Mohmad Abdullah Ahanger vs Saif-u-din

This application in revision is directed against the order dated 20121957 of the 2nd Addl. Munsiff, Srinagar, dismissing the plaintiff's two

applications dared 2971966 one for ""amendment"" of the order dated 3151967 and the other for direction to the defendant to file better particulars

of the averments made by him Para No. 10 of his written statement to the effect that all the necessary parties has not been impleaded as

defendants in the suit.

At the hearing of this revision petition, the controversy has assumed a narrower form as the learned counsel for the petitioner has confined his

submissions only to his prayer in the first application for amendment or deletion of the observations in the order of the trial court that ""Girdawar has

in his statement deposed that land in dispute is in possession of Kh. Saifuddin.

The fact material for the purpose of this application lie in a short compass and may be stated thus :

In a suit for permanent injunction brought by Mohammad Abdullah Ahanger against Saifuddin, the 2nd Addl. Munsiff Srinagar, issued temporary

injunction on 971966 restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's possession over the land in dispute, The defendant thereupon

applied to the court to vacate the interim injunction After examining the Girdawar and hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the court modified

the previous order by directing that the parties would 'maintain the position which was prevailing before the institution of the suit'. This order was

passed on 31567. In its short resume the court observed that the Girdawar has in his statement deposed that land in dispute is in possession of Kh.

Saifuddin. Aggrieved by this observation in the order, the plaintiff made an application to the court for amendment of the said observation on the

ground that the statement attributed to the Girdawar had not been made by him and if the observation was allowed to stand, it would effect him

prejudicially. The learned counsel appearing in support of this application has reiterated the submission made by him before the trial court.

The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the petition for review of the order made by the petitioner to the trial court did not lie

and in any event the order passed by it was correct and could not be interfered with in revision.

It is not necessary for me to decide as to whether a review petition lay or not because even assuming that no review lay even then there was no bar

to the court deleting or amending the remarks in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 C.P.C. as it is well settled by a catena of

authorities that nothing in the Code is to be deemed to affect the inherent powers of the court under Section 151 C.P.C. to make such orders as it

may deem necessary in the ends of Justice.

I am supported in this behalf by a ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, reported in AIR 1962 SC 527, wherein it has been held as follows

:

'Section 151 itself says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the court to make order

necessary for the ends of justice. In the face of such a clear statement it is not possible to hold that the provisions of the Code control the inherent

power by limiting it or otherwise affecting it. The inherent power has not been conferred upon the court, it is a power inherent in the court by virtue

of its duty to do justice between the parties before it. Further when the Code itself recognizes the existence of the inherent power of the court,

there is no question of implying any powers outside the limits of the Code.

The following observations made by Bowen Saifudin I.J. in Mellor v. Swire (1885) 30 Ch. D. 239 are also worth .quoting in this connection:

Every court has inherent power over its own records so long as those records are within its power and that it can set right any mistake in them. An

order even when passed and entered may be amended by the court so as to carry out its intention and express the meaning of the court when the

order was made.

Reference in this connection may also be made to another authority reported in AIR 1930 Bom. 294, where it was held :

''An interlocutory order made in Chambers can be reviewed by the court under S. 151 and ought to be reviewed if the ends of justice require it,

even though the application for such a purpose does not expressly fall within the language of 0.47.

It is also advantageous to reproduce the following observations made in AIR 1950 Calcutta 209 :

The fact that one officer has ceased to preside over a court and is succeeded by another gentleman does not mean that the court has ceased to

exist or that the court is another court. It is the court which in the exercise of its inherent powers can and where necessary should, make orders for

the ends of Justice.

Examining the matter in the light of the aforesaid observations I think that the trial court have made the amendment sought for in its order dated

3151967.

I have gone through the statement of the Girdawar with care and I find that the statement attributed to him by the trial court does not find place in

his. statement. In these circumstances, Saifudin therefore, the learned Munsiff was not justified in making the observations referred to above.

I, therefore, direct that the learned Munsiff while disposing of the case shall not be influenced by the aforesaid observation which seems to have

crept in inadvertently in the order of the learned Munsiff.

This revision petition is disposed of accordingly.