Moti Alias Mohit vs State of NCT of Delhi & Anr.

यत किञ्चेदं वरुण दैव्ये जनेऽभिद्रोहं मनुष्याश्चरामसि।

अचित्या यत्तव धर्मा युयोपिम मा नस्तस्मादेनसो देव रीरिषः॥

(Yat kiñcedaṃ varuṇa daivye jane'bhidrohaṃ manuṣyāścarāmasi,

Acittyā yattava dharmā yuyopima mā nastasmādenaso deva rīriṣaḥ.)

“ Item No. 50: The case of Moti @ Mohit s/o Sh. Dhan Bahadur – (Age-41 Yrs.)

(i)

Background:

This case has been put up in compliance to the order dated 25.07.2025, passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in W.P.(Crl.) No. 937/2-25 in the matter titled as Moti @ Mohit versus State, NCT of Delhi.

(ii)

Eligibility conditions:

Only after undergoing imprisonment for 20 years including remission. This case has been considered under the policy/order dated 16.07.2004 issued by the Govt. of NCT of Delhi i.e. policy that was existing on the date of conviction.

(iii)

Sentence details:

Moti @ Mohit S/o Sh. Dhan Bahadur is undergoing life imprisonment in case FIR No. 428/2004, u/s 302/380/34 IPC, P.S. Defence Colony, Delhi for murder of two persons & theft articles.

(iv)

Deliberation:

As on 20.08.2025, the convict has undergone imprisonment of 20 years, 07 months & 20 days in actual and 24 years, 05 months & 23 days with remission. He has availed Parole 07 times and Furlough 13 times.

As per record, the conduct of the convict is found to be unsatisfactory being punishment dated 20.01.2018 for recovery of 02 gram tobacco in Semi Open jail since then the convict was returned back to closed prisons.

The Board considered the latest reports received from Police Social Welfare Department and took into account all the facts and circumstances of the case. As per the Police Report dated 27.02.2024, the premature release of the convict is not recommended.

After considering all the facts and circumstances under which the offence was committed, i.e. murder of two persons and theft articles, nature/gravity and perversity of the crime, age of the convict, the Board is of the view that the propensity to commit crime again by the convict cannot be ruled out. The Board cannot merely look at the convict’s benefit, but the effect of the decision on the society as a whole cannot be ignored.

It is also observed by the Board that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held in Swamy Shraddananda (2008) 13 SCC 767.

“…the power of executive clemency is not only for the benefit of the convict but what has to be borne in mind is the effect of the decision on the family of the victims, society as a whole and the precedent which it sets for the future. Thus, the exercise of power depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and has to be judged from case to case ….”

(v)

Recommendation:

The Board after detailed deliberation and discussion, as outlined above, unanimously decided to REJECT premature release of convict Moti @Mohit S/o Sh. Dhan Bahadur at this stage.”

“29.

Each time the SRB rejects the plea, in a pithily drafted, cursorily articulated proforma paragraph, not only is each of the rejections almost a copy-paste of an earlier rejection, but it lacks any embellishment or modicum of assessment or reasoning beyond the proforma factors on which SRB has right to reject. What is, therefore, before this Court are a set of previous rejections and the impugned rejection of 2023 parroting the same reasons.

30.

The Court, therefore, faces two options: either to be persuaded by these repeated rejections and conclude that there must be a rationale underlying the SRB's consistent stance, or to evaluate whether the SRB has genuinely applied logic, rationality, reasonableness, and proper application of mind in accordance with the rules and guidelines it is bound to follow. The second option is prompted by the petitioner's 26-year-long journey being incarcerated, as noted above, which reveals an apparent and significant discrepancy between that journey and the reasons cited by the SRB for its rejections. There seems to be an apparent and obvious mismatch between the elements of that journey and the reasons for the rejection by the SRB.

31.

The underlying theme, fulcrum and raison d'être of premature release are fortunately well articulated in Rule 1244 Chapter XX, of DPR (which is extracted in paragraph 17 above). Premature release is achieving a balance in ensuring ‘reformation, rehabilitation, and integration into society of an offender on one hand and protection of society on the other’. For the purposes of this assessment, as stated by the Rule, is the conduct behaviour and performance of prisoners while in prison. The SRB is undoubtedly a recommendary body as per Rule 1247 (as extracted in paragraph 17 above). The body is constituted by Members of the Executive, District Judiciary, Police and Prison Authorities. The SRB, in achieving this recommendation, exercises ‘discretion’.

32.

However, the exercise of this discretion is to be based on relevant factors, which inter alia are whether the convict has lost his propensity for committing crime considering his overall conduct, possibility of reclaiming the convict as a useful member of society; and socio-economic condition of the convict’s family.

33.

These aspects form part of a comprehensive note prepared by the Superintendent of Prisons as per Rule 1256(ii) (extracted in paragraph 17 above), recommendation by Deputy Commissioner of Police. Superintendent of Police, as per Rule 1256(iv); report of Chief Probation Officer as per Rule 1256(v). On the basis of these three reports, the Inspector General (Prisons) is to make his recommendation. All this is finally funnelled to the SRB, which has to apply guidelines, general or special, laid down by the Government or by the Courts. A cautionary note has been ensconced in Rule 1257(c) for the SRB to not decline premature release “merely on the ground that the police have not recommended this release”, as also not rejecting it merely because it has been rejected on one or more occasions earlier. The decision of the SRB is mandated to be through ‘speaking order in writing’.

37.

Even if one were to ignore the brevity of articulation by the SRB, as merely for administrative convenience, there's complete opacity in whether the cautionary elements of Rule 1257(c) which ought to stare in the face of SRB, previous rejections, lack of police recommendation and welfare of the prisoner were considered and used as reasons ultimately leading to a negative recommendation.

xxxxx

43.

In Sushil Sharma (supra), Division Bench of this Court categorically held that SRB cannot state that they are not bound by the rules and guidelines to which they themselves owe their existence. Therefore, there is a necessity for due and proper application of mind, legal justification and lawful sanction.

44.

The Supreme Court in Joseph (supra) highlighted “typecasting convicts through guidelines which are too flexible based crime committed in distant past resulting in a danger of overlooking the reformative potential of each individual convict”. In this regard, the Court noted that insisting on continued punishment without considering the transformation of a prisoner undermines rationality and fairness. Persistence in penalizing someone who has reformed and no longer aligns with their past actions disregards the reality of personal change and violates Article 14 of the Constitution. A rigid adherence to guidelines that ignore positive conduct and rehabilitation perpetuates despair, denies the value of good behaviour, and reflects an unyielding societal harshness, negating the very principle of reformative justice...

45.

As rightly pointed out, “propensity for crime” cannot be a random subjective assessment but has to be based on objective factors. The objective factors are quite well ensconced in the eligibility conditions, of a convict being in a semi-open prison and even more stringent requirements to qualify for an open prison. If those factors are met in this case, the committing to a semi-open/open prison is done, and the ‘report card’ of the convict continues to be good, in the opinion of the Court would be supremely critical factors that ought to imbue any assessment for premature release.”

(emphasis supplied)

“9.

A perusal of the impugned order shows that the SRB while rejecting the premature release of the petitioner has only considered- (i) the facts and circumstances under which the crime was committed, (ii) the gravity, perversity and nature of the crime, (iii) unsatisfactory jail conduct, and (iv) the fact that the police opposed the premature release. However, it is noted that the SRB has to consider other relevant factors as enumerated in Para 3.1 of the policy dated 16.07.2004 and Rule 1251 of the Delhi Prison Rules, 2018 apart from considering the circumstances in which the crime was committed, as well as, the gravity, perversity and nature of crime.

xxxx

11.

Likewise, Rule 1251 of Delhi Prison Rules reads thus:

1251. Every convicted prisoner whether male or female undergoing sentence of life imprisonment and covered by the provisions of Section 433A Cr. P.C. shall be eligible to be considered for premature release from the prison immediately after serving out the sentence of 14 years of actual imprisonment i.e. without the remissions. It is, however, clarified that completion of 14 years in prison by itself would not entitle a convict to automatic release from the prison and the Sentence Review Board shall have the discretion to recommend to release a convict, at an appropriate time in all cases considering the circumstances in which the crime was committed and other relevant factors like:—

a)

Whether the convict has lost his potential for committing crime considering his overall conduct in Jail during the 14 year incarceration.

b)

The possibility of reclaiming the convict as a useful member of the society and

c)

Socio-Economic condition of the Convict's family.

12.

However, in the impugned order, there is no discussion on the aspects viz., (i) whether the convict has lost his potential for committing crime considering his overall conduct in jail during the 14 year incarceration, (ii) the possibility of reclaiming the convict as a useful member of the society, and (iii) the socio-economic condition of the convict's family. It is settled law that if the administrative power has been exercised without considering, or without application of mind to, the relevant factors, the exercise of power will be regarded manifestly erroneous. This being the position, the impugned order cannot be sustained.”

(emphasis supplied)

“12.

The factors for consideration while deciding the application of a convict for premature release, as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Laxman Naskar (supra) and which have been reiterated in State of Haryana v. Jagdish, (2010) 4 SCC 216, are:-

(i)

whether the offence affects the society at large;

(ii)

the probability of the crime being repeated;

(iii)

the potential of the convict to commit crimes in future;

(iv)

if any fruitful purpose is being served by keeping the convict in prison; and

(v)

the socio-economic condition of the convict's family.

15.

It is well established that when the convict has undergone substantial and long period of incarceration, the eventual purpose of imprisonment, in all circumstances, including the most serious offences, is reformative and not retributive. To deny the benefit of remission to a convict, solely on the basis of the nature of crime committed, and without appreciating other parameters including but not limited to the convict's age, health and socio-economic condition and family relations, his post-conviction conduct, jail conduct etc., would not serve the ends of justice. It is of ultimate importance that the societal interest must be balanced with the rights of the convict and resorting to mechanical and clerical approach in dealing with the application of premature release where the convicts have undergone long periods of incarceration which will result in defeating the said purpose.”

(emphasis supplied)

“3.

It is a settled position of law that life sentence is nothing less than lifelong imprisonment and by earning remissions a life convict does not acquire a right to be released prematurely; but if the Government has framed any rule or made a scheme for early release of such convicts then those rules or schemes will have to be treated as guidelines for exercising its power under Article 161 of the Constitution and if according to the government policy/instructions in force at the relevant time the life convict has already undergone the sentence for the period mentioned in the policy/instructions, then the only right which a life convict can be said to have acquired is the right to have his case put up by the prison authorities in time before the authorities concerned for considering exercise of power under Article 161 of the Constitution. When an authority is called upon to exercise its powers under Article 161 of the Constitution that will have to be done consistently with the legal position and the government policy/instructions prevalent at that time.”

“17.

A perusal of the Government Orders displays that the statutory mandate on premature release has been completely overlooked. The three-factor evaluation of (i) antecedents (ii) conduct during incarceration and (iii) likelihood to abstain from crime, under Section 2 of the UP Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938, have been given a complete go-by. These refusals are not based on facts or evidence, and are vague, cursory, and merely unsubstantiated opinions of state authorities.

18.

It would be gainsaid that length of the sentence or the gravity of the original crime can’t be the sole basis for refusing premature release. Any assessment regarding predilection to commit crime upon release must be based on antecedents as well as conduct of the prisoner while in jail, and not merely on his age or apprehensions of the victims and witnesses. As per the State’s own affidavit, the conduct of both petitioners has been more than satisfactory. They have no material criminal antecedents, and have served almost 16 years in jail (22 years including remission). Although being about 54 and 43 years old, they still have substantial years of life remaining, but that doesn’t prove that they retain a propensity for committing offences. The respondent-State’s repeated and circuitous reliance on age does nothing but defeat the purpose of remission and probation, despite the petitioners having met all statutory requirements for premature release.

19.

Indeed, the petitioners’ case is squarely covered by the ratio laid down by this court in Shor v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2020 SCC OnLine SC 626], which has later been followed in Munna v. State of Uttar Pradesh [Order dated 21.08.2020 in WP(Crl) 4 of 2020], the relevant extract of which is reproduced as under:

“A reading of the order dated 22.01.2018 shows that the Joint Secretary, Government of U.P. has failed to apply his mind to the conditions of Section 2 of the U.P. Act. Merely repeating the fact that the crime is heinous and that release of such a person would send a negative message against the justice system in the society are factors de hors Section 2. Conduct in prison has not been referred to at all and the Senior Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate confirming that the prisoner is not “incapacitated” from committing the crime is not tantamount to stating that he is likely to abstain from crime and lead a peaceable life if released from prison. Also having regard to the long incarceration of 29 years (approx.) without remission, we do not wish to drive the petitioner to a further proceeding challenging the order dated 22.01.2018 when we find that the order has been passed mechanically and without application of mind to Section 2 of the U.P. Act.” [emphasis supplied]

20.

It seems to us that the petitioners’ action of kidnapping was nothing but a fanciful attempt to procure easy money, for which they have learnt a painful life lesson. Given their age, their case ought to be viewed through a prism of positivity. They retain the ability to reintegrate with society and can spend many years leading a peaceful, disciplined, and normal human life. Such a hopeful expectation is further concritised by their conduct in jail. It is revealed from the additional affidavit dated 05.09.2020 filed by Anita @ Varnika (wife of Vikky) that during the course of his incarceration in jail he has pursued as many as eight distance-learning courses, which include (i) passing his Intermediate Examination, (ii) learning computer hardware, (iii) obtaining a degree in Bachelor of Arts; as well as numerous certificates in (iv) food and nutrition, (v) human rights, (vi) environmental studies. Vikky’s conduct shines as a bright light of hope and redemption for many other incarcerated prisoners. Compounded by their roots and familial obligations, we believe it is extremely unlikely that the petitioners would commit any act which could shatter or shame their familial dreams.

21.

In the present case, considering how the petitioners have served nearly two decades of incarceration and have thus suffered the consequences of their actions; a balance between individual and societal welfare can be struck by granting the petitioners conditional premature release, subject to their continuing good conduct. This would both ensure that liberty of the petitioners is not curtailed, nor that there is any increased threat to society. Suffice to say that this order is not irreversible and can always be recalled in the event of any future misconduct or breach by the petitioners.”

(emphasis supplied)

“74.

Therefore, in the present juncture, when we take judicial notice of the crime rate in our country, we find that criminals of all types of crimes are on the increase. Be it white-collar crimes, vindictive crimes, crimes against children and women, hapless widows, old-aged parents, sexual offences, retaliation murder, planned and calculated murder, through paid assassins, gangsters operating in the developed cities indulging in killing for a price, kidnapping and killing for ransom, killing by terrorists and militants, organised crime syndicates, etc. are the order of the day. While on the one side peace loving citizens who are in the majority are solely concerned with their peaceful existence by following the Rule of Law and aspire to thrive in the society anticipating every protection and support from the governance of the State and its administration, it is common knowledge, as days pass on it is a big question mark whether one will be able to lead a normal peaceful life without being hindered at the hands of such unlawful elements, who enjoy in many cases the support of very many highly placed persons. In this context, it will be relevant to note the precepts of law which are : to live honourably, to injure no other man and to render everyone his due. There are murders and other serious offences orchestrated for political rivalry, business rivalry, family rivalry, etc., which in the recent times have increased manifold and in this process, the casualty are the common men whose day-to-day functioning is greatly prejudiced and people in the helm of affairs have no concern for them. Even those who propagate for lessening the gravity of imposition of severe punishment are unmindful of such consequences and are only keen to indulge in propagation of rescuing the convicts from being meted out with appropriate punishments. We are at a loss to understand as to for what reason or purpose such propagation is carried on and what benefit the society at large is going to derive.

…

…

94.

As far as the argument based on ray of hope is concerned, it must be stated that however much forceful the contention may be, as was argued by Mr Dwivedi, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State, it must be stated that such ray of hope was much more for the victims who were done to death and whose dependants were to suffer the aftermath with no solace left. Therefore, when the dreams of such victims in whatever manner and extent it was planned, with reference to oneself, his or her dependants and everyone surrounding him was demolished in an unmindful and in some cases in a diabolic manner in total violation of the Rule of Law which is prevailing in an organised society, they cannot be heard to say only their rays of hope should prevail and kept intact. For instance, in the case relating to the murder of the former Prime Minister, in whom the people of this country reposed great faith and confidence when he was entrusted with such great responsible office in the fond hope that he will do his best to develop this country in all trusts, all the hope of the entire people of this country was shattered by a planned murder which has been mentioned in detail in the judgment [State v. Nalini, (1999) 5 SCC 253 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 691] of this Court which we have extracted in para 157. Therefore, we find no scope to apply the concept of ray of hope to come for the rescue of such hardened, heartless offenders, which if considered in their favour will only result in misplaced sympathy and again will be not in the interest of the society. Therefore, we reject the said argument outright.”

In the said case, the Supreme Court also elaborately discussed the scope of judicial intervention on the aspect of remission and held thus:

“105.

We, therefore, reiterate that the power derived from the Penal Code for any modified punishment within the punishment provided for in the Penal Code for such specified offences can only be exercised by the High Court and in the event of further appeal only by the Supreme Court and not by any other court in this country. To put it differently, the power to impose a modified punishment providing for any specific term of incarceration or till the end of the convict's life as an alternate to death penalty, can be exercised only by the High Court and the Supreme Court and not by any other inferior court.

106.

Viewed in that respect, we state that the ratio laid down in Swamy Shraddananda (2) [Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 113] that a special category of sentence; instead of death; for a term exceeding 14 years and put that category beyond application of remission is well founded and we answer the said question in the affirmative. We are, therefore, not in agreement with the opinion expressed by this Court in Sangeet v. State of Haryana [Sangeet v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 611] that the deprival of remission power of the appropriate Government by awarding sentences of 20 or 25 years or without any remission as not permissible is not in consonance with the law and we specifically overrule the same.”

“17.

The legal position admits of no dispute that no convict can demand remission or premature release as a matter of right. However, once the executive frames a policy and the prison rules prescribe a structured process, the convict acquires a right to a fair, meaningful, and non-arbitrary consideration under that framework. The discretion is broad, but it is not unstructured. It is confined by the governing policy, the prison rules, and the discipline of reasons.

18.

The policy dated 16th July, 2004, makes two features explicit. First, eligibility after the stipulated period of actual incarceration does not translate into automatic release, and the SRB retains discretion. Second, the discretion must be exercised by weighing the circumstances of the crime together with other relevant factors, including whether the convict has lost the potential for committing crime, the possibility of rehabilitation, and the socio-economic condition of the family. The policy also requires a comprehensive note dealing with the family and social background, the circumstances of the offence, prison conduct, and a reasoned recommendation. Thus, eligibility triggers consideration. It does not guarantee release. At the same time, the policy does not permit the SRB to treat the label of the offence as a veto that makes the rest of the inquiry redundant.

19.

The Delhi Prison Rules, 2018 reinforce the same approach. Rule 1244 states that premature release is anchored in reformation, rehabilitation, and reintegration, while ensuring protection of society, and it recognizes that conduct and performance in prison bear directly on rehabilitative potential. The Rules also contemplate that the SRB decision should be a speaking one, and caution against treating the police view as determinative in isolation.

20.

This insistence on reasons is not a cosmetic requirement. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that recording reasons is an essential component of fairness in administrative and quasi-judicial decision-making. A conclusion without an intelligible rationale disables scrutiny and breeds arbitrariness. In matters of premature release, the relevant considerations, such as the circumstances of the offence, antecedents, conduct in custody, and the likelihood of reoffending, are not mere formalities to be mechanically recorded. They constitute the foundation of the evaluative exercise.

21.

The same discipline appears in Satish @ Sabbe v. State of Uttar Pradesh, where the Supreme Court cautioned against mechanical refusals that ignore statutory or policy criteria and recognized that a constitutional court may step in where the executive repeatedly fails to discharge its obligation of meaningful consideration.

22.

The gravity of the offence, even when undeniable, cannot become the single note refrain that drowns out every other mandatory consideration. In Satish @ Sabbe, the Supreme Court cautioned that “gravity of the original crime cannot be the sole basis” for refusing premature release, and that any assessment of future criminality must be grounded in antecedents and conduct during incarceration, rather than vague apprehensions.”

(emphasis supplied)

“12.

.........The paragraphs reproduced by us above clearly stipulate that when a sentence awarded is for imprisonment for life without the categorical addition of ‘without remission’, the power of the State under Section 432 Cr.PC is unaffected and such an application would be maintainable. In those select few cases where the ‘without remission’ condition is utilised, which is obviously done so, in the attending facts of that case keeping in view the gravity of crime, nature of offence and the fact that reduction of the sentence therein to an ‘ordinary sentence’ would be unjust, the statutory right being denuded, cannot be termed to be offensive to the Constitution.”

“5.4......In such circumstances, remanding the matter to the very authority which has already taken a firm view against the petitioner would amount to an empty formality. The controversy before this Court, therefore, appears not to be one of absence of consideration, but the legality and sustainability of the conclusion already reached. In that light, remand may not be directed mechanically where it would not serve any substantive purpose. Considering that the petitioner has already undergone more than twenty-two (22) years of incarceration and all relevant material is already before this Court, relegating the petitioner to another round of administrative consideration would only prolong the proceedings unnecessarily. Sending the matter to the very same authority for reconsideration would be futile and not serve the interests of justice, particularly when the basis of that rejection is already fully articulated before this Court on merits. We, therefore, proceed to examine the case on merits.

…

…

6.4.

In Satish v. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 580 (“Satish”), this Court held that neither the length of the sentence nor the gravity of the original offence can, by themselves, constitute the sole basis for refusing premature release. Any assessment regarding the likelihood of reoffending upon release must instead be founded on the antecedents of the prisoner and his conduct while in custody, rather than merely on age or apprehensions expressed by victims or witnesses. The Court further observed that although remission cannot be claimed as a matter of right, once the appropriate legislature has enacted a law governing remission, the executive cannot indirectly defeat or subvert its mandate. It was also held that where executive authorities fail to discharge their statutory obligations despite judicial directions, a Constitutional Court exercising powers of judicial review may itself intervene and secure compliance through the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Having regard to the fact that the petitioners in Satish had undergone nearly two decades of incarceration and had suffered the consequences of their actions, the Court sought to strike a balance between individual reformation and societal welfare by directing their conditional premature release, subject to continued good conduct. Consequently, the State Government was directed to release the prisoners on probation under Section 2 of the U.P. Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938 within two weeks.

…

…

8.4.

Fourthly, the petitioner's case deserves to be considered in light of the reformative theory underlying the modern criminal justice system. The object of punishment is not merely retribution, but also the reformation and rehabilitation of the offender so as to enable his eventual reintegration into society. In Mohd. Giasuddin v. State of A.P., (1977) 3 SCC 287 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 496, Krishna Iyer, J., while emphasizing the reformative philosophy of sentencing, quoted George Bernard Shaw's observation that: “If you are to punish a man retributively, you must injure him. If you are to reform him, you must improve him and men are not improved by injuries.” The learned Judge also observed that modern penology regards sentencing as a process of reshaping a person who has deteriorated into criminality and that society itself has a vital stake in the rehabilitation of the offender as a means of social defence. The reformative approach to punishment, therefore, constitutes an integral component of criminal jurisprudence and remission policies are founded upon this principle. In the present case, the petitioner has undergone more than twenty-two (22) years of incarceration and his custody certificate records that his conduct during imprisonment has been good. The recommendation of the State Government for his premature release also indicates that the petitioner's conduct and rehabilitation have been found satisfactory by the competent authorities. Continued incarceration in such circumstances would run contrary to the reformative object underlying remission and premature release policies particularly, when his co-accused has already been released.”

(emphasis supplied)

“Eligibility for premature release:-

3.1

Every convicted prisoner whether male or female undergoing sentence of life imprisonment and covered by the provisions of Section 433A CrPC shall be eligible to be considered for premature release from the prison immediately after serving out the sentence of 14 years of actual imprisonment i.e. without the remissions. It is however, clarified that completion of 14 years in prison by itself would not entitle a convict to automatic release from the prison and the Sentence Review Board shall have the discretion to release a convict, at an appropriate time in all cases considering the circumstances in which the crime was committed and other relevant factors like:-

a)

Whether the convict has lost his potential for committing crime considering his overall conduct in jail during the 14 years incarceration;

b)

The possibility of reclaiming the convict as a useful member of the society; and

c)

Socio-economic condition of the convict's family.

Such convict as stand convicted of a capital offence are prescribed the total period of imprisonment to be undergone including remission, subject to a minimum of 14 years of actual imprisonment before the convict prisoner is released. Total period of incarceration including remission in such cases should ordinarily not exceed 20 years.

Certain categories of convicted prisoners undergoing life sentence would be entitled to be considered for premature release only after undergoing imprisonment for 20 years including remissions. The period of incarceration inclusive of remissions even in such cases should not exceed 25 years. Following categories are mentioned in this connection.

a)

Convicts who have been imprisoned for life for murder in heinous crimes such as murder with rape, murder with dacoity, murder involving an offence under the Protection of Civil Rights Act 1955, murder for dowry, murder of a child below 14 years of age, multiple murder, murder committed after conviction while inside the jail, murder during parole, murder in a terrorist incident, murder in smuggling operation, murder of a public servant on duty.

b)

Gangsters, contract killers, smugglers, drug traffickers, racketeers awarded life imprisonment for committing murders as also the perpetrators of murder committed with pre-meditation and with exceptional violence or perversity.

c)

Convicts whose death sentence has been commuted to life imprisonment.

3.2

All other convicted male prisoners not covered by section 433A CrPC undergoing the sentence of life imprisonment would be entitled to be considered for premature release after they have served at least 14 years of imprisonment inclusive of remission but only after completion of 10 years actual imprisonment i.e., without remissions.

3.3

The female prisoners not covered by section 433A CrPC undergoing the sentence of life imprisonment would be entitled to be considered for premature release after they have served at least 10 years of imprisonment inclusive of remissions but only after completion of 7 years actual imprisonment i.e., without remissions.

3.4

Cases of premature release of persons undergoing life imprisonment before completion of 14 years of actual imprisonment on grounds of terminal illness or old age etc. can be dealt with under the provisions of Art. 161 of the Constitution of India”

“3.

Broadly speaking, the SRB rejected the early release of the petitioner mainly on the basis of report of the Social Welfare Department and the police report. The Social Welfare Department report, rather supports case of the petitioner. When it comes to police verification report dated 15.09.2025, in the covering page of the report, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, South District recorded that as per verification report, pre-mature release of the petitioner is not recommended. But the verification report annexed with that communication of the DCP is to the contrary. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, the concerned DCP mechanically wrote in the communication dated 15.09.2025 that pre-mature release of the petitioner is not recommended as per report. I find substance in the submission that the DCP concerned, apparently did not even bother to read the report.

4.

Before proceeding further, it is considered appropriate that the concerned DCP be given an opportunity to explain, if he so desires, the circumstances in which he recommended case of the petitioner not to be fit for pre-mature release. For that purpose, learned ASC shall convey to the concerned DCP about an opportunity.”

“4.

That as per the verification report, the convict was found to be involved in the gruesome double murder cum theft case. It was seen from the record that he was arrested from Indo-Nepal Border.

5.

Further, there is no apparent source of income of accused's family. Also, the neighbors were not found familiar with the convict or his family.

6.

Moreover, the convict Moti @ Mohit was found actively involved in committing the offence of the present case. Based on the above details filled in the check list form the case of convict Moti@ Mohit for pre-mature release was not found fit for recommendation and accordingly, the same was forwarded as "Not Recommended" in the verification report.

However, The undersigned shall be more careful and attentive while submitting reports to SRB and shall ensure that the reports are concise and precise.”

“11.

Before proceeding further, it would be pertinent to note that the operative minutes of meeting dated 30.06.2023 are virtually copy-paste of the minutes of earlier meetings dated 06.08.2020, 11.12.2020, 25.06.2021, and 21.10.2021. The composition of the SRB would make this court assume that each matter is discussed threadbare in such meetings. But unfortunately, the manner in which minutes of these meetings were worded, the allegation of non-application of mind cannot be brushed aside. Every instrumentality of the State, be it judicial or administrative, while deciding an issue must author the decision in such manner that deciphers what worked in the mind of the authority concerned. The court must have material before it to examine as to whether there was proper application of mind or not. In the present case, there is nothing on record to suggest proper application of mind by the SRB.

12.

Another important aspect is that quite often, the SRB members appointed in their official capacity do not personally attend the meeting and rather send their representatives, owing to their other heavy official engagements. The profile of members of the SRB is such that it is practically not possible for all of them to gather and scrutinize so many cases dealing with human attitudes and personality. The Chairman of the SRB being the Minister and members of SRB being the Principal Secretary (Home) and Secretary (Law, Justice and Legislative Affairs), they opting to send their representatives owing to their overall heavy workload cannot be faulted with. Same is the status qua the District & Sessions Judge.

13.

The SRB deals with human beings, that too those who have been deprived of liberty across a long span of time on account of their aggression which led to criminality. The approach of the SRB ought to be reformation oriented and not a routine disposal/statistics dominated exercise. The composition of SRB needs to be re-examined by the authorities concerned so as to make the exercise of sentence review meaningful and commensurate to the laudable philosophy of reformation of criminal. It is suggested that the composition of SRB must include the judicial officer concerned (or her/his successor) who sentenced the prisoner under consideration; that judicial officer would better contribute after examining the entire trial and sentencing records. It is further suggested that composition of SRB must include an eminent sociologist and a criminologist with missionary zeal and sensitivity towards reformation of the prisoner under consideration. Another vital component of SRB can be the concerned Jail Superintendent, who had the best opportunity to watch the reformative growth or otherwise of the prisoner concerned from close quarters. In order to ensure meaningful exercise of sentence review, the composition of SRB should be based on nexus between the jail performance of the prisoner and the job profile of the member concerned, instead of just high official designation of the member.

14.

As regards application of mind, keeping in view sensitivity of the decision to allow or deny premature release to a prisoner, the application of mind has to be such that reflects application of reasonable and logical parameters. A comparative inventory of aggravating and mitigating factors must be taken on record by SRB in order to arrive at its decision. The decision, so arrived, must have a reasonable connect with the inventory, aimed at achieving meaningful reformation. In this regard, SRB should also make a graded response in the sense that depending upon the scale of observed reformation of the prisoner, if the stage is considered a bit early for premature release, the prisoner can be shifted initially to semi-open prison, followed by open prison. That gradual movement would give a taste of liberty to the prisoner, which would encourage him to push for his reformation and that would be a meaningful punishment. Not just this, SRB can also consider premature release of the convict/prisoner with necessary directions in the nature of surveillance over specific period, directing the prisoner/convict to report before the local police on a weekly basis for specific period. The binary of grant or denial of premature release has to be discarded.”

(emphasis supplied)

“The convict has undergone 19 years and 07 months inside the jail including undertrial period. He has availed parole/furlough multiple times. During this time he has not committed any crime, which shows his willingness to comply with the conditions parole/furlough. In addition to it, it also shows that he is harmless to the society. As per jail records there is no other case pending against the convict.

Upon interacting with him inside the jail, the undersigned was conveyed by the convict that he worked as a Store Sahayak, Plumber, Control Room Sahayak, Office Sewadar and currently working as VC Sewadar. He is earning Rs.10,000/month, a part of which he sends to his family. The convict also conveyed that he works as an attendant at a restaurant in Noida when goes for his parole/furlough. The convict was also out for about year or so (06.07.2023-08.10.2024) where he worked as an attendant in Shree Krishna Restaurant in Noida and earned his living and supported his family. This shows that the convict has engaged himself in doing meaningful work and has been showing responsibility towards his family.

When released, he plans to continue working as an attendant in a restaurant and earn his living. The convict is determined to reintegrate fully into his community and family ensuring their socio-economic stability and well being.”