M.P. State Co-Operative Marketing Federation Limited, Bhopal vs Director, Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti and another

D.P.S. Chauhan, J.

Petitioner has approached this Court basically aggrieved by the order dated 12-3-1987 (Annexure-P/8) passed by the Joint Director, Mandi, M.P., Bhopal, whereby the appeal of the petitioner u/s 61 of the Madhya Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972 was dismissed on the ground that the same was barred by time.

Any sum due to a market committee, u/s 61(1) of the M. P. Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972 (for brevity, hereinafter referred to as ''the Act''), was recoverable in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue. Sub-section (3) of section 61 of the Act provides that any person aggrieved by the proceedings made under sub-sections (1) and (2) may, within thirty days from the date of communication of notice to him appeal to the Director whose order thereon shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court of law.

The petitioner against the order dated 16-6-1985 passed in Revenue Recovery Case No. 86-A/76/78-79 by the Naib Tahsildar Chhindwara filed a revision u/s 50 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. This revision was rejected by the Collector, Chhindwara on the basis that section 61(2) of the Act makes provision for redress of the grievance before the Director of Mandi. This order was passed on 31-3-1986. Against this order the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Director, Mandi. The appeal was rejected on 12-3-1987, as stated earlier, on the ground that it was not filed within the period of 30 days as provided under sub-section (3) of section 61 of the Act.

Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondents.

Learned counsel for the petitioner firstly submitted that it was a proceeding under the old Act wherein no limitation was provided. According to him sub-section (3) of section 61 of the Act was substituted by M. P. Act No. 24 of 1986 w.e.f. 21-7-1986. Anterior to that section 61 which is as extracted below did not provide any limitation :

"61. Recovery of sum due to market committee. -- (1) Any sum due to market committee or the Board on account of any charge, costs, expenses, fees, rent or any other account under the provisions of this Act or any rule or bye-law made thereunder shall be recoverable in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.

(1-A) ...... Any sum due from a market committee to the Board or to the State Government, as the case may be, shall be recoverable in the same manner-as an arrear of land revenue.

(2) If any question arises whether a sum is due under sub-section (1) it shall be referred to the Director and he shall after making such enquiry as he deems fit and after giving to the person from whom the sum is alleged to be due an opportunity of being heard, decide the question and his decision shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court of law."

The substituted section is as extracted below:

"61. Recovery of sums as an arrear of Land Revenue. -- (1) Any sum due to a market committee or the Board on account of any charge, costs, expenses, fees, rest or any other account under the provisions of this Act or any rule or bye-law made, thereunder shall be recoverable in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.

(2) Any sums due from a market committee to the Board or to the State Government, as the case may be, shall be recoverable in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.

(3) any person aggrieved by the proceedings made under subsections (1) and (2) may, within thirty days from the date of communication of notice to him appeal to the Director whose order thereon shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court of law.

(4) The Director may if he considers it necessary so to do, grant a stay of the proceedings appealed against, for such period as he may deem fit."

The appeal, as stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, was filed on 1-8-1986. Sub-section (3) of the substituted section 61 of the Act provides that the appeal may be filed by an aggrieved person within thirty days from the date of communication of notice. Learned counsel submitted that this provision is not retrospective in operation and it is prospective in nature and in the cases anterior to the amendment the 30 days period to be counted from the date of commencement of the Act as earlier there was no provision for limitation. The demand notice is dated 5-1-1984 but no date of its communication has been given. Notice under sub-section (3) obviously means the notice of demand under the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959.

In the present case the matter was pending before the Collector and the Collector decided the matter on 31-3-1986. The appeal was filed on 1-8-1986, when the Collector directed for approaching the Director of Mandi there was no period of limitation. Period of limitation of 30 days in such cases should be counted from the date of commencement of the provision i.e. 21-7-1986. If it is to be taken as such, then the appeal was within period of 30 days from the date of commencement of the Act.

Learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 submitted that on the merit, the petitioner has no case.

This Court is not concerned with the merit of the matter as the petitioner has a right to appeal under the law and that right cannot be curtailed in an arbitrary manner. Merit may be looked by the concerned authority. Learned counsel for the respondent made no other submission.

In view of above, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 12-3-1987 (Annexure-P-8) passed by the Joint Director, Mandi is quashed. The matter is remanded back to him. He is directed to decide the appeal on the merit. In the circumstances no order as to costs. Security amount, deposited if any, may be refunded.