Moosa Haji vs Sped. Tahsildar for Land Acquisition and Another

Govindan Nair, J.—A common question arises for determination in these writ applications: whether the declaration, evidenced by Ext. p. 3 in each of these applications, made u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act I of 1894), is liable to be quashed in view of the fact that section 5 of the Act has been dispensed with. It is clear from Exts. P. 2 and P. 3 in each of these cases, Ext. P. 2 being notifications issued u/s 4 (1) that the land sought to be acquired and taken possession of was meant for the purpose of building an additional Ward attached to the hospital in Calicut Municipal Town. Ext. P. 2 notifications have dispensed with the provisions of section 5. This action was apparently taken u/s 17 (4) of the Act. That section is in these terms:

17(4). In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of sub-section (I) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of section 5A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made u/s 6 in respect of the land at any time after the publication of the notification u/s 4, sub-section (1).

In order that section 17(4) can apply, one or other of the purposes mentioned in section 17 (2) as amended by the Madras Legislature and reading as under must exist.

17 (2). In the following cases, that is to say-

(a) Whenever owing to any sudden change in the channel of any navigable river or other unforeseen emergency, it becomes necessary for any Railway Administration to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the maintenance of their traffic or for the purpose of making thereon a riverside or ghat station, or of providing convenient connection with or access to any such station,

(b) Whenever in the opinion of the Collector it becomes necessary to acquire the immediate possession of any land-

(i) for the purpose of any library or educational institution, or

(ii) for the construction, extension or improvement of-

(A) Any Building or other structure in any village for the common use of the inhabitants of such village, or

(B) any godown for any society registered or deemed to be registered under the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1932, or

(C) any dwelling house for the poor, or

(D) any irrigation tank, irrigation or drainage channel or any well, or

(E) any road,

The Collector may, immediately after the publication of the notice mentioned in subsection (1) and with the previous sanction of the appropriate Government, enter upon and take possession of such land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances.

It is conceded on behalf of the State that the acquisition did not relate to arable land or any waste land and so section 17(I) cannot apply. As far as section 17 (2) is concerned, various purposes have been mentioned; but the only relevant one for the purpose of this case is that contained in section 17 (2) (b) (ii) (A) which enacts,

Any building or other structure in any village for the common use of the inhabitants of such village.

This leads to the further question whether the acquisition was for constructing any building or other structure in any village for the common use of the inhabitants of such village. The land in question is situate within the Municipal limits of the Calicut Municipality. This can hardly be said to be a place which can be called a village. It may be useful to refer to two decisions. These decisions are reported in Diwan Chand v Nizam Din (A.I.R. 1924 Lah. 662 (1)) and in State v Nand Lal (A.I.R. 1953 Pepsu 103). In Diwan Chand v Nizam Din (A.I.R. 1924 Lah. 662(I)), Their Lordships said :

village'' connotes ordinarily an area occupied by a body of men mainly dependent upon agriculture or occupations subservient thereto.

These conditions cannot be said to be satisfied with regard to the inhabitants of the Calicut Municipal Town.

The notifications, Exts. P. 2 and P. 3, are, therefore, without the authority of law. They have to be quashed, and I do so. There will be no order as to costs.