Rs. 54 lakhs. As against the said interim order, the first respondent Bank has filed an appeal in Writ Appeal No. 662 of

2007. The Honourable First Bench of this Court disposed the said writ appeal by an order dated 27.4.2007 by relying upon the judgment of the

Supreme Court in the case of Transcore Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, wherein the Supreme Court has held that Section 5 as well as

Section 9 of the SARFAESI Act empowers the Bank to enter into such an agreement with securitisation bank because the basis of the Act itself is

for recovery of the amount in a quick manner. In that judgment, the Supreme Court held as follows:

The NPA Act proceeds on the basis that security interest vests in the Bank/FI. Sections 5 and 9 of the NPA Act is also important for preservation

of the value of the assets of the Banks/FIs. Quick recovery of debt is important. It is the object of the DRT Act as well as NPA Act. But under

NPA Act, authority is given to the Banks/FIs, which is not there in the DRT Act, to assign the security interest to securitisation Company/asset

reconstruction company. In cases where the borrower has bought an asset with the finance of the Bank/FI, the latter is treated as a lender and on

assignment the securitisation Company/asset reconstruction Company steps into the shoes of the lender Bank/FI and it can recover the lent

amounts from the borrower.

6.

The Division Bench has also referred to Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act holding that the purpose of Section 13 is for recovery of amount by

non-adjudicatory process and also held that the Act deal with the rights of the secured creditors like that of the first respondent Bank. Accordingly,

the Division Bench of this Court has upheld the resolution passed by the first respondent Bank and set aside the order of interim stay granted by

this Court by a learned single Judge.

7.

on further appeal filed by the petitioner before the Supreme Court in C.C. No. 9861 of 2007, the Supreme Court by an order dated

12.10.2007 while dismissing the petition, has however observed that the Division Bench while disposing of the matter has not decided the fate of

the pending writ petition and directed the matter to be sent to the learned single Judge for a decision. The order of the Supreme Court dated

12.10.2007 reads as follows:

Delay condoned.

We find no merit in the Special Leave Petition. It stands dismissed. There is no error in the reasoning of the impugned order. However, in this case,

a peculiar situation has arisen. The Division Bench of the High Court has disposed of the matter on merits without indicating the effect of its order

on the pending writ petition. The writ petition remains pending. We make it clear that dismissal of this SLP will not preclude the learned single

Judge from proceeding with the hearing of the writ petition on merits.

8.

It is by virtue of the said direction of the Supreme Court, the matter is before this Court.

9.

As I have elicited above, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that while the one time settlement proposal was pending between the

petitioner and the first respondent Bank and pursuant to the one time settlement agreement, the petitioner to show his bonafide has paid a sum of

Rs. 2.50 lakhs to the first respondent bank on 15.3.2005, the first respondent having kept the amount till 18.11.2005, ought not have passed the

impugned resolution on 2.12.2005. It is also his further contention, as I have stated above, that when the first respondent Bank itself has gone to

the Debt Recovery Tribunal, it is the duty on the part of the Bank to approach the Debt Recovery Tribunal and obtain proper permission before

entering into such an agreement with the second respondent.

10.

On the other hand, learned Counsel for the first respondent Bank submits that the agreement entered pursuant to the impugned resolution by

the Executive Committee of the Bank on 2.12.2005 with the second respondent is perfectly in order and in accordance with the power given to

the Bank u/s 5 of the SARFAESI Act. He also submits that once such an agreement is entered into with the second respondent, it is not necessary

for the Bank to inform the same to the petitioner at all. It is only after the agreement entered into, such an information can be passed on to the

debtor, since Section 5 of the SARFAESI Act enables the first respondent Bank to enter into such an agreement with the second respondent, by

which the Bank''s rights has been assigned to the second respondent by which the petitioner is not affected in any manner. It is his further

contention that even Section 6 of the SARFAESI Act shows that if the Bank has received payment from the debtor, the Bank will receive payment

only as a trust and not as a creditor.

11.

Learned Counsel for the second respondent, who has been subsequently impleaded would submit that the second respondent has already

taken action to implead themselves as a party in the proceedings pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Coimbatore and they are yet to take

any further action.

12.

I have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the respondents and perused the materials placed on

record.

13.

On facts, it is clear that the amount of Rs. 2.50 lakhs stated to have been paid by the petitioner to the first respondent Bank based on one time

settlement has been returned by the Bank to the petitioner on 18.11.2005, even though it is true that the Bank has been keeping the amount with it

from 15.3.2005. The fact remains that the conduct of the first respondent in returning the said amount reveals that the one time settlement is not

fructified before the impugned resolution has been passed by the Executive Committee of the first respondent Bank and it is not open to the

petitioner to rely upon such one time settlement, since the one time settlement has not come into effect at all. As far as the powers of the first

respondent Bank to enter into such an agreement with the second respondent is concerned, the first respondent Bank has power to enter into such

an agreement u/s 5 of the SARFAESI Act, which reads as follows:

5.

Acquisition of rights or interest in financial assets- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement or any other law for the time being in

force, any securitisation company or reconstruction company may acquire financial assets of any bank or financial institution:

(a) by issuing a debenture or bond or any other security in the nature of the debenture, for consideration agreed upon between such company and

the bank or financial institution, incorporating therein such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon between them; or

(b) by entering into an agreement with such bank or financial institution for the transfer of such financial assets to such company on such terms and

conditions as may be agreed upon between them.

(2) If the bank or financial institution is a lender in relation to any financial assets acquired under Sub-section (1) by the securitisation company or

the reconstruction company, such securitisation company or reconstruction company shall, on such acquisition, be deemed to be the lender and all

the rights of such bank or financial institution shall vest in such company in relation to such financial assets.

(3) Unless otherwise expressly provided by this Act, all contracts, deeds, bonds, agreements, powers-of-attorney, grants of legal representation,

permissions, approvals, consents or no-objections under any law or otherwise and other instruments of whatever nature which relate to the said

financial asset and which are subsisting or having effect immediately before the acquisition of financial asset under Sub-section (1) and to which the

concerned bank or financial institution is a party or which are in favour of such bank or financial institution shall, after the acquisition of the financial

assets, be of as full force and effect against or in favour of the securitisation company or reconstruction company, as the case may be, and may be

enforced or acted upon as fully and effectually as if, in the place of the said bank or financial institution, securitisation company or reconstruction

company, as the case may be, had been a party thereto or as if they had been issued in favour of securitisation company or reconstruction

company, as the case may be.

(4) If, on the date of acquisition of financial asset under Sub-section (1), any suit, appeal or other proceeding of whatever nature relating to the said

financial asset is pending by or against the bank or financial institution, save as provided in the third proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the

Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (1 of 1986) the same shall not abate, or be discontinued or be, in any way, prejudicially

affected by reason of the acquisition of financial asset by the securitisation company or reconstruction company, as the case may be, but the suit,

appeal or other proceeding may be continued, prosecuted and enforced by or against the securitisation company or reconstruction company, as

the case may be.

14.

Section 5(1)(b) of the SARFAESI Act in categoric terms enable the creditor Bank to enter into any agreement with any other bank or any

other financial institution for transfer of such financial assets to such company on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon between them.

15.

Section 6 of the SARFAESI Act deals with the issuance of notice to the debtor, which reads as follows:

6.

Notice to obligor and discharge of obligation of such obligor-(1) The bank or financial institution may, if it considers appropriate, give a notice of

acquisition of financial assets by any securitisation company or reconstruction company, to the concerned obligor and any other concerned person

and to the concerned registering authority (including Registrar of Companies) in whose jurisdiction the mortgage, charge, hypothecation,

assignment or other interest created on the financial assets had been registered.

(2) Where a notice of acquisition of financial asset under Sub-section (1) is given by a bank or financial institution, the obligor, on receipt of such

notice, such make payment to the concerned securitisation company or reconstruction company, as the case may be, and payment made to such

company in discharge of any of the obligations in relation to the financial asset specified in the notice shall be a full discharge to the obligor making

the payment from all liability in respect of such payment.

(3) Where no notice of acquisition of financial asset under Sub-section (1) is given by any bank or financial institution, any money or other

properties subsequently received by the bank or financial institution, shall constitute monies or properties held in trust for the benefit of and on

behalf of the securitisation company or reconstruction company, as the case may be, and such bank or financial institution shall hold such payment

or property which shall forthwith be made over or delivered to such securitisation company or reconstruction company, as the case may be, or its

agent duly authorised in this behalf.

16.

The above section makes it very clear that obligor namely, the principal debtor has to be informed only after such agreement is entered into

between the Bank and the Securitisation Company as per Section 5 of the SARFAESI Act.

17.

Therefore, a combined reading of Sections 5 and 6 of the SARFAESI Act show that any contract entered into between the Bank being a

secured creditor and the Securitisation company for assigning the rights of the Bank to the securitisation company, there is no necessity for the

Bank or the securitisation company to inform the original debtor and that agreement has been entered by way of the statutory rights.

18.

The law laid down by the Supreme Court in Transcore Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, makes it clear that the agreement entered into

between the Bank and the securitisation company is only for quick recovery of dues. In view of the same, it cannot be said that the impugned

resolution dated 2.12.2005 in which an agreement entered into between the first respondent Bank and the second respondent is perverse or illegal.

19.

The further contention of the petitioner that when the proceedings are pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, the first respondent ought to

have approached the Debt Recovery Tribunal is not sustainable. Section 5 of the SARFAESI Act does not contemplate such a prior approval or

intimation to the Debt Recovery Tribunal.

20.

A reading of the judgment of the Supreme Court shows that these are all parallel proceedings which are not contradictory to each other. One

is by way of non-adjudicatory process and another is by adjudicatory process.

21.

In view of the above legal position and on the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the considered view that the petitioner is not entitled

for any relief as sought for in this writ petition and it cannot be said that the impugned resolution is either perverse or illegal. Accordingly, the writ

petition fails and the same is dismissed. However, learned Counsel for the second respondent has fairly submitted that he is taking steps to implead

themselves as a party in the pending proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. If the second respondent approaches the Debt Recovery

Tribunal, it is always open to the petitioner to raise whatever legal rights that are available to the petitioner against the second respondent. No

costs. Consequently, WPMP No. 44088 of 2005 and 8955 of 2006 are also dismissed and WVMP No. 91 of 2007 is closed.