Most. Suryamani Devi And Ors vs State Of Bihar Through And Ors

Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the Bihar State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the 'Corporation'). Nobody appears on behalf of the State.

The petitioners have moved the Court alleging noncompliance of the order dated 22.10.2014 passed in MJC No. 4167 of 2013.

The order required the Corporation to make payment of interest in respect of delayed payment of CPF accumulation on compound interest basis. The operative portion reads as under:

"Today, a show cause has been filed along with Annexure-1, the order issued on 20.10.2014 by the Administrator, BSRTC, which has been communicated to all concerned authorities under Memo No. 4363 of the same day. This is office order no. 355 dated 20.10.2014. In this office order, he has accepted the finding of this Court that interest on the unpaid accumulations of CPF had to be calculated on basis of compound interest as done in the case of CPF itself. He has, accordingly, directed for payment of interest in respect of delayed payment of CPF accumulations on compound interest basis. The true import of this office order is that where the accumulated CPF became due and payable to a retired employee on a particular date but it was paid thereafter then for this period of delay the interest would be calculated on compounding basis. Thus, the Administrator has effectively by his said office order purged the contempt. No question of punishment would thus arise. However, it is directed that the interest calculation aforesaid in respect of the 56 employees/writ petitioners in question and its full payment and final settlement in respect of all would be done within a period of six weeks from today. All the aforesaid persons must also be individually intimated at their last known address about their entitlements. The responsibility of compliance of this Court's order would be on the Administrator of the BSRTC."

Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that though payments of CPF had been made to the petitioners but the same was delayed by more than a decade and accordingly, they are entitled to payment of interest till the date of actual payment. However, learned counsel tried to persuade the Court to interpret the order to mean that the interest would be payable till the date such interest was actually paid to the petitioners.

Learned counsel for the Corporation submitted that interest for the period from which the CPF amount became due i.e., the superannuation of petitioners, till the date the basic amount was paid to the petitioners, has been calculated and even if there has been a delay of a few months in making payment of such interest for the period when it became due and when the actual payment was made of the basic CPF amount, the Corporation has already discharged its liability by paying the amount to the petitioners.

Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and submissions of learned counsel for the parties, in the considered opinion of the Court, the order dated 22.10.2014 in MJC No. 4167 of 2013, only required that for the period from when the petitioners superannuated till the time they were paid the CPF amount, to be counted for payment of interest. There was no direction that if such payment of interest was also delayed, the interest would carry till the date of actual payment of the interest amount, i.e., interest on interest.

As the Court is sitting in contempt jurisdiction, it cannot go beyond the order of which there is alleged violation. Thus, in the present case, the Court finds that the payment made by the Corporation is in terms of the order dated 22.10.2014 in MJC No. 4167 of 2013.

Accordingly, the application stands disposed off.

The Court would only observe that it has not considered with regard to the claim of the petitioners, that even for the delay in payment of such interest, for the period of delay, further interest is payable, which is a separate cause of action and cannot be stretched to be included in the direction of the Court in MJC No. 4167 of 2013.