High Courts(1897) 07 CAL CK 0031

Mohim Chunder Sanyal and another vs Kashi Kant Sanyal and others

Calcutta High Court · Decided on 16 July 1897

RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Appeal from Appellate Decree No. 175 of 1896

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Judgment

2 paragraphs · 521 words
1.

It has been found and the facts are not now in dispute that Hara Sundari acquired a title by adverse possession to the property to which this suit relates; that upon her death in 1285, the property went to her daughter, Shib Sundari, who gave a putni lease of it to the Defendants and that the Plaintiffs after Shib Sundari''s death, which took place in 1294, purchased the property from Hara Sundari''s brother. The District Judge has also found that the property was the Stridhan of Hara Sundari, who had an absolute right to it; but that Shib Sundari inheriting from her took only a qualified interest in it and had no power to make a putni grant which would inure after her death as no necessity had been shown for it. He also held that the Plaintiffs had acquired a good title by their purchase from Hara Sundari''s brother, who was her rightful heir, and he gave the Plaintiffs a decree for khas possession. The only contention before us is that the property was not Stridhan over which Hara Sundari had absolute control, consequently that it devolved not on her heirs but on the heirs of her husband, and that the Plaintiff''s vendor had no title under the law of succession applicable to the case. The sole question, therefore, is whether the property was Stridhan over which Hara Sundari had absolute control.

2.

The learned pleader for the Appellants has cited various texts in support of his contention that this would not fall under any of the enumerated descriptions of Stridhan, but we think it is sufficient to say that those are not exhaustive and as authority for that to refer to the text in Dayabhaga, para. 18, Chap. IV, sec. 1, which states that the number is not restricted, and that that alone is the woman''s peculiar property which she has power to give, sell or use independently of her husband''s control. On a contention somewhat similar to this in the case of Brij Indur Bahadur Sing v. Rani Janki Koer R.L. 5 I.A. 1 before the Judicial Committee, this text was cited and followed. The question then is this--was this Hara Sundari''s property in the sense that she had power to dispose of it independently of her husband''s control? That question here, as in the case cited, seems hardly to arise because Hara Sundari''s title was acquired after her husband''s death But, even assuming that it was not so, we think that a title acquired by adverse possession is a title which would give to the holder of it an absolute control over the property. It was argued, on the authority of para. 20, sec. 1, Chapter IV of the Dayabhaga that a husband has dominion and full control over property earned by his wife in the exercise of mechanical art or received by her from any other than the family of her father, mother or husband. This property cannot be said to have been earned by her or received from anyone. The judgment appealed from is, we consider, right, and we dismiss the appeal with costs.