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Judgment
SACHIN DATTA, J. (ORAL)
By way of the present petition filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [pari materia to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter “CrPC”)], the petitioner seeks quashing of FIR No. 314/2020, dated 05.08.2020, registered at P.S. Dwarka South, Delhi, under Sections 376/328/354(A)/506/509 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter “IPC”), and all the proceeding emanating therefrom, on the basis of Settlement Agreement, dated 22.09.2026, entered into between the parties. The same is appended as Annexure-P4 to the present petition.
The aforesaid FIR was registered on the complaint of respondent no.2 against one Vikas Kumar Mittal. A chargesheet was filed against Vikas Kumar Mittal under Sections 376/328/354(A)/506/509 of the IPC. Subsequently, a supplementary chargesheet was filed against petitioner nos. 1 and 2 and Vineet Kumar under Sections 506/509/120B of the IPC. Further, by virtue of the same supplementary chargesheet, Section 174A of the IPC was also invoked against Vikas Kumar Mittal, in addition to the offences already alleged.
The case of the prosecution against the petitioners, as set out in the status report, is that petitioner no. 1 (business rival of Vikas Kumar Mittal) conspired with petitioner no. 2 and another accused, namely, Vineet Kumar, to have respondent no. 2 (complainant) threatened over the telephone in the name of Vikas Kumar Mittal. The object behind this act was allegedly to secure Vikas Kumar Mittal’s arrest and enhance his punishment.
Ld. Additional Sessions Judge (FTSC) (RC), South West District, Dwarka Courts, Delhi, vide order dated 25.08.2026, on an application moved by the State and supported by respective Ld. Counsel for all the accused and the prosecutrix, separated the trial of the petitioners and Vineet Kumar from the trial of Vikas Kumar Mittal. While doing so, Ld. ASJ (FTSC) (RC) recorded that the offences alleged against the petitioners and Vineet Kumar have no connection with the offences alleged against Vikas Kumar Mittal, i.e., the alleged commission of rape, in the following terms:
“4.The record reflects that originally accused Vikas Kumar Mittal was chargesheeted U/S 376/328/354A/509/34 IPC and subsequently, after the completion of investigation U/S 173(8) Cr.P.C., the remaining accused persons namely Sumit Yadav, Mohit Goel and Vineet Kumar were chargesheeted for the offences u/S 120B/506/509 IPC, which have no connection with the original offence i.e. alleged committal of rape by the accused Vikas Kumar Mittal.
5.Furthermore, it is a well settled principle of law that even if the conditions provided in Section 223 Cr.P.C are fulfilled, the court may direct separation/segregation of trial if a joint trial would cause delay, unnecessary waste of judicial time and confusion/prejudice to the co-accused persons, who had allegedly committed only a minor offence.”
(emphasis supplied)
Respondent no. 2 (complainant), who is present in person, has been duly identified by the concerned Investigating Officer (IO). Petitioner no. 2, who is also present in person, and petitioner no. 1, who has joined the proceedings virtually, have also been identified by the IO.
In view of the aforesaid order, dated 25.08.2026, the petitioners are not accused of rape or any sexual offence. Rather, Ld. ASJ (FTSC) (RC) invokes Section 223 of the CrPC in favour of the petitioners and implicitly classifies the allegations as “minor offences”.
Accordingly, the offences alleged against the petitioners and Vineet Kumar are under Sections 506/509/120B of the IPC. The following can be noted qua these offences:
| Section (Act) | Offence | Compoundable |
|---|---|---|
| 506 (IPC) | Criminal Intimidation | Compoundable, as per Section 320(1) of the CrPC |
| 509 (IPC) | Criminal Intimidation by Anonymous Communication | Compoundable with permission of the Court, as per Section 320(2) of the CrPC |
| 120B (IPC) | Criminal Conspiracy | Non-Compoundable |
It is pointed out that the petitioners’ application for compounding under Section 320 of the CrPC is pending before the trial Court. However, the charge of conspiracy under Section 120B of the IPC would prevent the trial Court from recording a compromise and compounding the matter qua the petitioners. Therefore, the petitioners have approached this Court for exercise of its inherent power.
The offences alleged against the petitioners are not heinous in nature and are largely compoundable. This Court is of the opinion that it would be in the interests of justice to quash the FIR qua the petitioners under Section 120B of the IPC.
What further weighs with the Court is that the petitioners and respondent no. 2 have entered into the aforesaid Settlement Agreement, which reads as follows:
3.Further, the Parties have arrived at the present settlement voluntarily, out of their own free will and without any force, coercion, undue influence, pressure, threat or misrepresentation from any person whatsoever.
4.Furthermore, the Parties have mutually agreed to bring an end to all disputes and grievances between them, if any, arising out of the aforesaid FIR and the consequential proceedings emanating therefrom, to the extent permissible in law.
5.The Parties have agreed that they shall not pursue or press against each other any claim, grievance or allegation arising out of the aforesaid disputes, except to the extent required for giving effect to the present settlement or as may be directed/permitted by the competent Court.
6.The Third Party has no objection to the compounding of the offences qua First Party as well as the Second Party and/or quashing of FIR No. 314/2020 dated 05.08.2020, registered under Sections 376/328/354(A)/506/509/120B IPC, P.S. Dwarka South, Crime Branch, Delhi, and all subsequent and consequential proceedings emanating therefrom, insofar as the same relate to the First Party as well as the Second Party, subject to the orders of the competent Court.
7.The Parties undertake to appear before the competent Court, if so required, and to make appropriate statements confirming the present settlement and their consent/no objection to the quashing of the proceedings/ compounding of offences in terms of the present Settlement Agreement.
8.The Parties further undertake to abide by the terms and conditions of the present Settlement Agreement in good faith.
9.The Parties further agree that this Settlement Agreement shall be placed before the Hon'ble Court in the proceedings arising out of the aforesaid FIR and shall form part of the record of the said proceedings.
During the course of hearing, respondent no. 2 affirms that she entered into the Settlement Agreement with the petitioners voluntarily out of her own free will and volition, without any pressure or undue influence. To that effect, she has submitted an affidavit dated 28.01.2026, which reads as under:
It is apposite to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, wherein it was observed as under:
“58.Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.”
(emphasis supplied)
The principles established in Gian Singh (supra) were further crystallised in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466. Paragraph 29 of the same reads as follows:
“29.In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: ***
29.2.When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. ***
29.4.On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
29.5.While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.” (emphasis supplied)
The Supreme Court in Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641, summarised the position qua compromise quashing in the following manner:
“16.1.Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court. ***
16.3.In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.
16.4.While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court. ***
16.7.As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.
16.8.Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.” (emphasis supplied)
Considering the facts and circumstances, there is no impediment in allowing the present petition.
Accordingly, in view of the joint request of the parties, and considering the law laid down in the aforesaid judgments, the present petition is allowed, and FIR No. 314/2020, dated 05.08.2020, registered at P.S. Dwarka South, Delhi, under Sections 376/328/354(A)/506/509 IPC and all the proceeding emanating therefrom, qua the present petitioners, stand CRL.M.C. 7512/2026 Page 9 of 10 quashed.
Considering that substantial judicial time and state resources have been expended pursuant to the subject FIR, the petitioners agree to pay cumulative costs of Rs. 1,00,000/-. Out of the said amount, Rs. 50,000/-shall be paid to the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee (DHCLSC) and Rs.50,000/- to the Delhi High Court Middle Income Group Legal Aid Society.
It is clarified that this order would not ensure any benefit to other co-accused. It is further clarified that this order shall not affect the trial of Vikas Kumar Mittal.
The petition, along with the pending application, is disposed of in the above terms.
