Mohinder Singh Babba vs The State of Punjab and others

B.R. Tuli, J.—The petitioner was appointed as Sectional Officer on May 21, 1960, by the Financial Commissioner, Development, and Secretary to Government, Punjab, Development and Panchayat Department, and was posted at Nurpur. On June 25, 1960 he was posted as Block Overseer in the National Extension Services Block, Shahpur, district Kangra. When he took charge of that post, there were certain works in progress, which he had to supervise. A middle school was being constructed at Masrarh and the petitioner went to see it only once in August, 1960. The building of the school fell down in 1961, and the petitioner was held responsible for the same on the ground that he had acted negligently in the discharge of his duties and in not properly supervising the construction of that building The enquiry in the matter was held by the District Development and Panchayat Officer, Kangra who sum noned the petitioner to appear before him on December 26, 1961. On that date the District Development and Panchayat Officer was on leave and therefore, he could not meet the petitioner. The petitioner was asked to meet him on January 10, 1962. On that date the petitioner explained to the District Development and Panchayat Officer that he was not to blame for the collapse of the building of the school. He shitted the burden on to his predecessor, Shri Ram Prakash, and the Sarpanch and other Panches of the Panchayat. The District Development and Panchayat Officer made his report to the Deputy Commissioner on January 15, 1982, on the basis of which a notice was issued to the petitioner by the Deputy Commissioner, Kangra, on February of, 1982, calling for his explanation. The petitioner submitted his explanation on March 16, 1962, and on September 21, 1962, the Deputy Commissioner informed the petitioner that his explanation had been considered by him and was found unsatisfactory He was warned to be more careful in the discharge of his duties in future.

Another enquiry was made by the Sub Divisional Officer, Panchayati Raj Public Works, Dharamsala into the matter, who issued a notice to the petitioner on June 23, 1963, asking for his explanation to four queries, to which the petitioner submitted his explanation on July 8, 1963. This explanation of the petitioner was sent by the Deputy Commissioner to the Commissioner, Agricultural Production and Rural Development, and Secretary to Government Punjab, Development and Panchayat Department. It was considered by the Superintending Engineer, Panchayati Raj, Public Works Circle, Punjab, who recommended that the punishment of stoppage of six annual increments with cumulative effect may be imposed on the petitioner and Ram Parkash, his predecessor. This recommendation was made on March 22, 1964, to the Development Commissioner and Secretary to Government. Punjab, Development and Panchayat Department, who agreed with the recommendation of the Superintending Engineer and directed that a notice may be issued to the two Overseers to show cause why the proposed penalty should not be inflicted on them. Consequently, a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner, to which he sent his reply. After considering the same the Superintending Engineer, Panchayati Raj, passed an order stating that the explanation of the petitioner has been considered and found unsatisfactory and that six annual increments with cumulative effect are, therefore stopped. This order was passed on April 18, 1966, and against that order the petitioner filed an appeal to the State Government, which was rejected on December 17, 1966. The petitioner then filed the present petition in this Court challenging the orders referred to above. A written statement has been filed by the Superintending Engineer, Panchayati Raj, Public Works Circle in which the punishment imposed on the petitioner has been justified.

The first point argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Superintending Engineer had no jurisdiction to pass the order of punishment as he was not appointing or the punishing authority of the petitioner. It is admitted that the petitioner was appointed by the Financial Commissioner, Development, and Secretary to Government, Punjab, Development and Panchayat Department; but it is stated that by an order dated July 6, 1962, the Financial Commissioner, Development and Secretary to Government, Punjab, Development and Panchayat Department, had delegated the power to impose minor punishments on Overseers at Block level to the Superintending Engineer; Panchayati Raj, Public Works Circle, Punjab, and it was by virtue of that power that the Superintending Engineer passed the impugned order of punishment. It is not shown under which rule or provision of any statute did the Financial Commissioner, Development, and Secretary to Government, Punjab Development and Panchayat Department could delegate his powers to the Superintending Engineer concerned. Normally, it is the appointing authority who has to impose the punishment after considering the explanation of the delinquent Officer and this power cannot be delegated to any other authority unless there is any statutory rule or provision of law permitting that delegation. No such statutory rule or provision of law has been brought to my notice by either side, with the result that I am constrained to hold that the Superintending Engineer, Panchayati Raj, Public Works Circle, Punjab, had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order imposing punishment on the petitioner, who had been appointed by the Financial Commissioner, Development, and Secretary to Government, Punjab, Development and Panchayat Department.

There is another ground on the basis of which the order of the Superintending Engineer has to be quashed and that is that it is not a speaking order and gives no reasons for imposing the punishment, nor does it state any reason why the explanation of the petitioner was not found to be satisfactory. In view of the pronouncements of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in various cases, it cannot be denied that the proceedings for imposing any kind of punishment on a public servant are quasi judicial in nature. It was so held by their lordships of the Supreme Court in Bachhittar Singh Vs. The State of Punjab, and Union of India (UOI) Vs. H.C. Goel, An appeal is also provided against the order imposing a minor punishment under Rule 10 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952, against an order passed under Rule 8 thereof. It is therefore, incumbent on the authority passing the order of punishment to state reasons and communicate the same to the public servant concerned in order to enable him to effectively exercise his right of appeal. In the absence of the reasons, he cannot urge in appeal as to what weighed with the punishing authority. Similarly, the appellate authority, while disposing of the appeal, has to pass a speaking order giving reasons for rejecting the appeal and it is not enough to state in the order that the explanation of the public servant has not been found satisfactory or that he should be informed that his appeal has been rejected. The order communicated to the public servant concerned should contain the reasons of the punishing authority or the appellate authority in support of each order. It has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shri Pragdas Umar Vaiakya v. Union of India C.A. 657 of 1967 and others (Civil Appeal No. 657 of 1967) decided on August 17, 1967), as under:

The order passed by the Central Government in exercise of its revisional authority under Rule 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules, is subject to appeal to this Court: Shivraji Nathubhai v. The Union of India and others. 4. It the right to appeal is intended to be effective, the tribunal must record its reasons and make them available to the parties to the dispute. In the present case the reasons in support of the order of the Central Government were apparently not recorded and were not made available to the parties concerned in the dispute. But, it was argued by the counsel for respondents 2 and 3, the High Court had looked into the file of the Central Government and it appeared that the revision petition filed by respondents 2 and 3 was granted by the Central Government because their application for a mining lease for ''refractory clay'' was prior to the application filed by the appellant, and the Central Government was satisfied that the revision application filed by respondents 2 and 3 on February 4, 1964, was within the prescribed time. In our view the procedure followed by the High Court was irregular. It is not for the High Court to give reasons which the Government might have, but has not chosen to give, in support of its conclusion Since no reasons were given in support of the order passed by the Central Government the order was ex facie defective, and the defect could not be remedied by looking into the file maintained by the Government and constructing the reasons in support of the order The reasons in support of the order had to be recorded and disclosed to the parties concerned by the Central Government the reasons could not be gathered from the ''notings'' made in the files of the Central Government. Recording of reasons and disclosure thereof is not a mere formality. The party affected by the order has a right to approach this Court in appeal, and an effective challenge against the order may be raised only if the party aggrieved is apprised of the reasons in support of the order.

The orders passed by the Superintending Engineer, Panchayati Raj, Public Works Circle, Punjab, in the first instance, and by the State Government on appeal were open to challenge in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution as well as through special appeal to their Lordships of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution The proceedings for infliction of punishment and the order imposing the punishment being quasi judicial in nature, the order has to be a speaking one, that is, the reasons in support thereof must be disclosed in the order itself, so that the order communicated to the public servant concerned also apprises him of the reasons on the basis of which the order or orders were passed in order to enable him to challenge those reasons before the appellate authority or in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The two impugned orders are therefore, liable to be quashed on this ground.

For the reasons given above, I accept this petition with costs and quash the order of the Superintending Engineer, Panchayati Raj, Public Works Circle, Punjab, dated April 18, 1966, in so far as it concerns the petitioner and the order of the State Government dated December 17, 1966, rejecting the appeal of the petitioner. Counsel''s fee Rs. 100/-.