Mohd. Akbar Kichloo vs District Magistrate, Doda

Jaswant Singh, J.—This is a petition for issue of a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus by Shri Mohamad Akbar Kitchloo who has been,

detained by Order No. I/PDA/69 dated 18-7-1969 of the District Magistrate, Doda issued u/s 3(2) read with Section 5 of the Jammu and

Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964, and approved by the Government vide Order No. ISD 244 of 1969, dated 9-8-1968.

It appears that pursuant to the aforesaid order of the District Magistrate, the petitioner was arrested on 19-7-1969 at 7-40 A.M. at the

entrance of the court gate of the Judicial Magistrate at Doda, and the grounds of his detention as contained in the order reproduced below were

furnished to the petitioner at his request on 26-7-69:

OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE DODA

ORDER

The Superintendent of Police Doda vide his No. 864/CB dated 18-7-1969 has reported that the young blood at Doda formed Students and

Youth Federation from 23-4-1969 and started a campaign by demanding the shifting of Sessions and Chief Judicial Magistrate Courts and

Teachers Training School from Bhaderwah and D.M.O's. office from Batote to Doda and opening of a Degree College at Doda. Since then they

have been organising public meeting as well.

Sh. Mohd Akbar Kichloo Advocate S/O Kh. Mohd. Khalil Kichloo r/o Doda, National Conference, is instigating the Students and Youth

Federation to organise strikes, Dharaa, meetings and processions simply to derive political capital out of it. He all along remains with the students

and addresses the meetings at various occasions thereby preaching violence openly. He is further reported to be conducting secret meetings with

the students and their supporters thereby instigating them to observe Hartal, stage Dharaa and organise processions and meetings in order to create

lawlessness at Doda. He is reported to have met the hunger strikers openly and at an occasion he encouraged them to continue their struggle and

also exploited them against the Government. He once referred to Telangana in his speech and thereby instigating the students to carry on the

agitation on the same lines.

He is reported usually starting his speeches with revolutionary couplet from Iqbal.

These acts of this individual are causing fear and alarm in public and there is every apprehension of breach of public order.

The Superintendent of Police Doda has therefore, recommended the detention of the said Mohd. Akbar Kichloo Advocatt r/o Doda under the

provisions of the J & K Preventive Detention Act, 1964, in order to prevent him for acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public

order.

In view of the above facts I am satisfied that a detention order u/s 3(2) read with Section 5 of the J & K Preventive Detention Act 1964 be issued

against the said Mohd. Akbar Kichloo Advocate son of Sh. Mohd. Khalil Kichloo and be detained in Central Jail Jammu. The detention order be

sent to the Superintendent of Police Doda for execution.

Dated 18-7-1969

Sd/-

District Magistrate

Doda.

In the petition challenging his detention the petitioner has inter alia averred that the grounds of detention are vague, flimsy and self-contradictory,

and as such liable to be set aside, that the order of detention illegal as the District Magistrate has acted merely upon the report of the

Superintendent of Police without verifying the facts or applying his judicial mind, that to muster public support for genuine and lawful demands of

the people and organise peaceful processions, dharnas and hartals is an established right in a democratic country and the detention order issued on

this account tantamounts to the denial of fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of India, that the speeches of the petitioner have been wilfully

and deliberately distorted with the mala fide intention of harming him politically as he was exposing the omissions and commissions of the

administration, and that the petitioner has all along been advocating non-violence and secularism as a creed and not as a political expediency and to

represent the petitioner as preaching violence is sheer injustice to him which appears to be motivated by political considerations of the vested

interests.

In the affidavit-in-opposition which has been sworn to by Shri Prahlad Singh, District Magistrate, Doda, it has been inter alia stated that the

impugned detention order was issued by him as he was satisfied that it was necessary so to do in order to prevent the petitioner from acting in a

manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, that the grounds of detention served on the petitioner were clear, capable of being clearly

understood and were sufficiently definite to enable the petitioner to make his representation, that the petitioner was organising and instigating

procession dhama, and hartal and preaching violence and instigating the public to commit acts of lawlessness, that these acts were prejudicial to the

maintenance of public order, that information of the issue of the impugned order of detention was duly conveyed to the Government through the

Home Secretary and a copy of the grounds was also forwarded to the Government who approved of his action.

Appearing for the petitioner Shri Thakur has vehemently urged that the grounds served on his client were extremely vague, non-existent and

irrelevant and were not definite to enable him to make an effective representation. He has further urged that the grounds of detention did not bear

any relation to the object for which his client was sought to be detained, that there was no connection between the strike of the students and

maintenance of public order that no ban had been imposed by the authorities in the town of Doda on the holding of the meetings and processions

and that no material has been brought on the record to show that the situation in Doda was explosive or that there was imminent danger of breach

of public order and that violence had not been alleged as a fact against his client but had been wrongly deduced from his innocent activities.

The learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the respondent has tried to controvert the submissions made on behalf of the

petitioner and has contended that considered as a whole the grounds supplied to the petitioner were not vague but were definite, certain and

sufficiently clear to enable him to make an effective representation.

It cannot be denied that it is the right of the petitioner under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India to be furnished with particulars of the

grounds of his detention sufficient to enable him to make a representation which on being considered may afford relief to him. (See AIR 1955 J&K

38 (FB)). It has also now been settled by a catena of decisions that vagueness is a relative term and the real test to find out whether the grounds of

detention supplied to a detenu are vague or not is whether they are capable of being intelligently understood and sufficiently definite to enable a real

representation being made against the detention. Reference in this connection be made with advantage to the decision of their Lordships of the

Supreme Court in Rameshwar Lal Patwari Vs. State of Bihar, where Hon'ble Hidayatullah, J. (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the Court

observed:-

The detention of a person without a trial, merely on the subjective satisfaction of an authority, however high, is a serious matter. It must require the

closet scrutiny of the material on which the decision is formed, leaving no room for errors or at least avoidable errors. The very reason that the

Courts do not consider the reasonableness of the opinion formed or the sufficiency of the material on which it is based indicates the need for the

greatest circumspection on the part of those who wield this power over others. Since the detenu is not placed before a Magistrate and has only a

right of being supplied the grounds of detention with a view to his making a representation to the Advisory Board the grounds must not be vague or

indefinite and must afford real opportunity to make a representation against the detention. Similarly, if a vital ground is shown to be non-existing so

that it could not have and ought not to have played a part in the material for consideration, the Court may attach some importance to this fact.

In Bhupati Goswami v. C.R. Krishnamurthi, AIR 1969 ASS 14 Goswami, J. speaking for the court observed:

When the grounds are given to the detenu, those grounds which are the conclusions of the detaining authority on the facts disclosed at that stage

must be clear and specific.

There must not be any vagueness about them. The object is to enable the detenu to make an effective representation against the order and unless

the grounds are given with sufficient particulars on which he is expected to make a representation the salutary pro-vision for making the

representation will become meaningless and illusory.

It would be well at this state to refer to a few decisions where the grounds supplied to the detenus were held to be vague and incapable of

enabling them to make effective representation.

In Rameshwar Lal Patwari Vs. State of Bihar, where the following grounds:-

(1) He is prominent businessman of Dumka and with the association of Sarvashri Mulchand Choudhary, Kanhaiaya Choudhury Mulchand Modi,

Pir Mohammed (Bengaria P.S.) Shikaripara and others he indulges in black marketing of foodgrains. He has four trucks, one jeep and a car which

have been registered in the names of the relatives, Truck No. BRL 1333 which is registered in the name of his brother-in-law (Sala) Sriharichandra

Agarwala was caught on 29th December, 1966 at Ranibahal near Mashanjor while carrying 95 bags of paddy for illegal trade. In this connection a

case under the Essential Commodities Act has been instituted. He is on bail in this case.

(2) His trucks always take to wicked routes to Saithia (West Bengal) and he himself pilots them.

(3) A businessman of Barahiya disclosed that he (Rameshwar Lal Patwari) visited Barahiya on several occasions and purchased gram and gramdal

under various names and smuggled them to West Bengal.

(4) On the night of 2-2-66, Sri R.S. Singh, 1st Class Magistrate, along with sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, other Magistrates, and Police Officers

raided the house of Sri Rameshwar Lal Patwari and found all kinds of foodgrains in huge quantity. His stock register was maintained in irregular

way. He could not produce the sale register and took the plea that it was produced before the income tax Officer. It was found that he has been

dealing in foodgrains without any licence. A case has been instituted in this connection in which he is on bail.

(5) Shri Babu Ram Bikaneria, owner of a Rice Mill at Saitha District Birbhum (West Bengal) visited Dumka on 26-11-1966 and told him (Sri

Rameshwar Lal Patwari) to supply gram and gramdal. He (Sri Rameshwar Lal Patwari) promised to supply gram and gramdal. On 7/8-12-66 Sri

Mulchand Choudhury of Rameshwar who is his agent sent his truck No. BRJ 2029 loaded with gram and gramdal to Saitha through Mahesh Kola

Check Post. His truck No. BRL 1366 and Van BRL 2005 were found at Rameshwar on 7-12-66 wherefrom he smuggles foodgrains to West

Bengal. He purchases gram and gramdal through Gopal Mandal of Lakhisarai (District Monghyr) and smuggles them to West Bengal.

In the circumstances, the State Government are satisfied that if Shree Rameshwar Lal Patwari is allowed to remain at large, he will indulge in

activities prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. For prevention of such activities, the State Government

consider his detention necessary.

Were challenged as vague, uncertain, non-existing and irrelevant. Hon'ble Hidayatullah J. (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the Court

observed:-

Can we say that the detenu was supplied grounds which were not vague or indefinite or irrelevant or non-existing. The grounds are five in number.

Putting aside the first and fifth grounds for the time, we may refer to the second, third and fourth grounds first. The second ground says that his

truck always take to wicked routes to Saithia (West Bengal) and he himself pilots them."" This ground is extremely vague. It does not mention a

single instance of a truck taking a particular route so that the detenu could prove to the satisfaction of the Advisory Board that the statement was

false. In Bhim Sen For R.S. Malik Mathra Das and Others Vs. The State of Punjab, , the conduct of the black-marketeer was shown in an

appendix. Here no particulars are furnished and beyond denying the allegation, the detenu cannot make effective representation. The details could

not be such as were required to be concealed in the public interest u/s 7(2) of the Act. The third ground that ""a Businessman of Barahiya disclosed

that he (Rameshwar Lal Patwari) visited Barahiya on several occasions and purchased gram and gramdal under various names and smuggled them

to West Bengal"" is equally vague. Learned counsel for the State admitted that some details were necessary to give the detenu an opportunity. It is

obvious that without the names of shops, dates of purchases, etc. it is next to impossible to controvert such an allegation. The fourth ground speaks

of a pending case in which the appellant is said to be on bail. The grounds were furnished in July, 1967. The appellant was tried for the offence and

acquitted as far back as February, 1967. This ground discloses carelessness which is extremely disturbing. That the detaining authority does not

know that the appellant was tried and acquitted months before, and considers the pendency of the case against him as one of the grounds of

detention shows that due care and attention is not being paid to such serious matters as detention without trial. If the appellant was tried and

acquitted, Government was required to study the judgment of acquittal to discover whether all these allegations had any basis in fact or not. One

can understand the use of the case if the acquittal was technical but not when the case was held to be false. In any event, even if there was no need

to consider the result of the case the case could not be referred to as a pending case.

XX XX XX

XX XX XX

This means that anything wrong or even false may be stated in the grounds leaving the detenu to deny it and prove his version. The attempt to

cover up the mistake is as futile as it is disingenuous.

(10) This leaves over the first and fifth grounds. The first charges the appellant with black marketing of foodgrains in conjunction with certain

named persons. No facts are mentioned and this part of the ground is equally vague. No incident is cited except one. The ground goes on to say

that his trucks, jeep and car are registered in the names or his relatives. One such truck is mentioned, namely truck No. BRL 1331. It is said to be

registered in the name of his brother-in-law and it is further stated that it was caught on December 29, 1966 at Ranibahal (near Mashanjor) while

carrying 95 bags of paddy for illegal trade and that in this connection a case under the Essential Commodities Act has been instituted against him. It

is not clear who is meant, the appellant or his brother-in-law. In a notice from the District Supply Officer, Dumka it was stated:

It was learnt from your driver that on 29-11-66 (sic) at 3-50 a.m. ninety five bags of paddy (190 mds.) was coming from Rani-bahal to Dumka in

your truck BRL 1331 belonged to you.

xx xx xx

The alleged statement of the driver was accepted and it was assumed that the paddy was being taken to West Bengal at the least the explanation

of the persons concerned could have been obtained. This is clearly a case of jumping to a conclusion which is being lamely justified, when it is

questioned with written record. In these circumstances there is much reason to think that this ground probably did not exist although we are not in a

position to say that it is non-existing.

The fifth ground mentions that one Babu Bam Bikanaria wanted gram and gramdal at his Rice Mill at Saitha, District Birbhum (West Bengal) and

visiting Dumka contacted the appellant. The latter promised to supply gram and gramdal. On 7/8th December, 1968 one Mulchand Choudhry sent

truck No. BR] 2029 loaded with gram and gramdal to Saitha through Mahesh Kola checkpost Further Mulchand's truck No. BRL 1366 and Van

BRL 2005 were found at Rameshwar on December 7, 1966 from where 'he' smuggles foodgrains to West Bengal. He purchases gram and

gramdal through Gopal Mandal of Lakhisarai (Dist. Monghyr) and smuggles them to West Bengal. It is again not clear who this 'he' is.

xx xx xx

It appears that there may be suspicion that the appellant may be connected with some blackmarketing. We are not concerned with the sufficiency

or the reasonableness of (he grounds. In this case at least two grounds are vague, one ground is found to be false and of the remaining in one there

is no explanation and in the other there is a lame excuse that the driver of the truck did not furnish the full information. The case is thus covered by

our rulings that where some grounds are found to be non-existing or are cancelled or given up the detention cannot be justified. It is further covered

by our decisions that if the grounds are not sufficiently precise and do not furnish details for the purpose of making effective representation the

detention can be questioned.

In another case namely Motilal Jain Vs. State of Bihar and Others, where the following grounds;-

(a) On 10th March, 1967, he sold match boxes and soap to a shopkeeper of Purnea court compound at a price higher than that fixed for these

commodities and did not grant any receipt for the same.

(b) On 15th March, 1967, it transpired from one Satyanarain Prasad, a shopkeeper of Purnea Bus Stand, that he (Shri Motilal Jain) sold him

match boxes at Rs. 11 per gross which was Rs. 2 higher than the price fixed. This was also substantiated by Nagendra Rarnoli, a shopkeeper of

Purnea Court compound who had also been supplied match boxes at the higher rate by him (Shri Motilal Jain).

(c) On 15th April, 1967, it transpired from Chandradeb Sao Shankarlal Modi, and Sitaram Sah, all of Gulab Bagh that they got supplies of Sugar

and Maida from him in excess of the quantity allotted to them on ration cards at a price higher than those fixed by the Government.

(d) On 7th May, 1967, he sold Kerosene oil to one Kishun Bhagat of Gulab Bagh at Rs. 12 per tin (excluding cost of tin) which was higher than

the price fixed by the Government.

(e) On 4th July, 1967, he sold sugar at Rs. 2 per kg. to Shyamsunder Poddar and Jangli Singh of Dhamdaha. The price charged by him was much

higher than the rate fixed by the Government in this regard.

(f) On 7th August, 1967, it was learnt from Nathu Sah, Chanderdeb Sah. Kusumlal Sah, and Ram Ratan Sah, all of Gulab Bagh, that he (Shri

Motilal Jain) indulged in blackmarketing of Sugar, Maida, Kerosene oil and other controlled commodities, to deal in which he had obtained

licence. It was further learnt from Moti Sah, a worker of Gulab Bagh Navayubak Sangh that he (Shri Motilal Jain) obtained supplies of match

boxes, vegetable oil from West Bengal to sell them in black market.

fell for consideration of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, Hon'ble Hegde, J. speaking for the court observed:-

On an examination of facts set out in Clause (a) of the order, it is seen that the name of the shopkeeper to whom the appellant is said to have sold

match boxes and soap ""at a price higher than that fixed for these commodities"" is not mentioned. Neither the price fixed nor the price at which the

appellant is said to have sold the match boxes and soap, is mentioned. The futility of making representation against an unknown man in respect of

an unspecified price can easily be imagined. There was no opportunity to the appellant to satisfy the Advisory Board that the alleged purchaser is

fictitious figure or that he is an enemy of his or that the information given by him should otherwise be not accepted. As things stood the appellant

was left to attack a shadow. He could not also make any representation as regards the alleged sale or the price at which the goods were sold

excepting making a bare denial of the accusation made against him............................ Hence the ground set out in Clause (a) of the order of

September 27, 1967 is not only vague but also irrelevant............................

In Clause (d) of that order it is mentioned that the appellant sold kerosene oil to one Kishun Bhagat of Gulab Bagh at Rs. 12 per tin (excluding cost

of tin) which was higher than the price fixed by the Government. In his special leave application, among other things, the appellant asserted that

there is no person by the name of Kishun Bhagat in Gulab Bagh. In the reply filed on behalf of the respondent that allegation is accepted as

correct................................ Hence the ground mentioned in Clause (d) must be held to be non-existing................

The defects noticed in the two grounds mentioned above are sufficient to vitiate the order of detention impugned in these proceedings as it is not

possible to hold that those grounds could not have influenced the decision of the detaining authority. Individual liberty is a cherished right, one of

the most valuable fundamental rights guaranteed by our Constitution to the citizens of this country. If that right is invaded, excepting strictly in

accordance with law, the aggrieved party is entitled to appeal to the judicial power of the State for relief.

In AIR 1955 J&K 38 (FB) where the following grounds of detention-

(1) He who has since August 1953 changed his nationalist outlook to communal ideology with the change of the Government, which he has been

propagating since then, has since the middle of July 1954, on his arrival and stay at Srinagar at Kashmir Guest House, been organising subversive

elements and has intensified his objectionable activities detrimental to public order.

(2) He started his subversive activities at Srinagar on his arrival here by organising elements with the object of disturbing communal harmony, by

dissemination of false rumours and misrepresentation. In this connection he contacted and collaborated with Sadar-ud-din Majahid, Begum

Abdulla and other subversive elements.

(3) He has since then embarked upon programme for materialising the observance of 9-8-1954 as martyrs' day No. 2 as advocated by Pakistan in

her recently published pamphlet with the object of disturbing public peace and tranquillity in Kashmir valley by taking out processions, observance

of Hartals, raising of objectional slogans, etc.

(4) With the object as set forth above, after his arrival in Srinagar he contacted with persons of subversive character and convened meetings on

15th, 18th, 19th, 22nd, 27th and 28th of July, 1954 at Kashmir Guest House and Chashmashai; as a result of the active part played by him in that

behalf subversive elements got active and propagated his ideology. Consequently the campaign of rousing communal passions of people by post

and propaganda was revived.

(5) On one such meeting on 20-7-1954 at the shop of Ghulam Mustafa Bhat of Maisuma steps for furtherance of his objectives were discussed

and finalised.

(6) He has been having contacts with the enemy across the border for enlisting its help for accomplishment of his designs. In this connection on

16th Sawan 2011 corresponding to 31-7-1954 Abdul Rahim 2nd A.K. Battalion has been intercepted while coming over to contact him again to

negotiate details of such help after his previous contact.

(7) On 4-8-1954 he visited Mattan with the object of exploiting the situation where dispute between the Sikhs and Kashmiri Pandits over a piece

of land near the shrine was pending. In that connection he contacted some Muslims to align themselves with one of the contending parties to create

communal disorder.

were assailed as vague. Hon'ble Wazir, C.J. speaking on behalf of the court observed:-

The grounds which have been served on the detenu are far too vague to enable the detenu to meet them satisfactorily. They are merely allegations

made against the detenu and the bases of these allegations have not been disclosed and it was not possible for the detenu to make any effective

representation to the Government in regard to the grounds served on him and that being so the detention, in our opinion, is not justified.

In the first ground it is mentioned that the detenu has been organising subversive elements and had intensified his objectionable activities detrimental

to public order.

This is a general allegation and does not say what were the objectionable activities in which the detenu was taking part, where they were organized,

when they were organised and what was the effect of those activities. Ground No. 2 is also as vague as it can be.

An allegation is made against the detenu that he was disturbing the communal harmony by (sic) false rumours and misrepresentations. A question

can be asked as to what were the false rumours which were spread by the detenu and what kind of misrepresentations he had made. No

particulars were furnished in regard to these matters in the grounds.

Ground No. 3 deals with the programme which the detenu was chalking out in regard to the observance of 9-8-1954 as Martyrs' day No. 2. No

particulars in regard to this programme are given in the grounds. In ground No. 4 reference is made to the fact that the detenu contacted with

persons of subversive character and convened meetings on definite dates. It is not stated who were the persons whom the detenu met and what

was discussed in the meetings held on different dates.

Ground No. 5 is the same as ground No. 4 and in ground No. 6 it is stated that the detenu established contacts with enemy across the border. No

details are furnished in regard to the detenu's meeting with any enemy agent. In ground No. 7 it is stated that the detenu went to Mattan with the

object of exploiting the situation where dispute between the Sikhs and Kashmiri Pandits over a piece of land near the shrine was pending.

It is not stated as to how the detenu exploited the situation when he visited Mattan on the 4th August. The detenu has completely denied having

been to Mattan on the 4th August. He has stated that he went to Aish Mukam and not to Mattan on 4th August.

....................

....................

....................

In the case of the petitioner it is not clear as to what were the subversive activities which were being conducted by him on different dates in

Srinagar. The allegations made in paras 1 and 2 of the grounds are very sweeping and vague.

The Assistant Advocate-General has argued that the detenu had made a representation to the Government in respect of the grounds served on

him. Therefore the grounds could not be considered to be vague. This contention is without any force. The grounds served on the detenu have

been discussed in detail and we may say at once that the allegations are not free from vagueness. Nothing is said as to what the detenu was doing

to form an organization on communal lines; how he was creating communal hatred in the town and how he was organizing subversive activities.

The detenu could say nothing in regard to these grounds except deny them. If in the grounds details had been given as to the particular place and

the particular day he had made a speech or he had advised some people to take part in subversive activities the detenu would have been in a

position to give adequate proof of the fact that he was not present on that particular day or at a particular place where it is alleged that he made

such speeches or took part in subversive activities.

In the present case grounds Nos. 1 and 2 do not give any such details and in this event these grounds cannot be considered to be free from

vagueness. In Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj Vs. The State of Delhi and Others, , the Supreme Court had held that preventive detention is a serious

invasion of personal liberty and such meagre safeguards as the Constitution has provided against the improper exercise of the power must be

jealously watched and enforced by the Court.

In this case the grounds which have been supplied to the; detenu are vague, indefinite and not sufficient to enable him to make an effective

representation. We are satisfied that further detention of the petitioner is bad in law.

Let me now examine the grounds of detention furnished to the petitioner in the present case in the light of the tests and decisions referred to

above and see whether they fulfil the requirements of law and Constitution. Although it is doubtless that the District Magistrate has merely acted as

a post office in transmitting the report received by him from the Superintendent of Police without even tying to formulate the grounds and the same

lie in a confused mass in the form of order reproduced at pages 1 to 3 above, let me make an attempt to sift and analyse them and see if they can

stand the judicial scrutiny. The second paragraph of the order commencing with the words ""Sh. Mohammad Akbar Kichloo Advocate"" and ending

with the words ""on the same lines"" can be split up into five separate grounds. The first ground which is comprised of the first five lines of the

paragraph reads:-

Sh. Mohd. Akbar Kichloo Advocate s/o. Kh. Mohd. Khalil Kichloo r/o. Doda National Conference is instigating the students and youth

Federation to organise strikes, Dharna, meeting and processions simply to derive political capital out of it.

A cursory glance at this ground is enough to show that it is extremely vague. It does not give any particulars. It is not stated as to when, where

and how the petitioner instigated the students and the youth Federation.

The second ground runs as follows:

He all along remains with the students and addresses the meetings at various occasions thereby preaching violence openly.

This ground sadly lacks in details. Not a single instance in which the petitioner addressed the meeting of the students has been given. Manifestly

the words at various occasions are very vague. xx xx xx. It is not clear on what dates, at what times and at what places the petitioner addressed

the meetings. The words used by the detenu as indicative of his preaching violence have also not been stated.

The third ground is:-

He is further reported to be conducting secret meetings with the students and their supporters thereby instigating them to observe Hartal, stage

dharna and organise processions and meetings in order to create awlessness at Doda.

Here also the places where and the dates on which the secret meetings were held by the petitioner with the students and their supporters have not

been given nor have the names of the students and their supporters been specified. The words used by the petitioner from which it has been

deduced that he was instigating the students to observe Hartals, stage Dharnas, and organise processions and meetings in order to create

lawlessness, have also not been given.

The fourth ground is to the following effect:-

He is reported to have met the hunger strikers openly and at that occasion he encouraged them to continue their struggle and also exploited them

against the Government.

Apart from the fact that it has not been shown how in the existing democratic set up the exploitation of the Government can be said to be

objectionable, here too the ground suffers from vagueness. It does not give any details and does not specify the place where and the occasion or

the date on which the petitioner met the hunger strikers. The names and other particulars of the hunger strikers are also not mentioned. It also does

not state the actual words used by the petitioner to encourage the hunger strikers to continue their struggle. The nature of the struggle carried on by

the hunger strikers and the manner in which the petitioner exploited them against the Government have also not been specified.

The next ground is as follows:-

He once referred to Telangana in his speech and thereby instigating the students to carry on the agitation on the same lines.

This ground is equally vague and it also does not give any details. The date on which and the place at which he made a speech and referred to

Telangana have not been given. Neither the actual text of the speech nor the context in which Telangana was referred to by the petitioner has been

disclosed. There is no special charm about ""Telangana"" and mere reference to that region without details does not lead anywhere.

The last ground is as follows:-

He is reported usually starting his speeches with revolutionary couplet from Iqbal.

Here too no particulars have been given and the revolutionary couplet from Iqbal to which objection has been taken has not been quoted.

It is, therefore, evident that the grounds furnished to the petitioner were vague and incapable of being intelligently understood.

Furthermore, some of the grounds are self-contradictory. For instance whereas in the first ground it has been stated that the petitioner has been

instigating the students and youth federation to organise strikes, stage dharnas, meetings and processions simply to derive political capital out of it in

the third ground set out above, it is alleged that the petitioner instigated the students to observe Hartals, to stage Dharnas, to organise processions

and meetings in order to create lawlessness in Doda.

It is, therefore, crystal clear that the grounds supplied to the petitioner were vague and some of them are self-contradictory as well. The

petitioner could not in this state of affairs be therefore in position to say anything with regard to these grounds beyond denying them.

Now it is also well settled that even if one of the grounds is bad the detention is rendered invalid. Reference in this connection may be made to

a decision of the Supreme Court in Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj Vs. The State of Delhi and Others, where it was laid down that the constitutional

requirement that the grounds must not be vague must be satisfied with respect to each of the grounds communicated to the person detained subject

to the claim of the privilege under Cl. (6) of Article 22 of the Constitution, and where one of the grounds mentioned is vague, even though other

grounds are not vague the detention is not in accordance with the procedure established by law and is therefore illegal.

In another ruling Shibban Lal Saksena Vs. The State of Utter Pradesh and Others, where it was found that out of the two grounds served on

the detenu one was non-existent, the contention of the State that the detention of Shri Saksena should not be interfered with because one of the

two grounds mentioned in the order is a good ground was rejected by the Hon'ble Court with the observation that to say that the other ground

which still remains is quite sufficient to sustain the order would be to substitute an objective judicial test for the subjective decision of the executive

authority which is against the legislative policy underlying the statute and in such cases the position would be the same as if one of these two

grounds was irrelevant for the purpose of the Act or was wholly illusory and that would vitiate the detention order as a whole.

To the same effect are the observations made in Dwarka Dass Bhatia Vs. The State of Jammu and Kashmir, .

The learned Additional Advocate General has referred me to the decision of the Supreme Court Naresh Chandra Ganguli Vs. The State of

West Bengal and Others, where the following ground:

That you intend to proceed to Delhi on 9-10-58 and that you are likely to instigate plans which may adversely affect the personal security of the

Prime Minister of India.

which was attacked on the ground of vagueness was held not to be bad. But the Additional Advocate General seems to forget that in that case

their Lordships held the above ground not to suffer from the taint of vagueness as it related to something which was apprehended to be in the

contemplation of the detenu and from the nature of the fact that it was not an event which had already happened no further details of the plan could

possibly be disclosed. This ruling has there-tore no bearing on the present case.

In view of the above I am of the opinion that it was not possible for the petitioner to make a real and effective representation against his

detention to the Government which the latter was in view of the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Pankaj Kumar v. State of

West Bengal, AIR 1969 NSC 109 : (AIR 1970 SC 97) bound to consider itself. In the circumstances, the detention of the petitioner cannot be

held to be in accordance with the procedure established by law.

I, therefore, allow this application and direct that the petitioner be released forthwith.